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We are travellers on a cosmic journey, stardust, swirling  
and dancing in the eddies and whirlpools of infinity. Life is eternal.  
We have stopped for a moment to encounter each other, to meet, to love, to share.  
This is a precious moment. It is a little parenthesis in eternity.   
Adapted from Paulo Coelho, The Alchemist (1988) by Joëlle Stocker 
 
Sisi ni wasafiri katika safari ya cosmic, stardust, swir na densi katika eddies na whirlpools 
ya infinity. Maisha ni ya milele. Tumesimama kwa muda mfupi kukutana, kukutana, 




Είμαστε ταξιδιώτες σε ένα κοσμικό ταξίδι, στροβιλίζουμε και χορεύουμε στις στροφές και τις 
δίνες του άπειρου. Η ζωή είναι αιώνια. Σταματήσαμε για μια στιγμή να συναντήσουμε ο ένας 
τον άλλο, να αγαπήσουμε, να μοιραστούμε. Αυτή είναι μια μικρή παρένθεση στην αιωνιότητα. 
ንሕና  ብርሑቕ ኣብ ሰማይ እንዳወደቑ ዝራኣዩ ተወንጨፍቲ ከዋኽብቲ፣ ኣብ ውሽጢ መወዳእታ ዘይብሉ ማዕበልን ሕምብሊልታ 
ዋሕዝን ዝመልኦ ህዋ/ሃዋህ ወይ ድማ መወዳእታ ዘየብሎም እኩባት ከዋኽብቲ እንስዕስዕ፣ እንሽክርከርን ተጓዓዝቲ ኢና።  
ህወይት ዘአለማዊት እያ። ምእንታን ፊት ንፊት ክንረአአ፣ ክንራኸብ ክንፋቐርን ዘለና ክንወሃሃብን ጉዕዞና ንሓፂር እዋን ጠጠው 
ኣቢልና ኣሎና። እዚ ንዓና እቲ ኣዝዩ ዝኸበረ፣ ወርቃዊ ግዜን ህሞትን፤ ኣብ ውሽጢ መወዳታ ኣልቦነት ዝተኸስተ ንእሽቶ ደውታን 
እዩ።   
Singabahambi abasehambeni lokuhlosisa umhlaba, lezinto ezenzakala emhlabeni wonke 
jikelele. Impilo kayipheli njalo sime okwesikhatshana ukuthi sazane ngokujulileyo, 
sihlangane, sithandane lokuthi siyabelane ulwazi. Lesi yisikhathi esiligugu njalo 
kuyisiphumuzo esifitshazana empilweni enaphakade. 
Iri vafambi vari parwendo rwusingagumi. Muchamupupuri tinokwira nekudzika, 
tichitamba nekupeperetswa muirworwu rwendo rusina magumo. Upenyu 
iziendanakuenda, Tinomira pane rino pasi kwechinguvana. Kuti tisanganiswe nekuyanana, 
Kuti tidane nekugovana zvinokosha. Ndiyoyi nguva inokosha muupenyu. Chikamu 
cheziendanakuenda. 
עצרנו  .נצחיים החיים .האינסוף במערבולות ורוקדים נסחפים ,כוכבים אבק ,קוסמי במסע מטיילים אנו  
בנצח קטנים סוגריים .יקר רגע זהו .לחלוק ,לאהוב ,בזה זה לפגוש לרגע . 
للحظة توقفنا لقد .أبدية الحياة .الالنهاية دوامات في ونرقص نحوم ، نجوم غبار ، كونية رحلة في مسافرون نحن  
األبدية في صغيرة وهلة ثمينة، لحظة هذه .والمشاركة والحب للقاء ، البعض بعضنا لمالقاة .  
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Preface by Zaminah Malole 
 
The person who has not travelled widely thinks his mother is the only cook. 
Ugandan proverb 
 
This Ugandan proverb, which is known in many African languages, 
teaches human beings to move out of the known and go elsewhere. 
Migration is not always forced by the violence caused by nature or 
people – migrating and mobility is also about learning and broadening 
the mind. It is in the nature of people to move to different places. 
Mobility is a basic human right. It is a social necessity. Mobility helps 
economies and sustains livelihoods in arid lands.  
 
Migrants and refugees are often talked about, but rarely heard. As 
their voices are stifled, we know little about the circumstances of 
migrants or mobile communities and of those who have been forced 
to flee and lead lives as refugees. Today, in 2019, there are nearly 70 
million people around the world who have been forced from their 
homes. Among them are more than 25 million refugees, over half of 
whom are under 18. There are an estimated 10 million stateless 
people, who are denied nationality and, with it, access to basic rights 
such as education, health care, employment and freedom of 
movement. 
 
You will not read in this book about numbers, but about people and 
the different circumstances in which they migrate, for very different 
reasons, and with very different needs. Those who migrate often leave 
everything behind to jump into an unsure life. The Zimbabweans say: 
“A king’s child is a slave elsewhere”.  
 
We should prepare now for the solutions of tomorrow. Uganda has 
taken a positive approach towards migrants and refugees. In Uganda, 
we welcome newcomers and focus on how they can contribute 
positively to our country and economy. The integration of refugees 
and migrants into our communities has worked very well. As refugees 
and migrants have found that they are welcome, they have given back 
and we as a nation have benefited from what they have to offer. We 
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urge other countries to follow our example, to see the benefits that 
migrants bring and to demonstrate commitment towards the 
protection and integration of refugees.  
 
We invite the African continent to follow the Pan African spirit. We 
are one continent, really a continent without borders, in which we are 
guided by the spirit of ubuntu: as long as one person suffers, we all 
suffer. Migrants and refugees are our brothers and sisters. Many 
cannot go home because of conflict and persecution. Many live in 
perilous situations. We need to allow migrants and refugees to speak 
up, not stifle their voice; we need to support them so that they can 
find their feet and build up their lives, so that they can live in dignity 
and be part of our communities. 
 
The fear of exploitation and abuse is what undermines the 
entrepreneurial spirit of migrants and refugees. We need to establish 
solid frameworks to support them, make sure they are protected by 
the rule of law and that their safety and security is not undermined. 
Africa can set an example for the world by applying common sense 
that is good for the wellbeing of migrants and refugees and that 
benefits our nations. To achieve this, we need to think of migration 
and mobility as a natural way of life, which has existed as long as we 
can remember and which has benefited all our people. A way of life 
for which we are prepared and have the knowledge and experience to 
handle within our communities. A Maasai proverb says: “If a stranger 
comes to stay with you, do not forget when you lay aside his weapons 
that he is hungry”. 
 
Africa has the wisdom and experience to lead the world towards a 
sensible approach in which migrants and refugees are not despised, 
but welcomed, according to African hospitality and traditions of 
building peace among and between our communities. 
 
H.E. Zaminah Malole 
Member of the Commission of Equal Opportunities 
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This book brings together studies from different regions in Africa and 
Europe. Our common interest was researching mobility as a social 
phenomenon in a specific context. Concerned that dominant push-
pull theories do not describe the varied realities in which people make 
decisions, we sought to investigate alternative theoretical frameworks. 
In order to succeed, it was necessary to collaborate with partners with 
vastly different perspectives embedded in specific local realities. 
 
Consequently, this book is the result of collaboration between Great 
Zimbabwe University, Mekelle University, Pan African University in 
Adua and Axum University, Tangaza University, Mbarara University, 
Mekelle University, Kampala International University, Tilburg 
University, and University of Leiden, as well as colleagues working 
within other universities in Africa, especially Somalia, Niger and 
Sudan. Prof. Dr Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher was the Chairperson 
of the Editorial Committee and together with Prof. Dr Munyaradzi 
Mawere reviewed the chapters in a double-blind peer review. The 
academic standard was set by Prof. Dr Mirjam Van Reisen and Dr 
Mia Stokmans, who also provided academic support to the authors, 
and upheld by Prof. Dr Gebre-Egziabher and Prof. Dr Maware 
during the peer review. Susan Sellars-Shrestha was responsible for the 
copyediting of this book, Rick Schoenmaeckers for editorial 
coordination, and Klara Smits and Kristína Melicherová for editorial 
support. 
 
We would like to thank NUFFIC (the Dutch organisation for 
internationalisation in education), the Netherlands Organisation for 
Scientific Research (NWO), Science for Global Development 
(WOTRO) and other funding organisations for the support provided 
to the research published in this book. The content is solely the 
responsibility of the authors and the Editorial Committee. 
 
Prof. Dr Mirjam Van Reisen 




A Word on the Review Procedure  
 
All chapters in this book were subjected to an extensive review 
process. In the first phase, the chapters were reviewed by the 
executive editorial team (Professor Dr Van Reisen and Associate 
Professor Dr Stokmans), who contributed to the topics covered and 
provided scientific and innovative input. The executive editorial team 
then provided all chapters that were preliminary accepted with 
specific comments and recommendations to improve the chapters. 
Some young researchers were extensively coached during this phase.  
 
In the second phase, the adjusted drafts of all accepted chapters were 
copyedited by Susan Sellars-Shrestha, who also reviewed the chapters 
for structure, coherence, comprehension, flow and the like. In the 
third phase, all chapters were double-blind peer reviewed by two 
reviewers (Professor Dr Mawere and Professor Dr Gebre-
Egziabher), with the assistance of a third peer reviewer (Dr Nulagala) 
for chapters provided by a member of the peer review team. These 
reviewers did not evaluate the chapters in the first phase. The authors 
did not know who the reviewers were, and the reviewers were not 
informed of the identity of the authors, as all references to authors 
were removed. The process was handled by the editorial coordinator 
(Rick Schoenmaeckers). Comments received were communicated to 
the authors who responded to the comments by making adjustments 
to the chapters.  
 
In the fourth phase, the adjusted draft chapters were reviewed for the 
last time by the executive editorial team and moved for final approval 
by the entire editorial team, who considered sensitive issues and any 
remaining lack of clarity. All of the chapters included in this book are, 
therefore, the joint responsibility of the four editors in the Editorial 
Committee, and based on a rigorous double-blind peer review 
process. The final decisions about the inclusion of the chapters and 
printing of the book were taken by Professor Dr Gebre-Egziabher, 
who served as the chair of the Editorial Committee. The publishing 
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A Social Analysis of Migration and Resilience 
 
Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Munyaradzi Mawere & 
Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher 
 
Introduction 
‘Africa Roaming’ is an advertisement for a mobile phone provider; 
the picture shows an African 
herdsman in traditional 
clothing with a stick standing 
in front of his herd texting on 
a mobile phone. The 
advertisement implies that 
the mobile phone allows him 
to stay connected while he 
moves around. It is a pivotal 
image showing the meeting 
of modern technology with 
traditional ways of life. The 
image alludes to the 
pervasiveness of digital 
technology – which is 
embraced even by traditional 
pastoralists, who have often 
proudly rejected 
modernisation and 
technology to preserve their 
identity and way of life. And, 
pervasive it is: “Safaricom is 
like that loyal girlfriend or 
boyfriend who texts all the 
time” (Mwangi, 2017).  
Current approaches to migration are 
mainly based on the ‘push-pull’ theory of 
migration, which fails to explain the 
complexity and multifaceted situations of 
people on the move. This theory is 
premised primarily on economic 
considerations and oversimplifies how 
decisions are made, leading to policies 
that are misguided at best and harmful 
at worst. Alternatives are needed to 
understand why and how people move, 
and whether this contributes to resilience 
or undermines it. Social theory provides a 
useful lens, acknowledging that within 
the specificity of each situation a better 
understanding of motivations, dynamics 
and drivers can be obtained. This book 
aims to bring African voices to the fore, 
working with researchers close to ground 
realities in Africa, to explain why people 
in Africa are on the move and provide 
alternative approaches to setting agendas 
on this issue. 
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The most influential innovation of the 21st Century is arguably the 
global digital architecture. Much of this technology, most of it 
originating from Europe and the US, has been embraced in Africa, 
leapfrogging the continent into the 21st Century and requiring it to 
adapt this architecture to its own structures, systems and contexts 
(Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). 
 
Information communication technology (ICT) is facilitating mobile 
communication. It goes hand-in-hand with mobility – movement of 
all sorts. Mobility is the oldest of human ways of living. It is associated 
with the traditional livelihoods of pastoralist communities, such as the 
Afar. Mobility has offered the Afar their livelihood and resilience 
across three countries – Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea – although 
their lifestyle is undermined by the current borders resulting from the 
French and Italian colonial presence in the Horn of Africa (Chapter 
5, Mobility as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of 
Afar Region, by Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen). The artificially 
introduced African borders, which cut through communities that 
belong together, pose specific challenges (Chapter 4, Continuation of 
Care across Borders: Providing Health Care for People on the Move in East 
Africa, by Dorothy Muroki, Boniface Kitungulu & Leanne Kamau), 
however, digital solutions have the potential to bring such split 
systems together.  
 
Mobility, in the form of migrating communities, is also associated 
with the colonial policy of integrating Africans originating from one 
place as soldiers to fight in other places, or introducing them as 
migrant labourers or slave labourers in various colonial programmes. 
This is the origin of the Nairobi slum, Kibera, meaning ‘forest’, where 
Nubi people remained after having served the British colonial 
government (De Smedt, 2011). Another example is the Nairobi slum 
area of Eastleigh, which was founded as a township for Somalis who 
had moved to the Ngara plains; Eastleigh was established as a separate 
area in response to the segregation policy of the British colonial 
government and the inhabitants, till today suffer discrimination, 
hardship and marginalisation (Chapter 9, Countering Radicalisation in 
Communities: The Case of Pumwani, Nairobi, by Reginald Nalugala). 
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Mobility is often associated with conflict and returnees from conflict, 
such as the children abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Northern Uganda, who returned as adults suffering from serious 
trauma (Chapter 15, Life after the Lord’s Resistance Army: Support for 
Formerly Abducted Girls in Northern Uganda, by Primrose Nakazibwe & 
Mirjam Van Reisen). Mobility may include returning to the original 
home, but this is sometimes unrealistic and can be a source of new 
problems (Chapter 13, Home, but not Home: Reintegration of Ethiopian 
Women Returning from the Arabian Gulf, by Beza L. Nisrane). Due to the 
many different realities of people on the move, it follows that there is 
a need for diversified and localised approaches to researching 
mobility on the African continent.  
 
Recent terminology, such as ‘irregular migration’ or ‘mixed migration’ 
have created container concepts for people on the move.1 This 
creates a problem, as the specific circumstances of people with 
different experiences are not described by such container concepts. 
The danger is that the use of such concepts obscures the realities that 
inform or prompt people to move. This terminology also generalises 
the various and widely different realities and experiences of migration 
within overarching umbrella concepts that conceal specificity and 
uniqueness. The danger is that necessary distinctions can no longer 
be made, leading to overgeneralisations and a lack of understanding 
of mobility in specific situations. In this way, the cultural and 
contextual understanding of mobility on the continent is undermined 
(Mawere, Van Reisen & Van Stam, 2019). Rather than providing 
insight into the various modes of mobility across the continent, the 
use of container concepts frames migration as a negative ‘problem’, 
appearing as such on policy agendas (Smits & Karagianni, 2019). The 
framing of ‘migration’ as a problem impacts on people on the ground, 
creating new realities, which can undermine their resilience (Crowther 
& Plaut, 2019). Increased mobility, often facilitated in one form or 
 
1 The concept of ‘irregular migration’ refers to migration that does not fall into 
regulated streams and ‘mixed migration’ refers to large flows of migration in which 
movements are made across similar routes for different purposes (e.g., to escape 
conflict or find work). 
6 
 
another by ICTs, coined as ‘migration’, is increasingly being seen as a 
potential security threat (Mawere, 2019).  
 
In this book Roaming Africa: Migration, Resilience and Social Protection, 
which is the second in a four-part series called Connected and Mobile: 
Migration and Human Trafficking in Africa, the use of container terms is 
avoided for the reasons given above, and we have done our best to 
use clear and accessible language that allows precise descriptions and 
understanding. In order to promote a clear framework for discussing 
migration and human trafficking, in this book, we adhere to a strictly 
legal interpretation of the terms, as defined by international 
frameworks referring to migrants and refugees (United Nations 
General Assembly, 2016), or refugees, returnees and internally 
displaced persons (African Union, 2019). Under international law, a 
refugee is defined as a person who: 
 
…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country. (Article 1, 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto)  
 
In addition, Article 1 of the Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) recognises this 
definition and expands it to include persons who flee their country 
“owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or 
events seriously disturbing public order” (Organization of African 
Unity, 1969) to cover the specific aspects of refugee problems in 
Africa at the time of decolonisation. The United Nations provides a 
consensus on the definition of an international migrant as “someone 
who changes his or her country of residence, with a distinction made 
between short-term or temporary migration and permanent 
migration” (United Nations Secretary-General, 2016, p. 4). 
 
This chapter aims to give an introduction to the book and an 
overview and justification of the theoretical lenses and 
methodological approaches used in the research reported. In the next 
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section, the purpose of the book is set out. In the subsequent section, 
the core approach used by the authors of the chapters in this series 
to study migration from a social science perspective is explained. The 
section that follows describes the different conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks used in the book – the theory of planned behaviour, 
cultural entropy, agenda-setting, resilience and social protection. A 
brief description of the mixed-method approach applied in the 
research for the chapters is then given. The last section contains an 
overview of the structure and chapters presented in this book.  
The problem with migration studies 
So, why is this book – and this series – necessary? The field of 
migration studies enjoys considerable interest at present, but what 
contribution do the authors expect this book to make to the field? 
Firstly, the origin of this book is frustration with the 
(macro)economic approach to migration, such as the ‘push-pull’ 
theory of migration, which is used as the dominant frame through 
which to view any movement from Africa to other places. The 
(macro)economic approach is almost uncontested and assumed by 
many to perfectly represent reality. The use of this theory seems to 
be motivated by (unconscious) political paradigms, instead of solid 
scientific paradigms. This series intends to explore this theory and 
propose alternatives that are better suited to explain the movement 
of people from Africa to other places. 
 
The experience of the authors who contributed to this book is that 
the situations of people on the move are complex and multifaceted. 
They have observed many policies on migration misfiring and seen 
valuable financial, political and executive resources being spent with 
little hope of resolving the issues at hand. The research on which 
these chapters is based emerges from close collaboration between the 
Great Zimbabwe University (Zimbabwe), Mbarara University 
(Uganda), Tangaza University (Kenya), and Mekelle University 
(Ethiopia). Research was also conducted in other countries, including 
Sudan and Niger. The expectation is that more in-depth 
understanding will be derived if research problems are defined from 
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a social science perspective (social psychology, sociology, and 
economics) and if research is conducted in greater proximity to the 
actual situations being studied and with the involvement of 
researchers who are close to the realities being investigated.  
 
Secondly, emanating particularly from Europe, the term ‘migration’ 
has been identified not just as a phenomenon, but as a (potential) 
societal danger that needs to be controlled. In the last decade, a range 
of new policy measures have been put in place, mostly by the 
European Union (EU), to mitigate this phenomenon (Smits & 
Karagianni, 2019; Crowther & Plaut, 2019). These measures are often 
the result of, what Munyaradzi Mawere calls, ‘copy-paste’ policies 
from Europe to Africa (Mawere, 2019). These measures respond to 
problems identified from a European perspective with measures that 
fit with European ideas of what the world looks like. In this world 
view, migration is defined as a security threat that should be curbed 
at all cost. Proposed solutions suffer from Eurocentricity by 
emphasizing the Westphalian model of the state as the main 
mechanism for addressing the problem. However, the African reality 
on African soil unfolds quite differently. In fact, in Africa, mobility is 
crucial for sustainable livelihoods. The ways of addressing mobility 
across the continent are more complex and multi-layered, involving a 
mix of regional, devolved, and traditional, as well as centrally-led 
leadership (Mawere, 2019). Hence, the interaction between European 
policy production and changing realities in Africa is a relevant topic 
of investigation. 
 
Eurocentric policies introduced on the African continent are largely 
derived from the functionalist theories of ‘push and pull’, or 
variations of thereof. The push-pull theory sets the understanding of 
migration in a framework of push factors that encourage people to 
move away from one place and pull factors that attract them to 
another place (Castles, De Haas & Miller, 2011). These factors are 
derived from the functionality of certain benefits and the theory 
follows an economic model that assumes that people are attracted 
from a place with lesser benefits to a place with more benefits. In all 
of the various ways in which people migrate, digital connectivity is a 
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crucial enabler and ‘navigating’ tool. A naïve observer may expect that 
the combination of digital connectivity and physical mobility (from 
places of lesser benefits to places of larger benefits) will bring social 
and economic opportunities and that it is naturally beneficial to 
society. In this book, we show that this assumption needs critical 
scholarly consideration. Judgements about the benefits and returns of 
migration are contextual and subjective, and cannot be generalised 
across situations. 
 
Thirdly, a critical review of the push-pull theory leads to its positivist 
roots, which explain that the theory relies heavily on the outside 
judgement of costs and benefits to clarify the rationales for people’s 
movements. This frame, constructed from an outsider’s perspective, 
needs to be confronted by analysis based on an insider’s perspective 
that sets out what motivations people have to explain their own 
mobility (Chapter 3, Why do Foreign Solutions not Work in Africa? 
Recognising Alternate Epistemologies, by Gertjan Van Stam). There is a 
sense that African issues are too often approached from an outsiders’ 
frame of reference, based on assumptions that may not apply in an 
African context, or are at least in need of questioning. In a message 
circulating on social media, an African middle-aged man with a long 
beard and piercing eyes expresses his frustration that everything that 
is consumed in Africa comes from a foreign place – including 
perspectives on what drives people and why. This, in his opinion, is 
also the case in relation to mobility. He expresses bitter frustration 
with the inequality and injustice experienced and how mobility 
favours the rich and punishes the poor: “We have passports that don’t 
give us access to other countries. They get access to our countries, 
but we don’t get access to their countries” (PN, personal 
communication to Mirjam Van Reisen, by video on social media, 10 
July 2019). “Is this freedom?”, he asks. He points out that Africa 
works on the basis of ubuntu, “I am because you are” and that thinking 
on Africa needs to be grounded in African philosophy. Applying an 
ethnographic social science-based approach, Kidane & Stokmans 
(2019) question the suitability of the push-pull theory to adequately 
define mobility, and demonstrate that social theories provide a more 
suitable, locally-relevant, explanatory framework that is deducted 
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from the perceptions of the participants. Hence, they argue that there 
is a need for alternative theoretical approaches to explain migratory 
patterns in the digital world from the experience and interpretation 
of people on the move. 
 
This book illustrates that mobility patterns are part of varied realities 
in a large continent leading to different outcomes in a specific context. 
In order to gain a thorough understanding of movements, it is 
important to explore different migratory groups (refugees, migrants, 
returnees and even tourists), as well as different situations on the 
ground. This allows investigators to compare and understand the 
situational factors that contribute to the movement of certain groups. 
The book, therefore, presents a wide spectrum of experiences with 
migration, including the human trafficking of migrants and refugees, 
investigated within their concrete situations. This inside approach 
focusing on the experiences and perceptions of the people involved 
is necessary to take into account the peculiarities of different contexts 
and to avoid overgeneralisation in this sensitive field. 
 
The purpose of most research is to diligently and faithfully describe 
situations and establish reasoned explanations. It is important that 
research participants recognise themselves in the findings. This points 
to the need for ecological validity. Studies need to include theoretical 
frameworks tested within African reality, by African researchers, and 
with African explanatory frameworks, in order to obtain 
understanding derived from as close to the natural setting as possible. 
The approach of the research presented in this book and subsequent 
volumes is, therefore, purposefully empirical, set in a theoretical 
questioning of findings and using an explicit ethnographic mixed 
method approach. Many of the researchers involved come from 
Africa, work in African universities and were involved in 
collaborations with European researchers to maximise the relevance 
of the research approach to the setting at hand. We believe that such 
a collaborative methodology gives alternative and new insights into 
the experience of mobility on the African continent and that such an 





The book is part of a series called Connected and Mobile: Migration and 
Human Trafficking in Africa, which aims to make an ethnographic 
contribution to migration research. The first book, Human Trafficking 
and Trauma in the Digital Era: The Ongoing Tragedy of the Trade in Refugees 
from Eritrea (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017), took an ethnographic 
approach following the trajectory of one highly mobile group across 
several countries. This book, Roaming Africa: Migration, Resilience and 
Social Protection locates mobility in various environments, in order to 
give a nuanced and detailed overview of the diversity of migration in 
Africa, emphasising the differences between particular places within 
countries, in border areas and across countries. This book presents a 
wide range of case studies, which provide a broad exploration of the 
different phenomena related to mobility and migration and their 
manifestations within the extended availability of digital technology. 
It looks at mobility as part of strategies for building resilience by 
strengthening livelihoods in a variety of African places. 
 
The third book, Mobile Africa: Human Trafficking and the Digital Divide, 
looks at the ‘new’ phenomenon of mobility in trajectories across 
multiple countries, with a focus on the transaction process of 
migration, with mobility as a scarce resource that needs to be paid for 
through agents, facilitators and criminal organisations. This book 
places particular emphasis on the role of gatekeepers in online and 
offline information streams, who influence the mobility of people on 
these trajectories.  
 
The fourth book, Digital Human Trafficking in Africa, zooms in on one 
region, North Africa, and investigates how the digital architecture 
produces places that can be referred to as ‘black holes’, which are 
unconnected and in which the ‘gated’ are entirely dependent on 
‘gatekeepers’ for information. This book investigates how extremely 
unequal access to information in the digital environment produces 
extreme situations of displacement, dehumanisation and trafficking 
in persons.  
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A social analysis of migration  
This book studies mobility in Africa in the digital era as a social 
process that unfolds in specific situations from the interaction 
between different people. It firmly illustrates that a decision to 
migrate is not an idiosyncratic decision in which a person rationally 
evaluates the assumed push and pull factors. In the book Thinking, 
Fast and Slow, Kahneman (2012) points out that decision making is 
never a rational process. Moreover, decisions are taken in specific 
situations, in which people have a cultural and historical legacy, have 
specific experiences, and live in a specific community, all of which 
influence their emotions, their attitudes, the social norms they adhere 
to, and what they think they can or should do. Hence, the social 
context affects the decision to migrate.  
 
There are a lot of opinions about migration. This book chooses to 
investigate migration on a strictly empirical basis, allowing the data to 
speak for itself so that it can contribute to a fresh understanding of 
the mobility of people. In each of the situations researched and 
presented, the authors present empirical material that speaks to the 
particular situation. For the analysis of the data, the authors use 
conceptual frameworks of abstract social theories to provide a lens 
through which the information can be structured, analysed and 
interpreted. Nonetheless, we found the usefulness of theoretical 
concepts to differ significantly between contexts, due to people’s 
cultural and historical legacy; their values, beliefs, and experiences; as 
well as their perceptions of opportunities and threats in the 
environment. Consequently, these theories only provide a starting 
point from which to approach the research problem, but are not 
regarded as a straitjacket into which the data collection or analyses are 
forced. This perspective can be implemented by using a convergent 
design of mixed method studies in which a qualitative emic (insider) 
perspective is combined with a quantitative epic (outsider) 
perspective (Creswell & Clark, 2018). In such a design, the data 
provided by the participants are as important as the theoretical 
concepts, and the role of the researcher is to let both the data and 




In this book, different conceptual frameworks from the social 
sciences are used as a preliminary lens through which to approach the 
research problem(s) being investigated. Three major theoretical 
approaches are used. First of all, the theory of planned behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1991) is employed to try and understand what motivates 
individuals to migrate. The concept of cultural entropy (Stokmans, 
Van Reisen & Landa, 2018), which refers to the difference in the value 
system of an individual and his/her perception of the value system of 
the social network or community the individual is active in, is also 
used to explain how values and perceptions influence migration. This 
is a useful concept for examining the differences in the value systems 
used by the different stakeholders who are involved in the 
formulating and designing of migration policies at both national and 
international levels. The third framework is the multiple streams 
model of Kingdon (1984), which zooms in on the framing of 
problems in agenda setting and the role of different actors in that 
process. Finally, we consider the concept of resilience as a measure 
of the degree to which people perceive that they can participate in 
society and contribute to common goals. These theoretical 
frameworks are discussed in the ensuing section. 
Theory of planned behaviour 
Icek Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behaviour is a widely-accepted 
and frequently-used socio-psychological model for studying the 
antecedents of behaviour (see Manstead & Parker, 1995; Armitage & 
Conner, 2001). The theory holds that the beliefs of people about their 
situation and in relation to other social groups are central to 
understanding the decisions they make in their life situations. These 
beliefs also shape the movement (or intended movement) of people 
or groups of people, such as refugees, migrants and returnees. The 
theory identifies three antecedents of behaviour: 1) the personal 
attitude of the migrating person, which entails his/her beliefs about 
the instrumental and hedonic benefits or discomforts of migration; 2) 
the social or subjective norms, which refers to the social pressure by 
relevant others in the social network of a migrant to migrate, in other 
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words, the social approval or disapproval of migration; and 3) the 
perceived behavioural control, which refers to the perceived capacity 
of someone to migrate and focuses on knowledge, resources, 
opportunities and threats of migration, as viewed by the migrant. The 
perceived behavioural control resembles the self-efficacy construct of 
Bandura (1977, 1982), which refers to the belief of an individual that 
he/she can implement the decision at hand successfully. The theory 
of planned behaviour, thus, assumes that background variables, such 
as socio-economic background and educational level, have an indirect 
effect on migration (intention) via attitude, social norms and 
perceived behavioural control (Ajzen, 1991). Unfortunately, the 
theory of planned behaviour has not been specifically used to study 
migration in the African context, although it could shed light on the 
decision of refugees, migrants, returnees and tourists to move from 
one place to another. 
 
Within the context of migration in Africa, attitude (the beliefs of the 
individual) and social norms (social approval or disapproval of 
migration) are affected by historical and cultural beliefs relevant to 
those particular migration situations. People – either as individuals or 
a community – have a culturally-defined perception of what 
constitutes rights. The concept of a human rights culture (Rorty, 
1993) implies that rights can only be demanded, advocated for, 
accessed or realised if the social situation recognises those rights as 
rights. Within a specific community, the beliefs about human rights 
may or may not be coherent. If they do coincide, the attitude and the 
social norms give the same impulse towards the decision to migrate. 
For instance, there is widespread consensus that victims of war 
should be able to seek protection as refugees. In instances where the 
perceptions of rights do not correspond, a person faces an internal 
struggle to decide what to do: follow what you regard as your right or 
comply with the opinion of the relevant others, who may have the 
power to enforce their perspective. For example, in the case of 
Eritrea, the authorities argue that the obligation of citizens is to serve 
the country, whereas a large number of citizens have decided to 
escape what they consider to be inhumane treatment and crimes 
against humanity (Chapter 18, Where is your Brother? Religious Leaders in 
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Eritrea Offer a Counter Narrative to Totalitarianism, by Makeda Saba). The 
concept of a human rights culture can help us to consider such 
situations. The concept is not only relevant to analyse situations 
within a community, but also to reflect on particular situations where 
a migrant or refugee is directly or indirectly confronted with a 
different human rights culture that involves them. Understood in this 
way, the concept is central in this book, as it helps us to investigate 
social norms as they manifest in the movement of people. 
 
The third factor in Ajzen’s theory of planned behaviour is the 
construct of perceived behavioural control. This concerns people’s 
personal judgment, regardless of their objective competence, to 
accomplish the behaviour. It is not an objective characteristic. If 
people hear success stories about the migration of others, these 
stories can affect their attitude to migration, as they are informed 
about the benefits and losses of migration. But it also affects their 
perceived behavioural control; it evokes the idea that if other people 
can do it, I can also do it (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). The believed 
success of migration probably has a strong influence on perceived 
behavioural control or self-efficacy, as it is difficult for people to 
exactly imagine what resources and knowledge are needed in such a 
complex journey and what suffering may be part of it. In such 
instances, people often rely on stories about the success of others to 
get an idea of their chances of success (De Vries, 1992). In this way, 
an assessment of the attainability of migration can be made without 
consideration of the lack of own resources and knowledge to 
accomplish the journey.  
 
Ajzen’s theory of planned behaviour assumes that all three 
antecedents have a positive effect on the intention to migrate and, 
consequently, on the motivation to start and accomplish a migration 
trajectory. In most applications of the theory of planned behaviour, 
behavioural intention plays an important role as an intermediate 
construct (Armitage & Conner, 2001). In the case of migration, we 
expect this also to be the case, as refugees and migrants are often not 
aware of the barriers and dangers they may encounter to start and 
accomplish a migration trajectory. In other words, refugees and 
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migrants do not have a realistic perception of their behavioural 
control. People may move because they feel it is a good idea (based 
on their attitude and/or social norms) or to escape a miserable 
situation, without rationally considering the instrumental benefits of 
migration. It may be just a flight – a move forward to get out of a 
miserable situation – without consideration of what is next. 
 
Lack of awareness of the barriers and (possible) dangers that may be 
encountered indicates that people do not always base their decision 
to migrate on exact and conscious arguments or beliefs. The decision 
to migrate can also be triggered by negative feelings associated with 
the person’s current situation. These feelings can be regarded as 
information (Schwarz, 2011) or cues that directly, as well as indirectly, 
affect the decision-making process (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; 
Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). These feelings can 
be so strong that they blind refugees and migrants from considering 
their options calmly and coming to a rational decision. Moreover, 
research (see for example, Kahneman, 2012; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2011) indicates that feelings triggered by a situation, or 
as a part of the mood of a person (in the case of trauma), have a 
strong impact on their first immediate reaction, which can lead them 
to take a particular approach to a life situation. If positive feelings 
dominate, one is in a ‘winning mood’ and there can be avoidance of 
an ill-advised situation; if negative feelings dominate, the person may 
be focused on leaving this negative situation without fully considering 
the facts and possible consequences. The feelings may further impact 
on the person’s beliefs, which may be triggered to back up or 
counteract this primary affective response. Kahneman (2012) 
illustrates that an affective reaction takes very little effort and that the 
affective response always has an impact on an immediate decision. 
Only if a person feels the necessity to calmly reflect on the decision, 
for instance, because the considered decision is not in line with social 
norms, or because one has to account for the decision, than the 
person activates opinions and beliefs (attitudes, social norms and 
control beliefs) to counteract or back up this first immediate affective 
response (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). This points to the need 
to add a fourth antecedent to the theory of planned behaviour, 
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namely, the affective feelings an individual has in the current decision 
situation. In the case of trauma, for example, strong negative feelings 
associated with trauma (affecting the mood of a person) are dominant 
and can trigger a flight, fight or freeze reaction. Furthermore, the 
trauma can impair a person’s ability to deliberately consider attitudes, 
social norms and self-efficacy. In the studies presented in this book, 
the affective response is included in the theory of planned behaviour, 
referenced to Schwarz (2011) and Kahneman (2012). 
Cultural entropy 
In discussing attitudes and social norms as part of the theory of 
planned behaviour in the African context of migration, we have 
already mentioned that the human rights culture may differ between 
different stakeholders in a migration situation. Stokmans et al. (2018) 
also mention that if the beliefs of an individual about his/her human 
rights do not coincide with the perceived beliefs of other members of 
the community or stakeholders in the migration process, the person 
experiences stress due to the contradicting values. The clash of values 
in a system is what is called cultural entropy. This concept was first 
introduced by Barrett (2010; 2013) to monitor organisational change, 
which often goes along with a change in the values underlying the 
management of work processes. In this context, Barrett (2013) makes 
an explicit distinction between the values an individual sees as 
important for him/herself and the values that he/she regards as 
important (leading principle) by a social group (organisation, 
community or relevant others). The concept was validated by 
Stokmans et al. (2018) in the context of organisational change and by 
Mubaya (forthcoming, 2019) in the African policy context of heritage 
conservation.  
 
Barrett (2013, p. 3) states that values are “a shorthand method of 
describing what is important to us individually or collectively at any 
given moment in time”. Values are, therefore, universal in that they 
transcend a specific context (and time) (Barrett, 2013, p. 3). However, 
Rorty (1993) claims that human rights values are always held in 
relation to a specific community and, therefore, not universal; the 
human rights values of a stakeholder can differ according to the group 
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of persons they pertain to, such as refugees or migrants from a 
specific region. This indicates that cultural entropy is situation 
specific. In consequence, not all values a person holds, are equally 
important in terms of prescribing social behaviour or decision making 
in a specific situation. Therefore, it is believed that values are ordered 
according to their priority with respect to other values in a tiered 
system. An individual may adhere to a value system in a certain 
context, which may not necessarily overlap with the value system the 
individual ascribes to as part of a social group, community, 
organisation or authority, which will then result in cultural entropy. 
This cultural entropy may also occur with regards to the human rights 
values that different stakeholders in the migration process hold in 
relation to the target group. 
 
According to Barrett, misalignment of a personal value system and 
the value system attributed to others in the social situation of interest 
undermines effective behaviour. When this happens, the preferred 
mode of conduct of an individual triggered by their personal value 
system does not correspond to the mode of conduct signified by 
relevant others. In this case, a person can be obliged to do something 
that is not the best option or decision in the situation, as it is either in 
conflict with their personal value system or the stakeholders’ value 
system. People experience this as frustrating. The result is that a 
person has to invest more energy to get the job done and that the job 
provides the person with less energy (less satisfaction, relevance or 
meaning). The findings of Stokmans et al. (2018) and Mubaya 
(forthcoming, 2019) confirm this. This difference in energy is called 
‘cultural entropy’, as it is caused by factors (such as values) that are 
believed to be at the base of the culture of a community (Barrett, 
2010; 2013).  
 
In the area of migration, the differences in values can be situated 
between the different stakeholders involved. Cultural entropy can 
pertain to the difference in the values of an individual and those of 
the social network or community the individual is active in. But it can 
also be useful for studying the different perspectives on migration 
held by different stakeholders. Different stakeholders, such as 
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policymakers who operate at different levels of government, have 
their own objectives and corresponding human rights values, based 
on which they formulate and design their migration policies. If 
different parts of administrations and organisations make use of 
different value systems in the formulation of their respective 
migration policies, migration policies may be contradictory. This 
results in migration policies that are less effective than when cultural 
entropy is low or zero. The consequence is that more energy and 
more forceful authority and control is required for the 
implementation of such policies. Policies in situations of high cultural 
entropy are, therefore, more costly in financial, political and executive 
terms.  
Multiple streams model 
Some of the research conducted for this book investigated how 
authorities play a role in situations where there is an intention to 
impact on the movement of people. Such intentions can be studied 
by analysing the process of agenda-setting in public policy. Kingdon 
(1984) explains agenda-setting as a social process in which he 
distinguishes three separate streams: 1) the problem stream is the 
stream of potential problems to be addressed in a public agenda, 2) 
the policy stream is the stream of possible ways to address these 
problems, and 3) the political stream is the stream of political 
priorities. Kingdon’s main question is: “how will new ideas enter a 
public policy agenda?” He proposes the concept of a ‘policy window’, 
which is a moment in time when a window opens for new items to 
be moved on to the agenda. This happens when the three streams 
come together. The opening of a policy window can be triggered by 
regular moments, such as budget negotiations or elections, or 
unexpected ones, such as an impactful event that suddenly emerges. 
Situations that have the potential to open a policy window are also 
referred to as ‘focusing events’ (Birkland, 1998). Van Reisen (2009) 
explains that after a focusing event, the streams need to be redefined, 
as the perception of the situation prior to the focusing event is no 
longer the same as after the focusing event. The re-interpretation of 
the situation after a focusing event to make sense of the new situation 




Vdovychenko (2019) identifies the Lampedusa disaster on 3 October 
2015, when a boat full of refugees caught fire resulting in 366 deaths, 
as a focusing event. Analysing the documentary It Will be Chaos 
(Luciano & Piscopo, 2018), she narrates how heads of state, the 
President of the European Commission, Manuel Barroso and various 
directors of international organisations all came to Lampedusa to 
explain to the media how they saw the situation after the event and 
what they thought was the way forward. The role of the Mayor of 
Lampedusa is particularly interesting. The documentary shows that 
she was focused on what she saw as the correct framing of the 
situation. Emphasising the need to use correct terminology to address 
the victims of the tragedy as ‘refugees’ and not ‘illegal migrants’, she 
insists that this is critical for the correct framing of the problem. 
Klandermans & Oegema (1987) analyse the importance of the 
framing of a problem for social mobilisation. Contesting frames lead 
to cultural entropy and, as a consequence, the policy window may 
close, without a change to the policy agenda, because the three 
streams did not converge. The three streams model of Kingdon 
(1984) draws attention to the role of policy entrepreneurs – people 
with responsibilities within the policy process and outside in policy 
networks – in the definition of a problem and the formulation of 
political positions, policies and alternative policies. 
 
The process of problem definition is analysed by Melicherová 
(Chapter 11, Inhospitable Realities: Refugees’ Livelihoods in Hitsats, Ethiopia, 
by Kristína Melicherová) as a social process, in which social groups 
and individuals are mobilised to engage with a policy agenda; she 
particularly looks at the process of bringing new ideas to the agenda. 
This process, which is called ‘framing’, is helpful in explaining the 
relationship between changing social norms and the creation of 
environments that enable or disable certain possible behaviours 
through policies. The situational aspect of problem definition is taken 
as an important precondition for understanding the relationship 





The concept of resilience is derived from the Latin word resilire, which 
means to leap back, to recover from a disturbance of some kind. It 
construes resilience as the bouncing back of a system following a 
shock to its pre-existing state or path (Martin & Sunley, 2014). The 
term resilience has been used by sociologists to explain the human 
ability to return to its normal state after absorbing some stress or after 
surviving some negative change (Surjan, Sharma & Shaw, 2011, pp. 
17–18). A new strategy to achieve resilience for people is social 
protection, which “is now being recognized as instrumental in both 
poverty eradication and rural transformation, as well as an integral 
component of effective humanitarian response and resilience building 
efforts” (FAO, 2017 p. 2). Conway, De Haan, & Norton (2000, p. 2) 
define social protection as “public actions taken in response to levels 
of vulnerability, risk and deprivation which are deemed socially 
unacceptable within a given polity or society”.  
 
Van Reisen, Nakazibwe, Stokmans, Vallejo and Kidane (2018) 
operationalised socio-economic resilience on the basis of six scales 
that can be categorised into three different aspects: 1) individual 
abilities (capabilities and human capital, empowerment, and worry), 
2) the perceived social support (embeddedness in the community and 
trust in government), and 3) perceived income security (Chapter 16, 
Is Trauma Counselling the Missing Link? Enhancing Socio-Economic Resilience 
among Post-war IDPs in Northern Uganda, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia 
Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, Zaminah Malole & Bertha Vallejo). 
Van Reisen et al. (2018) found that the three scales measuring: 1) 
capabilities and human capital, 2) empowerment, and 3) perceived 
income security had high correlations, both within and between, and 
changed due to social protection programmes (cash transfers and 
trauma counselling). This illustrates that resilience is closely 
associated with perceived and real sustainable access to livelihoods 
and the perception of ability to access these. The first definition of 
livelihood is broadly accredited to Chambers and Conway’s working 
definition (1992). Their definition was accepted and adapted by the 
Department for International Development (DFID), among others. 
In a set of Guidance Sheets (DFID, 1999), DFID recognise that a 
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livelihood is comprised of the capabilities, assets and activities 
required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can 
cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or 
enhance its capabilities and assets, both now and in the future, while 
not undermining the natural resource base (Chambers & Conway, 
1992, p. 6). This definition acknowledges the complexity of the 
livelihood concept and implies that securing livelihoods may entail, 
for example, access to water, land, health care, education, or even 
services protecting legal rights (De Silva, 2013, p. 5) and depends on 
socio-economic resilience to make use of the resources available.  
 
In emergencies that lead people to become destitute, it is often the 
case that the large-scale loss of livelihood assets could be saved by 
providing timely assistance. Social protection or livelihood support in 
emergencies, therefore, consists of actions to protect the assets that 
are essential for people's livelihoods and to support people's own 
priorities and strategies. It includes any activity that aims to restore 
people's dignity and ensure adequate living conditions (Caverzasio, 
2001). 
Mixed methods 
In the foregoing, several conceptual frameworks were discussed as 
abstract theories that can provide a lens through which to look at 
migration in Africa. We also indicated that these frameworks have 
some flaws, due to the social and contextual dynamics of migration 
processes. In this book, we regard these frameworks as global ideas 
that should be fine-tuned to the specific dynamics of the African 
migration context. We believe that theoretical concepts provide an 
abstract model that can help to understand and explain phenomenon 
on the ground. But, we are studying social processes, which are 
affected by the cultural and historical legacy of the people involved, 
as well as their past experiences and perceptions of what is going on.  
 
Theories provide a starting point from which to approach the 
research problem, but do not provide standardised guidelines for 
studying problems, as problems are context-specific and the 
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uniqueness of the people and the situation involved need to be 
recognised. This means that the perceptions and experiences of 
people in the different situations are as important as theoretical 
concepts when trying to understand the dynamics of African 
migration. The role of the researcher is to give a voice to the persons 
involved in the social process of migration, to integrate their views 
into theories at an abstract level, and to adjust the theories accordingly 
so that the views of the participants are accounted for. This 
perspective can be summarised as ‘living with theory’ (Burawoy, 
2013), which involves diminishing the separation between participant 
and researcher, inspiring critical assessment of existing theories and 
allowing for the participant’s alternative understanding of reality. 
 
The separation between participant and researcher is reduced as the 
researcher takes into account the perspective of the participant and is 
responsive to the research situation at hand. In the migration 
discourse, such an approach is not implementable if the researcher 
uses the push-pull theory of migration, as this theoretical model takes 
an etic (or outsider) perspective of the migration situation. Moreover, 
it assumes that objective push and pull factors motivate a person to 
migrate, or not, factors that are not known to the researcher as an 
outsider to the situation. From the perspective of living with theory, 
the push-pull theory does not take into account a (potential) migrant’s 
perceptions of the push and pull factors involved, nor their 
experiences and feelings. Accordingly, we believe that an insider 
perspective can give valuable information about migration processes 
as they unfold in real-life situations. The point is that the researcher 
gathers specific insider information, which necessarily and inevitably 
makes him or her part of the social reality in which the research takes 
place (Burawoy, 1998).  
 
Such a research perspective can be implemented as a convergent 
design, which is one of the three core designs of mixed methods 
(Creswell & Clark, 2018). In a convergent design, “the researcher 
intends to bring together the results of the qualitative and the 
quantitative data analyses so they can be compared and combined” 
(Creswell & Clark, 2018, p. 65) in a complementary effort.  
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The objective is to “obtain different but complementary data on the 
same topic” (Morse, 1991, p. 122) in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the research problem at hand.  
Qualitative studies to explore the situation at hand 
In the convergent design used in this book, qualitative studies serve 
two important objectives. First of all, they give vivid information 
about the situation studied, as perceived by the people who live in 
that situation and who give meaning to the social processes unfolding 
in it. Secondly, qualitative studies enable a researcher to build a 
rapport with all people involved. Consequently, participants trust the 
researcher and give inside information about the social processes 
investigated, and the researcher is empathic and able to take the 
perspective of the participant. The building of rapport is necessary in 
a ‘living with theory’ approach. 
 
The qualitative component of this book is based on observations 
communicated by refugees in different locations on the routes in the 
network of Africa Monitors and other organisations working with 
refugees. The data provided through this network was corroborated 
through interviews and observations by the researchers. Information 
was communicated through the research monitors from Kampala, 
Khartoum, Kassala, Addis Ababa and the Shire region. Observations 
were further investigated in field visits to Addis Ababa and 
Khartoum. The collaboration of Tilburg University with Africa 
Monitors and the technique of working with monitors within the 
trafficking routes, as a way of exploring the modus operandi of 
traffickers on the routes, resulted in the publication of a high impact 
volume: Human Trafficking and Trauma in the Digital Era (Van Reisen & 
Mawere, 2017). The observations made about the human trafficking 
routes were compared with study findings in the host communities. 
This work concentrated on Ethiopia. Mekelle University conducted 
several studies as part of the study into host communities, their 
relationships with refugees and migrants, and the dynamics of human 
trafficking. Ethiopian researcher, Beza Nisrane (PhD candidate at 
Tilburg University) conducted additional research into the specific 
experiences of Ethiopian women who had returned from the Arabian 
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Gulf and Middle East with human trafficking, migration and 
reintegration. The findings of the research were presented and 
compared during a workshop held in Mekelle in January 2018 and a 
writing week held in February 2018 in Tilburg University. The 
qualitative research on the use of social media was conducted by Rick 
Schoenmaeckers through (participatory) observation and interviews 
carried out during a three-month stay in Hitsats refugee camp (June 
to August 2017), during which the researcher participated in the daily 
routines in the refugee camp. The researcher was introduced through 
Zuid Oost Azië’s (ZOA), a humanitarian organisation working in the 
camp that had established working relationships with organisations 
and refugees in relation to unaccompanied minors in the camp. A 
survey conducted by Kristína Melicherová served as explorative 
research to describe the population of Hitsats camp and explore their 
perceptions about the livelihood opportunities available in the camp. 
This research served as a background against which other research 
activities took place. The data were collected through a survey and 
descriptively analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS).  
Quantitative studies to test hypotheses  
In the convergent design applied in this book, quantitative studies are 
important to test causal relationships between concepts, as 
hypothesised by theory or as derived from the qualitative data 
provided by the participants. The most rigorous method to test cause 
and effect hypotheses is a true experimental design (Shadish, Cook, 
& Campbell, 2001). However, using such experiments in examining 
social processes as they unfold in real-life situation assumes that the 
researcher has full control over the research situation, including 
designing the study so that (Van Reisen et al., 2018): 1) respondents 
are randomly assigned to intervention and control groups, 2) the 
intervention is based on theory, so hypotheses can be formulated to 
explain why, and to what extent, the intervention works and in what 
settings, and 3) the implementation of the intervention is under the 
control of the researcher and the treatment of each individual 
assigned to a specific group is equal and the (social and 
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environmental) context of the treatment is equal or known to the 
researcher. 
 
These guidelines usually result in an experiment that is carried out in 
a controlled setting, such as a room at a university or a laboratory, 
creating an artificial situation that is not representative of the real-life 
situation in which the cause and effect relationship unfolds naturally 
(Van Reisen et al., forthcoming, 2019). When research is conducted 
outside the natural environment, it results in lower ecological validity. 
The problem identified by many policymakers, who are interested in 
evidence-based decision making, is that research tends to be carried 
out in a sterile experimental environment, which undermines our 
understanding of what may be expected of an intervention in the real-
life situation that policymakers are concerned with. Studying social 
processes demands that an experiment be carried out in a real-life 
situation. The findings established in such a situation can inform 
researchers about the way in which the intervention resonates in a 
natural setting. Araújo, Davids and Passos (2007) call this a 
representative design. A representative design requires awareness of 
the specifics in a particular place: “proper sampling of situations and 
problems may in the end be more important than proper sampling of 
subjects, considering the fact that individuals are probably on the 
whole much more alike than are situations among one another” 
(Brunswik, 1956, p. 39, cited in Araújo et al., 2007).  
 
The study by Kidane and Stokmans (2019) is an example of a true 
experiment conducted in a real-life situation. This study was 
conducted in a refugee camp, allowing the implementation of the 
intervention to be controlled to a great extent. The researcher made 
use of a mobile app for trauma counselling that was designed for the 
purpose of the study. This gave the researchers the opportunity to 
control the assignment as well as the implementation of the trauma 
counselling in great detail, as the digital app needed a code to be 
activated. Moreover, due to the camp-setting, participants had no 




However, in most situations, it is not possible to conduct a true 
experiment, as a researcher is seldom able to design an intervention 
and/or control the implementation of the intervention, due to the 
fact that other stakeholders are important agents in such 
implementation. Even if the researcher is able to design an 
intervention that is effective according to his/her ideas, they often 
depend on others to implement the intervention in a real-life setting. 
Consequently, the researcher does not have full control over the 
intervention, nor the assignment of participants across groups. In 
such a case, researchers can make use of a quasi-experimental design, 
in which the researcher can compare the effectiveness of the own 
intervention with that of existing interventions.  
 
However, such a procedure calls for a pre-test (the measurement of 
the effect variable before the intervention starts), which can be 
problematic in real-life situations, as implementation agencies often 
start the implementation of their interventions without the consent 
of a researcher. In such a case, the effectiveness of the intervention 
can still be studied, as illustrated in the study by Van Reisen et al. 
(Chapter 16, Is Trauma Counselling the Missing Link?), who reported on 
the effectiveness of social protection programmes. In this study, the 
researchers were not able to assign people to specific social protection 
programmes, nor did they have any control over the design of these 
programmes, as in this real-life setting these were existing 
programmes being implemented by agencies that had their own 
objectives. However, in this design, the researchers ‘assigned’ 
participants to specific groups on the basis of the social protection 
intervention they were receiving. The researchers had little control 
over the implementation of the intervention and, therefore, little 
control over alternative causal explanations.  
 
Irrespective of the kind of experimental design that is used in studying 
the effects of an intervention in a real-life situation, one should realise 
that by researching the effect of an intervention for a defined group, 
one helps this particular group (and, therefore, not another group). 
This choice can trigger envy and affect the ecological validity of the 
study. For example, the research by Van Reisen et al. (Chapter 16, Is 
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Trauma Counselling the Missing Link?), which focused on women, the 
men in the community (spouses, fathers, and sons) asked to be 
included in the intervention. Such a reaction by a community 
indicates that doing research is not an objective act that does not 
interfere with the social situation at hand. Research is an integral part 
of the social reality in which the intervention takes place. The effect 
of the research itself can be estimated through a Solomon’s 4 group 
design, but a pre-test is then required for some groups. 
 
When a researcher realises that the results of an intervention always 
emanate from social processes in specific social situations that the 
researcher is participating in, certain standard rules for experimental 
design can be modified. The rule that representative cases should be 
chosen is no longer relevant, as representative cases as such do not 
exist in real-life situations, given that each context is different and 
specific and, therefore, not representative. The inclination to 
generalise the results to a wider context (other populations, other 
social circumstances) needs to be modified based on the 
understanding of the social reality of the research (representativeness 
of the experiment and ecological validity of the results). This does not 
mean that it is not possible to identify results at a more aggregate 
level. The researcher is prompted to look for general tendencies 
across different implementation contexts and can, thereby, develop 
an abstract theory of the working elements of the intervention. This 
theory can then be used as a guideline to develop (and study) similar 
interventions in other situations and to validate or adjust the theory. 
Structure of this book 
This book opens by introducing the topic and outlining the key 
theoretical considerations for the study of migration in Africa 
(Chapter 1). In Chapter 2, Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher gives an 
overview of the new manifestations of migration-related phenomena 
in the Horn of Africa, with a specific focus on Ethiopia. As Gebre-
Egziabher explains, being one of the countries with a large population 
of refugees, internally displaced people and migrants, new migration 
routes have recently developed from Ethiopia to Europe, as well as 
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other countries in Africa. He outlines the new aspects of this 
phenomena for consideration, such as the impact of refugees on local 
communities and the extension of human trafficking to people within 
host communities. In Chapter 3, Gertjan Van Stam critically reflects 
on the different realities in Europe and Africa and the use of foreign 
epistemologies, coming from a dominant position. He argues that as 
a result of epistemological imperialism, the understanding of social 
migration dynamics in Africa are obfuscated. Van Stam concludes 
that in order to create a basis for intimate knowledge of migration in 
African places, epistemological awareness is necessary and needs to 
make space for African creations of meaning that relate better to 
social relations in an African place.  
 
One example of Eurocentric epistemology is ‘borders’. In Africa, 
(national) borders are artificial boundaries, created for political 
purposes that often have little historical or cultural meaning to the 
communities split by these borders. The borders, agreed in Berlin in 
1884–1885, were established by the colonial powers to divide their 
rule in Africa, but had little to do with realities on the ground. In East 
Africa, as elsewhere on the continent, these borders separate 
communities that belong together. In light of this realisation, in 
Chapter 4, Dorothy Muroki, Boniface Kitungulu and Leanne Kamau 
present a study of cross-border communities in East Africa and the 
challenges involved in serving such mobile communities. The study 
specifically presents the result of inventorising the problems that arise 
with the provision of health care to mobile populations in the region. 
In Chapter 5, Abdelah Alifnur and Mirjam Van Reisen introduce the 
way of living of a pastoralist community in the Horn of Africa, the 
Afar people. Their culture and way of living includes many 
approaches to minimise conflict and maximise resilience in rapidly 
changing, vulnerable environmental contexts. But their way of living 
is under pressure due to population growth, increasing pressure on 
land, and conflict, which has resulted in increased tensions between 
sedentary and pastoralist communities. The authors argue that their 
traditional values, norms and customs are important and cost-




New perspectives on migration are presented in Chapter 6 by 
Radoslaw Malinowski and Mario Schulze, who critically examine the 
relationship between human trafficking and climate change in Kenya. 
Their conclusion is that there is a complex correlation between 
climate change and increased vulnerability to human trafficking. In 
Chapter 7, Antony Otieno Ong’ayo discusses the online and offline 
dimensions of migration in Africa focusing on the role of diasporas. 
He argues that the interaction of diasporas through mobile phones by 
transferring information, payments, and knowledge creates changes 
in the home communities, as well as expectations about other places. 
In Chapter 8, Melissa Phillips and Mingo Heiduk look at the role of 
diasporas in a European context (Denmark) and how the 
communities try to dissuade relatives in the country of origin 
(Somalia) from taking insecure and dangerous irregular migration 
routes to Europe. In Chapter 9, Reginald Nalugala examines how 
community programmes have led to the social transformation of 
Somali youth in Nairobi and countered radicalisation.  
 
If making the dangerous journey to Europe is ill advised, what are the 
options open to refugees and migrants closer to home, in 
neighbouring countries? To answer this question, in Chapter 10, 
Bereket Godifay Kahsay, discusses limitations on the access of 
refugees to economic activities in refugee camps in northern 
Ethiopia, due to fragmented support systems. In Chapter 11, Kristína 
Melicherová presents the findings of a survey carried out among 
Eritrean refugees in Hitsats camp to explore their access to economic 
activities. She concludes that the situation in the camps is not 
adequate, including the provision of basic necessities, and that it is 
very difficult for most refugees to earn a living. These conditions 
encourage refugees to move on to other places, where they hope that 
there are better opportunities. In Chapter 12, Tekie Gebreyesus and 
Rick Schoenmaeckers describe the extremely poor and substandard 
conditions that unaccompanied and separated minors find 
themselves in Hitsats refugee camp in Ethiopia – conditions that 
violate international norms to protect the best interest of the child. 
These conditions explain why minors often continue their perilous 
journeys, despite the well-known dangers. 
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Refugees and migrants often dream of the day that they can return 
home. Yet, the challenges involved in return migration are large. In 
Chapter 13, Beza L. Nisrane describes the lack of welcome that 
Ethiopian women receive when returning home from the Arabian 
Gulf and show that this can be partly explained by the clash in 
expectations between the returnees and their relatives at home. She 
concludes that many women re-migrate as they feel unwelcome and 
unhappy after their return. In Chapter 14, Shishay Tadesse Abay 
looks at the lives of return migrants deported from Saudi Arabia to 
Ethiopia and finds that reintegration is extremely difficult. In Chapter 
15, Primrose Nakazibwe and Mirjam Van Reisen investigates the 
trauma of women returnees who were abducted by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army in Uganda as children and who face hostile and 
challenging situations on their return, including the difficulty of home 
communities accepting children born in captivity. 
 
In Chapter 16, the success of efforts for rehabilitation in Northern 
Uganda, where refugees and rebels returned after the war, is 
investigated by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Primrose 
Nakazibwe, Zaminah Malole and Bertha Vallejo. In this study, the 
researchers found that social protection schemes for vulnerable 
women led to significant positive changes in their socio-economic 
resilience. The authors conclude that psycho-social support 
significantly increased the positive effects on resilience of social 
protection. A literature review by Zeremariam Fre and Naomi Dixon 
in Chapter 17 on social protection programmes by the Government 
of Ethiopia for vulnerable pastoralist communities in the Afar region, 
shows that these programmes have had positive results. The authors 
conclude that the government policies on social protection, targeting 
vulnerable populations, make a good contribution to strengthening 
resilience and independence. 
 
The role of government is critical to the conditions in which people 
can build their lives and livelihoods. But what if a government fails to 
protect its own people? In Chapter 18, Makeda Saba describes the 
desperate and deteriorating situation in Eritrea, a country where the 
majority are required to serve under indefinite National Service, 
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which is tantamount to slave labour. The inhumane conditions and 
ongoing human rights violations have led to large numbers of 
refugees fleeing the country, a number that has not decreased since 
the peace agreement was signed between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 
2018, despite expectations to the contrary. In Chapter 19, Bereket 
Selassie and Mirjam Van Reisen describe the importance of the rule 
of law and lament the lack of implementation of a constitution in 
Eritrea. A constitution provides for protection of citizens, 
predictability, accountability and justice. It is an essential element of 
good governance and the foundation of any rights-based society. 
 
In Chapter 20, Stella Maranga analyses how the constitutional reform 
process in Kenya, which provides a framework for devolution, has 
also opened up the possibility of protecting women’s rights, despite 
push-backs in its implementation. In Chapter 21, the final chapter, 
Istar Ahmed describes how the constitution-making process can be 
regarded as an opportunity for the interests of youth to be better 
represented, thereby contributing to a more stable situation in 
Somalia, and possibly diminishing sentiments that migration from 
home is always the better option. 
 
Together, these chapters attempt to describe mobility in Africa that 
is grounded in reality, giving an alternative to the dominant narrative 
coming out of Europe. By describing mobility more accurately, it is 
hoped that our understanding will deepen and our solutions become 
more nuanced and targeted, and, therefore, effective. In this way, we 
hope to be better equipped to deal with the challenges facing the 
world today driven by a population on the move.  
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All or Nothing: The Costs of Migration from 
the Horn of Africa – Evidence from Ethiopia 
 
Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher 
Introduction  
In Africa, migration has a long tradition and exhibits a wide variety of 
patterns. Some migrants and 
refugees pursue seasonal 
agricultural activities that 
involve crossing borders 
regularly and over long 
periods of time. Others 
migrate for shorter periods 
as a reaction to changes in 
economic conditions, as a 
means of gaining experience 
or training, or to save for a 
future investment. 
Individuals or whole families 
may choose to settle in other 
African countries to attain a 
better way of life. Or people 
may migrate to Europe, 
America, or Asia on a short-
term or long-term basis. 
Crossing borders for the 
purpose of trading is also 
common in Africa and, 
depending on the length of 
stay, may or may not be thought of as migration. Travel for cross-
border trading also occurs between Africa and Europe.  
 
In the first decade and a half of this 
century, Ethiopia is estimated to have 
lost at least a million productive people 
(mostly youth) and billions of US dollars 
to smugglers and human traffickers, 
along the three main routes: the 
Northern, Southern and Eastern 
migration routes. Pressure from 
smugglers and traffickers is emerging as a 
new cause of migration. Smugglers and 
traffickers are aggressively ‘selling’ a very 
bad product that entails high risks at a 
very high price. In order to stop this 
disturbing trend we need to create 
employable youths and employment 
opportunities and promote investment at 
home in Ethiopia. At the same time, 
stronger persecution is needed to rid the 
Horn of smugglers and traffickers, which 
requires strengthening of the rule of law. 
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In recent years the Horn of Africa has been an epicentre of immense 
migratory and refugee movement. Irregular migration from the Horn 
is mixed in nature, which means that it includes labour migrants 
(individuals who seek a better life), smuggled and trafficked 
individuals, unaccompanied minors, refugees and asylum seekers 
(Schröder, 2015; UNHCR, 2016; Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017). As 
it is becoming increasingly difficult for Africans to legally arrive and 
work in Europe, every year tens of thousands of Africans attempt to 
circumvent border controls and enter illegally as irregular migrants 
(Reitano, Adal & Shaw, 2014).  
 
Ethiopia is one of the main source countries for migrants and 
refugees in the Horn of Africa. It is a demographic giant with an 
estimated total population of nearly 102 million people in 2016. 
Ethiopia is the second most populous nation in Africa, next to 
Nigeria (Population Reference Bureau, 2016). The overwhelming 
majority of Ethiopia’s population is made up of youth (of aged 15–
34), with an estimated two million people entering the labour market 
each year (Carter & Rohwerder, 2016). One of the world’s oldest 
civilisations, Ethiopia is also one of the world’s poorest countries. As 
stipulated in the report of the first Growth and Transformation Plan, 
the country’s annual average per capita income increased from USD 
377 in 2009/2010 to USD 691 by 2014/15 (National Planning 
Commission, 2016). However, the per capital income in Ethiopia is 
substantially lower than the regional average.  
 
Over the past decade, the Ethiopian economy has experienced strong 
and broad-based growth, averaging 10.8% per year from 2003/04 to 
2014/15, compared to the regional average of about 5% during the 
same period. The proportion of the population living below the 
poverty line fell from 38.7% in 2003/04 to 23.4% in 2014/15 
(National Planning Commission, 2016). The Government of 
Ethiopia is currently implementing the second phase of its Growth 
and Transformation Plan. The plan, which will run from 2015/16 to 
2019/20, aims to continue improvements in physical infrastructure 
and transform the country into a manufacturing hub. The 
overarching goal is to turn Ethiopia into a lower middle-income 
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country by 2025. Growth targets are comparable to those under the 
previous plan, with annual average gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth of 11%. In line with this manufacturing strategy, the industrial 
sector is slated to grow by 20% per annum on average (National 
Planning Commission, 2016). 
 
Despite this promising progress, Ethiopia has faced enormous 
challenges in recent years. One of the challenges is the irregular 
migration of its youth, including trafficking and smuggling. Despite 
economic liberalisation and Ethiopia’s integration into the global 
economy, many Ethiopians consider out-migration as the only way to 
achieve a better standard of living (De Regt & Tafesse, 2016). The 
geostrategic situation of Ethiopia makes it a source, destination, and 
transit hub for migration and refugee flows, mostly within the region, 
but also to South Africa (Southern Route), the Gulf countries and 
Middle East (Eastern Route), and Europe (Northern Route). 
Ethiopian migrants often choose irregular means of migration 
because it is perceived to be less bureaucratic and time consuming, 
cheaper and more likely to be successful (Frouws, Munge, Danish 
Refugee Council, & RMMS, 2014). 
 
The main objective of this research is to document the reasons for 
migration from Ethiopia to the rest of the world via different routes 
and identify the costs of each route. To meet the research objectives, 
the following questions are posed: What are the reasons for the migration 
of youth from Ethiopia? How is migration facilitated? And what are the costs 
and risks of migration from Ethiopia via the three main routes? These 
questions are addressed in turn in sections 5, 6 and 7. 
Methodology 
The study used both primary and secondary data sources to 
investigate migration, including irregular migration, along the three 
main migration routes from Ethiopia: the Southern Route (to South 
Africa), Eastern Route (to the Middle East and Gulf countries) and 
the Northern Route (to Libya, Sudan, Israel, and Europe). The main 
qualitative methods used were individual in-depth interviews and 
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focus group discussions. These were supplemented by a quantitative 
survey of household heads.  
Theories of migration 
Throughout the history of migration, theorists have been concerned 
with the causes of migration and the reasons why people decide to 
migrate from their place of origin. As a result, there is no single 
decision-making theory for migration, but a number of different ones 
that deal with the kind of mental processes that people go through 
when they decide to migrate. Two examples of decision-making 
theories of migration are: the push-pull theory and the perceptions 
theory.  
 
Proponents of the first theory argue that the desire of most people to 
get ahead in life is the most influential factor that determines the 
decision to migrate. The theory describes the causes of migration as 
a series of forces that encourage an individual to leave one place (push 
factors) and reside in another (pull factors). This approach takes into 
account the imbalance between the place of origin and the place of 
destination, and considers the migration flows towards areas believed 
to be desirable for either economic or non-economic reasons through 
an interplay of push factors at the place of origin and pull factors at 
the place of destination.  
 
According to this theory, migration is a form of livelihood and 
income diversification. On the pull side, youth are attracted by the 
‘glamourous’ life in more developed countries, often motivated by the 
stories of friends, peers and relatives. These people form a network 
that facilitates the movement of youth out of the villages and small 
urban areas towards other countries, often crossing borders 
illegally. With the many push factors in the Horn of Africa (e.g., 
poverty, unemployment), youth are easily drawn to follow the three 
main routes of migration. The human capital model views migration 
as an investment decision based on a cost-benefit analysis. According 
to this model, it is only when the net benefit is greater than the cost 
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that people migrate, assuming full employment at the place of 
destination.  
 
The perception theory purports that people migrate not because they 
know, but because they perceive (rightly or wrongly) that the place to 
which they wish to migrate is better than the place in which they are 
living. This is based on the assumption that migration is a function of 
how migrants and refugees cognise their present and future places of 
residence. In this regard, migration is more of an attitudinal thing, in 
the sense that it depends on the way people, especially youth, see 
themselves (their inner potential) and their surroundings – past and 
future – as well as how they see other countries that they are planning 
to emigrate to. 
 
However, the migration observed in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa 
seems to follow none of these theories or models. The people 
interviewed from Tigray, Ethiopia for this study reported that many 
youth are migrating because of the influence of traffickers and 
smugglers. The influence of human traffickers and smugglers is not 
included in these theories and models. 
Migration and human trafficking in the Horn of Africa 
Nowadays, smugglers and human traffickers are playing an increasing 
role in migration. Groups who are particularly at risk include 
undocumented migrants and refugees and unaccompanied minors. 
Although it is difficult to know the number of irregular Ethiopian 
migrants and refugees, the brutal beheading of 30 Ethiopians (and 
Eritreans) in Libya by the terrorist group Islamic State (ISIS), mass 
deportation of more than 165,000 from Saudi Arabia, and killings in 
South Africa and Yemen are among the recent tragedies and signal 
the severity of the problem (IOM, 2014b; Van Reisen & Mawere, 
2017). Communities and administrative bodies alike are reporting 
their deep concern about the alarming surge in irregular migration 
(mostly smuggling, but also trafficking) of young women and men 




Migration from the Horn of Africa has been fuelled by various 
socioeconomic and environmental factors. Some migrants and 
refugees use irregular migration channels due to the extreme resource 
scarcity, caused by environmental change, drought, crop failure, food 
insecurity and severe poverty, among other things. According to 
Koser (2010), “For some people irregularity is a deliberate choice or 
decision, but many others find themselves in an irregular situation 
because of lack of information or due to administrative obstacles”. 
There are also reports of people who used regular channels to out-
migrate from the Horn of Africa, but ended up in exploitative 
situations, or being subjected to abuse, abduction and extortion 
during their journey or at their final destination. Thus, mixed 
migration flows from the Horn of Africa are comprised of people 
with different profiles and varying levels of vulnerability. These 
include: migrant workers (both regular and irregular), smuggled 
migrants and refugees, victims of exploitation and abuse, asylum 
seekers, people seeking to reunite with their families and refugees. 
According to the Global Commission on International Migration:  
 
The term ‘irregular migration’ is commonly used to describe a variety of different 
phenomena involving people who enter or remain in a country of which they are not 
a citizen in breach of national laws. These include migrants who enter or remain in 
a country without authorization, those who are smuggled or trafficked across an 
international border, unsuccessful asylum seekers who fail to observe a deportation 
order and people who circumvent immigration controls through the arrangement of 
bogus marriages. (GCIM, 2005, p. 32) 
 
To address the potential threat posed by the unprecedented swelling 
of migrants and refugees, human trafficking and smuggling, different 
destination countries have taken enormous steps to reduce the 
number of immigrants. However, noticeable change has not been 
observed in terms of the direction and flow of migrants and refugees. 
Instead, migration has become more complicated, dynamic and 
mixed in nature (AB, interview with Gebre-Egziabher, face-to-face, 
Tigray, Ethiopia, 2017). 
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Reasons for migration 
Studies have found that poverty and low income, unemployment, 
peer and family pressure, inducement by traffickers and smugglers, 
and rampant corruption are the key drivers of irregular migration 
from Ethiopia (Tadelle, 2016; IOM, 2014a). Other studies cite the 
role of development processes, state formation and policies (Flahaux 
& De Haas, 2016), as well as high population growth, oppressive 
political contexts, and insecurity and internal conflicts as drivers 
(Carter & Rohwerder, 2016; IGAD, 2015). This study found that the 
reasons for migration are interwoven with each other.  
 
The participants identified the main reasons for migration from the 
study sites as follows: 
 
• Lack of job opportunities: Respondents pointed to the lack 
of job opportunities and their economically-poor family 
background as drivers of irregular migration in all of the 
places of origin. Furthermore, many youth consider migration 
to be a livelihood strategy and the only way to fulfil their 
future ambitions.  
• Family and peer pressure: Family and peer pressure were 
also found to be factors pushing youth to out-migrate.  
• Refugee camps nearby: The presence of refugee camps 
nearby (mainly in the Northern Route) was also mentioned as 
promoting international migration. Eritrean refugees and 
youth from host communities interact at sporting events, the 
cinema and other social gatherings, which allows Eritreans to 
share their migration experiences with Ethiopian youth. Many 
respondents mentioned that before the establishment of the 
camps, there was not so much youth out-migration to Europe 
and other countries, except to Sudan. Respondents said that 
those who migrate to Sudan usually come back and invest at 
home. So, international migration via the Northern Route is 
a very recent phenomenon, highly influenced by the presence 
of the Eritrean refugees in the camps. 
44 
 
• Smugglers and traffickers: According to a key informant, 
smugglers and traffickers play a major role in migration from 
all of the study sites. Smugglers and traffickers are 
everywhere, and their communication is often hidden and 
secretive. Some smugglers and traffickers even offer to cover 
the migration expenses of youth, if they agree to repay them 
after they reach Europe; this situation is most common in the 
Northern Route.  
 
Explaining the causes of irregular migration, commander BA from 
Tigray stated that “youths in the zone are suffering from poverty and 
unemployment, and they are taking irregular migration as the only 
possible way-out (BA, interview by Gebre-Egziabher, face-to-face, 
















Figure 2.1. Framework for analysing the factors and costs in the decision to migrate 
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One of the long-term solutions to the problem is to create employable 
youth in the country, which requires equipping youth with the 
necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes required by the market. Of 
course, youth also need employment opportunities. Even though 
poverty and unemployment were high everywhere, international 
migration was lower in some areas than others. This may be due to 
strong family and community ties and their attitude towards 
migration and irregular migration, as well as the presence of 
smugglers and human traffickers.  
 
The majority of those who out-migrate are from rural areas and poor 
family backgrounds. Some respondents also mentioned that 
community leaders in some areas have better awareness about the 
consequences of irregular migration and try to make society aware of 
these. Thus, poverty and unemployment seem to be (in most cases) a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for migration. On the other 
hand, it was observed that many youngsters know the risks involved 
in irregular migration, but still decide to out-migrate. 
  
The information that migrants and refugees receive seems to be a 
critical factor in driving them into the hands of smugglers and human 
traffickers. A policeman by the name BC explained that  
 
[…] human traffickers have a very strong ability to convince people, mainly the 
youth. Especially the experienced human traffickers can convince the youth that the 
sheep which is in front of them is actually a dog, not a sheep. (BC, interview by 
Gebre-Egziabher, face-to-face, Tigray, Ethiopia, 2017) 
 
The causes of migration are highly entwined, with the presence of 
smugglers and human traffickers as an increasing relevant factor 




Facilitation of migration 
The respondents explain that traffickers and smugglers are present 
everywhere and their inducements and encouragements prompt 
people to migrate. This appeared relevant in all the three routes 
investigated. The respondents said that those involved in trafficking 
and smuggling have built networks that stretch from the rural areas 
and small towns in all the places of origin to the destination countries. 
The respondents alleged that some of the traffickers and smugglers 
have close links with some local, regional and federal government 
officials, including police and security forces. Human trafficking in 
the Horn of Africa is a lucrative business.  
 
Many traffickers are getting rich due to this business. The trade is so 
large that government officials and law enforcement bodies may also 
be involved. The comments of commander BA, who is from one of 
the towns in the north-west of Tigray, Ethiopia, support this view:  
 
A trafficker by the name GM was suspected by the police who were mandated to 
deal with preventing human trafficking. He was imprisoned for his deeds. After 
fulfilling all the necessary judicial and legal formalities, police checked the balance of 
his bank account and obtained that the amount of money in his saving account was 
ETB 32,309,482 [USD 1,468,612.82]. The trafficker GM is an ordinary 
person, from a small town in Tigray and there is no sign that he owns a business 
firm registered by his name. Besides, there is also no indication that the needed taxes 
are paid for the money that he saved in his account. GM had four different ID cards 
with four different names, but the same photograph. His case was presented to the 
court and the court released him by giving appointment for another time. Then he 
went out of country, and we don’t know where he is now. (BA, interview by 
Gebre-Egziabher, face-to-face, Tigray, Ethiopia, 2017) 
 
This respondent (Commander BA) said that the police suspected that 
the Ethiopian birr (ETB) 32 million in the traffickers account was 
obtained by selling people for slavery.  
 
Understanding the routes that irregular migrants and refugees are 
taking to reach their destinations is a complex task, as migration from 
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the Horn of Africa is extremely dynamic. Explaining this situation, 
Horwood (2009, p. 41) states as follows: “The routes used by the 
smugglers are often changing at short notice, and hence are very 
dynamic”. However, generally speaking, three main routes are used: 
the Southern, Eastern and Northern Routes. 
 
In some circumstances, returnee migrants and the refugees 
themselves act as traffickers and smugglers. When smugglers recruit 
potential migrants and refugees, they study the economic background 
of the migrant’s parents and target those who are from economically 
well-to-do families. After they cross the border, they force the 
migrants and refugees to call to their parents and ask them to send 
money for ransom. If their parents are not able to send the money 
demanded by the smugglers, the migrants and refugees are exposed 
to serious inhumane actions, including torture, rape, beatings, and 
other forms of punishment, which dehumanise the individuals, and 
even killing. These practices occur in all three of the routes mentioned 
in the previous section (AC, interview with Gebre-Egziabher, face-
to-face, Tigray, Ethiopia, 2017). 
Financial cost of migration 
In financial terms, the routes used by Ethiopians can be categorised 
into three main groups: expensive routes (mainly to Europe and 
North America) which require more than USD 7,000, medium-cost 
routes (Africa and Asia), which require a minimum of USD 4,000, 
and budget routes (Middle Eastern countries), which require as little 
as USD 500. Which migration route is used is often up to the 
smuggler, as explained by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat 
(RMMS, 2017): “Migrants have little influence over which routes they 
take, with smugglers choosing the routes based on perceptions of 
safety, levels of violence, ease of transfer to the next stop and levels 
of corruption likely to be accounted”.  
 
The Southern Route is through Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Malawi to South Africa. This route is increasing used by youth. Mainly 
Ethiopians and Somalis use this route to migrate to South Africa 
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(Gebre-Egziabher, Shishay, Kibrom, Atakilty & Kefyalew, 2017a; 
2017b). According to RMMS (Frouws & Horwood, 2017), “an 
estimated number of 14,300 persons emigrate via this route, 
annually”. The same source also states that, in South African, “80 
percent of migrants from the Horn of Africa were Ethiopians and 20 
percent Somalis” (Frouws & Horwood, 2017, p. 2). Thus, one can 
conclude that every year, about 11,440 Ethiopians migrate to South 
Africa. Gebre-Egziabher et al., (2017a) estimate that “in the last 
sixteen years, from all over Ethiopia, more than more than 200,000 
youths have emigrated to South Africa; via Moyale, crossing the 
Ethio-Kenya border, via Nairobi, through Tanzania and the like”.  
 
Although “the costs associated with such movements vary 
considerably and are dependent on the final destination and mode of 
transport” (Long & Crisp, 2012), Gebre-Egziabher et al. (2017a) 
estimate that migrants and refugees pay smugglers and trafficker 
Ethiopian birr (ETB) 114,146.73 per person (USD 3,9732). Based on 
this figure, in the last 16 years, in the Southern Route alone, an 
estimated USD 950 million was paid by Ethiopian migrants to the 
smugglers and human traffickers on the Southern Route. Had this 
money been spent in a legal and productive sector, it could have 
contributed to creating employment for youth and reducing poverty. 
Assuming that the Somalis also paid a similar amount, it can be 
roughly estimated that USD 237 million has been paid by Somalis in 
the last 16 years. This totals USD 1.187 billion paid to smugglers and 
human traffickers by 228,800 youths from the Horn of Africa (mainly 
Ethiopia and Somali) who migrated via the Southern Route, with an 
intended destination of South Africa in the last 16 years.  
 
The Eastern Route takes migrants and refugees towards the Middle 
East, mainly Saudi Arabia. The Ethiopians use Djibouti and Somali 
as transit hubs. This route takes youths from the Horn of Africa into 
Yemen and then to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States and the Middle 
East. It is exclusively used by Ethiopians and Somalis (Gebre-
Egziabher, 2016). According to RMMS (2017), “A total of 813,683 
 
2 Using the exchange rate from Oanda.com of 2 August 2019 1 USD = 28.73 ETB 
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youths have emigrated via the Eastern Route within a decade’s time 
(between 2006 and 2016) and 72 percent are Ethiopians”. Thus, over 
half a million (585,852) Ethiopians migrated to the Middle East 
irregularly from 2006 to 2016. Estimates by the Regional Mixed 
Migration Secretariat (Frouws et al., 2014) reveal that, as of December 
2013, 65,319 migrants and refugees arrived in Yemen, among which 
54,213 (83%) were Ethiopians and 11,045 (16.9%) were Somalis (the 
remaining 0.1% were from other countries). Frouws et al. (2014) 
reported that:  
 
Djibouti is the major transit country for Ethiopians travelling irregularly to Yemen 
and further to Saudi Arabia. In 2012, over 80,000 migrants (78 percent of all 
arrivals in Yemen) transited via Djibouti, the others transited mostly through 
Bossaso in Puntland.  
 
Of course, there are fluctuations from year to year, but the record 
year this decade was 2016, when 117,107 youths migrated to Yemen, 
with an intention of continuing to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. 
During this time, there was no stability in Yemen (Frouws et al., 2014). 
Many studies on the Eastern Route have also shown that the 
disappearance of women and girls is common. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Ethiopian arrivals into Yemen (2012–2016) 


















It can be estimated that in the 15 years from 2000 to 2016 a total of 
878,776 Ethiopians migrated to the Middle East at a total cost of USD 
439 million (based on USD 500 per migrant)3. Hence, cumulatively, 
for both the Southern and Eastern Routes, more than USD 1.626 
billion is estimated to have been be paid for irregular migration over 
this time period (USD 1.187 billion for the Southern Route in the last 
16 years and USD 439 million in the Eastern Route in the 15 years 
from 2000 to 2016).  
 
The Northern Route extends through Sudan, Libya and Egypt. While 
Libya and Sudan are also final destinations, Libya and Egypt are 
transit hubs for migrants and refugees travelling to Israel (previously 
via the Sinai desert) and Europe. This route is regularly used by 
Ethiopians, Eritreans and Sudanese. Most of the Ethiopians using the 
Northern Route are from Tigray. The youth who use this route go 
through Sudan, Libya and Egypt, across the Mediterranean Sea and 
then finally to Europe. According to RMMS (2017), “in 2016 alone, 
40,773 persons from the Horn of Africa arrived in Italy; and out of 
these 39,953 persons arrived in the months between January and 
November of 2016”. Eritreans are the largest group using the 
Northern Route. This is the most risky route and the youth are 
exposed to the risk of kidnapping, detention, and death while crossing 
both the desert and the Mediterranean Sea. It is also the most 
expensive route, and people usually pay around USD 7,000 to arrive 
at their destination (Frouws et al., 2014). Many people die or disappear 
on this route and it is hard to estimate the cost per annum. It is also 
unclear how many of the migrants and refugees using this route are 
Ethiopians. The costs associated with trafficking on the Northern 
Route are in the billions of USD over the period 2009–2016 (Van 
Reisen & Mawere, 2017, p. 13, estimated the costs for just Eritrean 
refugees to Libya, traveling on from Ethiopia and Sudan, as roughly 
around USD 1 billion in 2017). 
 
 
3 This figure is a rough estimate based on the interviews and focus group 
discussions conducted for this research. 
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Hence, although impossible to estimate precisely, the total cost of the 
facilitation of migrants and refugees on the three routes is in the 
billions of US dollars. This money could be used for the economic 
development of the sending countries and would go a long way to 
creating employment. Tragically, migration represents not just a loss 
of financial resources, it is also a loss of human resources that the 
country needs for its economic development. 
Conclusion  
The main objective of this research was to document the reasons for 
migration from Ethiopia to the rest of the world via different routes 
and identify the financial cost of each route. It addressed three 
questions: What are the reasons for the migration of youth from Ethiopia? How 
is migration facilitated? What are the costs of migration from Ethiopia via the 
three main routes? 
 
This research identified the following reasons for the increase in 
migration from Ethiopia: lack of job opportunities; family and peer 
pressure; the presence of a refugee camps nearby; and the presence 
of smugglers and traffickers. These reasons were usually intertwined. 
The importance of the presence of smugglers and traffickers to nudge 
migrants and refugees is new and has not been previously identified 
in migration theory, which has traditionally focused on push-pull 
theory or perceptions. This research shows that the migration process 
can be regarded as an exchange process in which human traffickers 
are aggressively selling (using persuasive communication targeting 
youth) a very bad product (that entails high risks) at a very high price 
(high costs). The findings of the study show that even though there 
are differences between the routes, smuggling and human trafficking 
in the three routes is posing serious risks to the lives of the migrants 
and refugees, through kidnapping, holding migrants and refugees for 
ransom, and violation of their basic human rights. In the Horn of 
Africa, smuggling and human trafficking is a very financially-
rewarding business and is run by network(s) of highly-organised 
criminals. They prey on unemployment and poverty and have 




Based on the calculations made in this research, in the first decade 
and a half of this century, Ethiopia is estimated to have lost at least a 
million productive people (mostly youth) and billions of US dollars 
in payments to smugglers and human traffickers, along the three 
routes. Hence, the issue of mixed migration from Ethiopia and the 
Horn of Africa is not only costly in monetary terms, but also in terms 
of human resources and loss of life. This issue has to be given priority 
and addressed by creating employable youths and employment 
opportunities. Attention must also be given to poverty reduction, so 
that youth can secure their basic needs without going abroad. 
Smugglers and traffickers are playing a significant role in the mixed 
migration process, which is a transnational problem and must be 
addressed accordingly. Stronger persecution is necessary to rid the 
Horn of the problem of smuggling and human trafficking. Thus, 
there is a need for an integrated and coordinated approach to fight 
smuggling and human trafficking by country governments in the 
Horn of Africa together with the Inter-Governmental Agency for 
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Why do Foreign Solutions not Work in Africa? 
Recognising Alternate Epistemologies 
 
Gertjan Van Stam 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the narrative of a Western-trained engineer 
working with rural 
communities in underserved 
areas of Southern Africa. 
Through the reflexive 
interpretation and 
reinterpretation of physical 
evidence (nature) and the 
narratives in communities 
(nurture), I present insights 
into the tension between the 
normative epistemology 
underpinning technology 
and the integrative 
epistemology of rural 
communities in Southern 
Africa. With a 
transdisciplinary sensitivity, I 
show the effects of 
technology on meaning-
making and resource 
allocation in these 
communities. From my 'in 
situ' embeddedness – living 
and working with African communities – I investigate the modernist 
philosophical approach that separates nature from culture and culture 
from technology, highlighting the intrinsic disrespect for indigenous 
The misalignment between foreign 
solutions and local realities in rural 
Africa is often the cause of harmful 
cultural entropy. This clash in value 
systems undermines solutions that 
embolden and strengthen local 
communities. The recognition that value 
systems may differ is lacking in research 
on resilience in Africa. The undermining 
of resilience can lead to loss of trust in 
what ‘home’ has to offer and encourage 
people to move to new places. We need to 
take a fresh approach that values 
African epistemologies and ways of 
knowing and that nurtures local talent to 
take the lead. In order to solve African 
problems, there is an urgent need to see 
the situation through an African lens – 
both when defining the problem and 
coming up with locally-relevant solutions. 
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worldviews that guide daily practices in African communities. Using 
two examples, one of a rural hospital in Zimbabwe and the other of 
an Internet network in the rural village of Macha, Zambia, this 
chapter argues for sensitivity towards, and respect for, local 
epistemologies and the local embodiment of knowledge, as well as for 
the local ability to define problems and come up with solutions. As 
part of ensuring such sensitivity and respect, I outline the ‘Big Five’, 
which are African virtues that can be used to guide interactions and 
interventions in rural communities of Southern Africa.  
 
In March 2018, I accompanied a team of experts on a journey into a 
remote rural area in Southern Africa. We went to visit a hospital in 
Zimbabwe, located more than 500 kilometres from the capital of 
Harare. I had visited this particular 160-bed hospital several times 
before. During the visit, we found 15 patients admitted, most of them 
suffering from malaria, as can be expected in the rainy season. On 
one of my previous visits in late 2017, I found only two patients 
admitted to the hospital. Although this hospital has a catchment area 
with a radius of over 100 kilometres, at any of my visits, the utilisation 
of its facilities was underwhelming.  
 
Before moving back to Zimbabwe at the end of 2012, my family and 
I lived in Zambia for 10 years. In the rural village we stayed in, 
collaboratively, the community itself built a local and wide area 
network to link the local community to the Internet (Matthee, 
Mweemba, Pais, Rijken, & Van Stam, 2007). The network provided 
connectivity in places where there was none before. From its 
beginning in 2004, the network was always congested (Belding et al., 
2012) and the gap between supply and demand has continued to grow 
ever since (Belding, Johnson, Pejovic, & Van Stam, 2011). The use of 
this network was overwhelming. 
 
Both of these cases represent efficiency problems with service 
utilisation in underserved areas. The first case is of service utilisation 
that is underwhelming, with infrastructure for health care laying idle. 
The second case is of use that is overwhelming, with communication 
infrastructure used up to its capacity and beyond. In both cases, 
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efficiency dissipates and stakeholders become distressed. So, why do 
foreign solutions not work in rural Africa? To answer this main research 
question, this chapter examines these two case studies and asks: What 
is the common thread linking both cases? And how can solutions to their troubles 
– in health care and communications – be found?  
Methodology: Why do foreign approaches not work in Africa? 
This chapter is based on a method congruent with the extended case 
method, as described by Michael Burawoy (1998). In my time in 
Africa, I have applied and amended this method to suit my 
longitudinal academic goal: to recognise common cultural threads and 
values in an effort to understand ‘knowing' in African society. I have 
dubbed this adapted method ‘living research’ – to live with theory, in 
theory and for theory (Van Stam, 2012; 2017b). In this setting, I act 
as a perceptive, reflective, evaluative and active ‘practitioner’, seeking 
to understand how community members ‘know’ (Bigirimana, 2017). 
‘Living with theory’, Burawoy (2013) argues, takes away the 
separation between the participant and the observer, inspiring critical 
assessment of existing theory and allowing for alternative 
understandings. This approach allows for participation while 
observing and conceiving a hypothesis.  
 
The realisation of the existence of multiple realities, depending on 
one’s philosophical and epistemological lens, fuels this chapter to 
uncover foreign (Western) views and theories about an African world, 
set in normative epistemology. In previous work, Mawere and I 
(2015) pointed out the very real, and often destructive, ramifications 
of such views. Due to the messiness of reality, I do not claim that this 
chapter is universally valid. My perceptions and deductions are based 
on my happening to be at a particular place, in both time and space. 
I link my long-term and ongoing observations in Sub-Saharan Africa 
with my desire, for example, to discern new theories. My notions of 
significance – for instance, valuing the knowledge of the so-called 
subaltern – align with my aim to provide a culturally-sensitive and 
theoretically-rich narrative using reflexive research that unfolds 
interactively and retrospectively (Ingold, 2000). In this way, I 
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continuously loop between the critique of Western-dominated 
theories and practices, using evidence gathered from extended case 
studies, and confront abstract or foreign projections of an African 
world with lived experiences. Through the presentation of my work 
in local, national and international settings, I check the validity of my 
claims, while gaining an ever-evolving understanding of African 
epistemologies.  
Pathfinding 
“It has been quite a journey”4 for me, as a Western-trained engineer, 
to live, learn, and know in rural and urban areas of Southern Africa. 
Only after considerable study have I started recognising what might 
make or break the use of technology in so-called ‘underserved areas’ 
(Van Stam, 2011; 2017d). This journey has taken me almost 30 years, 
during which time I have worked as a broadcast system engineer at a 
shortwave radio station in Swaziland, a strategist in 
telecommunication systems in South Africa, and a resident expert in 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) in rural Zambia 
and Zimbabwe (IEEE TV, 2010). I have been fortunate to be 
involved with communities that use many forms of technology, for 
example, the use of local subsoils for building housing infrastructure5 
and ensuring the availability of ‘essential services’ such as water6 (Van 
Stam, 2011, p. 23) and electricity7 (Mudenda, Johnson, Parks, & Van 
Stam, 2014). I was also involved in various community enterprises 
working to produce biofuel or solve transport challenges with the use 
of aeroplanes. So-called ‘local talent’ (Bets, Van Stam, & Voorhoeve, 
 
4 A phrase borrowed from Njabulo Khumalo (2017), as he put it in the title of his 
assessment of the implementation of an information platform (DHIS2) in the 
health system in Zimbabwe. 
5 In the process, locally produced, interlocking soil-cement blocks are dry stacked 
eliminating the use of mortar, concrete or steel columns, using South African 
Hydraform block making machinery. 
6 In arid regions, like in Macha, Zambia, water provisioning requires creativity and 
perseverance, involving the sinking of deep boreholes, the purchasing, installation 
and maintenance of pumping equipment, and the development of a distribution 
network covering a wide area. 
7 Using generators and, later, grid power in Macha, or planning for biofuel in 
Chikanta or water-turbines in Kalene, Zambia. 
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2013; Van Oortmerssen & Van Stam, 2010) were at the forefront of 
these endeavours and trained information technology experts in rural 
areas (Bishi, Bishi, & Van Stam, 2016; Mudenda & Van Stam, 2012). 
They sensitised, implemented, and operated infrastructure and 
services and mobilised, at times, hundreds of people for local 
development in their respective communities (BBC Clicks, 2011).  
 
In my research, I have reflected on the different ways that we 
experience reality. In its wake, over 50 publications and a few 
dissertations were published.8 I focused on the built environment, 
mostly concerning access to ICTs, in rural areas of Zambia and 
Zimbabwe (Van Stam, 2013a; 2014), and examined “the displacement 
of technology and meaning in an African place” (Van Stam, 2017d). 
However, upon invitation by my friends in these community, I cannot 
resist sometimes taking up a screwdriver or a computer or 
participating with local engineers and other experts in facilitating 
service delivery (Toyama, 2011). Getting one’s ‘feet wet’, when 
invited by – and reporting and accountable to – local leadership, 
provides valuable and transdisciplinary inputs. In all of this, I focused 
on the nexus between community engagement, culture, and digital 
technologies. In this quest, I have seen local ‘future centres’ emerging, 
such as an eHealth laboratory that tests local and national eHealth 
services (Bishi, Shamu, Van Dijk, & Van Stam, 2017a) and have 
searched for local perspectives on how to facilitate communities in 
the use of remittances (Fulgencio, Ong’ayo, Van Reisen, Van Dijk, & 
Van Stam, 2016), TV white spaces (Gweme & Van Stam, 2016) and 
eHealth (Bishi, Shamu, Van Dijk, & Van Stam, 2017b). 
 
In this process, I quickly learnt that my skills and, especially, my 
Western-trained understanding of ‘needs’ and ‘solutions’, was 
inadequate and incomplete to provide solutions to the problems of 
these communities (Van Stam, 2012). Whatever I tried to build would 
fall to pieces, stand idle, or break within a short period of time. Hardly 
any of the activities I initiated worked, as there was always something 
 




else needed to complete it, something that was not available and 
needed sourcing from the outside world.  
 
My training and methodological understanding of how to ‘get it done’ 
was not cutting it (Mawere & Van Stam, 2015). Electric equipment 
got blown up by dirty power (Mudenda et al., 2014); the Internet 
would be available in a manner and at a cost incompatible with the 
local economy, tools and equipment; that ‘last thing’ needed to 
complete something took years to arrive; or an airplane would sink in 
the mud after a freak rainstorm. Those visiting from the outside 
seemed to be unable to keep hold of what they learnt from the 
community. I found out the truth in what the Italian Ernesto Sirolli 
bluntly, but convincingly, presented in his TED Talk: “Want to help 
someone? Shut up and listen!” (Sirolli, 2012). 
 
I recognised that my training as an engineer, with its methods of 
essentialising and categorising and its set frames for technical 
assessments, were leading me astray and preventing me from being 
part of the solution (Van Stam, 2014b). This mismatch, of course, is 
quite logical (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016a): how can anyone be part 
of sustainable development when one does not start together, does 
not share the local community’s understanding and needs, and does 
not respect the existing craftsmanship in the local community? 
Turning it around: which nation or people would welcome foreigners 
that ‘bring development’ but do not share the local understanding of 
history, culture, way of living and way of knowing? (Mawere, 2016). 
 
The question that hounds me is whether the search for 
interdisciplinary solutions for the disenfranchised is like a puzzle or a 
mystery. If it is like a puzzle, it would be a matter of sorting out all 
the available pieces, consider all available information, and finding the 
answer. However, if it is a mystery, the answer will remain elusive, 
because one would misunderstand the underlying question (Van 
Stam, 2017d, p. 51).  
 
Contemplating this issue has raised some nagging questions in my 
mind. What if science is proposing answers, or solutions, to 
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misconstrued questions? What if the methodology used to define 
problems and validate solutions in Africa settings is flawed? What if 
the dominant epistemic ‘state of mind’ used to approach and identify 
issues and guide the assessment of success is not applicable in the 
African environment? 
 
When reflecting on the dynamic interface between technology and 
culture in rural communities and its effects on meaning-making – 
taking into account the local perception of the dynamics of resource 
allocation (Sheneberger & Van Stam, 2011) – the benefits of 
technological solutions and interventions that come from the outside 
appear to be unclear and disserving in many ways. Where (who) do 
the solutions for conceptualised problems emerge from? (cf, Ahmat 
et al., 2014). In fact, who defines what the problems are? And who 
defines the divisions and system of classifications that mark the 
conceptual frames that technologists use?  
 
When I regarded the hollowness of presumed ‘solutions’ to perceived 
needs, I decided that I am dealing with a mystery rather than a puzzle.9 
When using a non-African lens, it appears that we are seeking to 
understand unknown unknowns. Therefore, the philosophy of 
science and use of dominant epistemologies needs to be reviewed. 
There is a need for science to wander into unchartered waters. 
 
Thus, my engineering research shifted to gain a better understanding 
of the question. However, I learnt that ‘questioning the question’ is 
not necessarily appreciated by engineers, especially when this 
uncovers moral and political issues, which points to the need to 
regulate technology platforms, locally and internationally.10 It is in this 
way that I started on the path of transdisciplinarity, while setting up 
intellectual camp in both the natural and social sciences. 
 
9 The revelations of Edward Snowden (Greenwald, 2014) and, for example, the 
public concern about unanticipated socio-political influence possibly exercised 
through social media and information platforms by Cambridge Analytica are 
pointers towards such a mystery in the use of the Internet and social media. 
10 In this line of thought, Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, 




Upon entering a community, and in researching needs and potential 
local solutions, I focused on building and maintaining relationships 
first (Van Stam, 2016a). In Murambinda, Zimbabwe, in the year 2000, 
it took more than six months of unstructured living in the community 
before I was able to carefully participate in local discussions about 
needs and solutions (Van Stam, 2017b). From that point onwards, I 
fervently studied the many histories, local understandings of meaning, 
complicated settings of the many stakeholders (Kroczek, Mweetwa, 
& Van Stam, 2013), and built environment in the rural communities 
in which I lived. Through such study, I endeavoured to discern 
contemporary and fruitful theories of change and their 
epistemologies that involve technology from within the communities 
themselves. I noticed the utter complexity underlying what some call 
‘underservedness’. I recognised that what is happening in 
disenfranchised areas is related to a history of being ‘othered’ (Van 
Stam, 2016b; 2016c) and, subsequently, being dominated (Van Stam, 
2017e). From my position as an engineer in Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
I found that this ‘othering orientalism’ and its handmaiden 
‘hegemonic imperialism’ remains the order of the day in 
disenfranchised environments. I started to see that many realities 
express themselves in a clash of paradigms and, subsequently, a clash 
of epistemologies (Van Stam, 2017d).  
 
To deal with the multiple realities I saw, I conceptualised three 
different paradigms (although there may be more), which those who 
I studied in rural Africa seemed to switch between (Van Stam, 2017d, 
pp. 201–203):  
 
• I-paradigm: In the ‘I-paradigm’, which exists in the context 
of globalised policies and practices, truths are predicated in 
relation to individualism and capitalism, and people interact 
the way billiard balls do. 
• We-paradigm: In the ‘We-paradigm’ one is defined as a 
derivative of the whole. This reality is set in the community 
and deals with social personhoods. 
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• It-paradigm: In the ‘It-paradigm’ one considers the inputs 
from cosmology and religious belonging.  
 
I noticed that my African friends had no problem switching between 
these realities in a matter of seconds. It sometimes took me weeks to 
be able to switch with them, especially when I would return to the 
community from a trip overseas (Van Stam, 2011).  
 
Through lots of lengthy and ongoing conversations, hard study, 
reflection and introspection and ‘living-the-life’ in rural Africa, I 
started to recognise and appreciate the local paradigms, philosophies, 
and epistemologies. I eventually understood their solidification in 
contemporary cultural expressions and the practice of local engineers. 
So sensitised, I became enthralled by the ingenuity of local engineers 
and the general agency of people to provide local solutions to local 
problems (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016a; Van Stam, 2013b; 2016a). For 
instance, I recognised that 99% of Zambia’s electricity production is 
green energy (Mudenda et al., 2014) and that mobile money 
infrastructure allows for expressions of communal love (Fulgencio et 
al., 2016; Van Stam, 2017d, Chapters 12, 15). From then on, together 
with my local, national, and international friends and collaborators, I 
committed myself to searching for pathways that make sense of what 
technology might mean in the intricate web of meanings, perceptions, 
and human relationships in disenfranchised areas in rural Africa. 
The voice of the ‘subaltern’ 
Although far between, critical voices do pop up, even in mainstream 
academic literature. In ICT, for instance, various scholars have asked: 
“are we asking the right questions?” (Gomez & Pather, 2012) and “do 
pilots really work?” (Surana et al., 2008). These are questions of 
ideology. Perhaps the most pressing of these questions is: ‘Who 
defines success?’  
 
Critical and courageous contemporary writers, notably from within 
Africa, such as Munyaradzi Mawere, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
Francis Nyamnjoh and many others, raise the issue of local agency 
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(for instance, Mawere & Awuah-Nyamekye, 2015; Ndi, 2011; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Nyamnjoh, 2012). These academics 
invariably insist on the existence of different perceptions of reality 
and success, depending on where one resides. They provide a sound 
academic basis for the idea of local, African understandings, even 
while they set their research in the context of global matrixes of 
power underpinned by Eurocentrism and coloniality.  
 
In my various works, I have shown how the local perspective in the 
areas where I lived and live – now in rural Zimbabwe – have had a 
profound impact on how I understand needs and service 
provisioning. I have made the case for the ongoing existence of 
orientalism imperialism and colonialism, which I call the ‘Terrible 
Three’ (Van Stam, 2016c; 2017d; 2017e). These predispositions affect 
and obscure the contributions of many a technologist and academic, 
both in and outside Africa.  
 
Living together and sharing resources and conversations with those 
regarded as ‘subaltern’, or, even more demeaning, generalised as being 
in the ‘Global South’ (Grosfoguel, 2010), gave me whole new realms 
of academic sensitivity and understanding of the meaning of 
technology in the communities in which I live. I had methodologically 
migrated from interdisciplinarity to transdisciplinarity (Du Plessis, 
Sehume & Martin, 2013). 
 
So, scientifically, what are some of these realities that I have found in 
rural Africa in the communities in which I have lived? And, what can 
be observed about epistemology? What approaches have been 
unearthed?  
Lessons learnt 
First of all, living and working in rural Africa, I discovered that 
technology is not only about nature – determined by its essential 
properties – but, and perhaps more profoundly, about nurture – its 
affects for humans. We are human beings networked together in 
complex relationships. Therefore, nature is to be understood in its 
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social context. It is the local cosmology, epistemology, ontology and 
methodologies that form the basis of the local, indigenous knowledge 
system that defines ‘what is’. I learnt that, in the community, 
knowledge is understood in its embodied form (Mawere & Van Stam, 
2017) and not necessarily – or not at all – as text (Van Stam, 2013d). 
For example, I noticed that network designs of community networks, 
if they existed, would be drawn up after the creation of the network. 
Designs drafted upfront were neither consulted nor adhered to, as 
they were not communally developed. Using my interdisciplinary 
handling of both the social and natural sciences, and appreciating the 
local, ever-evolving indigenous knowing, I was gaining some 
understanding and, hopefully, some wisdom. Subsequently, local 
realities started to make sense when I began to approach them from 
the local understanding of reality, set in a dynamic and integrative 
epistemology. This need to understand technology contextually is 
real; technology needs to be understood both from where it is 
conceptualised and from where it is deployed. When those 
understandings do not overlap, which often seems to be the case in 
disenfranchised areas in rural Africa, there are at least two worlds – 
two realities – to consider, one embedded in a local epistemology and 
one set in a foreign epistemology. 
 
It is in this realisation of the past and the present that the ‘where we 
are right now’ makes sense. For instance, I discovered that in many 
disenfranchised areas in Southern Africa, colonialism relied on a 
circular process of condemnation, brainwashing, and, subsequently, 
resource release linked to foreign imposed conditions (Van Stam, 
2017e). Understanding colonialism in this way I came to realise that 
such practices are still ongoing. Quite often, external experts would 
portray my local interlocutors as having essential deficits that need 
urgent intervention to solve, for instance, approaching technologies 
as relational instead of ‘being rational’. Proposed solutions would 
require foreigners to fly in from the West. Only after sufficient 
compliance was committed to – in the form of a written project 
proposal – would resources become available. Ironically, the 
resources involved might have been expropriated from Africa in the 
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first place (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016b).11 An academic friend living 
in Rwanda recognised this, and told me in early 2018: “researchers 
from abroad that often stopped by my office were almost always on 
some mission to study about Africa as if Africa was some curiosity-
ridden domain to be investigated from their elevated perspective 
from the outside” (Prof Bruce Krogh, personal communication, 
2018). 
 
Secondly, I was amazed to realise that a focus on innovation can be 
entirely counterproductive. Change brings a lot of risks and is often 
proposed with such vigour that local relationships in the community 
and with stakeholders have no time to develop or strengthen. The 
literature seems to exalt these innovations. However, the innovations 
proposed are not necessarily mapped with a local understanding of 
what is valued, are desirable practices, or can be considered a success 
(Mawere & Van Stam, 2016a). In the communities I have visited and 
lived in Southern Africa, change is the result of a collective process 
and happens gradually. Therefore, it is essential to observe the 
ordinary (Van Stam, 2016a). 
 
I learnt that the local focus is on improvisation: one works with what 
one has. Locally, engineers aim to improve on what works and neglect 
practices that are not beneficial (Van Stam, 2016a). Such a stance is 
reflected, for instance, in the current National Health Strategy of 
Zimbabwe, which states: 
 
Significant investments in health system strengthening are necessary for the health 
facilities and other service delivery and coordination platforms to function optimally. 
[...] new innovative programmes such as e-health are implemented to enhance and 
not to disrupt what has been working so far. (MoHCC, 2016, p. 61) 
 
11 In 2014, for Sub-Saharan Africa, researchers reported a yearly inflow of USD 134 
billion – in the form of loans, foreign investment and aid – and a conservatively 
calculated net outflow of USD 192 billion – mainly in profits made by foreign 
companies, tax dodging and the costs of adapting to climate change (Sharples, 
Jones, & Martin, 2014). 
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Clash of epistemologies 
The Burundian scientist Stanislas Bigirimana (2011; 2017) describes 
how normative epistemology positions externalise knowledge as 
indubitable, infallible and incorrigible. This aligns with Michael 
Burawoy’s (2009) assessment of a positive science, which relies on the 
‘4Rs’: representativeness, reactivity, reliability and replicability. These 
authors problematize these approaches as harbouring dichotomies 
and being removed from the complexity of power.  
 
The use of amended positivistic methods, such as in post-positivism 
and constructivist-interpretivist and critical-ideological methods, 
seem not to deal with the fundamental issue of regarding knowledge 
as existing separate from the knower. The results of any of these 
methods are further problematized by their dominant use, being 
focused on the individual. Maslow framed the self-actualisation of the 
individual as the central theme of human development, something 
Mawere, Mubaya, Van Reisen, and Van Stam (2016) show is 
unaligned with the reality in many African places. This consistent 
framing of ‘the individual’ and reflecting on his effectiveness or her 
self-actualisation have influenced how success measured. 
Subsequently, in line with the adage ‘what gets measured gets done’, 
the conceptualisation of technologies and reports on their 
implementation are set to echo this foreign discourse of success. 
 
Indirectly, the statesman and former Secretary-General of the United 
Nations Kofi Annan stood against such individualism. Preceding his 
passionate arguments for democracy, he commented on the politics 
of human beings, stating that “Man is born, lives and dies as a 
member of a community and the affairs of that community are 
therefore his and vice-versa” (Annan, 2017). However, dominant 
western approaches continue to put the individual at the centre. Such 
a centrality creates division, as it pitches one against the other in a 
competitive world. Individualism also raises dichotomies, where 
opposing and mutually exclusive positions are assigned to thinking 
and doing, for instance, as well as experience and 
understanding, reason and faith, knowing and knowledge, facts and 
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principles, orality and textuality, physics and thinking, practice and 
theory, and reflection and action. The resulting fights over boundaries 
have taken academic attention away from the value of integrated ways 
of knowing, often available in the form of counter-narratives. 
 
In the search for a method, I have endeavoured to understand the 
local epistemologies by gleaning inputs from African philosophies. 
Although outside the mainstream, often tough to access, and 
relatively under-researched (Van Stam, 2017d, Chapter 2), the study 
of African cultural heritage provides narratives on how meaning-
making is lived in a community. A rendering of such meaning-making, 
embedded in conversations and abundance, matured and in the 
present moment, I called the ‘Big Five’. The Big Five consists of 
‘ubuntu’ (communal love), ‘oratio’ (communicating embodied 
knowledge), ‘relatio’ (relational resource allocation), ‘dominatio’ 
(maturity through forgiveness and covenants), and ‘animatio’ (the 
continuous present moment) (Van Stam, 2017d, Chapter 14). This 
interpretation of African value orientations presents a gateway to 
understanding and knowing how many Africans sustain their cultural 
identities against the (often technology enabled) onslaught of the 
‘Terrible Three’ (orientalism, imperialism, and colonialism), which 
has led to Africa’s disenfranchisement for over 500 years. The 
epistemology of the Big Five is dynamic and integrative, 
understanding ‘knowing' as an act of the knower and ‘knowledge' as 
having emotional, intellectual, evaluating and pragmatic forms 
(Bigirimana, 2017). Methodology, of course, is subject to the 
epistemic base and philosophy of knowing and, in the case of the 
dynamic and integrative epistemology of the local community, 
methodological approaches must be subject to and aligned with the 
level of consciousness one is focusing on (Bigirimana, 2017, p. 1603). 
Unfortunately, technology research seems to undervalue methods – 
which are social constructs – that involve a dynamic and integrative 
(and thus evolving) local knowing in a community of inquiry and that 
trigger the intention to know, involving human and non-human 
inputs (for instance, ‘other beings’, as in Mawere, 2013). 
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In the land of the misunderstood 
To my relief, the literature is gradually starting to resonate with the 
kind of counter-narrative presented in this chapter. For instance, 
coming back to the rural hospital mentioned in the introduction, a 
decline in health service utilisation has been noted in Zimbabwe’s 
National Health Profile (MoHCC, 2015). The profile lists a plethora 
of social issues that may be causing this underutilisation including, for 
instance, people’s perceptions and factors like religion, culture, 
education, status, quality, accessibility, affordability and disease 
burden. Likewise, usage patterns of African community networks 
have been reported on, for instance, showing previously unexpected 
high levels of traffic between local users (Belding et al., 2011). The 
consequences of these findings, however, are not featuring in the 
literature yet. 
 
Systems designed outside of Africa are influenced by the cultures and 
histories of those who created them (Van Stam, 2016b). Without 
considering all voices, including the voice of the disenfranchised 
embedded in local epistemologies, any foreign construct is self-
validating. Blindly accepting outside definitions creates room for alien 
systems and platforms to frame and dominate local realities in Africa. 
Such a colonial act defines (but does not describe) a world in which 
control is exercised by those who control the mechanisms to do so. 
Therefore, how one views reality defines the past, present and future. 
 
Disquietingly, the quest to understand African expressions of 
technology, in its dynamic and integrated forms, is not high on 
African research agendas. To gain such an understanding, 
longitudinal interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary studies are needed, 
as well as a belief in local agency. Furthermore, the fact that realities 
in so-called ‘underserved areas' are far removed from realities in 
environments where services are available needs to be acknowledged. 
Lastly, we need to be sensitive to underlying clashes of paradigms, 
and subsequently clashes of epistemology, and the presence – and 
need for mediation – of undeserved (‘white’) privileges (Van Stam, 




I place a big question mark on the epistemological base and 
methodologies that the dominant, Western-centric academy use in so-
called underserved areas. Many, if not most, of these are not 
conceptualised or tested in the realities of the disenfranchised and, 
therefore, their applicability is not proven (Mawere & Van Stam, 
2015). However, in our current age of super-colonialism (Van Stam, 
2017e), it takes courage to stand up for counter-narratives and for the 
local desire to amplify local technologies (Mawere & Van Stam, 
2016a), using locally embodied knowing. 
 
So why do many technologies perform so mediocrely in 
disenfranchised settings? This may be due to the presence of system 
diversity, which encompasses three particular lineaments in Africa. 
When the counter-narrative is ‘diversity equals normality’, due to 
system diversity (Van Reisen, 2017), technologists are faced with 
three critically important features in many parts of Africa: 
 
• Latency: The issue of latency recognises that the transfer of 
information, whether digital or interpersonal, takes 
considerable time. Latency occurs because of the finite speed 
of light, or whatever means of transport is used, whereby the 
transfer of information takes time given the enormous 
distances to information platforms. Bits and bytes have 
thousands of kilometres to travel, and building relationships 
also involves traveling and working with all authorities. 
Getting all the permissions in order takes a significant amount 
of effort as well as time. In ICT systems, for instance, we 
noticed that in a mixed flow environment with substantial 
latency, Linux based systems outperform Windows systems 
almost ten to one over a 1 Mbps line (Johnson & Van Stam, 
2016).  
• Congestion: Due to the dominant mix of technical, 
economic and political systems, supply seems unrelated to 
demand. Although communities are used to sharing 
abundance (Sheneberger & Van Stam, 2011), technical 
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systems thriving on models of scarcity are timing out while 
communities are busy interacting.  
• Variety: Here, we recognise the enormous variety, diversity 
and richness of expressions in Africa. It seems that anything 
one can think of is available in African society and markets. 
A lot of variety exists in languages, cultures, and regulations, 
and there is an enormous range of equipment. 
 
In many parts of Africa, the reality of system diversity has been 
present for a long time. This is unlikely to change soon. Therefore, it 
is important to think about how “to enhance what has been working 
so far”, considering the prevalence of system diversity. 
A view on African critical agency 
Referring back to the two cases presented at the start of this chapter 
– one in which health services are sparsely used and the other in 
which Internet connectivity is always congested – what is the 
common thread underpinning these problems? I contend that 
underutilisation is mainly caused by ‘discontinuities of vision’, due to 
a disconnect between the normative epistemologies used by those 
initiating the hospital and the dynamic and integrative epistemologies 
of many African environments. Reviewing Africa’s extended history, 
it is clear how pre-colonial epistemologies have been overlaid and 
crowded out by a foreign normative epistemology. The systems now 
in place have emerged from an alien worldview, from the I-paradigm. 
Such systems are poorly matched with local views of continuity, 
which rely on the maintenance and expansion of human relationships 
(Sheneberger & Van Stam, 2011). Settler colonialism is long gone, but 
the normative epistemologies put in place continue to ravish 
relationships. In the first case, the underutilisation of the hospital, 
overreliance on a foreign scheme and support (to maintain it) has led 
to a disrupted vision of health. When testing counter-narratives with 
the leadership at that particular hospital, I saw eyes sparkle and heard 





In Macha, Zambia, from the outset, local ways of doing were taken 
into account (Bets et al., 2013; Van Oortmerssen & Van Stam, 2010). 
The Macha Works Theory of Change involves local talents in a 
circular and continuous process of community engagement (Van 
Stam, 2013c), workforce development, and thought leadership (Van 
Stam, 2014a). Subsequently, ‘new Macha’ was declared by members 
of the community, and the Internet and technologies facilitating 
services like community radio became desired vehicles for progress 
in community life (Mweetwa & Van Stam, 2012). 
 
So, if we want to look from the local perspective and live in the We-
paradigm, what are some aspects of the local epistemology that we 
need to understand? What did I recognise as being regarded as 
‘ordinary’ in the African settings I live and work in? Of course, there 
is no one African reality or cultural expression. However, it appears 
that the value of ubuntu is widely shared, especially in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, as expressed in the vocabulary of the Big Five, which are 
explained here:  
 
• Ubuntu: In ubuntu (or whatever word in the specific 
language12), one views existence from the perspective of the 
community (Mawere & Van Stam, 2016c).  
• Oratio: The value of oratio indicates how, in the community, 
one continuously communicates embodied knowledge 
(Mawere & Van Stam, 2017).  
• Relatio: Relatio describes how resources are allocated in 
relational fashion (Sheneberger & Van Stam, 2011).  
• Animatio: Animatio signifies the continuous present 
moment, in which one adjusts according to the way the future 
presents itself in the continuous present.  
• Dominatio: Dominatio represents the virtue of maturity, 
activating ubuntu’s conviviality through forgiveness and in 
covenants between people.  
 
 
12 For instance, ubumuntu in Rwanda (see http://www.kgm.rw). 
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I propose these perspectives on African virtues as tools for 
intellectual sensitivity – for knowing – and for use in daily encounters 
in disenfranchised African communities. These Big Five provide a 
framing for conversations on the ordinary that sustains the art of 
living and knowing in African places. 
Technology 
So, what is the effect of all this on the use of technology in solving 
problems for those in ‘underserved’ areas? ‘Living research’ (Van 
Stam, 2019) in disenfranchised communities raises questions about 
out of context research and the development of (technical) solutions. 
There is a need for sensitivity towards the opportunities created by a 
community, based on a local understanding of local requirements, as 
well as recognition of the local capacity for seizing those 
opportunities. The definition of success depends on the local context, 
epistemology, values, and agency. Techno-solutions based on 
normative epistemology and imposed on environments other than 
that in which they emerged from are problematic (Toyama, 2015). 
However, recognising the community for what it is and recognising 
what it can do opens up exciting avenues for ways ahead. 
  
While preparing this chapter, I connected with an entrepreneur in the 
southern part of Rwanda. This person breeds fish. He commented 
that his “fish team work better than any mechanised device”. He 
related how he was forced to find this out when his imported 
equipment failed to work. He explains how he dealt with the problem:  
 
I converted from paperwork to software and from clipboard mounted charts to 
handheld Internet devices. Now I have a management information system that helps 
me hone in on trouble spots, and project future feed requirements, sales income and 
cash flow. (Fish breeder, personal communication, 9 February 2018) 
 
Coming back to the health case presented here, when we regard the 
field of electronic information handling, it is clear that the current 
‘platformising’ of technologies (Van Dijck, Poell & De Waal, 2018) 
has significant effects, also for the disenfranchised. Dominant 
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information platforms such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and 
Twitter, as well as upcoming platforms such as Amazon and Alibaba, 
aim to define the information relationships that are possible. The 
normative epistemology that guides such platforms assumes to 
govern how health professionals will interact and how they will 
exchange information, as prosumers (producers and consumers) of 
knowledge, also in Africa. However, when we analyse the underlying 
commercial values that fuel these platforms and compare them to the 
communal values proposed in the Big Five it becomes clear there is 
little overlap. As a result, there is a need to empower communities to 
develop technologies and platforms that genuinely serve them. 
 
In the history of imperialism and colonialism, ‘the centre’ reifies 
realities in ‘the periphery’ (Galtung, 1971). Coming back to the case 
of the community Internet network in Zambia: when we look at the 
architecture of the Internet, it is striking that the current information-
streams overlap with the shipping routes of centuries ago (Williams, 
2017; see also Van Reisen, Mawere, Stokmans, Nakazibwe, Van Stam 
& Ong’ayo, 2019). Therefore, I propose that, in its contemporary 
structure, the Internet will continue to fuel digital exclusion as it 
inherently reproduces dichotomies and sustains power-distances, 
bringing the benefits of the periphery to the (super-colonial) centre. 
However, we can counter this imperial expropriation of information 
and define new and more just and culturally-aligned technologies that 
allow communities to benefit from their local resources, locally. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the importance of one’s epistemic position in 
defining solutions to supposed areas of need. Its explanatory 
perspective calls for recognition of the implicit intent and explicit 
capacity of both the community and technologists. When we are 
decolonised and switch to the We-paradigm – to the community (Van 
Stam, 2017c) – and reason from a dynamic and integrative 
epistemology, technologists become intending inquirers, and can 
function in facilitating and mentoring roles to assist local talents to 
achieve their collective and individual potential through local 
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renderings of technology (Bets et al., 2013; Mawere & Van Stam, 
2016a). Without such an attitude and orientation, I believe that the 
impact of technology is minimal at best (Marais, 2011) and can 
amplify unintended negative consequences that are detrimental to the 
agency and strength of the local community (e.g., such as human 
trafficking, see Van Reisen et al., 2017). 
 
Accepting foreign solutions for problems in disenfranchised 
communities can put such communities under a foreign spell (Van 
Stam, 2017a) and undermine their agency. Technology is valuable 
only as a servant in “the amplification of human intent” (Toyama, 
2015). Only if we first seek to know local human intent can 
technology be of use. A transdisciplinary approach that considers 
both nature (engineering) and nurture (humanities) brings to light that 
relationships and local knowing are just as substantial as the resulting 
technologies (Bateson, 1979).  
 
In my research, recognising the clash of epistemologies, I have found 
that the notion that people who barge in with ideas (the innovators 
or disruptors) are the ones who will make a difference is flawed. In 
this chapter, I hope to have shed some light on the mystery of 
knowing and facilitated an understanding of the existence of local 
perceptions of reality. I also hope to have offered guidance, by way 
of the Big Five, for those seeking to align with rural African 
communities to find solutions to their problems, as they define them, 
not as outsiders see them, by recognising local ways of meaning-
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Continuation of Care across Borders: Providing 
Health Care for People on the Move in East Africa 
 
Dorothy Muroki, Boniface Kitungulu & Leanne Kamau 
 
Introduction 
African borders are living places in which communities belong to, and 
often span, the border areas. 
People move, work and live 
across borders. However, 
essential services, such as 
health care, are nationally 
organised, which poses 
challenges in serving mobile 
communities across borders. 
Moreover, borders have 
traditionally been 
marginalised areas that are 
not highly prioritised in 
national policy 
implementation. This 
chapter investigates the 
challenges that emerge in the 
border areas, particularly 
when people move across 
borders, and the difficulties 
regarding the accessibility of 
health services. The main 
question addressed in this 
chapter is: What are the challenges involved in providing health services in cross 
border areas? The investigation on which this chapter is based was 
People on the move may need to access 
health services in countries other than 
their own – and it is important that they 
can, as their mobility can increase the 
spread of communicable diseases. 
However, access to health care outside the 
home country can be complicated: people 
on the move often do not have time to wait 
for results and are not available for follow 
up. This study looks at cross-border 
communities in five East Africa 
Community countries to determine the 
challenges in providing health care to 
people moving across borders. It finds 
that health programmes are country 
specific and nationally administered, 
giving rise to a need to integrate health 
services and patient follow up to ensure 
the continuation of care across the region. 
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carried out as part of the Cross-Border Health Integrated Partnership 
Project13 in East Africa. 
 
Border towns are generally poorly served by national health 
programmes, in part due to the reluctance of governments on either 
side of the border to provide services to non-nationals. Although 
border populations report seeking services across national borders, 
there is a shortage of data on this transnational access due to a lack 
of harmonised health services in East African Community partner 
states. No formal cross-border coordination structures exist, and 
there is a lack of formal referral and patient monitoring mechanisms 
across borders. As a result, the health outcomes of cross-border 
populations are likely to be compromised due to missed 
appointments, poor treatment adherence, multiple registration in 
different facilities, and loss-to-follow-up, especially in HIV and 
tuberculosis (TB) care and treatment.  
 
To investigate these issues further, this study was conducted among 
vulnerable populations at cross-border sites in five East African 
Community partner states: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda. The study looked at vulnerable women and girls, female sex 
workers, men who have sex with men, people who inject drugs, 
people living with HIV, long distance truck drivers and their 
assistants, clearing and forwarding agents, and fisherfolk. Health care 
workers and policymakers in facilities located within a 10 km radius 
of the cross-border sites were also included in the study. 
 
Marginalised and underserved border areas, with weak health care 
systems, undermine global health security, because of their capacity 
to act as incubation sanctuaries for infectious diseases such as HIV 
and TB. Pockets of high-risk populations in cross-border areas are 
key bridges for HIV transmission to the general population. It is 
hoped that this chapter will prompt further research and 
 
13 The Cross-Border Health Integrated Partnership Project/FHI 360 is funded by 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The authors are 
engaged in the implementation of the research under the programme. 
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collaboration so that we can better respond to the challenges involved 
in providing health services for mobile communities living in cross-
border areas in East Africa, as well as more broadly in other parts of 
Africa. 
Health risks among mobile communities in East Africa 
The road transport corridors in East Africa are economic lifelines that 
link Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan, 
which form the East African Community. However, this extensive 
road network, which links major cities and business hubs with border 
areas from one country to another, is also a major transmission route 
for HIV (East African Community, 2015). Surveys in the region have 
indicated that, compared to the general population, HIV prevalence 
is higher for some sub-populations concentrated along these routes, 
including female sex workers, men who have sex with men, people 
who inject drugs, long distance truck drivers, fisherfolk, and 
vulnerable women and girls. In Burundi, for example, data shows a 
HIV prevalence of 21.3% among female sex workers and 4.8% 
among men who have sex with men, compared to 1.1% in the general 
population (15–49 year olds) (UNAIDS, 2017a). In Kenya, HIV 
prevalence among men who have sex with men was estimated to be 
18.2%, among female sex workers 29.3%, and among people who 
inject drugs 18.7%, compared to 4.9% among the general population 
(NASCOP, 2014). In Uganda, estimates put the prevalence of HIV 
among female sex workers at 34.2%, men who have sex with men at 
13.2%, and people who inject drugs at 26.7%, compared to only 5.9% 
in the general population (UNAIDS, 2017b).  
 
Wet border areas such as lake regions also report high levels of HIV 
and TB. For instance, populations in and around Lake Victoria 
(estimated at 1.7 million) often live in isolated, difficult to reach areas, 
which serve as incubation pockets for infectious diseases. These 
populations have a HIV prevalence 2–4 times national averages 
(NASCOP, 2014), report high levels of HIV/TB co-infection rates 
(40–60%), and lower HIV/TB treatment retention (up to 75% are 
lost to follow-up). A HIV prevalence of 15% and 21% was reported 
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among young women and girls and female fisherfolk, respectively, in 
Mbita and Rusinga Island, Kenya, where national prevalence is 4.9% 
(Measure Evaluation, 2017). 
 
Several factors drive HIV transmission along land and wet border 
areas, including mobility, economic vulnerabilities pushing women 
into transactional sex, multiple concurrent sexual partnerships, 
substance abuse, gender-based violence, and poor access to quality 
health services including HIV services. For mobile workers, especially 
transport workers, extended periods away from home and family, 
delays at border crossings, boredom, and increased opportunities for 
sex with multiple partners have been found to contribute to an 
elevated risk of contracting HIV (World Bank, 2009). One study 
found that long-distance transport workers in East Africa had an 
annual average of 2.8 sexual partners (Morris & Ferguson, 2007). 
Contact with local communities and sub-groups such as sex workers 
also increases vulnerability to HIV for both the mobile transport 
workers and host communities (Measure Evaluation, 2017). 
Health services in cross border areas 
Research on cross-border populations in the region shows that the 
prevalence of HIV is high in cross-border and transport corridor 
sites. One study, which looked at female sex workers in ‘hotspots’ in 
Kenya and on the Kenya-Uganda and Tanzania-Uganda borders 
found HIV prevalence to be as high as 24% (Measure Evaluation, 
2017). Several factors were found to contribute to the increased risk 
of HIV infection in the cross-border areas, including the 
phenomenon of ‘mobile men with money’, socioeconomic disparities 
and lack of alternative income-earning opportunities for vulnerable 
women and girls in the host communities, and vibrant entertainment 
venues, which all encourage risky sexual relationships for both men 
and women. 
 
Because transport corridors and cross-border towns in East Africa 
are generally poorly served by national health programmes, some 
border posts have no health services at all (IOM, 2013). Where they 
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exist, many health facilities lack enough medicine and other supplies 
and have limited human resources. In addition, there are no systems 
to track the services provided to people across borders, increasing the 
risk of poor treatment adherence, multiple registration, and loss-to-
follow-up of patients, especially in HIV and TB care and treatment. 
 
One study found that along the transport corridors in the five East 
African Community partner states, the vast majority of health 
facilities reported providing HIV counselling and testing services, but 
less than half provided HIV treatment services and the majority did 
not have specific information and education materials for key 
populations (East African Community, 2015). Furthermore, less than 
a third of facilities offered TB treatment or rapid TB screening and 
testing. Also, while the majority of the facilities provided condoms 
and sexually transmitted infection (STI) screening and treatment, 
fewer than a quarter conducted screening and treatment for hepatitis 
B and C and cervical cancer. Another study concluded that, although 
by 2011 some donor-funded initiatives along the transport corridor 
targeted key and vulnerable populations, “the collective impact of the 
effort [was] minimal” (IOM, 2011a) and undermined by its limited 
geographical scope and focus (IOM, 2011b).  
 
Subsequently, these groups report poor access to health services 
along the transport corridors. For instance, in Kenya, 70% of sex 
workers and truck drivers at five truck stops had never received 
information on HIV (IOM, 2011a). Some population groups also 
have better access to health services than others; for example, truck 
drivers and their assistants and female sex workers reported more 
frequent access to health services than people who inject drugs (East 
African Community, 2015). Measure Evaluation (2017) found that 
even where services exist, cross-border populations face other 
barriers in seeking care, including distance from the facility, 
inconvenient opening hours, cost/having to pay for services, and 
concerns about the attitudes of health care workers. Bogart et al. 
(2016) found that the cost of transport was the highest barrier for 
fisherfolk accessing care, as well as the scarcity of facilities in 




Mobile populations also sometimes find that they cannot access any 
health services, or they must seek episodic care at health facilities, 
which are often not equipped to provide the scope and quality of 
services they need, leading to failure to complete prescribed 
treatment, incomplete and unreliable medical records, and disrupted 
preventive care (East African Community, 2015). For instance, 
among fisherfolk, it has been observed that their need to move to 
new areas seasonally to find the best source of fish impedes timely 
access to HIV care and their ability to get enough treatment to last 
for months at a time while they are traveling (Bogart et al., 2016). Lack 
of time is also a barrier; Bogart et al. (2016) found that fishermen often 
decided not to seek care if they felt that they did not have enough 
time, and the need to earn money and keep their jobs often 
outweighed the need to get treatment for illness.  
 
Mobility undermines treatment adherence monitoring, especially for 
TB and HIV, as patients cannot be tracked by health providers while 
on the move (IOM, 2013). Morris and Ferguson (2007) found that 
the majority of long-distance truck drivers preferred to seek care for 
STI treatment in private health facilities, some public facilities and 
pharmacies, with the largest proportion attending private facilities 
where they did not have to wait, but where adherence monitoring was 
not possible. 
 
In summary, health services across East African Community partner 
states are not harmonised and there are no formal cross-border health 
coordination structures to address the needs of vulnerable and key 
populations along border areas. In addition, national differences in 
policies and legal frameworks related to health services undermine 
efforts to ensure the continuity of HIV and AIDS care across borders. 
All of these factors place the health of vulnerable mobile 
communities in cross-border areas at risk. 
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Research methodology  
Between 2015 and 2017, research was conducted at cross-border sites 
in five East African Community states – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, and Uganda – to determine the availability and accessibility 
of health and HIV and AIDS services for key and vulnerable 
populations (Table 4.1). These were selected as strategic cross-border 
sites recognised as HIV transmission ‘hotspots’ along the transport 
corridors. The investigation looked at: the mobility and sexual 
behaviour of members of the target population (including 
engagement in transactional sex); the health-seeking behaviour of 
members of the target population; health services received across 
borders; and barriers and facilitators affecting access to health and 
HIV/AIDS services among members of target population. 
 
Table 4.1. Assessment sites in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda 
 
Border site Land border site Wet border site 
Kenya-Uganda 
border 
Busia and Malaba 
(Kenya and Uganda)  
Sio Port and Port 





Taveta (Kenya), Holili 
(Tanzania) 
Kirongwe and Muhuru 









- Kabonga (Burundi) 
 
Integrated health surveys were conducted using a cross-sectional 
design to collect data from members of the target population and 
health care workers. In addition, key informant interviews were 
conducted with health care workers and managers and focus group 
discussions and in-depth interviews with members of target 




Combined, the integrated health surveys had a sample of 9,117 
respondents comprising: 1,904 vulnerable women and girls; 2,155 
female sex workers; 281 men who have sex with men; 350 people 
who inject drugs; 1,379 people living with HIV; 955 long distance 
truck drivers and their assistants; 461 clearing and forwarding agents; 
and 1,632 fisherfolk. The sample was distributed across the five 
countries, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The study also included 275 




Figure 4.1. Key and vulnerable groups sample distribution by country (N=9,117) 
 
The respondents were selected as follows:  
 
• Female sex workers, men who have sex with men and people 
who inject drugs: Respondent-driven sampling was used.  
• Vulnerable women and girls: Potential respondents were 15–
24 year olds, assessed to be economically vulnerable. Simple 
random sampling was used to select households for the study, 
and a vulnerability checklist applied to select eligible women 
and girls. Vulnerability criteria included being out-of-school, 
married or pregnant/had children, or were the head of 
household.  
• People living with HIVs: Identified and recruited through the 













antiretroviral therapy care and treatment services. Simple 
random sampling was used to identify potential respondents 
from the client registers.  
• Long distance truck drivers and clearing and forwarding 
agents: Consecutive sampling was used to recruit respondents 
as they arrived at border points and work places until the 
complete sample was achieved.  
• Fisherfolk: Time location cluster sampling was used with a 
two-stage sampling procedure to select respondents from this 
sub-group. Health care workers and facility in-charges were 
selected at health facilities located within a 10 km radius of 
the cross-border sites. These were recruited on site by 
research assistants and interviewed upon consent. 
 
The data was collected using tablets pre-loaded with the study tools.14 
Once completed, the data was transferred electronically and stored in 
a central database for analysis and reporting. Data management and 
analysis was conducted using Stata software. The qualitative data was 
analysed using a thematic framework in NVivo10. Analysis was done 
separately for different countries and by population.  
 
14 The research tools used were: exit face-to-face structured interviews with people 
living with HIV; face-to-face and venue-based interviews, using a structured 
questionnaire with men who have sex with men, female sex workers, people who 
inject drugs, fisherfolk, long distance truck drivers, clearing and forwarding agents 
and vulnerable women and girls; individual face-to-face interviews using a 
structured questionnaire with facility in-charges and health care workers from 
family planning clinics, HIV clinics, outpatient departments, STI clinics, TB clinics 
and records departments; an inventory checklist administered to health facility 
managers and health care workers to catalogue equipment and supplies in all 
facilities in each site as part of functional quality assessment; and health 
records/document review using the District Health Information System (DHIS2) 
and other relevant records to assess the utilisation of health services at the facilities. 
No personal identifying information was collected. Aggregate data on people 
accessing HIV and AIDS services; maternal, newborn and child health; and STI, 
TB, family planning and reproductive health services were collated and 
disaggregated by gender, age and target population. Permission to review health 
records was sought from ministries of health at national and local levels in all sites.  
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Mobility and sexual behaviour  
Among the vulnerable women and girls, mobility characteristics 
varied by country.15 In Rwanda, over half of the girls (57%) had lived 
at the border site for more than six years and about 42% were born 
there. In Kenya, only 9% were born at the border sites and 43% had 
lived there for two years or less. In Tanzania and Uganda, nearly all 
were born at the study site – 88% in Tanzania and 85% in Uganda. 
In Uganda, about 28% reported having crossed the border into the 
neighbouring country more than 3 times in the 12 months prior to 
the survey.  
 
Except in Ugandan sites where the majority were born in the cross-
border site, most of the female sex workers in the other sites had 
come from elsewhere. The study found a lot of movement away from 
the usual place of residence (cross-border areas) among female sex 
workers. For instance, among female sex workers in Uganda, about 
three quarters (74%) reported that they planned to travel outside their 
usual county/district of residence within the next three months, with 
84% planning to travel for sex work. The main reason for travelling 
elsewhere by female sex workers in Kenya was sex work. 
 
Female sex workers also reported frequent cross-border travel in the 
study sites in four of the five countries,16 mostly for sex work. In 
Uganda and Tanzania, 50% and 29%, respectively, of the female sex 
workers interviewed reported that they had travelled out of the 
country for sex work, while in Rwanda, 35% said that they crossed 
the border to the neighbouring country every week. In Burundi, while 
over half of the female sex workers said they had never crossed the 
border, 25% (6 out of 24) of those who said they had, did so at least 
every month. 
 
There were equally high levels of mobility among men who have sex 
with men for reasons that included sex work and visiting sexual 
partners. In Uganda, a large proportion (93%) were planning to travel 
 
15 The Burundi sample did not include vulnerable women and girls. 
16 Respondents in Kenya were not asked about cross-border travel. 
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away from their usual district of residence within the next three 
months. In Kenya, 8% of those who planned to travel away from 
their district of residence in the next three months said they would be 
travelling for sex work. 
 
Among fisherfolk, data on mobility was only available for Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Burundi, where results show that the majority of the 
fisherfolk interviewed often slept away from home, mostly on fishing 
business or visiting relatives. The proportion of those who reported 
often sleeping away from home was 54% in Tanzania, 79% in 
Uganda, and 82% in Burundi. The period away from home varied 
widely, from 1 week for 41% of the respondents in Tanzania, to 7–
13 days for 16% of the Uganda respondents, and 3 months for 13% 
of Burundi respondents. The results also show that cross-
border/transnational movement is frequent among the respondents 
in this group. In Tanzania, 60% of the respondents reported having 
crossed the border to the neighbouring country before, with 11% 
crossing every week. In Burundi, 40% reported that they cross the 
border to the neighbouring country every month, and 12% every 
week.  
 
Among long distance truck drivers in Tanzania and Uganda,17 when 
the same question was asked, 64% and 84%, respectively, said that 
they had been driving long distance trucks for over five years, but 
while the average duration of a single road trip in the entire Uganda 
sample was under four days, 23% of the Tanzania group were on the 
road for over eight days on any one trip. In addition, 95% of the 
Tanzanian respondents and 74% in Uganda often went to other 
towns not necessarily on the transport corridor, showing their high 
level of mobility.  
 
In Tanzania, about half of the clearing and forwarding agents who 
took part in the research had lived at the border sites for over five 
years, and 52% travelled to other towns for work. In Rwanda, 32.7% 
 




of the clearing and forwarding agents interviewed had lived in the area 
for six or more years; of those who came from elsewhere, 56.3% 
returned home more than once a year. 
Reported engagement in transactional sex 
Among the people living with HIV, sex work was also one of the 
reasons some travelled out of their usual district of residence. In 
Rwanda, a third (31%) of the people living with HIV interviewed gave 
sex work as the reason they travelled out of their district. In Kenya 
and Uganda, the proportions traveling for sex work were 29% and 
36% respectively. None of the people living with HIV in Tanzania 
and Burundi appear to be engaged in commercial sex – none reported 
travelling for sex work or receiving goods or cash in exchange for sex. 
 
Although most vulnerable women and girls did not report engaging 
in commercial/transactional sex, in Uganda 18% said they had 
received goods or money in exchange for sex and 3.4% said that sex 
work was the main reason they had travelled outside the district in the 
previous three months. Transactional sex was also reported by a small 
proportion of fisherfolk: 17% in Tanzania, 12% in Uganda, and 11% 
in Burundi said they had received gifts/goods or money in exchange 
for sex in the three months before the survey. In Uganda, 56% of the 
people who inject drugs had more than one sexual partner and 38% 
had received or given money or goods in exchange for sex within the 
last three months.18 Data regarding the sexual behaviour of long-
distance truck drivers is not available, except in Tanzania, where 36% 
of the respondents said that they had exchanged goods or cash for 
sex in the three months prior to the survey. Among the clearing and 
forwarding agents, 9% in Tanzania and 14% in Uganda reported 
having received or given cash or goods for sex in the previous three 
months. 
 
While the data shows that most vulnerable women and girls did not 
report engaging in commercial/transactional sex, in Uganda 18% said 
they had received goods or money in exchange for sex and 3.4% said 
 
18 This question was not asked of the Kenya group. 
97 
 
that sex work was the main reason they had travelled outside the 
district in the previous three months. In Tanzania, 42% of the 
vulnerable women and girls reported that they were engaged in cross-
generational sexual relationships. Transactional sex was also reported 
by a small proportion of fisherfolk. Asked if they had received 
gifts/goods or money in exchange for sex in the three months before 
the survey, 17% of the fisherfolk respondents in Tanzania, 12% in 
Uganda, and 11% in Burundi said they had. In Uganda, 56% of the 
people who inject drugs had another sexual partner(s), and 38% had 
received or given money or goods in exchange for sex within the last 
three months.19 Data regarding the sexual behaviour of long distance 
truck drivers is not available, except in Tanzania, where 36% of the 
respondents said that they had exchanged goods or cash for sex in 
the three months prior to the survey.  
 
Among the people living with HIV, sex work was also one of the 
reasons some travelled out of their usual district of residence. In 
Rwanda, a third (31%) of the people living with HIV interviewed gave 
sex work as the reason they travelled out of their district. In Kenya 
and Uganda, the proportions traveling for sex work were 29% and 
36% respectively. None of the people living with HIV in Tanzania 
and Burundi appear to be engaged in commercial sex – none reported 
travelling for sex work or receiving goods or cash in exchange for sex. 
Among the clearing and forwarding agents, 9% in Tanzania and 14% 
in Uganda reported having received or given cash or goods for sex in 
the previous three months. 
Health seeking behaviour 
To examine the health seeking behaviour of the study population, 
participants were asked what service they had sought the last time 
they went to a health facility and whether they had received it. The 
data shows that while treatment for common illnesses was the leading 
service sought during the last visit to a health facility by most 
vulnerable women and girls, there were also some remarkable 
variations. While more vulnerable women and girls in Tanzania 
 
19 This question was not asked of the Kenya group. 
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sought antenatal care and new-born services (55%), in Uganda more 
vulnerable women and girls sought STI treatment (61%) and in 
Kenya most sought HIV testing services (44%).  
 
Most of the female sex workers who sought health care services 
across all the cross-border sites needed treatment for common 
illnesses and HIV testing services. The highest proportion of female 
sex workers seeking HIV testing services was in Tanzania (32%) and 
Kenya (26%), while in Kenya and Burundi, the proportions were 
about 18% and 17%, respectively, and 14% in Rwanda. Demand for 
STI services was relatively low and was highest among female sex 
workers in Uganda (15%), Tanzania (14%) and Rwanda (13%). The 
services that were least demanded by this group across all sites were 
pregnancy testing, services for post-abortion care, services for sexual 
and gender-based violence, TB drug refills, substance abuse 
counselling, nutrition counselling, and screening for non-
communicable diseases. Overall, the majority of the female sex 
workers said that they received the services they sought at the facility 
during their previous visit. 
 
While the majority of the men who have sex with men across the 
three countries20 where data was available sought treatment for 
common illnesses, a large majority in Kenya (71%) and about a third 
in Uganda (29%) sought HIV testing services. Comparatively, only 
10% of the respondents in Rwanda sought HIV testing services. The 
results also suggest that health facilities may not be a 
popular/common source of condoms for this group, as very few 
reported seeking this service: 12% in Uganda, 2% in Kenya and none 
in Rwanda. In addition, except for Uganda (28%), very few of the 
men who have sex with men went to a facility for lubricants (10% in 
Kenya and 7% in Rwanda). STI services were equally in very low 
demand among this group across the three countries: highest in 
Kenya at only 10%, compared to 5% and 7% in Uganda and Rwanda, 
respectively. 
 
20 Data on men who have sex with men in this study was only collected in Kenya, 




The results show that in three of the five countries, fisherfolk most 
frequently sought treatment for common illnesses (Tanzania 60%; 
Uganda 83%; Rwanda 80%). Demand for laboratory services by this 
group was high only in Burundi (40%) and Tanzania (37%) and 
negligible in the other countries. Demand for HIV testing services 
was highest in Kenya (54%),21 followed by Tanzania (23%) and under 
10% in the other countries. Only in Uganda did a notable proportion 
seek STI services (15%) – in other countries, the demand was 
negligible. Demand for condoms, antenatal care and family planning 
services was low across the five countries.  
 
In Uganda, the most commonly sought service by people who inject 
drugs was for the treatment of common illnesses (79%), while in 
Kenya, it was HIV testing services (40%). About a third (33%) of the 
respondents in Kenya also sought treatment for common illness, 
while 16% and 9% in Uganda and Kenya, respectively, sought 
laboratory services (16%). Demand for other services was negligible 
among this group.  
 
Over 60% of people living with HIV across the five countries studied 
needed antiretroviral refills at their last visit to a health facility. 
Treatment for common illnesses and laboratory services were also in 
moderate demand. In sharp contrast to the other countries, 57% of 
the people living with HIV in Kenya required antenatal care and 
newborn care services, and 42% in Uganda required STI services. For 
both services, demand was almost nil in other countries. Negligible 
proportions of respondents needed TB services, condoms, family 
planning and nutrition services. The majority of people living with 
HIV reported receiving the services they needed during their last visit 
to a health facility.  
 
 
21 Data is available for only one site in Kenya (Sio Port and Lake Victoria), where 
fisherfolk were sampled. 
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The results show that in Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda, long distance 
truck drivers and their assistants22 sought treatment for common 
illnesses more than any other service. The highest proportion seeking 
HIV testing services was in Kenya (30%). Demand for other services 
was low, under 10% in most cases. 
 
A significant proportion of the clearing and forwarding agents23 in 
Kenya (68%), Rwanda (58%) and Uganda (42%) sought treatment for 
common illness. More clearing and forwarding agents in Kenya (76%) 
needed HIV testing services than in any other country; in Uganda and 
Rwanda, only 25% and 9%, respectively, sought HIV testing services. 
In Uganda and Rwanda, 25% and 15%, respectively, sought 
laboratory services. Demand for antenatal care and newborn services, 
STI treatment, antiretroviral refills, and condom services was almost 
negligible among this group.  
Health care services received across the border 
Respondents were asked whether they had sought health care services 
from facilities located across the border in a neighbouring country in 
the six months before the survey. In Uganda, 44% of men who have 
sex with men and nearly a third of the people who inject drugs (29%) 
said they had sought services across the border in the last six months, 
as had 25% of long distance truck drivers, 16% of female sex workers 
and 17% of fisherfolk. The majority of these sought services for the 
treatment of common illnesses. In Uganda, men who have sex with 
men had also sought condoms (22%) and lubricants (42%) across the 
border. Vulnerable women and girls in Uganda were the only group 
who sought antenatal care and newborn care across the border (29%).  
 
The results show that seeking health care services across the border 
is not common in the Burundi study site (Kabonga). Only 16% of 
 
22 The data from Tanzania was incomplete and was, therefore, not included in this 
analysis. No long distance truck drivers were included in the Burundi sample. 
23 No clearing and forwarding agents were sampled in Burundi. The Tanzania 
clearing and forwarding agents sample had only 23 respondents, of whom only 9 
had sought services from a health facility. The sample was dropped from further 
analysis due to the small number of respondents. 
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fisherfolk, 8% of female sex workers and 5% of people living with 
HIV reported that they had ever sought health care services across 
the border. Of the fisherfolk who did, 15% sought laboratory 
services. In Rwanda, about a quarter of long-distance truck drivers 
had sought health services across the border, as well as 15% of female 
sex workers and 17% of vulnerable women and girls. Of those who 
did, more than 65% sought treatment and laboratory services. In 
Kenya, varying proportions of the different groups in the five sites 
sought health services in the neighbouring country from where they 
lived. The highest proportion of those who had accessed services 
across the border in the previous six months were female sex workers 
in Taveta (18%), vulnerable women and girls in Taveta (16%) and 
long-distance truck drivers in Busia (17%), mostly for the treatment 
of common illnesses. Lower cost, proximity and the better quality of 
services were cited as the main reasons for seeking services across the 
border. 
Barriers and facilitators affecting access to health and 
HIV/AIDS services  
The survey results, as well as the findings of the formative 
assessments conducted in the five countries, provide some insight 
into the factors that affect the ability of key and vulnerable 
populations in the region to fully benefit from available health care 
services. These factors are discussed here. 
Lack of insurance cover and perceived high cost of care 
In Rwanda, the formative assessment revealed that lack of money to 
subscribe to Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI) was a key 
barrier in seeking care. Female sex workers, vulnerable women and 
girls, and people living with HIV on the Rwanda side of the border 
with Uganda reported that they sought services in Uganda and paid 
directly out of pocket because they were not members of the 
insurance programme. In Tanzania, qualitative interviews revealed 
that key populations prefer the Community Health Fund, which 
caters for people in the informal sector and rural areas and is seen as 
more affordable, than the national health insurance fund. In Burundi, 
the results also show that the majority of fisherfolk and female sex 
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workers paid for services directly, mostly out of pocket. In Kenya, 
over half of the respondents said they paid directly for services, even 
paying for drugs separately and out of pocket in most cases. The 
results also show that ‘reasonable’ cost was the key factor for most 
respondents in choosing facilities for care, including those who 
sought services across the border in neighbouring countries. For 
instance, in Holili, Tanzania it was reported that many patients from 
Kenya cross the border into Tanzania for cheaper health services, 
because services in Kenya were deemed very expensive:  
 
The cost for services here is very fair and even the clients who come from Kenya find 
it easy to pay for the health services because the exchange rate is very friendly […] 
with KES [Kenyan shilling] 100 (USD 1), they are able to get a good amount of 
money. (Key informant interview, health facility in-charge, Busia, Kenya) 
 
Hence, differences in costs for health services may steer health-
seeking behaviour across borders. As a result health services on one 
side of the border may be overextended. 
Mobility and time taken waiting for services 
Being on the move was noted to be a barrier to accessing health care 
services among long distance truck drivers and a major hazard in 
adherence to treatment: 
 
For truck drivers who may be HIV positive, some of them may have challenges 
accessing HIV services because they are mobile. It might happen that the day when 
they should be going to the clinic, they have been assigned to travel outside the country. 
So, it becomes very difficult for the truck driver to access such services. (Focus group 
discussion, long distance truck drivers, Malaba, Kenya)  
 
Time taken waiting at the health facility for services was also of major 
concern, and the majority of respondents in the Kenya sample found 
the time taken to be too long. Nearly all the female sex workers and 
some of the long distance truck drivers found the time taken waiting 
for services too long. In Tanzania, delays and long waiting times in 
public health facilities were reported in the formative assessment as 
one of the reasons for not visiting health facilities. 
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Inadequate quality of services 
The perceived low quality of services and lack of drugs was also seen 
as a barrier to accessing health care services in the study. For instance, 
in Rwanda, focus group discussants felt that the services provided 
were of low quality, the drug supply was inadequate and there were 
limited staff at the facilities. Some facilities were also seen as located 
in far off areas that took time to get to. In Kenya, it was reported that 
some of the facilities in the survey did not have drugs available – in 
one site (Busia), over 50% of the men who have sex with men and 
nearly half of the people who inject drugs did not get drugs at the 
facility. Two other sites (Taveta and Malaba) also had many 
respondents reporting not having received drugs during their last visit 
to a facility. 
Perceived stigma and fear  
Perceived stigma and fear due to the criminalisation of specific 
behaviours and practices, such as homosexuality, sex work and 
injecting drug use, was reported as another factor hindering people 
from seeking services. Some of the participants in focus group 
discussions reported that they felt discriminated against and 
stigmatised and this affected their willingness to seek health care 
services. In Uganda, for example, some sex workers, men who have 
sex with men and people living with HIV reported that they were 
regularly exposed to extremely negative, discriminatory and hostile 
reactions from health workers, which discouraged them from seeking 
care in public facilities: “They tell you to wait outside and that you 
want me to touch your rubbish and you are the ones destroying our 
marriages” (Focus group discussion, female sex workers, Busia, 
Uganda). Another respondent said: 
 
As you know if we go to the main hospitals, most of us, we are likely not to share 
the problem, so at least if you go to a clinic you tell the nurse instead of the main 
hospital where you can be a story. (Interview, men who have sex with men, 
Busia, Uganda) 
 
On the other hand, factors that facilitate seeking health care were 
identified as friendly health care providers, good quality services, and 
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easily accessible facilities, as well as prompt services. For instance, in 
Tanzania, the perceived good quality of services was a key reason why 
respondents chose the facilities they did and was cited as a reason by 
nearly half (48%) of the female sex workers, 67% of fisherfolk and 
27% of long-distance truck drivers. Easy physical access was also 
cited as a key reason for choosing a facility, by 61% of the female sex 
workers, 47% of fisherfolk and 74% of people living with HIV in 
Tanzania. In Kenya, most of the respondents chose a facility close to 
home (less than half an hour away). For long distance truck drivers, 
besides location, convenient opening hours was also a key factor in 
facility choice. ‘Reasonable’ cost and not having to pay directly for 
services was mentioned as important in choosing a point of care – 
most respondents were attracted to facilities that were perceived to 
charge reasonable or no fees for services. 
Conclusion 
Cross border mobility is a neglected area in research despite the 
substantial level of mobility in today’s world. In particular, health care 
needs in cross border areas are significant and specific to different 
types of cross border communities. Mobility affects health through 
mobility-related life-patterns, and the utilisation of health care 
facilities by mobile populations affects treatment. Some of the 
problems with health care for cross border communities include 
incomplete patient records of users and lack of completion of 
prescribed treatment due to lack of follow up or unavailability of 
treatment. These problems, and others, are not sufficiently addressed 
by the current health programmes in the region, which are 
administered nationally. Accordingly, this chapter looked at the 
challenges involved in providing health services for mobile 
communities in cross borders areas. It examined the relationship 
between the cross border mobility of these groups and their sexual 
behaviour, as well as their access to health care (health seeking 
behaviour, health care services received across the border, and 




The study was carried out among 9,117 individuals in 12 cross-border 
sites in the East African Community countries of Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The participants in this survey were 
from the following groups: female sex workers; men who have sex 
with men; people who inject drugs; vulnerable young women and 
girls; people living with HIVs; long distance truck drivers and clearing 
and forwarding agents; fisherfolk; and health care workers. The study 
found that many members of these groups are engaging in 
transactional sex and traveling for sex work, which increases the 
spread of communicable diseases in cross border areas. Most of the 
respondents reported seeking health services for common illnesses, 
as well as HIV testing services and laboratory services, and to a lesser 
extent antenatal care and newborn services, STI treatment, 
antiretroviral refills, and condom services. Although there appears to 
be high levels of access to health care services, factors such as the 
quality of health care influence where individuals preferred to access 
services. In addition, the proportion of target groups seeking health 
care services across borders is considerable, suggesting the need to 
adopt and implement a standard package of health services, targeted 
at mobile and border communities across all the countries in the East 
African region. It is worth noting that in some of the sites, quality of 
care was not a major factor in respondents’ choice of preferred health 
facility. A key barrier in seeking health care services in the region 
appears to be the cost of services and having to pay for services (lack 
of insurance), cited in both the survey and qualitative interviews. 
Other barriers include mobility and time waiting, quality of services, 
lack of drugs, and perceived stigma.  
 
This study highlights the importance of understanding the health risks 
and needs of cross border mobile communities, which can vary for 
different groups and in different countries. It underlines the relevance 
of addressing these needs in order to ensure the quality of treatment 
and continuation of care across the region. Based on these findings, 
there is clearly a need for the increased integration of health services 
and patient follow up across borders to enable better care provision. 
There is also room for a health care financing product to remove 
direct payments for services across borders, which were reported as 
a barrier by the majority of those who paid for services. It is hoped 
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that this study will prompt governments of the region need to 
cooperate closely in order to develop joint approaches through which 
the health needs of cross border communities can be served.  
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Mobility as a Social Process: Conflict Management in 
the Border Areas of Afar Region24 
 
Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen 
 
Introduction 
Since ancient times, people have travelled across boundaries in search 
of resources. They have also 
moved to conquer other 
societies and territories or to 
escape from war, natural 
disasters or major climatic 
shifts. In a broad sense, the 
history of the world is the 
history of human migration 
and settlement (McNeill, 
1984). Hence, ‘mobility’ is 
not necessarily confined to a 
pastoral way of life, although 
pastoralists adhere heavily to 
a mobile lifestyle (Davies & 
Hartfield, 2007). Instead, this 
chapter identifies mobility as 
a social process, in which 
resources are shared and 
interests are managed 
through conflict 
management and resolution. 
 
 
24 Part of this chapter, which was prepared for this book, was also published as: 
Alifnur, A. (2019). Managing mobility driven conflict in the border areas of Afar 
Region, Ethiopia. American Research Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 5(1), 1–
19.  
The Afar pastoralists use mobility to 
optimise livelihoods, cope with drought, 
maximise efficient resource use and keep 
their animals free of disease. For the 
Afar, mobility is a social process, with 
complex rules in a highly evolved social 
system. This system also manages conflict, 
which mainly stems from rivalry over 
resources, using a combination of 
customary law, Sharia (religious) law 
and formal law, all applied in 
supplementary and complementary ways 
to achieve solutions that are suited to the 
context and strengthened by community 
buy-in. This chapter offers an in-depth 
analysis of how mobility contributes to 
resilience and how social processes can 
help mitigate conflict to optimise solutions 
for local communities. 
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This chapter looks at pastoralist mobility in the context of conflicting 
interests and the existing mechanisms to manage and resolve such 
conflicts. The focus is on the Afar people in the border areas of the 
Afar Regional State in Ethiopia, who have been particularly neglected 
in terms of development and research (Tesfay & Tafere, 2004). The 
Afar people have a long history of mobility. They live in a hot, dry 
and sandy environment, where people survive under challenging 
circumstances. The resilience of the Afar and their ability to sustain 
their livelihoods is important. Already, due to the tensions in the 
region, large refugee camps in Asaita host thousands of Eritrean 
Afars, who have become dependent on outside support.  
 
Pastoralist mobility is considered instructive when considering 
migration, for several reasons. First of all, the existing literature on 
pastoralism provides a number of insights into migration that are 
specific to the pastoralist context, and yet may reveal dynamics that 
relate to migration more generally. Secondly, pastoralist mobility gives 
insights into the dynamics of communities living across borders in 
different states and the challenges and opportunities that this brings, 
as well as the conflicts. Conflict is becoming increasingly prevalent in 
relation to conflicting polities across migration routes. This is also 
related to the pressures on pastoralism as a sustainable livelihood due 
to the changing economies that sustain communities (in rural, 
farming, urban and other communities), as well as the changing 
contextual realities that impact on these economies (such as 
population and climate change) (Gina, 2015). Finally, the study of 
pastoralist mobility is interesting in terms of investigating the 
relevance of traditional conflict resolution systems specifically 
designed to deal with conflict-related challenges in the context of 
migration. 
 
As pastoralist lifestyles are under pressure, and the situation of the 
Afar is increasingly challenging due to the various developments 
described in this chapter, a sharp rise in conflict can be expected. 
While communities struggle to cope, age-old value systems are under 
pressure. This may lead to an increased divergence of values within 
and between communities. Cultural entropy allows the divergence of 
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value systems to be measured. When values systems within and 
between communities diverge, their organisation and coping 
strategies may be negatively affected. 
 
The objective of this study is to investigate mobility-related conflict-
management as a social process through the lens of cultural entropy. 
It attempts to depict the relationship between resource shortages, 
utilisation systems and pastoral mobility. The study also aims to 
describe the functioning of existing systems of conflict management 
in Afar communities, to promote viable customary institutions for 
conflict management and fill the gaps observed in those institutions 
through formal intervention mechanisms. The main research 
question is: What are the main sources of conflict among Afar pastoralists and 
how are these conflicts managed and resolved? 
 
The study is based on interviews conducted in the kebeles25 of Hidelu, 
Finto (both in Awra District) and Garriro (Chifra District), located 
on the western side of Afar Regional State, bordering Amhara 
Regional State, in Ethiopia. These places are home to pastoralists and 
agro-pastoralists, and are all rural places. They were selected for their 
suitability to investigate conflict management between the mobile 
Afar and other groups. 
 
In the next section we introduce the concept of cultural entropy, as 
the lens through which we analyse mobility and conflict management 
among the Afar people. We then describe the Afar people and the 
social structure of their communities. The subsequent section looks 
at mobility and conflict, including mobility as a strategy, the 
procedures for mobility among the Afar, and the causes of conflict in 
the study areas. We then consider conflict management in the Afar, 
including the three-pronged system in place – customary law 
(Ma’ada), Sharia law and the formal law courts and administrative 
system – and practical examples from the study area, before providing 
a brief conclusion. 
 




This study investigates the role of indigenous institutions in the 
management of conflict among the Afar and between the Afar and 
others. A clash of values (between cultural groups or between the 
state and its people) can be measured using the concept of cultural 
entropy (Stokmans, Van Reisen & Landa, 2018). A high level of 
cultural entropy (or difference in values) can lead to a decline in the 
efficiency of systems and organisations. In order to study cultural 
entropy in any given context, it is necessary to understand the social 
structures that are relevant to that situation as well as the values that 
are important to the people within the system of organisation. The 
level of cultural entropy informs us about the level of convergence of 
values within the organisation or system. This can include values 
underpinning mechanisms to manage conflict within or between 
organisations or elements of a system. High cultural entropy usually 
results in less effective policies and management systems, and more 
resources, effort and energy are needed to keep the system or 
organisation running. In addition, the higher the level of cultural 
entropy, the more likely a situation will lead to conflict.  
The Afar people 
This study concerns the Afar people, an ethnic community in the 
Horn of Africa. The Afar traditionally follow both seasonal and 
permanent mobility patterns, due to the nature of their pastoral way 
of life, which is tuned into the natural environment. Pastoral 
communities in Ethiopia live in the most water and pasture deprived 
areas, which experience low annual precipitation averaging between 
400 to 700 mm. In many areas, droughts occur on a regular basis. As 
a result, pastoral land use depends on the scarce water supply available 
from rivers (Sandford & Habtu, 2000). 
 
The Afar people live in and around the borders of three countries: 
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. The Ethiopian Afar possess a wide 
geographic area, stretching as far as Eritrea in the north, Djibouti in 
the north east and Somalia in the east. The Afar Regional State, which 
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is part of this geographical area, is home to an estimated 1.3 million 
Afar people (Minority Rights Group International, 2018). It covers 
an area of 108,860 square kilometres (Ilukor, Birner, Tilahun & Getu, 
2014). The Afar region serves as Ethiopia’s entrance to the Red Sea 
Port, which has great economic and political importance. It has 5 
zones and 32 districts. Chifra District is part of Zone 1 and lies near 
the base of the eastern escarpment of the Ethiopian highlands. It is 
bordered by Dubti District in the east, Amhara Region in the west, 
Zone 4 (including Awra District) in the north and Mille District in the 
south. The district has two rainy seasons: karma (long rain), which 
occurs from mid-July to mid-October, and sugum (short rain), from 
March to the end of April.  
 
Unfortunately, the Afar people have been denied their right to 
unrestricted mobility by the various political regimes in Ethiopia. The 
imperial regime of Haile Selassie (1930 to 1974 instituted the Awash 
Basin Authority and greatly restricted the mobility of the indigenous 
Afar community and their access to resources. The Dergu regime 
(1974 to 1987) forced the centuries-old system of rule in the region 
(the sultanate) into decline and ordered the communities to institute 
pastoralist associations and become sedentary. Under this regime, the 
Afar were ordered to graze their livestock in ‘protected tribal areas’ 
allotted by the regime. The Government of Ethiopia, led by the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (incumbent 
since 1991), has pursued the large-scale land dispossession of locals 
through the Tandahoo Sugar Plantation Scheme. The Tandahoo 
Sugar Factory, the largest in East Africa, is established in Zone 1 
along the Awash River Basin. It has restricted pastoralist mobility and 
created range land and water insufficiency problems, which are not 
balanced by its returns to the local community (Alifnur, 2019). 
 
In recent times, changes in natural conditions have brought about a 
shift in the patterns of mobility of Afar pastoralists in a way that has 
triggered conflict. However, it is important to remember that conflict 
has existed in all periods of human history. Archaeological findings, 
anthropological interpretations and historical records indicate that 
people have been engaged in armed conflict since prehistoric times 
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(Mohammed, 2001). The history of pastoral societies is particularly 
tied to social conflict, with both positive and negative outcomes. 
Although the scope and frequency varies, conflicts are common in 
pastoral and agro-pastoral areas (Ministry of Peace, 2019). When it 
comes to Ethiopia, this is no different, as pastoral conflicts have 
struck Ethiopia in different forms for centuries and, thus, are not a 
new phenomenon. However, during the past two decades the country 
has experienced an increase in the frequency and intensity of violence 
in inter-ethnic conflicts (Løber & Worm, 2015). 
 
Ethiopia’s eastern peripheral lowlands are home to the majority of 
the country’s pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, and the scene 
of many local conflicts. Conflicts also occur in different corners of 
the region; for instance, in the border areas between Afar and 
Amhara; Afar and Argoba; Afar and Tigray; Afar and Karrayu 
Oromo, as well as Afar and Issa Somalis. All of these communities 
have their own way of handling conflict (Ministry of Peace, 2019).  
Social organisation  
The Afar people have a structured system of social organisation and 
kin-based networks. They combine traditional and formal systems of 
administration in which both channels are used to regulate members’ 
day-to-day activities, including conflict. In most cases, formal 
government organisations are of secondary importance in solving 
conflict. Afar communities are collectivist in their way of living, 
characterised by polygamous marriages and an extended family 
structure. Central to the social organisation of Afar communities is 
descent and familial ties. The Afar have a patrilineal descent system, 
based on which a person belongs to a particular clan (mela). Afar 
settlements are composed of a mixture of clans, although each locality 
is identified with a major clan and sub-clans (or relationships through 
marriage). This makes it easier to organise social, economic and 




The social organisation of the study communities is hierarchical, 
consisting of the supreme clan, clans (mela), lineage groups (afa), 




Figure 5.1. Social organisation of Afar communities 
Source: Alifnur (2019) 
 
For example, in Hiddelu (Kalkalsa), a clan called, Alla’ayto-goharto is 
dominant and extends far into Gulina and Teru districts. Other clans 
include Hunda-humedo, Kadda-humedo, Ali-gayya, Lau-ala’aytoo 
and Asabboora. However, in Garriro the structure is formed from the 
supreme clan called Arabta and eight clans with their own categories: 
Haddoda, Bedihitto, Adanto, Utbantto, Namelalite, Bosali, Nessar 
and Bulokto. In the third community, Finto, the clans consist of 
Hadarmu, Hayssantu, Muhto, La’ado, Gaminto, Koborto, and 
Andwolwalo. The clan-based structure consists of individual clan 
 
26 A family refers to the extended family composed of one or more households; a 
household refers to individual households, which together form a family. 
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leaders (kidu-abba), collective decision makers (makabantoo) and an 
enforcer (fie’ma aba). The latter is an adult or youth concerned with 
managing the internal (domestic) affairs of a neighbourhood or kebele.  
 
In Afar communities different clans or pastoralist groups meet to 
make arrangements for the use of resources, travel patterns and any 
other issues related to the group. However, these arrangements are 
not static and may need to be adapted as locations shift and new 
realities unfold. Mobility can trigger conflict, especially when 
situations change.  
Mobility and conflict in Afar Regional State 
Mobility as a strategy  
Mobility is sometimes considered an adaptive strategy, as it allows 
pastoralists to adjust to changing weather conditions without 
permanently departing from a certain territory. It is fundamental to 
pastoralists’ strategies for coping with unpredictable rainfall, livestock 
diseases, and scarce natural resources (Van den Akker, Berdel & 
Murele, 2015). Mobility also allows people to simultaneously exploit 
more than one fixed environment during climate change. In relation 
to the Afar people, the existence of well-patterned mobility enables 
the Afar to make a living without over utilising and destroying 
environmental resources and disrupting the co-existence of 
pastoralism, agro-pastoralism and farming, which have taken place 
side-by-side for centuries (Getachew, 2004). 
 
In this way, pastoral livelihoods are the outgrowth of resource 
scarcity, such as water and pasture scarcity. The unpredictability and 
uneven distribution of rain across the area inhabited by the Afar 
pushes pastoralists in the study sites towards alternative zones. The 
short supply of water compels pastoralists to take their livestock to 
an area located hundreds of kilometres away from their residence. 
Mobility allows pastoralists to cope with the problem of finding 
enough water and pasture. According to Tesfay and Tafere (2004), 
mobility has enabled the northern Afar pastoralists to use the spatially 
variable rangelands for a limited period of time. Likewise, Getachew 
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(2004) highlighted that the seasonal migration of the Afar makes their 
land use, settlement and herd management highly efficient and well-
organised enabling them to make a living without over-utilising or 
destroying environmental resources. Afar pastoralists also use 
mobility as a mechanism to avoid herd diseases and endangering 
conditions. A group of herders may leave a particular rangeland, not 
only due to depleted feed and water, but also due to the presence of 
biting flies, mosquito, ticks and predators (Tesfay & Tafere, 2004).  
 
Mobility can, therefore, be understood as a: 
 
• strategy to optimise the livelihoods of pastoralist 
communities  
• strategy to cope with drought and extreme weather 
• mechanism for efficient resource utilisation 
• strategy to optimise herd safety 
 
As well as having many positive benefits for the Afar, mobility also 
has negative consequences. Seasonal mobility and the constant search 
for adequate pasture and water make it difficult to access health care, 
education, water, electricity, and financial assistance. Alemayehu 
(2016) noted that mobility is a major obstacle to the delivery of 
education in pastoralist districts. The long journeys that pastoralists 
make can also claim the life of the pastoralists and their livestock. In 
addition, mobility can create conflict. Gakuria (2013) stated that 
disputes flare up between farmers and pastoralists and among 
pastoralist themselves, as migrating camel and livestock herds 
sometimes graze on farmers' lands or other livestock herders’ grazing 
lands and use their water points. Farmer-herder conflict is an 
enduring feature of social life in the Sudano-Sahelian Zone, the arid 
belt that stretches across Africa from Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean 
to Somalia on the Red Sea. So, understanding farmer-herder relations 
is key to conflict management and resolution (Turner, Ayantude, 
Patterson & Patterson, 2004). 
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Procedures for mobility  
The mobility patterns of Afar pastoralists are clear; each clan member 
knows the sites it can use, how long they can stay and when they 
should return to the main settlement. Even the distances covered are 
well known (Getachew, 2004). The mobility of the Afar involves 
certain procedures that are deeply embedded in and supported by 
cultural values and social systems. 
 
Mobility is supported by the exchange of information and forming 
extended relationships with different groups. In the case of the Afar, 
exchanging information (xaggu) is often tied to mobility, as local 
people deliberately move to seek or deliver information about a 
distant situation. According to Tesfay and Tafere (2004), a team of 
people monitor the state of the rangeland before allowing herds to 
use it and guide the movement of people and herds in the Afar region. 
Information-sharing and distribution across geographies is, therefore, 
a vital element to decisions regarding mobility patterns. The scouting 
team is locally called eddo, which literally translates to ‘range scouts’. 
The team has to get the consent of the host community to use 
enclosures (deso), which can be allowed only after negotiation. There 
are also critical pre-conditions that outsiders should respect including, 
for instance, access may only be allowed for lactating and young 
stock; all authorised animals must be free from any apparent disease; 
and access is only allowed for a pre-defined period of time. 
 
Social organisation in the organisation of mobility is critical. Every 
clan or a specific pastoral territory has a representative responsible 
for managing the affairs of travellers (mostly his kin groups) and 
negotiating with people in the area of destination on behalf of the 
people who accompany him on the journey (Tesfay & Tafere, 2004). 
When there is a problem managing movement, conflict arises. In 
addition, other emerging factors may create conflict. Meier, Bond and 
Bond (2007) noted that the causes and dynamics of conflict in 
Ethiopia are changing, due to a number of factors, including 
environmental degradation, shrinking grazing land, climate change 
and political instability. Conflict can sometimes be attributed to 
physical mobility in search of scarce resources. However, all forms of 
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conflict cannot be interpreted as resulting from pastoralist mobility. 
According to Alemayehu (2016), at times mobility triggers conflict, at 
other times conflict causes mobility. When there is no traceable 
kinship between the migrating group and the host community, the 
likelihood of conflict is higher. 
Causes of conflict 
Conflict occurs for various reasons. But the view that pastoral 
communities are traditionally warlike and aggressive does not hold 
true. Conflict not only happens in these communities, but generally 
tends to happen in places where resources are scarce and not shared 
fairly; where there is little or no communication between the groups 
in the conflict; where the groups have incorrect ideas and beliefs 
about each other; where there are unresolved grievances from the 
past; and where power is unevenly distributed (Swanstrom & 
Weismann, 2005). However, according to Bekele (2010), resource-
centred orthodoxies about the reason for conflict are being 
challenging. It is now widely argued that contemporary conflicts 
among East African pastoralists are driven not only by the scarcity of 
pastoral resources (which was prominent in the past), but also by 
competition over new sources of revenue (e.g., government funds) 
and control of market centres and strategic places. Thus, he asserts 
that resource-centred solutions are unlikely to bring sustained peace 
in these areas. 
 
In pastoralist communities in Ethiopia, major causes of conflict 
include competition for pasture and water, among other things 
(Ministry of Peace, 2019). Both intra and inter-clan conflicts occur in 
the lowlands during times when water and grazing resources are 
scarce. As the population is growing and disasters are become more 
frequent and intense, resources have become even scarcer and 
traditional coping mechanisms have been pushed to the breaking 
point, giving rise to conflict (Van den Akker, Berdel & Murele, 2015). 
For instance, in 2000, three major conflicts occurred between the 
main pastoral groups in Borena lowlands: Borena versus Garri, 
Merehan versus Digodi, and Digodi versus Borena. These conflicts, 
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in combination with severe drought, resulted in the death and 
displacement of hundreds of people (Dejene & Abdurahman, 2001). 
 
In the Afar Regional State and its surroundings, differences in value 
systems exist between Afar pastoralists and others. But such 
differences were not primary sources of conflict in the past. Rather, 
past conflicts occurred for two basic reasons: encroachment on a 
living space (without agreement) and use of scarce resources (without 
consent). For instance, the wide-scale westward expansion of Issa 
Somalis in the past decades has led to recurrent bloodshed between 
the two ethnic groups, most notably in 2002 (Bekele, 2010). The 
invasion of the Afar boundary by Tigrigna speaking ethnic groups 
from the northwest is another example of territorial conflict. Tesfay 
and Tafere (2004) elaborated that in the period prior to the Italian 
occupation of the region, the Afar experienced a series of raids from 
Tigrayan highlanders, particularly from the Wajirat and Raya 
communities, which culminated in considerable loss of life and 
property on both sides. A report by the Government of Ethiopia, 
Ministry of Peace found that the clan system can be “both a 
stabilizing and destabilizing force” (Ministry of Peace, 2019, p. 38). 
The report identifies that the clan system can be regarded as ‘conflict 
multiplier’, as its communal nature can draw the entire clan into a 
conflict. Tesfay and Tafere (2004) also added that socio-cultural 
factors, such as the quest for social honour and prestige, are 
important causes of conflict, although they concluded that economic 
ones were more compelling in the above case. The next sections look 
more closely at mobility and conflict in the study area to identify the 
sources of conflict and the mechanisms for managing and resolving 
conflict. 
The case of Kalkalsa, Finto and Garriro 
In the following sections we zoom in on the reality in the Afar region, 
with specific reference to three kebeles: Hidelu, Finto and Garriro. 
Hidelu is located within Awra district and in Hidelu, Kalkalsa villagers 
are found. The people of Garriro (Chifra District) live on the outskirts 
of Chifra town. The Kalkalsa and Finto (both in Awra District) live a 
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pastoral lifestyle, while the people in Garriro are agro-pastoralists. 
The aim of the study was to investigate how conflicts evolved and are 
managed within and between these groups. Before looking at conflict 
management in the study area, this section looks at resource 
ownership and use; social interactions; mobility patterns; and sources 
of conflict in the study area. 
Resource ownership and use 
The key resources of the Afar are livestock, land, water and pasture. 
The resource base declines from time to time due to drought. Key 
bases are seriously affected, despite efforts by the government and 
non-government organisations to rehabilitate the region. Due to this, 
conflict emerges between groups over resources. 
 
As far as water is concerned, the pastoralists in Kalkalsa, Finto and 
Garriro mainly rely on rivers to water their animals. The people of 
Hiddelu (Kalkalsa) and Finto mostly use the Awra River for their 
camels, whereas the people of Garriro, who live on the fringe of 
Chifra town, use Mille River. Abdulatife and Ebro (2015) list the 
major sources of water for livestock in Chifra District (where the 
Garriro live) as permanent rivers, temporary rivers, ponds and 
traditional wells. They also report that the sources of water for 
animals and humans are the same, which means that the water may 
not be clean. In addition to such rivers, alternative man-made water 
reserves, which are mostly seasonal, are also used by the communities. 
These include, hand dug wells, shallow ponds and deep wells. In the 
communities, access to such reserves is open to all clan members. 
There are critical water shortages during the dry season. 
 
In relation to land resources, the regional land law dictates that all 
forms of non-grazing land is under the direct control of the state, 
while grazing land can be used by various clans. Accordingly, each 
clan exclusively owns a patch of territory. The clan land and its 
borders are clearly known to clan members, as well as members of 
neighbouring clans. The tenure over clan land is communal and each 





Unlike in Hiddelu (Kalkalsa) and Finto, where the people are purely 
pastoralists, the people in Garriro are agro-pastoralists. As a result, 
arable land is a critical resource among Garriro residents. Arable land 
and irrigable land are distributed to locals to produce grain alongside 
cattle keeping, but rangeland is commonly owned.  
 
Many rangeland pasture reserves are exhausted for several months of 
the year. For instance, the reserves in Finto are not sufficient to feed 
animals for more than three months a year. In this respect, Kalkalsa 
is in relatively better condition, but is still deteriorating. Due to this, 
pastoralists have moved into Yallo, Teru, Kelo and Gewane. Pasture 
reserves in Garriro also persist longer than in Finto. As an alternative 
to migration, the agro-pastoralists in Garriro supplement animal 
feeding with crop residue and purchased fodder. In an extensive study 
Abdulatife and Ebro (2015) concluded that pastoral-based livestock 
is still the major source of income, but that the communities perceive 
that rangelands have deteriorated in the last two decades. They 
conclude that there is a need to restore rangelands. Gina (2015) 
emphasises that participatory approaches involving the farmers are 
needed for such restoration to be successful and to ensure that efforts 
are based on cultural values and customs relevant to the communities 
and in line with their ability to maintain their rangelands. 
Social interaction 
The social interaction of pastoralist communities is generally kinship 
based. But beyond kinship ties, the various clans and lineage groups 
in the three selected kebeles also engage in a complex and dynamic 
process of cooperation, conflict resolution and consensus building, as 
well as confrontation. There are also institutions aimed at strengthen 
community cooperation, which provide zakat (charity/social support) 
and other informal forms of support. Zakat is a traditional form of 
social protection arranged within the community. According to the 
Pastoral Forum Ethiopia, the International Institute of Rural 
Reconstruction and the Development Fund (PFE, IIRR & DF, 2010), 
support in the form of zakat is provided to people who have lost 




Given the mobile nature of communities in the study areas, contacts 
are created with other pastoralists or non-pastoralist communities. 
Communities interact with ethnic and tribal groups beyond their 
kebeles. For instance, pastoral communities in Garriro interact with 
neighbouring Amhara ethnic groups. They exchange livestock for 
certain food stuffs, including a local leaf used for leisure (khat) in the 
markets.  
 
Most of the time, interactions among members of the same clan are 
built on the principles of trust, mutual cooperation and solidarity. 
Pankhurst and Piguet (2004) reported that historical relations 
between highlanders and lowlanders in the region have been 
characterised by periods of conflict as well as coexistence. 
Interrelations between highland agriculturalists and lowland 
pastoralists have involved some complementarity, notably in the 
exchange of livestock for grain, particularly in times of hardship. 
 
Solidarity is expressed through collective resource and information 
sharing. It may also take the form of sharing punishments when one 
member of a clan is punished for the negative acts he commits 
towards non-members. According to Bekele (2010), any incoming 
compensation is also shared among clan members. Indeed, the 
principle of collective (as opposed to individual) guilt and 
responsibility for infractions against outsiders forms the basis for 
solidarity within Afar clans. However, there are occasional feuds and 
bloodshed among members of the same clan. Beyond this, inter-
ethnic confrontations and conflict are also observed at the western 
border of the Afar region.  
Mobility patterns  
From Kalkalsa and Finto, pastoralists move northward to the districts 
of Yallo, Teru and Megale during periods of difficulty. In rare cases, 
they march as far south as Gewane. On the other hand, the 
communities of Garriro move westwards to Amhara region and 




The pastoralists move in groups belonging to the same clan or 
neighbourhood. The movement of pastoralist from Finto and 
Kalkalsa does not involve the entire family, except in rare cases. 
Usually adult men representing each household take the livestock 
together and stay away for a number of months. The elderly, women 
and children remain at home to look after the house and manage the 
domestic property. 
 
The time to start moving for Kalkalsa and Finto pastoralists is 
December. The main drive behind this mobility is to seek pasture for 
animals. They stay in the destination for nearly half a year (December 
to May). However, some return in early April when there is a short 
shower of rain (sugum). The period from May to early June is the most 
difficult season for Afar pastoralists, not only because of the demand 
for pasture, but also because of the shortage of water, as it is a time 
when wells are dry. If sugum rain is delayed, the pasture deteriorates 
and animal fodder is endangered. This pushes communities to 
relocate to the aforementioned destinations. 
 
Unlike the pastoralists in Kalkalsa and Finto, agro-pastoralists in 
Garriro use supplementary feed for their animals, but they are not 
relieved of mobility. The months immediately before the main rainy 
season (karma) are especially times of forced mobility. So, a delay in 
karma rain is a push factor for movement in Garriro. The same is true 
for other areas. For example, a lack of rain in 2016 due to El Nino 
had a drastic effect on the study communities, resulting in a massive 
exodus and change of conventional migration routes. For instance, 
the pastoralists in Finto do not regularly use the Gewane route, except 
in extreme circumstances. The shores of the Awash River hold 
pasture reserves. However, the security problems in Awash valley 
(which is a hub for Afar and non-Afar groups alike, including the Issa 
Somali clan) greatly limits mobility in this area. As a result, the people 
of Garriro avoid taking the route down to Zone 3.  
 
People are mobile in cases where there is temporal and spatial 
variability in the distribution of resources. When the resources in a 
certain area are drained, communities drift into other areas and return 
125 
 
when the original place has recovered in terms of pasture. Unlike 
forced dislocation, pastoralist mobility is arranged following certain 
procedures and is not random, as an outsider may think. Mobility in 
the context of Finto and Kalkalsa pastoralists and Garriro agro-
pastoralists is a planned operation. They exploit kinship networks and 
religious-political connections to arrange their mobility routes. For 
instance, prominent sheikhs (Islamic religious scholars, acting as 
community representatives) in neighbouring Habru District are often 
consulted by the Garriro agro-pastoralists before moving into the 
area. 
 
The time and direction of mobility, as well as the duration of stay, is 
determined by the availability of water and pasture. In periods of 
karma (the long rainy season), people in all sites remain in their place 
of residence, because animal fodder and water are accessible. 
Conversely, during the dry seasons they move to other areas and stay 
for a long time until times of abundance. The movement of Afar, 
Somali and South Omo pastoralists is dictated by the seasonal 
flooding of the Awash, Wabi-Shabelle, Ganalle and Omo rivers, 
which threatens lives and livelihoods (PFE, IIRR & DF, 2010). The 
customary, culturally-embedded practices in place within and 
between the communities are critical for the management of mobility. 
As the Afar people have a tradition of arranging their movement 
before moving from one area to another, conflict happens only when 
such arrangements fail to materialise as planned. 
Sources of conflict 
Inter-group conflict arises between Afar lowlanders and pockets of 
neighbouring Amhara communities in the highlands due to cattle 
raiding and the use of water and land. The most common cause of 
conflict is rivalry over the use of resources. The major resources are 
range land and water, whose availability is insufficient. Awra and Mille 
rivers are of vital significance in the region and beyond. They are used 
for watering animals and irrigation activities. Access to land and water 




Conventional mobility increased during the El Nino-related drought 
in 2016, which prompted the massive movement of pastoralists. 
Mobility is a triggering factor for social conflict. During the dry 
season, communities move in different directions and over different 
distances, as far as Habru, Worebabu, Teru, Yallo, Asayta and 
Gewane. In the process they can come into conflict with other clans, 
especially when they enter a deso (enclosure).  
 
According to the research, cattle raiding caused conflict between clans 
from Hiddelu and Finto kebeles at the end of 2015. At that time, 
pastoralists from Hiddelu took one camel from their counterparts in 
Finto. In response, members of Finto took two camels belonging to 
Hiddelu pastoralists. The conflict escalated until it became out of the 
control of the clan leaders, pointing to the important role such leaders 
can play in conflict resolution based on values shared and accepted 
within the communities. 
 
In addition, a conflict over access to water broke out between the 
kebeles of Chifra District and the Sodoma area of Habru District (the 
Sodoma are ethnic Amhara and largely Muslim). Chifra belongs to 
the Afar, whereas Habru District belongs to the Amhara. The cause 
of this conflict was the water sources of Zemzem and Akela in 
Sodoma, over which the Afar agro-pastoralists are denied access by 
the host community. The Afar pastoralists claim that the water source 
of Akela is meant for both them and the Amharas, as the area is 
located near the border. But the Sodoma herders do not accept this 
claim and want exclusive control of this water.  
 
Another case of conflict was reported in the vicinity of Garriro 
between the Afars and Gafera herdsmen. Gafera is in Habru District 
in North Wollo Zone, where there is a water source developed by 
government. This water source has different names for each group. 
The Afars call it Afar Ela, which indicates their affiliation to this water 
source. But the Gafera assume they have sole possession. This 




Perceived scarcity of land can also cause conflict, and may be the 
result of multiple factors such as land degradation and demographic, 
economic and political factors, causing population pressure and 
inequitable distribution of land. In Awra District (where Kalkalsa and 
Finto are found), village-level kebeles are marred by internal conflict 
over the boundary of arable land. Sometimes this conflict spills over 
to neighbouring kebeles, because of kinship links. 
 
Unlike water-based conflict, land-based conflict on the borders of 
Afar and Amhara at Chifra has a long history. A place called Shul-
gora is a disputed territory among the two. Reportedly, conflict 
occurred in July 2016 and continued up to November 2016 when it 
was time to harvest crops. According to information received, the 
conflict took the lives of 6 and wounded 14 Afar people. It also 
claimed the lives and wounded an unknown number of Sodoma 
Amhara.  
 
Pasture is also a cause of conflict especially when there is drought. 
Most of the time, conflict associated with the movement of 
pastoralists occurs when there is a deso (enclosure) or where hatred 
has existed between the Afar and the people in the place of 
destination for a long time. The pastoralists in Finto face conflict 
during their movement into other areas. The agro-pastoralists of 
Garriro also move to neighbouring Amhara territory in times of 
drought with or without the consent of the host community. When 
there is open consent, the parties usually agree to trade animal fodder 
(hay and other types of dry grass) among themselves. On such 
occasions, reciprocal arrangements are created. There is a sense of 
trust and confidence among the Afar pastoralists in Chifra and 
Amhara herders from Worebabu District. This situation has enabled 
the Afar agro-pastoralists to cross the boundaries with neighbouring 
people even without open consent from the host. However, the 
research also found that the Gafera now prohibit the Afar from 
sharing pasture. This is a potential new source of conflict. When the 
situation becomes tense, it can become life-threatening resulting in 




Last, but not least, there are kebeles from Awra District, which are 
bordered by North Wollo in Amhara Region, which is known for 
sporadic conflict. The conflict includes Deraytu, Hidda and Ali-
marih-masgid. Transgression of the boundary during drought is the 
cause of the conflict in these areas. This conflict has great potential 
to spill over into other kebeles if not successfully resolved.  
 
The frequency and intensity of conflict has increased in recent times 
due to the recurrent droughts facing the Afar people. The pattern of 
using land, water, and other natural resources among the 
neighbouring agro-pastoral communities follows a different form 
than that used by the Afar. Thus, conflicts emerge when the two 
groups collide over use of the same resources.  
Conflict management in Afar Regional State  
Conflict management involves mechanisms designed to ensure 
monitoring and evaluation of the conflict, and the behaviour and 
compliance of parties to the conflict, with resolutions on ending 
violence, demobilisation and disarmament, or making concessions 
and remedies, vital in easing tensions (Akpuru-Aja, 2007). The 
process assumes that there is some convergence of cultural values. If 
there is no convergence, the level of cultural entropy becomes too 
high and conflict management breaks down, making conflict 
inevitable. The process of conflict management includes techniques 
such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration. The procedures vary 
in each case, but all of them rely on social processes, as people need 
to get along with one another and subscribe to the cultural values 
involved in the process. This section looks at the mechanisms and 
institutions for conflict management in the Afar region, in general, 
and the study areas, in particular. 
Customary, Sharia and formal law 
A report on the Pastoralist Community Development Program 
(Ministry of Peace, 2019) revealed that pastoralist and agro-pastoralist 
communities use various mechanisms to resolve conflict. As well as 
traditional/customary mechanisms, in which community leaders, clan 
leaders and prominent community members administer, manage, and 
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mediate conflicts between different groups and individuals, the Afar 
also use modern institutions, such as local courts, as well as religious 
institutions, such as Sharia courts. The three systems for conflict 
management in the study sites – customary institutions, formal courts 
of law and administrative agents, and Sharia courts – are both 
supplementary and complementary, as envisioned in Article 78 (5) of 
the Ethiopian Constitution. This article gives regional state councils 
the power to establish or give official recognition to religious and 
customary courts to adjudicate disputes (Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, 1995). In accordance with this provision, the 
Afar religious courts have branches in different parts of the region 
and Afar customary institutions are functional in every district of the 
region.  
 
The actors involved and the techniques used to manage or resolve 
conflict vary in each case, although they sometimes overlap. When 
law courts and administrative agents are used, the actors are 
professional jurists who make up tribunals or other legal bodies to 
hear cases and provide judgements. Kebele administrators, district or 
regional leaders, social workers, members of the police force, peace 
committees, and the military are responsible for applying and 
executing the court rulings. In the case of customary institutions, the 
actors are clan leaders (kidu aba), tribal councils (makabons) and 
executives (fie’ma aba) and elders. In the Sharia courts, the actors are 
religious judges (qadi).  
 
In the Afar region and districts, the administrative political elites have 
excessive power to act, but the normative tradition at the societal level 
restricts them from applying their decisive power, except in some 
politicised conflicts. In addition, actors in customary institutions have 
a wide mandate. The kidu aba, makabons, and elders have the mandate 
to use customary law (mada’a) to negotiate, decide cases and punish 
offenders, as well as recommend the timing of formal interventions. 
The formal administrative agents prefer to play a supportive role to 
customary establishments and Sharia courts, rather than a lead role. 
Conflicts among close friends or neighbours, especially over property 
inheritance, marriage, divorce and family, are within the jurisdiction 
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of Sharia courts. Customary institutions have persisted over 
generations and are fundamental for maintaining peace and resolving 
conflict. They mostly deal with intra-clan or intra-group conflicts. 
They usually address conflicts over such issues as natural resource 
use, communal property sharing, cattle raiding, revenge killing and 
absuma27 marriage. Furthermore, political conflicts of an inter-ethnic 
or inter-group nature fall within the jurisdiction of the formal legal 
and administrative agents. The process of conflict management 
through customary channels follows negotiation, mediation and 
arbitration techniques. This strengthens a value-based order, rather 
than an order imposed from above, which might be more dysfunction 
due to its distance from the people on the ground, which can lead to 
a high level of cultural entropy. As a result of this distance, and the 
related cultural entropy, the political structures may have more 
difficulty in imposing their policies on the ground. 
 
In relation to traditional conflict resolution, there are three forms of 
assemblies used to manage conflict in the Afar region: malbo, detto and 
billa-ara (Getachew, 2004). Malbo is devoted to mitigating local 
conflict cases and gereb, a jointly established institution, is responsible 
for alleviating inter-ethnic disputes. In both malbo and gereb 
assemblies, a group of prominent elders are involved in a chain of 
negotiations and arbitration processes to resolve conflicts in an 
orderly and transparent manner (Tafere, 2006). The third traditional 
mechanism is billa-ara, which is defined by Getachew (2004) as a 
process of peace making between two different Afar clans in which 
members of the traditional jury who are elders selected from different 
clans, other than the clans involved in the conflict, engage in 
mediation. This process works because of the respect afforded to 
elders in the community.  
 
In addition, in some place, such as Argoba Special Woreda (district), 
the government has established peace and security committees 
 
27Absuma marriage is a customary arranged marriage practice of the Afar people. It 
is a cross-cousin marriage in which a close male relation claims the right to marry a 
girl by virtue of his blood ties to her. The girl is traditionally not expected to turn 
down a marriage request from a close male relative.  
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including elders, clan leaders, religious leaders, and the district 
administrator. This committee handles cases that are beyond the 
ability of local elders to manage. For these systems to work, it is 
necessary for the members of the communities to share a minimum 
number of common values concerning the relevance of such 
mechanisms. Peace committees have also been established to manage 
conflict between the Afar and Amhara, but there are no joint 
customary institutions like gereb.  
Conflict management in the study areas 
The balance between the three systems (customary institutions, Sharia 
courts and formal law courts/administration) is recognised by those 
involved and, hence, the actors cooperate and generally attempt to 
contribute to social processes aiming to alleviate conflict without 
relinquishing the authority vested in them. For instance, the land-
based conflict in Garriro in 2016 required religious blessings, cultural 
feasts, negotiation and formal court decisions. After several weeks of 
bloodshed, initial efforts were made by the peace committee in the 
conflicting areas to communicate the recent developments regarding 
the conflict. This committee is assigned and assisted by the 
administration agents in the kebele. The peace committee in Garriro 
initiated a peace dialogue, in which community representatives 
(elders) from both sides met face to face. Accordingly, elders of the 
Afar went to Sodoma, where they met the sheiks and elders of 
Sodoma Amhara in order to avoid conflict. In the long process of 
dialogue, the joint parties reviewed the details of what had happened 
on each side during the conflict, including the acts of instigators, 
violations of previous pacts, and the damage suffered. After dealing 
with all of this, the two sides arrived at a consensus that one of the 
Afar groups would pay compensation to the Sodoma Amhara, who 
lost hundreds of cattle during the raids. Conversely, the Sodoma 
agreed to avoid any retaliatory action in the future. In the meantime, 
the political administrative body of Garriro kebele decided to pay the 
compensation on behalf of the clan (involved in perpetration) by 
selling the wheat flour that was supposed to be distributed to them in 
the form of aid. In this way the fractured relations were mended, at 




In order to create community buy-in, the two negotiating teams held 
a joint community-level briefing and issued orders for their respective 
community members to respect the pact. This was done at a feast 
prepared by the two communities. In the case of the Afar, a body 
called the fie’ma aba ensures that the agreed pact is maintained in its 
domain. It is responsible for preventing young members from 
violating the pact by regularly patrolling the area. It is vested with the 
power to punish individuals who deviate from community norms and 
agreements. In this sense, it is a regulatory body, with enforcement 
powers, while at the same time calming and redirecting members 
towards the normative framework enabling peace. 
 
Despite these efforts, there are the occasional raids between 
conflicting parties and the truce between the Afar and the Sodoma 
Amhara has been violated, leading to direct conflict and loss of life. 
Such a situation may escalate beyond the control of clan leaders and 
elders. As a restraining move, government authorities may become 
involved and enforce peace through the military, which can then ban 
disputed areas to both conflicting groups. However, the involvement 
of the military remains restricted and when the military leave the 
potential for conflict remains. Before the Ethio-Eritrean war, the 
military were camped in the Afar region, near the conflicting zone. 
Later on, conflict between the Afar and the Sodoma arose when the 
military evacuated the area. After that there is another occasion of 
military intervention but not lasting. Ironically, the current military 
force camped at Jara is facing suspicion from both communities to 
the conflict, who complain that the military is taking sides.  
 
As well as this specific example, there appear to be some differences 
as to when the government authorities should act. Some prefer the 
government to intervene, even if clan leaders do not necessarily invite 
such intervention. They urge government authorities to act to 
successfully control conflicts. While some may admire the military 
interventions in the past for the way they have handled situations 
when conflict has escalated, others hold the view that the government 




Whatever intervention takes place, conflicts may be diffused, but may 
not be completely resolved. Regular attempts at making concessions 
or cooling down tensions are made by representatives of the 
conflicting parties, particularly elders. The common trend in conflicts 
is to control the so-called mishig (fortification). The mishig is a natural 
terrain used in the disputed territory by the Sodoma Amhara to 
defend themselves from incoming Afar agro-pastoralists. Previously, 
the Afar were able to control this fortification when the Sodoma were 
not alert. This made it difficult for Sodoma farmers nearby to harvest 
their crops. As a result, the Sodoma mobilised their members and 
deployed a portion of the community to stand guard, while others 
harvested the crop. Meanwhile, the Afar agro-pastoralists left the 
area. When the Afar leave, the Sodoma will not move beyond the 
fortification deeper into Afar territory, because their sheikhs have 
firmly warned them not to do. Despite these confrontations and the 
loss of life and property suffered, the communities have the habit of 
temporary consensus building and agreement through their tribal 
representatives.  
 
Such cooperation is also available in the resolution of conflicts that 
occur among people of the same clan and the mostly small disputes 
are quickly resolved. The main actors include elders, clan leaders and 
fie’ma aba. Inter-ethnic conflicts are also sometimes dealt with by 
indigenous institutions. But, when the traditional leaders fail to 
successfully control the conflict, formal administrative agents 
intervene. An example is a case of camel raiding in a dispute between 
clans in Finto and Hiddelu. To handle the case, the district 
administration became involved after earlier arrangements through 
clan leaders did not succeed. Its way of involvement, however, was 
not a legal proceeding. Instead, it conducted mediation by which an 
agreement was reached to give the Finto 5 goats, 1 camel and 
Ethiopian Birr (ETB) as compensation. In addition to the 
aforementioned techniques of negotiation and mediation, arbitration 
is also used. For instance, it is applied in malbo assemblies (council of 
clan leaders). A good example of this is one that happened between 
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two Afar clans in Chifra: one from Garriro and the other named 
Doda from nearby Ta’eboyarea.  
 
When people of different clans enter into conflict, the makabons 
(neutral decision makers drawn from a clan or clans not taking part 
in the conflict) are often called upon to meet the leaders of the 
conflicting clans. In the meeting, cultural and religious rituals are 
performed including the slaughtering animals. Perpetrators are 
interrogated and their confessions accepted in front of the makabons. 
An oath is taken by injured clan members not to retaliate against the 
perpetrators until the investigation is finished and decisions made. 
Once decisions are made after investigation of the matter, 
punishments are imposed and compensation rendered, together with 
feasts and rituals. Compensation is given in kind (by giving animals) 
or in cash, as per Afar customary law. According to informants, the 
customary law specifies the compensation for human life as 100 
camels (Alifnur, 2019). 
 
Customary mechanisms are preferred by the indigenous people in the 
area. They have relative advantages in terms of responding to crises 
quickly and reducing the resources used for court cases, thereby 
saving scarce public funds. In addition, they are seen as more 
accessible, affordable and fair (Abebe, 2001). They are also 
advantageous in that they do not seek mere restitution and the 
upholding of injustice. They simultaneously strive to avert ruptures in 
social relations and create conditions conducive to peace in the future 
(Tesfay & Tafere, 2004). To take advantage of both methods, 
government institutions are engaging with indigenous systems. This 
institutional support from modern legal set-ups, along with the 
internal integrity of the indigenous institutions themselves, has 
contributed to the effectiveness and continued strength of the latter 
(Tafere, 2006). Proactive engagement by the government is also 
desirable, such as the activation of a joint peace committee, 
demarcation of the territory through judicial processes or the 
initiation of a development project on a disputed area that will benefit 
both parties, as well as managing day-to-day security by dispatching 




This chapter asked: What are the main sources of conflict among Afar 
pastoralists and how are these conflicts managed and resolved? For the pastoral 
and agro-pastoral communities in the Afar Regional State, mobility is 
a strategy for efficient resource utilisation, optimising livelihoods, 
coping with drought conditions, and optimising herd safety and there 
are customary procedures in place for mobility. Tafere argues that 
“The most important internal factor is that the indigenous institutions 
acquire their status of authority and power from Afar normative 
frameworks” (Tafere, 2004, p. 37). This study concurs with the view 
that mobility is a social process and, therefore, sometimes associated 
with conflict. Social procedures are followed among the Afar people 
to engage with the different parties to prevent conflict. However, 
sometimes mobility causes conflict, and conflict can cause mobility. 
 
The direction and distance covered during mobility varies and the 
duration of stay depends on the availability of water and pasture. This 
study found that the main source of conflict among Afar pastoralists 
is rivalry over resource use. It also found that cultural entropy leads 
to conflict as values clash with challenges. These challenges emerge 
due to environmental pressure and climate change, scarce resources 
such as land and water, competing claims over these resources, and 
increasing population pressure and the pressure of different lifestyles 
trying to operate in the same environment. While cultural entropy 
exists between groups (Amhara peasants and Afar pastoralists), it was 
not found to be a main source of conflict in the region. 
 
If conflict does arise, there are social structures in place to manage 
and resolve conflict in the Afar region. In order to mitigate conflict, 
social groups are structured to perform traditional and tested 
procedures to involve parties and to create possibilities for 
negotiation and conflict resolution. There are three systems or 
institutions that work together to manage and resolve conflict in the 
Afar region: customary institutions, the Sharia courts, and legal 
courts. Sharia courts and judicial process are formal arrangements, 
while the customary ones are informal. The parties involved in each 
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case are different, or they may come together at some point, 
depending on the complexity of conflict. Informal channels based on 
customary institutions are seen as most effective by the Afar people. 
They are timely in responding to crises, require less resources than 
formal court cases, and seen as more affordable and fair. They follow 
negotiation, mediation and arbitration techniques and are easily 
accessible by the people. For all these reasons, they enjoy buy-in and 
consensus from the local people.  
 
While cultural entropy was not necessarily found to be a major factor 
causing conflict, it certainly played a part in managing conflict: where 
value systems were aligned between customary, religious and formal 
systems, or at least complemented and supported by each other, 
conflict was more likely to be managed or resolved. The involvement 
of leaders in customary forms of conflict management strengthens 
common values among communities. This strengthens convergence 
(decreases cultural entropy) and buy-in and, therefore, helps prevent 
full-blown conflict. When conflict breaks out despite these efforts 
and can no longer be contained, government institutions need to 
come in to restore calm, but formal institutions still rely on local 
efforts to create a renewed basis for social cohesion in the areas. The 
study shows that although cultural entropy can be high between 
conflicting groups (e.g., the Afar lowlanders and Amhara highlands), 
customary forms of conflict management tend to find convergence 
between value systems and are, therefore, more likely to lead to a 
solution. When cultural entropy is too high for customary systems to 
manage, the local sharia courts, formal courts and government 
administration (including police and federal military) can be useful in 
imposing a situation when conflict escalates out of hand, but only 
when there is buy-in and support from the customary actors. While 
such imposition may be needed at times to avoid conflict, it cannot 
deliver sustainable peace and is not cost effective. Therefore, the 
evidence of this research points to the importance of traditional 
mechanisms of leadership and problem-solving at the local level in 
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Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire: Are Climate 
Disasters Fuelling Human Trafficking in Kenya?  
 
Radoslaw Malinowski & Mario Schulze 
 
Introduction 
The term ‘climate disaster’ is used to describe events that, through 
their intensity, adversely 
affect vulnerable populations 
and their surroundings. In 
Kenya, the most common 
type of climate disaster is 
drought (Mata-Lima, Alvino-
Borba, Pinheiro, Mata-Lima 
& Almeida, 2013). Over the 
years, Kenya has experienced 
a number of severe droughts 
that have impacted on the 
agricultural sector, which 
relies heavily on rainfall to 
sustain production. It is 
important to note that only 
20% of the country is 
covered by rainfall in regular 
intervals, while 80% is made 
up of arid and semi-arid 
lands (Mbogo, Inganga & 
Maina, 2014). Consequently, 
in the absence of rainfall, 
there is often no viable 
alternative to continue agricultural production, the effects of which 
are usually felt immediately.  
 
Kenya is experiencing increased droughts, 
which are impacting on food security and 
vulnerability. This study investigates 
whether people affected by drought in 
Kenya are at higher risk of being 
trafficked. The study finds that drought-
affected populations are more vulnerable 
to human trafficking, especially when 
combined with conflict and in locations 
where alternative sources of income are 
not available. The association between 
climate change and human trafficking is 
worrying. The findings confirm the need 
to strengthen resilience as a key element 
in policies to counter human trafficking. 
There is an urgent need to address the 
underlying causes of vulnerability, 
including climate change, as a relevant 
and important element in the fight 
against human trafficking. 
144 
 
Food security in Kenya deteriorated significantly during the drought 
in 2017. In July of that year, 2.6 million people (19% of the 
population) were classified as ‘in crisis’ and ‘emergency’ (Phase 3 and 
4 in the Integrated Phase Classification), requiring urgent 
humanitarian assistance. This number increased to an estimated 3.4 
million (25% of the population) from August to October 2017, as the 
drought persisted. Most of the acutely food-insecure population live 
in the pastoral counties of Turkana, Marsabit, West Pokot, Baringo, 
Wajir, Mandera, Tana River and Garissa, as well as parts of the 
coastal, marginal agricultural areas of Kilifi and Lamu (see Figure 6.1). 
The number of people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance 
(Phase 3 or above in Integrated Phase Classification) doubled 
between late 2016 and mid-2017, and increased again by almost a 
million between August and October 2017 (Food Security 
Information Network, 2018).  
 
Drought is posing problems not only in Kenya, but on a global scale. 
Since the beginning of the 21st Century, episodes of drought have 
intensified worldwide and are predicted to become two to three times 
worse in the coming years (Sheffield, Herrera-Estrada, Caylor & 
Wood, 2011). To give some examples, Australia was plagued by what 
has become known as the Millennium Drought, which lasted for 
approximately 15 years from 1995 to 2009. In addition, drought in 
north eastern Spain forced the large-scale import of water from 
France in 2008. Then, in 2017, roughly 5.6 million Ethiopians were 
in need of assistance due to drought caused by El-Niño between 2015 
and 2016 (Reliefweb, 2019). Meanwhile, the intensity and impact of 
each of these droughts as well as the coping mechanisms adopted in 
response to them differ from one region to the next. This is because 
all regions of the world have different geographical, climatological 
and other characteristics, and because different nation states have 
distinct economic and logistical capacities to react to climate disasters 
(IMF, 2016).  
 
One area of interest in relation to climate disasters is the impact of 
such events on societies and how affected communities react to these 
extreme, and often unforeseen, changes to their natural and social 
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environment. Of great concern is the fact that climate disasters can 
increase the vulnerability of affected people to human trafficking. In 
his book Blood and Earth. Modern Slavery, Ecocide and the Secret to Saving 
the World (2016), Kevin Bales notes: 
  
Well, we know environmental change is part of the engine of slavery. The sharp end 
of environmental change, whether slow as rising sea levels and desertification, or 
disastrously sudden like hurricane or tsunami, comes first to the poor. I’ve seen men, 
women and children, families and whole communities impoverished and broken by 
environmental change and natural disasters. Home and livelihoods lost, these people 
and communities are easily abused. Especially in countries where corruption is rife, 
slavers act with impunity after environmental devastation, luring and capturing the 
refugees, the destitute, and the dispossessed. (Bales, 2016, pp. 8–9) 
 
According to Bale (2016), climate disasters disrupt the economic and 
social environments of those they affect, thereby increasing people’s 
vulnerability to crimes that exploit the volatility of their income and 
livelihoods. Presuming that this is correct, societies who depend on 
stable climate conditions would also be among those most at risk. As 
many African countries, including Kenya, rely heavily on agriculture 
and self-subsistence farming (Muller, Cramer, Hare & Lotze-
Campen, 2011), they must then be seen as particularly vulnerable to 
practices like human trafficking.  
 
This chapter looks at the relationship between climate disasters and 
human trafficking. It examines the ways in which climate disasters 
increase the vulnerability of affected populations to human 
trafficking. It also analyses cross-cutting issues such as conflict, 
attitude and preparedness in relation to vulnerability to trafficking 
during and after a climate disaster. Finally, based on the findings, the 
study attempts to develop a concept in relation to the interplay 
between climate disasters and human trafficking.  
Nexus between human trafficking and climate disaster 
In the last decade of the 20th Century, with the end of the Cold War 
era and beginning of globalisation, a sharp increase in trafficking cases 
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was recorded globally (Gallagher, 2010). Since then, human 
trafficking has become one of the most lucrative illicit businesses, 
generating an estimated USD 150 billion in illegal profit for traffickers 
annually (May, 2017). Since 2000, human trafficking has been defined 
internationally in the Palermo Protocol as:  
 
…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, 
of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation. (UNODC, 2004, p. 42) 
 
This chapter uses this definition. The components of this definition 
– the act, means, and purpose – serve as the basis for formulating the 
methodology and obtaining results. According to the Palermo 
Protocol, the three main variations of exploitation in human 
trafficking are: 
 
• The exploitation of the victim’s manpower through forced 
labour, slavery or servitude 
• The exploitation of the victim’s sexual properties 
• The exploitation of the victim through the acquisition and 
sale of his or her organs  
 
In practice, many cases of human trafficking may entail elements of 
the first two manifestations simultaneously.  
 
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), a number of factors can contribute to vulnerability to 
human trafficking. Among them are: being a child, gender, poverty, 
social and cultural exclusion, education, political instability, war or 
conflict, social, cultural and legal frameworks, mobility and demand 
for cheap labour (UNODC, 2008). Natural disasters are thought to 
increase the vulnerability of potential victims of trafficking in a 
number of ways: by forcing or compelling them to migrate, by causing 
the death of income earners and livestock, by causing the destruction 
147 
 
of property, as well as by deepening social and economic exclusion 
(e.g., access to education), among other things.  
 
Even though human trafficking is addressed by several national, 
regional and international policies, a possible link with environmental 
disasters is not their main focus (IOM, 2015; c.f. IOM, 2016). In turn, 
interventions during and after an environmental disaster concentrate 
on humanitarian aspects, with little or no regard for possible incidents 
of human trafficking among the affected population (IOM, 2015). 
This could be because human trafficking is still largely conceptualised 
as an international crime perpetrated by organised criminal networks 
(such as gangs, mafias and terrorist groups). It is not surprising then 
that international human trafficking for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation has become the focus of policymakers, given that its 
features are the most congruent with the convention.  
 
Unfortunately, this means that local and regional human trafficking 
undertaken by opportunistic individuals, rather than organised 
criminal groups, is likely to fly under the radar. Outside the context 
of organised crime, human trafficking may be linked to cultural 
traditions, customs and rites. In Kenya, for example, these traditions 
include child marriage, which is practised by several ethnic 
communities. Environmental disasters such as drought typically have 
an impact on the income-generating activities of affected populations 
(IOM, 2015). In places where the local population ensures their 
livelihood through activities that rely on favourable weather patterns, 
and where alternatives are not available, the effects of drought are 
likely to be profound, leading to increased vulnerability to human 
trafficking. This is because the affected population could potentially 
be forced to engage in negative coping mechanisms such as child 
marriage, child labour or commercial sex work to ensure survival. 
While it is entirely possible that criminal organisations see a chance 
to exploit the vulnerability of the affected population and recruit 
them into exploitative situations, trafficking in this context is more 
likely to be perpetrated by opportunistic local offenders. This could 
also be attributed to the fact that the effects of environmental 
disasters are in most cases felt most strongly in remote areas without 
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any developed infrastructure, such as roads or communication 
networks. Such conditions may complicate the process of 
recruitment, thereby making it either costly or not logistically viable 
for organised trafficking groups to operate in environments affected 
by climate disaster, especially when demand can be satisfied elsewhere 
(Malinowski, 2016; Malinowski & Schulze, 2017). 
 
Another reason why organised criminal groups might be less 
interested in trafficking populations affected by environmental 
disasters (such as drought, in the case of this study), is the short-term 
nature of vulnerability caused by these phenomena. In other words, 
environmental disasters such as drought make people vulnerable only 
for a period of time, and once the effects wear off, vulnerability is 
likely to diminish. A previous study by one of the authors 
(Malinowski, 2016) conducted among internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in Kenya established that those who were displaced due to 
floods were not only less frequently targeted by traffickers, but also 
more resilient to trafficking offers. This was probably because they 
understood that the floods were going to cease or subside in the near 
future. International trafficking for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation, however, often requires established structures and 
resources. As a result, organised criminal groups are unlikely to invest 
resources in order to traffic people who may only be vulnerable 
temporarily. It is more feasible to invest such resources in trafficking 
people who are vulnerable in the long term or permanently. This 
includes people living in slums, street children, unemployed urban 
youth, orphans, and single mothers. To further strengthen this point, 
a study conducted by IOM (2007) established that events that create 
time-bound vulnerability (though the case used, an international 
sports event, was unrelated to environmental disasters) do not 
guarantee profits to organised criminal networks. Accordingly, this 
discourages them from investing resources to exploit such 
vulnerability. However, when there is no need for previous 
investment because exploitation simply occurs as a result of cultural 
and other social dynamics, environmental disasters such as drought 
may create situations in which even temporary vulnerability increases 




The main objective of this research was to strengthen the existing 
anecdotal knowledge base on the nexus between human trafficking 
and environmental disasters with empirical data. Statistical data was 
collected to allow the researchers to gain an impression of the scale 
of the issue, rather than just its nature. The primary interest of the 
researchers lay in understanding the coping mechanisms of people 
affected by drought, with a view to providing insight as to why 
individuals may adopt measures that potentially expose them or 
others to human trafficking. As discussed in the introduction, 
societies that depend on certain climate conditions are thought to be 
highly vulnerable to crimes that exploit the volatility of their income 
and livelihoods. As many African countries, including Kenya, rely 
heavily on agriculture and self-subsistence farming (Muller et al., 
2011), they must then be seen as particularly vulnerable to practices 
such as human trafficking. Based on this assumption, the research 
started with the hypothesis that drought is a catalyst for vulnerability 
to human trafficking. The main research question was: What is the 
nexus between climate disaster-related drought and human trafficking in Kenya? 
 
The conceptual framework of this study took into account the 
influence of drought on individual behaviour. It assumed that 
drought-affected people are more likely to engage in activities that 
increase their vulnerability to human trafficking. Nevertheless, this 
study is guided by the argument that the relationship between drought 
and human trafficking is not straightforward, as explained in the 
introduction. Given the complex nature of the latter, drought might 
have three possible associations with human trafficking: 
 
• Drought increases the vulnerability of the affected population 
to human trafficking 
• Drought decreases the vulnerability of the affected 
population to human trafficking 
• Drought is neutral (neither increases nor decreases) the 




This research used a mixed method approach to data collection. In 
order to ensure the reliability and validity of the research instruments, 
they were subjected to revision based on previous research 
experience, consultations with research experts and a literature 
review. The research tools were then pre-tested and several variables 
adjusted with a view to increasing the reliability and validity of the 
quantitative instrument. For this purpose, a test group was invited 
from the drought-affected areas in Kenya to partake in a testing-
session of the research instruments. This was done to ensure that the 
survey and interview questions were relevant and would ultimately 
provide the desired results.  
Qualitative and quantitative tools 
Both qualitative and quantitative tools were used for data collection. 
During the data collection, respondents were coached on human 
trafficking and how to position this phenomenon against other types 
of migration, especially human smuggling, forced displacement or 
economic migration. Qualitative data was gathered through semi-
structured interviews with affected persons, drought relief 
organisations, and recruitment agencies.  
 
Quantitative data was also collected from persons living in drought-
affected areas using a survey, which was divided into three sections. 
Section 1 focused on information about the respondent and questions 
about migration patterns during drought. It also included questions 
on the quality of life before and after the drought to enable the 
estimation of whether the respondent was actually affected by 
drought or not. Respondents were asked to rate this quality of life 
during the drought on a scale of 1 to 10 (where 1 meant terrible, 2 – 
very poor, 3 – poor, 4 – poor, but manageable, 4 and 6 – moderate, 7 
– good, but with room for improvement, 8 – good, 9 – very good, 10 
– perfect). Responses were compared and calculated with those about 
‘quality of life’ before the drought (using the same scale). Negative 
responses represented cases of those whose quality of life had 
improved (they scored higher for quality of life during the drought). 
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Those at 0 (quality of life at least remained the same as before the 
drought) were not considered in the analysis of the impact of drought 
on human trafficking. A score from 1 to 7 indicated that the drought 
affected their lives in a negative way, with 1 being moderate impact 
and 7 very significant impact of drought on the respondents. Table 
6.1 indicates the distribution of responses on quality of life before and 
during drought. 
 





Ranking of quality of life before and during 
drought (number of respondents) 
Total 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Kilifi County 
Kaloleni 1 1 5 9 7 18 17 3 3 0 0 64 
Kilifi 0 0 0 29 1 2 3 3 23 3 0 64 
Mandera County 
Lafey 1 0 0 0 6 28 20 11 4 0 0 70 
Mandera 
East 




0 0 1 4 15 25 19 6 1 0 1 72 
Samburu 
North 
0 0 0 1 5 17 16 12 12 1 0 64 
Total 2 1 6 43 36 91 84 44 87 11 1 406 
 
Section 2 of the survey was concerned with the respondent’s drought 
experience. Interviewees were asked to rate 12 indicators of drought 
effects and scores were made accordingly. A low score indicated less 
effects, while a high score represented severe effects of drought on 
the respondent.  
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Section 3 dealt with the respondent’s human trafficking experiences. 
For the purposes of this study, the components of human trafficking 
were grouped into three main categories (act, means and purpose). 
For each category, elements of the definition of human trafficking 
were specified. Respondents were asked questions about each 
element of human trafficking and, from their responses, the research 
assistants identified the corresponding component. A score of 1 was 
assigned for ‘Yes’ (element was experienced) and a score of 0 for ‘No’ 
(element not experienced). If they scored at least one component 
from each column, they were assigned 1 point. Three points meant 
that the respondent or his or her child was a victim of human 
trafficking. Two points meant that the respondent was likely to have 
been in a situation in which human trafficking could have occurred. 
One or zero points meant that there was no exposure to human 
trafficking.  
Sampling 
As the 2016/2017 drought has been affecting East Africa and the 
Horn of Africa in a cyclical way, the three most affected counties in 
Kenya were purposively selected for this research: Samburu, Kilifi 
and Mandera. As can be seen, these are arid areas. The selection was 
based on data derived from the Kenya National Drought 
Management Authority (NDMA) Vegetation Condition Index (VCI). 
The drought observation time period ranged from December 2016 to 
May 2017. According to VCI standards, the three selected counties 
ranged between the categories of ‘Severe Vegetation Deficit’ and 
‘Extreme Vegetation Deficit’ (National Drought Management 
Authority, 2017). In each county the data was collected in two sub-
counties; one remote and one situated in the centre. By choosing one 
sub-county located in the centre and one in a remote location, the 
study attempted to capture the difference in the impact of drought on 
remote areas and county centres (as the county headquarters provide 
more opportunities, such as access to government institutions, 






Figure 6.1. Map of Kenya showing counties where data was collected 
Source: Kenya Livestock Marketing Council (2017) 
 
The population was divided into two sub-samples: those severely 
affected and those mildly or not affected by drought. To distinguish 
the two, the study used the objective criterion of displacement. When 
drought forces people to migrate in order to mitigate negative 
impacts, the study assumed that the effects of the drought were 
severe, contrary to a scenario where no migration ensues (Burton, 
Kates & White, 1993; Perch-Nielsen, 2004; Raleigh, Jordan, & 
Salehyan, 2008). The total estimated population for the three counties 
was 2,359,438 (Kenya National Bureau Statistics, 2010).  
 
Using the sampling formula proposed by Krejcie and Morgan (1970): 
, the minimum sample size was 384. To 
enable generalisation, the sample size obtained using the above 




Table 6.2. Geographic distribution of all respondents and those affected by drought  
 
 Mandera Kilifi Samburu Total 
 N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 



















The research team also verified whether the interviewed persons 
indeed represented the desired target group. Section 1 of the survey 
contained questions related to the respondent’s quality of life before 
and after the onset of the 2016/2017 drought. It turned out that a 
proportion of respondents actually felt that their personal situation 
did not become worse during the drought, despite having stated that 
they were affected by the climatic conditions. While this appeared like 
a contradiction at first, it seems plausible that in certain situations the 
life of the affected persons could remain the same or improve, 
regardless of the hardships that could be expected in such a situation. 
Drought mitigation measures exerted by the affected person or civil 
society organisations, for instance, could mean that the respondent 
feels affected, but ultimately not worse off than before. 
Data analysis 
The descriptive and inferential statistical analyses were performed 
using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software. 
Selected variables were cross-tabulated and a chi-square test of 
association was applied. Non-parametric tests were conducted for the 
data for respondents who were only affected by drought, as well as 
for those who had two or more human trafficking components. A 
simplified content analysis process was used to analyse the qualitative 
data.  
Ethical considerations 
This research was done within the confines of ‘do-no-harm’. 
Whenever there was a chance of harm occurring, the research team 
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was instructed not to proceed. Consent was obtained from the 
participants before proceeding with the interview or survey. The 
participants were also informed that they could decide to stop the 
interview at any time. Underage children were not interviewed for this 
study for ethical reasons. Finally, the research assistants were required 
to provide identified victims with the contact information of a 
specialised organisation, counsellor or social worker, in case they 
needed care.  
Results: All respondents 
Correlation between quality of life and risk, optimism, support, 
age, vulnerability and human trafficking 
In order to test the association between drought and vulnerability to 
human trafficking, several variables were correlated using Spearman's 
Rho correlation. The results indicate that the Spearman's Rho 
correlation between the quality of life before and during drought is 
only 0.401 (p<0.001, 2-tailed). This means that the quality of life 
before drought is a significant, but rather weak predictor (only 16% 
shared variance) of the quality of life during drought. All three 
indicators of quality of life (before and during drought, and the 
difference between before and during drought) were explored. Next, 
the relationship between the factor quality of life (before and during 
drought, and the difference between before and during drought) and 
other variables such as vulnerability and experiences with human 
trafficking should be looked at. Table 6.3 presents the Spearman’s 
Rho correlation. 
 
Table 6.3. Spearman's Rho correlation between the indicators of quality of life and the 
other variables 
 
 QLB-QLD QLD QLB 
Risk 0.080 0.363*** 0.439*** 
Optimism 0.215*** 0.315*** 0.537*** 
Support 0.095 0.289*** 0.366*** 
Age 0.250*** -0.092 0.146** 
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Vulnerability 0.404*** -0.532*** -0.032 
Human 
trafficking 
0.275*** -0.064 0.176* 
Notes: * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is 
significant at the .005 level (2-tailed); *** Correlation is significant at the .001 
level (2-tailed). The table presents only the significant correlations at p<.05. 
Variables:  
QLB = Quality of life before the drought 
QLD = Quality of life during the drought 
QLB-QLD = Difference between quality of life before and during the drought 
Risk = Readiness to risk taking an opaque offer of job/education/marriage in 
unknown place 
Optimism = Rate of optimism that the current situation will improve 
Support = Support received from others 
Age = Age of the respondent 
Vulnerability = Indicators of being affected by drought 
Human trafficking = Human trafficking component 
 
The highest value (0.537) in Table 6.3 relates to optimism and quality of 
life before the drought and depicts a relation between past experiences 
and expectations for the future. A lower, yet recognisable association 
was also identified between optimism and quality of life during the drought 
(0.315). Drought, which is a natural phenomenon, can be perceived 
as a temporary occurrence that eventually ends with the passage of 
time. A similar manifestation was noted when analysing the 
predisposition to migration (specifically to human trafficking) among 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kenya. The IDPs who had 
been displaced by flood were less eager to migrate and take a risk than 
IDPs who had been displaced by other causes (such as inter-ethnic 
violence or post-election violence) (Malinowski, 2016).  
 
Readiness to risk taking up an opaque offer of job/education/marriage in an 
unknown place correlates strongly with quality of life before the drought 
(0.439) and quality of life during the drought (0.363). The moderately 
strong, positive correlation with the taking of risk variable means that 
quality of life played a significant role in people taking risky offers 
(such as those that led to human trafficking) and could catalyse the 




The difference between life before and life during the drought variable scores a 
significant correlation with vulnerability (0.404), human trafficking 
(0.275), age (0.250) and optimism (0.215). The strong correlation with 
vulnerability to drought can be explained by drought having an impact on 
the difference between quality of life before and during the drought. 
As for human trafficking, the difference between quality of life before and 
during drought impacted on respondents’ experiences with human 
trafficking. This implies that the greater the difference between 
quality of life before and during the drought, the higher the chances 
of being trafficked. It is also important to note that the difference between 
life before and life during drought variable has a stronger association with 
human trafficking (0.275) than quality of life before drought (0.176) and 
quality of life during drought (-0.064). This means that it is not necessarily 
the quality of life before or during the drought that causes 
vulnerability to human trafficking, but the difference between them. 
 
Next, the research team explored the relationship between the other 
variables to get an idea of the interplay between the variables that may 
affect human trafficking (see Table 6.4).  
 








Optimism 0.264*** 1    
Support 0.370*** 0.471*** 1   
Age -0.016 0.028 0.076 1  
Vulnerability -0.184*** -0.074 0.01 0.185** 1 
Human 
trafficking 
-0.03 0.211** 0.105 0.053 0.203** 
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Notes: * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is 
significant at the .005 level (2-tailed); *** Correlation is significant at the .001 
level (2-tailed). The table presents only the significant correlations at p<.05. 
Variables:  
Risk = Readiness to risk taking an opaque offer of job/education/marriage in 
unknown place 
Optimism = Rate of optimism that the current situation will improve 
Support = Support received from others 
Age = Age of the respondent 
Vulnerability = Indicators of being affected by drought 
Human trafficking = Human trafficking component 
 
Looking more closely at the interplay between optimism and human 
trafficking, it seems that the former can play an ambiguous role in 
preventing or exposing a potential victim to human trafficking. For 
instance, optimism can sometimes make the victim neglect warning 
signs that could be indicative of trafficking. Optimism, especially in 
the context of a natural disaster that is perceived by the affected 
population to be temporary, could, however, contribute towards the 
targeted person’s rejection of an offer made by a potential trafficker. 
This could be because of the expectation that economic conditions 
will improve in the near future and, hence, there is no need for a 
drastic change in lifestyle. In order to rule out that the association 
between the two variables is subject to the second scenario, and that 
optimism prevented respondents from a taking risky offer and ending 
up in a trafficking situation, there is a need to consider other 
correlations. The optimism and risk variables correlated at 0.264, which 
is a moderately positive correlation. This means that optimism 
increased the tendency to take the risk of the unknown, thus making 
the person vulnerable to trafficking. In this context, it means that 
optimism played a negative role in the connection with human 
trafficking, explaining why optimism scored a moderately positive 
correlation (0.211) with the human trafficking variable.  
 
The readiness to risk taking an opaque offer of job/education/marriage in an 
unknown place correlates strongly with support received from others (0.370). 
This indicates that the risk-taking variable increased with support 
received. In a trafficking scenario, support, just like optimism, can 
play an ambiguous role. While support from others can improve one’s 
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life, it can also increase the likelihood of a person being trafficked. 
People who are trafficked internationally frequently receive support 
(both words of encouragement and financial) from family and friends. 
Often, victims would not be in a position to be drawn into a 
trafficking situation without the help of family. In some scenarios, 
help can even become a pressure that drives the person to take up a 
risky offer. Some forms of family support can also be detrimental, for 
instance, where the affected family is offered support in the form of 
accommodating their child, but instead that same child is subjected 
to child labour or some other type of exploitation. 
Correlation between human trafficking and vulnerability 
The correlation between human trafficking and vulnerability (0.203) 
is significant (p<.05). However, it is important to clarify that the 
association between the two is moderate at best, if not weak. A more 
significant correlation emerges when the values for this variable are 
grouped into two categories; with those who scored 0–6 (little or no 
effect of drought experienced or ‘not significantly affected’) in the 
first category and those who scored 7–9 (significant effects or 
‘significantly affected’) in the second category. It transpired that the 
two groups exhibited significant differences in terms of their degree 
of association with vulnerability to human trafficking. The Mann-
Whitney non-parametric test captures the differences between the 
two groups. 
The level of human trafficking among those who were not seriously 
affected by drought differed significantly from those who were 
affected significantly by drought at p=.01228, U=7,160.50029 
(N=220), Ws=13,601.50030, and SE=443.830.31 Those who were not 
affected significantly (N=107) had a mean rank of 100.08, while those 
who were significantly affected by drought (N=113) had a mean rank 
of 120.37. It transpires that the biggest difference between the two 
groups can be found in the respective share of respondents who 
 
28 p = the attained level of significance 
29 U = the number of times observations in one sample preceded observations in 
the other sample in ranking 
30 Ws = the sum of the ranks of the first samples 
31 SE = standard error 
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scored 3 components for each column of the human trafficking table 
(victims of human trafficking). Those who were strongly affected by 
the drought had a significantly higher representation in this category 
than those who were less affected. 
 
These results could be explained by the multifaceted nature of human 
trafficking, which could have resulted in some types of exploitation 
increasing due to drought, while others that lacked an association with 
this type of natural disaster registered no such change. This suggests 
a complex and contextual relationship between drought and human 
trafficking. It seems that in some situations, where the socio-cultural 
milieu is conducive, drought increases some streams of human 
trafficking, while in other circumstances drought has at best a neutral 
effect on human trafficking. Inferential statistics were conducted on 
the reduced sample to identify which aspects of this complex 
association was the most highly correlated with drought. 
Can climate disaster related drought reduce human trafficking? 
As odd as it sounds, drought could also have an inverse relationship 
with human trafficking; that is, the occurrence of drought could 
reduce vulnerability to human trafficking in some situations. 
However, this is only possible for some isolated streams of human 
trafficking and in specific socio-cultural and economic circumstances. 
Child marriage (which is included as a form of child trafficking in 
Kenya) is an example of such an inverse relationship. 
 
For instance, participants from Kilifi and Samburu agreed that the 
economic hardship brought about by famine could make a higher 
number of parents open to the idea of marrying off their children at 
a young age, especially their daughters. Marriage was used as a means 
of gaining access to more livestock as part of the dowry, or at least to 
reduce the economic burden of the household. On the other hand, 
dowry can be an obstacle to child marriage as some individuals will 
be more inclined to retain their livestock during insecure times. In 
addition to this, respondents in Mandera claimed that they did not 
experience a high number of child marriages during the drought as 
the drought disrupted normal patterns of behaviour, including 
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cultural rites. Thus, early child marriage, being an important cultural 
rite, cannot be performed properly due to social (i.e., migration) and 
economic (i.e., poverty) challenges created by drought, and, hence, 
families are often forced to postpone child marriages till the drought 
is over. 
Results: Respondents affected by drought 
The data was then narrowed down to only those respondents affected 
by drought (317 in total). Respondents were asked to what extent 
drought had an impact on them on a scale of 0 to 9. Respondents 
who scored values from 0 to 3 (where 0 meant not affected by 
drought and 9 meant affected by drought32) were removed. The 
remaining respondents who scored values between 4 and 9 were then 
subjected to further analysis about their experiences with human 
trafficking.  
 
Table 6.5. Distribution of respondents affected by drought in each county  
 
 
The following variables were subsequently tested on the reduced 
sample with the use of non-parametric tests: location, gender, migration, 
overt conflict, preparedness for drought, risk-oriented attitude and financial 
instability.  
Location  
The first additional variable to be analysed in conjunction with the 
reduced sample was the respondent’s county. Place of residence is 
 
32 From 0 to 3 the effect of drought was low, from 4 to 6 the effect was moderate, 



















critical in evaluating the cultural dimensions of human trafficking in 
the context of drought, as respondents originating from the same 
counties are more likely to demonstrate a greater degree of cultural 
homogeneity because of their similar or same ethnical affiliation.  
 
A Kruskal-Wallis test performed on those who were significantly 
affected by drought (H (2)=68.526; P=.000; N=317) showed that 
there is significant difference in the degree to which human 
trafficking was experienced across the three counties: the mean rank 
for Mandera county was 163.66, for Kilifi County was 103.74 and for 
Samburu county was 205.06. The fact that Kilifi scored the lowest 
while Samburu scored the highest reaffirms that the former was 
affected to a lesser extent by human trafficking while the latter was 
more affected.  
 
In order to understand this further, the research team explored the 
socio-economic environment of each county and found that Kilifi 
provided several economic opportunities in agriculture, mining, and 
tourism, as well as in industries located in neighbouring Mombasa. 
People residing in Kilifi, thus, had a wide array of options for 
alternative sources of income. In contrast, Samburu and Mandera 
counties were predominantly reliant on pastoralism, with the majority 
of the population having little or no alternative to animal husbandry. 
Drought can have a greater detrimental effect on an undiversified 
economy that depends on stable climate conditions, which, in turn, 
makes more persons vulnerable. 
 
Still, persons living in Kilifi were by no means spared from human 
trafficking. It was reported that many of them were recruited to work 
abroad in Gulf States such as Dubai, Saudi-Arabia and Qatar, with 
several of them ending up being trafficked. In comparison to other 
areas such as Samburu and Mandera, those trafficked abroad from 
Kilifi generally had a different profile. This could be because people 
who are trafficked abroad are often required to possess some form of 
education and skills (such as teachers, nurses, builders), which are not 




For the target group of drought-affected persons, the main danger 
lies in their lack of access to formal labour market opportunities, 
which guarantee workers certain things, such as a minimum wage and 
regular work hours, among other benefits. Consequently, pastoralists 
and farmers are more likely to be found working in the informal 
sector. In tourism, for example, this would include occupations such 
as beach boy (a male who shows tourists around or links them up 
with drugs or sex workers), cleaning lady (especially in hotels) or 
vendor (a male or female who sells handcrafted goods). Low returns 
in this sort of work push many, including children, to supplement 
their income through prostitution (Tuesday, 2006).  
Gender  
Conventionally, human trafficking has been considered through the 
lenses of age and gender. Gender would, therefore, be expected to 
play an important role when it comes to human trafficking among 
drought-affected people. The Mann-Whitney non-parametric test 
was used to measure the prevalence of human trafficking among male 
(mean rank 148.31) and female (mean rank 166.12) respondents, and 
failed to find a significant difference (U=13709, p=.067, N=314) at 
p=.05. The effect of gender (r=.104, z=1.835)33 on vulnerability to 
human trafficking is small to medium. The Mann-Whitney test 
indicates that the human trafficking experience among the drought-
affected population was not significantly different gender wise. Men 
and women were equally exposed to human trafficking during the 
drought. Although the two genders might have experienced specific 
types of exploitation at different frequencies, the overall vulnerability 
and exposure remained similar for both men and women.  
Migration 
Another factor that has the potential to influence the vulnerability of 
drought affected populations is migration, both cross border and 
internal. When the migration variable was tested with the Mann-
Whitney non-parametric test on the reduced sample, the results 
indicated that those who did not migrate (mean rank 169.85) 
experienced more cases of human trafficking than those who did 
 
33 r = effect size; z = z-score 
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migrate due to drought (148.12). The Mann-Whitney test indicates 
that there is a significance difference at p level <.05 between 
respondents who migrated due to drought (mean rank 148.12) and 
respondents who did not migrate due to drought (mean rank 169.85) 
in terms of probability of encountering human trafficking (U=14171, 
p=.026, N=316). The effect of the estimate (r=.125, z=2.230) is small 
to medium.  
 
The biggest difference between the two groups can be found among 
those who scored 0 elements of human trafficking. Those who 
migrated had a higher number of 0 scores compared to those who 
did not migrate. Migration appears to have been a mitigation strategy 
adopted by respondents in response to the drought. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that migration during drought plays a positive role as a 
coping mechanism and does not increase human trafficking 
vulnerability among the affected population.  
Overt conflict 
Prolonged conflict is common in arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya. 
Displacement, destruction and closure of infrastructure such as 
schools and hospitals, as well as loss of life and property are some of 
the effects of overt conflict (for example, between different ethnic 
groups or along socio-economic lines). Previous research in Kenya 
(Malinowski, 2016) established a connection between exposure to 
overt conflict and vulnerability to human trafficking. Respondents 
affected by drought were grouped into two categories: those who 
claim to be affected by overt conflict34 and those who perceive 




34 ‘Subjective belief’ was the best indicator of being affected by overt conflict, as 
overt conflict does not affect every member of the local community equally. In 
Kenya, there are several areas where conflict between two ethnic groups persists, 
yet not all members of the affected community have the same level of impact on 
their lives.  
165 
 
Table 6.6. Conflict experienced by respondents affected by drought35 
 
Conflict situation Yes No Total 
N 148 (46.7%) 169 (53.3%) 317 (100%) 
 
When the Mann-Whitney test was applied, it revealed that the 
prevalence of human trafficking significantly differs (U=16849, 
p=.000, N=316) among the respondent groups. Interviewees who 
were or had been in a situation of conflict scored considerably higher 
(mean rank 188.62) than respondents who had not experienced a 
conflict situation (mean rank 132.30). The effect of the conflict 
estimate is rated medium (r=.325, z=5.772).  
 
The distribution of ranks together with the effects estimate allows the 
conclusion to be drawn that conflict plays an important role during 
drought in causing vulnerability to human trafficking. And, in fact, 
the interplay between conflict and location emerged as a major factor 




Figure 6.2. The influence of conflict and location, together with drought, on vulnerability 
to human trafficking 
Preparedness for drought, risk-oriented attitude and financial 
instability 
The three variables, preparedness for drought, risk-oriented attitude 
and financial instability, did not increase the impact of drought on 
vulnerability to human trafficking as there was no difference across 
the categories for each variable. With respect to preparedness for 
 
35 Respondents were asked whether they have a contemporary direct experience of 









drought (p=.352), the two categories of drought-affected 
respondents experienced human trafficking in equal measure between 
those who had 0 elements and those who identified 1, 2 and 3 
elements of human trafficking. The same applied to risk-oriented 
attitude (p=.630) and financial instability, which was conceptualised 
as having to take out a loan due to drought (p=.731).  
Limitations  
There were several limitations anticipated before the research and 
encountered during the research process. Firstly, this research 
focused on one drought during a specific period of time (2016–2017). 
A longitudinal research design that repeatedly compares data during 
drought and no-drought periods would be more suitable to assess the 
effect of climate disaster related drought and vulnerability on human 
trafficking.  
 
Secondly, there was failure to anticipate in advance that a certain 
proportion of affected persons would be unavailable for the survey 
and interview. This concerns the group of affected persons who may 
have migrated to foreign countries or other places in Kenya. Locating 
these persons after their migration was difficult, not only from a 
logistical perspective, but also given the limited resources at hand.  
 
The random selection of participants presented its own challenges. 
Even though the research team did not strive to gain a representative 
sample of the overall population in terms of age, the number of 
participants within the lowest age spectrum (20–29) turned out to be 
lower than in the higher age brackets. During the data validation it 
became clear how this composition came to be. Many of the younger 
persons in the communities were said to be engaging in income-
generating activities or taking part in political rallies during the 
election period, which rendered them unavailable. In addition, it was 
argued that elders were seen as the most experienced members of 
their communities and, by extension, were more likely to represent 




Conclusion and recommendations 
This study investigated the nexus between climate disaster-related 
drought and human trafficking in Kenya. Using a quantitative design, 
we found that drought has an impact on human trafficking 
(Spearman’s Rho coefficient =0.203, p<.005) by making the drought-
affected population vulnerable to human trafficking. The association 
is most significant in conjunction with the existence of conflict 
(U=16849, p<.001) and in certain locations (H [2] =68.526, p<.001). 
Among the three locations examined, two, Samburu and Mandera, 
experienced inter-ethnic conflict, and thus the people in those 
counties were more vulnerable to human trafficking than that in 
Kilifi. In the context of drought, gender seems to play a lesser role 
than in a scenario where there is no drought. The same applies to 
migration, which is a neutral factor in relation to vulnerability to 
human trafficking.  
 
The study found that of the three possibilities – drought increases, 
decreases or neither increases nor decreases vulnerability to human 
trafficking – the first scenario seems to be the most supported by the 
evidence. That is, drought increases vulnerability to human trafficking 
in certain circumstances. However, in some circumstances, 
vulnerability remains neutral or even decreases. It appears that what 
determines whether drought increase, decreases or has a neutral effect 
on vulnerability to human trafficking is location (i.e., the socio-
cultural context) and whether there is a situation of conflict in that 
location.  
 
Based on these findings, certain recommendation can be made:  
 
• In relation to the prioritisation of national, regional and 
international policies, there should be more focus on climate 
change migration streams, especially non-regularised 
migration (this also includes human trafficking). Further 
research is needed to support this by mapping out areas where 
populations are particularly vulnerable to different types of 
human trafficking due to climatic disasters. 
168 
 
• It would be helpful to include counter-trafficking measures in 
humanitarian assistance programmes for drought-affected 
communities. This should especially be done in areas affected 
by inter-ethnic conflict and where populations lack 
alternatives to the main type of economic activity (for 
example, animal husbandry). 
• Finally, further research should be conducted on: the 
relationship between other types of climate disaster (besides 
drought) and human trafficking; the role of climate-related 
natural disasters on child marriage; the role of climate-related 
natural disasters on child labour; and the interplay between 
climate induced inter-ethnic conflict and human trafficking in 
drought prone areas, among other things. 
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Standing in Two Worlds: Mobility and the 
Connectivity of Diaspora Communities 
 
Antony Otieno Ong’ayo 
 
Introduction 
Global diaspora communities have changed rapidly over the past 
decades with expanding 
digital connectivity, although 
access remains varied in 
different parts of the world. 
As stated in Castells’ (1996) 
seminal work on The Rise of 
the Network Society, 
information and 
communication technology 
(ICT) has had a major impact 
on migration. International 
migration has generated what 
Vertovec calls “super‐
diversity”, which describes 




differentiated and legally 
stratified immigrants” 
(Vertovec, 2007, p. 1024), 
and is influenced by both global and local social processes. The result 
has been the emergence of diaspora communities in various 
destination countries, whose ties to their country of origin remain, 
despite the disconnection that migrants may feel from family and 
friends left behind.  
Diaspora communities live in an 
online/offline world of between their 
places of origin in Europe and Africa – 
the ‘here’ and ‘there’. This chapter looks 
at this connectivity and how it affects their 
mobility and transnational engagement. 
It finds that the online platforms 
established by diasporas enable them to 
transfer money and skills (financial and 
social remittances), with significant socio-
economic and political impact in both 
places. The chapter points to the reality of 
diaspora communities in the digital 
world, where they take part in life in 
different spaces. The cyber-presence of 
diasporas in more than one world drives 
mobility through connectivity and needs to 




In the Netherlands, Ethiopians, Eritreans and Ghanaians make up 
some of the most visible diasporas of African background, whose 
immigration has been largely driven by conflict and regime-
conditions (refugees), family union/reunion and formation (De Valk, 
Liefbroer, Esveldt & Henkens, 2004), and human trafficking (Van 
Reisen & Mawere, 2017; Van Reisen, Gerrima, Kidane, Rijken & Van 
Stam, 2017; Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015). Others have been motivated 
by study and the search for employment opportunities. As for groups 
from the Horn of Africa, such as Ethiopians and Eritreans, political 
conditions at home, especially in Eritrea, have provided sufficient 
grounds for applying for asylum in the Netherlands. In contrast, 
Ghanaian migrants are considered ‘economic migrants’, due to the 
relative economic and political stability in Ghana. Among all groups, 
the need to stay in touch is influenced by direct relations (next of kin), 
cultural ties, and efforts to maintain the identities that diasporas 
possess through their multiple layers of belonging (Madsen & Van 
Naerssen, 2003; Castles & Davidson, 2000). Links to the country of 
origin also influence collective organising, which diasporas use to 
mobilise for transnational activities (Ong’ayo, 2019). 
 
Regardless of their migration status, members of the three African 
diaspora communities (Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian) often 
engage in community activities influenced by identity (national or 
ethnic), cultural practices, the need for safety nets and solidarity in the 
‘new’ society. These activities are also influenced by attachment to the 
country of origin in terms of socio-economic and political 
developments, which influence their involvement from a distance 
(see Conversi, 2012). For instance, with some differences, members 
of the Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas in the Netherlands 
travel back and forth between the Netherlands and their countries of 
origin, where they implement various charity projects, visit family 
members or establish projects and enterprises in preparation for their 
return (Ong’ayo, 2016). This entails regular contact via telephone, 
email, Skype, video, social media and other forms of ICT and digital 
technology, characterising their simultaneous engagement ‘here and 
there’ (see Ong’ayo, 2019).  
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However, not all diasporas from these communities, especially 
Ethiopian and Eritreans, can return home or undertake transnational 
activities freely (see Ong’ayo, 2010). This is due to the nature of their 
relationship with the government in their country of origin (see 
Ong’ayo, 2014b; 2017), as well as immigration and integration 
conditions in the country of residence. Ethiopian, Eritrean and 
Ghanaian diaspora communities face interrupted circular migration 
options, because of the migration regime in the Netherlands, which 
has become more restrictive in the last decade.  
 
While technology presents opportunities that facilitate diaspora 
linkages with the country of origin, it can also have a disruptive effect 
on life and society (Van Oortmerssen, 2015), especially in relation to 
its influence on local populations in the region of origin, where people 
generally have limited access to the Internet and are sometimes faced 
with government censure. From a migration control perspective, 
technology is increasingly being used in the form of biometrics, 
thermal imaging and radar, while traffickers and smugglers also use 
some of these advanced technologies to track migrants and trade in 
refugees on migration routes (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). 
Diasporas also encounter ICT and digital technology-related control 
measures by governments in their countries of origin. This can be in 
the form of the surveillance of refugees and diaspora communities in 
host countries, while others use these tools to construct and impart 
identities of nationhood (see Van Reisen & Gerrima, 2016). The use 
of ICT by states (particularly countries of origin) to control diaspora 
communities also applies to the politics of information, which can be 
linked to the control of cyberspace through regulation (Glen, 2017) 
or disruption and even shutdown. These conditions have effects on 
the connection of diaspora communities to their country of origin, 
but also on their interactions within the host country.  
 
ICT also influences how diaspora communities reconstruct their 
identities, because of the influence of contextual conditions 
(structural and streams) in the host societies and in their countries of 
origin. The cultural, religious, and social networks that diasporas 
bring with them further influence the relationship between diaspora 
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communities and natives of the host country, other migrant 
communities, and with institutions in the host society.  
Research questions 
This chapter looks at the online/offline dimensions of migration in 
Africa. It seeks to answer the following research question: What is the 
online/offline connectivity of diaspora communities, and how does this connectivity 
affect their mobility and transnational engagement between the country of residence 
and origin? 
 
To answer this question, the chapter looks at the following sub-
questions: 
 
• What are the ‘here and there’ manifestations of the online/offline 
connectivity of diaspora communities in their transnational practices? 
• What is the role of agency in how diaspora communities deal with multi-
layered structural conditions through offline/online connectivity?  
• What are the effects of interactions between communities with ICT and 
digital technology? 
• What tensions are generated by the increased cyber-based connectivity of 
diaspora communities? 
• What are the similarities and differences between the various diaspora 
communities in terms of how they interact with technology (online/offline 
connectivity) based on their immigration, integration and transnational 
engagement experiences? 
 
This chapter attempts to answer these questions using the Ethiopian, 
Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas in the Netherlands as a case study. 
Understanding the online/offline dimensions of migration from 
Africa to Europe (and circular migration back to Africa) is essential 
from the perspective of diaspora engagement in the digital era and 
the social change that this generates in the countries of residence and 
origin. Within this context, ICT and digital technology serve as 
instruments through which members of diasporas create connected 
spaces and function within transnational spaces through their virtual 
presence – their embedded and disembodied presence (Van Stam, 
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2017). Giving such social processes a ‘here and there’ perspective 
offers us an opportunity to explore the social capital that accrues 
through diaspora online/offline connectivity and its implications for 
the integration of diasporas and their transnational practices.  
Online/offline diaspora connectivity in a transnational context 
The conditions that influence the formation of diaspora communities 
are important for the analysis of their online/offline connectivity and 
the intersection between the ICTs and digital technologies they use 
to maintain connections from a distance. Linked to the various 
migratory patterns is the rapid expansion of connectivity, which has 
generated various opportunities for diasporas to maintain 
connections with family and friends in their countries of origin. 
Manifestations of these dynamics can be observed in the remittances 
(financial, social and material) that diasporas make to their countries 
of residence (Ong’ayo, 2019, 2016, 2014a, 2014b; Faist, 2008; 
Sørensen, 2007). ICTs and digital technologies have also increased 
the simultaneity of diaspora transnational practices and reduced the 
time and space needed for these practices. These technologies have 
influenced how groups construct or reconstruct their identities in 
relation to their country of origin and the host society (see Van Reisen 
& Gerrima, 2016) in ways that profoundly shape relationships 
between physical space and cyberspace (Hiller & Franz, 2004). This 
is reflected in the use of the Internet, email, satellite television, mobile 
phones, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and social media (e.g., 
Facebook, Skype, WhatsApp, YouTube, LinkedIn and Twitter) for 
various purposes (social, cultural and political), within and across 
borders (see Warnier, 2007; Hiller & Franz, 2004). 
 
Notwithstanding the policy debates and measures introduced for 
return migration (voluntary and involuntary return), there are many 
temporary and permanent migrants in destination countries. Stringent 
immigration policies can interrupt circular migration and push 
migrants into permanent settlement. Despite restrictions on mobility, 
many migrants have settled in destination countries, leading to the 
formation of diaspora communities. In the context of policy 
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discussions about how to deal with migration, some propose that 
members of diasporas be enabled to return to their countries of origin 
(and again to the host country) within the framework of circular 
migration (Vertovec, 2008b).  
Conceptual framework  
The transnational practices of diasporas are composed of cross-
border connections that are characterised by continued, fluid and 
frequent contact between members of diaspora communities and 
people in their country of origin. Because diasporas lead “multi-sited 
transnational lives” (Collyer & King, 2016, p. 168), the simultaneous 
nature of their activities and the effects of these activities can be seen 
in both the country of residence and the country of origin, from a 
‘here and there’ perspective (Ong’ayo, 2019). The social fields that 
diasporas build across geographic and political borders through their 
mobility between their country of residence and origin provide a basis 
for understanding how online/offline diaspora connectivity 
influences migration dynamics between Africa and Europe, and vice 
versa. This section looks at two concepts – ‘here and there’ and 
agency – that are essential to understand the connectivity of diaspora 
communities and how this connectivity affects their mobility and 
transnational engagement. 
‘Here and there’ 
In this chapter, I deploy the theoretical concept of ‘here and there’ 
(Ong’ayo, 2019; Waldinger, 2008) to refer to the contexts in which 
diaspora communities emerge and interact with local social structures 
and the transnational practices that they engage in from an 
online/offline perspective. This perspective helps to understand the 
connections, attachments and loyalties that members of diasporas 
have with their country of residence and origin and how these 
connections and attachments impact on their movement and 
exchanges between the two contexts (see Ong’ayo, 2019). Thus, the 
notion of ‘here and there’ highlights the lifestyle and practices of 
members of diasporas, which entail “sustained ties of persons, 
networks and organisations across the borders of multiple nation-
states” (Faist, 2000 p. 2). The diasporas build these social fields across 
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geographic and political borders through their mobility between their 
country of residence and country of origin; however, these social 
fields can be challenged by migration regimes that hinder mobility, 
especially from Africa. Consequently, these social conditions provide 
a relevant basis for investigating the implications of the online/offline 
connectivity of diaspora communities.  
 
The notion of ‘here and there’ further contributes to our 
understanding of the ties that members of diasporas have with their 
country of residence and origin. For instance, frequent and dense 
contact with Ghana does not imply that Ghanaians who actively 
participate in these processes are less integrated into Dutch society. 
On the contrary, such collective undertakings are mainly possible for 
members of the diaspora who are well established in the Netherlands, 
but who still have enduring ties to those left behind (Vertovec, 2004). 
This view ties in with the noted link between integration and 
transnationalism (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). 
 
To explain how diaspora communities function within the framework 
of online/offline connectivity, it is important to look at the role of 
context. Framed within the notion of ‘here and there’ about the 
country of residence and the country of origin, context often denotes 
a more deterministic or static form of factors that influence diaspora 
community formation and transnational engagement. According to 
Exworthy, context refers to the “milieu within which interventions 
are mediated but also shapes and is shaped simultaneously by external 
stimuli like policy” (Exworthy, 2008, p. 319). However, in this 
chapter, I seek an alternative conceptualisation that sees context as a 
set of conditions that are fluid and can be characterised as streams 
(Kingdon, 2014). The analytical value of this conception is 
recognition of the fact that a more static conception of context does 
not capture dynamics and processes that are not time bound. Even 
though context informs the kind of political opportunity structures 
that influence some of the developments in diaspora communities, 
context never remains static due to interactions with the agency of 
diasporas. These social processes become more relevant when 
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looking at the intersection between migration and the rapid expansion 
of ICT and digital technology.  
Agency 
Behind diaspora transnational practices, and the social processes they 
generate, lies an agentic component that shapes, and is shaped by, the 
actions that members of diasporas take (see Ong’ayo, 2019). The term 
‘agency’ is used here to refer to the individual ability to make choices 
and take decisions within a particular social structure and culture. 
Studies that focus on empowerment describe agency as “the ability to 
define one’s goals and act upon them” (Kabeer, 1999, p. 438). In 
diaspora studies, agency relates to “the meanings held, and practices 
conducted, by social actors” (Vertovec, 1997, p. 24). When applied to 
how diaspora communities function within a nation-state, agency has 
an analytical value in terms of the value that diasporas attach to 
activities between and within the country of residence and the country 
origin and the agendas that they have. Drawing on Vertovec’s view, 
agency can be used to characterise the ability of diasporas to construct 
and reconstruct narratives around identity and create negotiations 
about the various aspects of diasporic experiences (see Ong’ayo, 
2019). Examples, include narratives about belonging as well as 
demands for space and recognition (Kleist, 2008), in response to the 
socioeconomic, political, institutional and policy contexts that 
diasporas encounter (see Ong’ayo, 2019). 
 
The above description of agency is aligned with Giddens’ view that 
agency affects structure, as individuals are “the only moving objects 
in social relations” (Giddens, 1984, p. 181). In line with this 
understanding, Lacroix highlights several characteristics that enable 
agents to act, including:  
 
…their transformative power (i.e. the capacity to act upon structures), their 
knowledgeability (the stock of knowledge they rely on to undertake action), their 
rationality (the capacity to assess their situation and establish priorities) and their 
reflexivity (i.e. the consciousness, as a social actor, of their transformative capacity 




The agentic responsibility that exists in diaspora communities can 
also be linked to the organisations they have established in the 
country of residence to manage living conditions in the host country 
and facilitate their transnational engagement. This function has led to 
the recognition of diasporas as agents of change (Kleist, 2014). Paying 
attention to the agency of diasporas, therefore, aids understanding of 
the various initiatives that diasporas undertake in response to 
contextual conditions, such as the need to stay connected in the 
context of the immobility caused by migration regimes. 
 
As noted in the various literature on migration (Vertovec, 2008a; 
Faist, 2000), the conditions under which diasporas engage 
transnationally is largely influenced by migration networks, linked to 
social ties, rapid developments in digital technology, and access to 
different types of ICTs. In relation to this, it is important to examine 
the intersections involved and tensions generated by migration and 
connectivity-linked social processes in terms of how diasporas 
function within an online/offline framework to maintain ties and 
remain connected. This is crucial for understanding how agency is 
exercised within diasporas, especially when mobility is curtailed by 
strict migration regimes and digital technology is used by states to 
control their diasporas, construct identities of nationhood, or 
redefine the identity of citizens abroad (see Van Reisen & Gerrima, 
2016). The embeddedness of migration dynamics and networks 
within specific, as well as dispersed (or deterritoralised), contexts (see 
Ong’ayo, 2019; Vertovec & Cohen, 1999) necessitate the in-depth 
examination of how ICT and digital technology influence diaspora 
connections and practices and the positionality of diasporas in 
relation to the different contexts to which they have an affinity. These 
concerns are the focus of the main research question in this chapter, 
as outlined earlier. 
Research method 
The research on which this chapter is based was carried out in three 
periods, 2009–2010, 2013–2014 and 2016, as part of different 
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research projects.36 The analysis is based on 60 in-depth interviews 
with respondents from the three diaspora communities studied: 14 
from Ethiopia (all first-generation migrants), 30 from Eritrea (5 first 
generation, 24 new arrivals, and 1 second generation migrant) and 16 
from Ghana (all first-generation migrants). The respondents were 
selected through purposive and snowball sampling, as access to some 
communities (Eritrean and Ethiopian) was only possible through 
introductions, owing to sensitivities around connections with the 
country of origin. A similar approach was adopted in the case of the 
Ghanaian community to overcome trust issues. All the interviews 
were conducted face-to face, with follow-ups done by telephone and 
Skype. Interviews were recorded using a Dictaphone and handwritten 
notes. These were then transcribed and analysed using thematic 
coding to determine broad patterns. 
 
The study took an ethnographic approach involving field work within 
the three diaspora communities in the Netherlands and in the 
countries of origin (except Eritrea), to verify linkages and the nature 
of their transnational engagement. This entailed an exploratory and 
multi-sited case study research design and the use of mixed methods 
to maximise the strengths of the different data collection tools 
(Bryman, 2012). The ethnographic approach was useful in 
investigating the dynamics within the three communities studied, as 
it facilitated an in-depth examination and ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 
1983) of networks, social interconnectedness and relationships 
(Mawere, 2015). An ethnographic approach also pays attention to the 
historical and political context influencing online/offline diaspora 
connectivity as part of their transnational practices. An ethnographic 
approach allows for involvement with the respondents and their 
 
36 The data used was derived from studies that were part of the DIASPEACE 
project ‘Diaspora for Peace: Patterns, Trends and Potentials of Long-distance 
Diaspora Involvement in Conflict Settings. Case Studies from the Horn of Africa 
2009–2010’; from fieldwork for the research project ‘Migration Corridors between 
the Netherlands and Horn of Africa (Ethiopia)’ (2013–2014); a PhD research 
project ‘Diaspora Organisations, Transnational Practices and Development: 
Ghanaians in the Netherlands’ (2011–2014); and a study on the Eritrean community 




communities in ways that help to overcome norms and values that 
are expressed in (social) expectations and reactions (cognitive, 
emotional and behavioural). This was important considering the 
sensitivities that members of these diasporas (especially Ethiopians 
and Eritreans) attach to information related to their migration 
experience and transnational activities between the Netherlands and 
their countries of origin. 
 
During the interviews, I asked the respondents how the use of ICT 
and digital technology influences their connectedness within the 
diaspora community and with the country of origin, both at the 
individual and collective levels. Questions also covered their 
experiences with dynamics within the two distinct structural contexts 
and what role their own agency plays in dealing with these conditions. 
Questions around agency also touched on how respondents interact 
with various technologies and the choice of these technologies. The 
interviews were conducted in private homes, and secure office spaces 
at refugee reception locations to ensure privacy, confidentiality and 
openness. Direct information was also collected through focus group 
discussions, which were held in places convenient for the groups. 
Interviews were mainly conducted in English, but where the 
respondents, especially refugees, could not speak English, a person 
fluent in Amharic and several Eritrean languages provided 
translations. These were later verified by a second person to minimise 
information lost during translation. 
 
Besides the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, data 
collection also included direct observations during community 
cultural events in the municipalities of The Hague, Ede, Amsterdam, 
Eindhoven, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Almere. These events provided 
opportunities to observe interactions and the kind of mobilisation 
taking place within these communities. This information was 
supplemented by a review of the relevant literature on the three 
communities in the Netherlands in terms of their online/offline 




Although the data used in this chapter is derived from different 
research projects and periods (2009–2016), these variations have 
proved useful for observing developments and changes in 
online/offline diaspora connectivity. This is important in verifying 
the use of ICT and digital technology in terms of new and old ties 
(Hiller & Franz, 2004) across the various categories of migrants (first 
generation, second generation and newcomers) within their migration 
networks and engagement with their countries of origin.  
Results of the study 
The aim of this study was to provide an understanding of the various 
dimensions of the online/offline connectivity of diaspora 
communities and how these dynamics intersect with their 
transnational practices in the context of mobility. The results are 
presented in this section structured according to the five-sub research 
questions. 
‘Here and there’ manifestations of online/offline connectivity 
of diaspora communities in their transnational practices  
The online connectivity of members of Ethiopian, Eritrean and 
Ghanaian diaspora communities in the Netherlands plays an 
important role in their transnational practices, some of which 
transcend the barriers to circularity and create direct linkages with 
those left behind and networks elsewhere. ICT and digital technology 
inform the diaspora connectivity that lies behind collective organising 
in different spaces, as well as individual functioning within distinct, 
yet interconnected, contexts. The implications of this multiplicity of 
contexts and layers of belonging and being is captured in the 
following reaction to a question on the relevance of online/offline 
connectivity in the lives of members of diasporas:  
 
As a refugee, I live here and care somewhere else. I am exposed to dual forces, which 
are competing for my attention and action. Both socio-economic dynamics here in the 
host society and back home have a profound impact on my identity and thinking. Life 
in the diaspora is split between your country of residence and your country of origin. 
This condition demands constant contact and communication, which is only made 
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possible through technology, since none of us can physical return home in the 
foreseeable future. (GT, interview, face-to-face, 14 September 2016) 
 
In line with this, members of the three diaspora communities studied 
use a combination of ICTs and digital technologies, including regular 
telephones, recorded video tapes, mobile phones, and Internet-based 
communications such as email, Yahoo messenger, Skype calling and 
messaging, Viber calling and messaging, WhatsApp calling and 
messaging, Facetime, VoIP, and YouTube recordings. Digital 
technology has enhanced the interactions, networking and collective 
organising of diasporas with new innovations enabling instant 
communication and the sharing of information, which can be 
accessed repeatedly over time. 
 
Members of Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas whose legal 
status is precarious rely on networks of co-ethnic and diaspora 
organisations (hometown associations, umbrella organisations and 
migrant development NGOs), which conduct activities in the various 
municipalities in the Netherlands, for social support (also see 
Ong’ayo, 2019, 2016). This has led to the establishment of both 
physical and online connections as a source of information for 
migrants who fail to access services provided by host country 
institutions.  
Role of agency in how diasporas deal with multi-layered 
structural conditions through offline/online connectivity  
Based on their agency, some diasporas with more capacity (high-level 
education or previous work experience) take initiatives that bring 
newcomers together using ICTs. They reach out to large numbers of 
newcomers (refugees and migrants) who are challenged by 
integration. A respondent who has been taking the lead in 
online/offline mobilisation had this to say:  
 
Through simple efforts, upon finishing my Dutch language course, I have been 
organising newcomers in the Eindhoven area – organising groups of 30 people directly 
and online through a chat house of 700 people. […] The goal is to facilitate 
participation in sports (football and volley ball) and coordinate information meetings. 
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So now I am seeking to register the group as an organisation. (BG, interview, 
face-to-face, 18 October 2016) 
 
Online/offline connectivity among the diaspora communities studied 
demonstrates the critical intersection between technology and agency, 
especially during emergencies. While members of diasporas may have 
limited resources, the connections that newcomers establish with 
‘pioneers’ or early arrivals with experience on how Dutch public 
services function, their ability to reach out and take initiative, and the 
instant exchange of information facilitate quick resource 
mobilisation. An illustration is provided by the following emergency 
that needed urgent attention: 
 
A young girl recently delivered a baby at the HMC Westeinde Hospital in The 
Hague and was discharged, but upon arrival at home she had [high] blood pressure. 
[…] because of lack of confidence and the language barrier, she could not negotiate 
with service providers. The chairperson of the organisation took her to the house 
doctor and brought her back to the hospital by his own means. In such cases, the 
organisation intervenes where members are in bad health situations and asked to 
wait for a long time. (GG, interview, face-to-face, 11 October 2016) 
 
Most of the information on integration issues is in Dutch, which 
poses problems for new refugees. Consequently, they rely on social 
media and other sources to access the relevant information from 
individuals within their networks who have mastered the Dutch 
language or who have had experience with the system and know their 
way around. As described by one leader of the Eritrean community 
in The Hague:  
 
Our community is a kind of network for support to each other, especially the 
newcomers who need help with settlement, housing, and acquiring house materials. 
We also help with finding prayer places and public services. We give advice on the 
way of life here to individuals […] how to fit within Dutch society. The network 
that people establish here plays a major role […] and this is made possible through 
mobile phones and social media, combined with face-to-face meetings. (GG, 




The online/offline activities of the diasporas also focus on collective 
organising, particularly socio-cultural events targeting the respective 
communities, natives and other diaspora communities. The main 
technologies used for mobilisation include social media, email, 
telephone calls, Skype and Paltalk. Besides face-to-face 
communication during community meetings, members of the three 
diaspora communities also use community radio and television 
programmes to create awareness and stay informed about 
developments in their country of origin. Examples include Radio 
RECOGIN (run by the Representative Council of Ghanaian 
Organisations in the Netherlands), Ghanatta Radio, Radio Erena,37 
Stichting Eritrea TV Amsterdam, Shekortet (an Eritrean government 
news website),38 Stichting Ethiopian Satellite Television and Radio 
(ESAT), and Oromia Media Network.39  
 
During the Irreecha festival (the Oromo Thanksgiving) in Gaasperplas, 
Amsterdam, one of the respondents involved in the coordination of 
the event emphasised the added value of ICTs as follows: 
 
You can see that the participation in this event is very diverse. People came from 
many parts of Europe, in buses and private cars. They are being hosted by others 
(friends and families) in the Netherlands. It is a huge logistical job involving mailing, 
calling directly with mobiles phones, and the use of social media such as Facebook 
and Twitter to inform people of the activities and how to reach the locations, since the 
event takes place in two phases: One near the water in Diemen and a reception with 
an evening event in this big hall. (AG, interview, face-to-face, 14 September 
2014) 
 
The ties that members of diaspora communities have with their 
country of origin are also highly political, as many, especially those 
from Eritrea and Ethiopia, were driven to migrate by regime 
 
37 Radio Erena (http://erena.org/) is based in France and accessible across the 
globe via satellite, on the Internet, and calls to listen to the mobile phone service.  
38 Shekortet (https://shekortet.com). 
39 The Oromia Media Network is described on its Facebook page 
(https://www.facebook.com/pg/OromiaMedia/community/?ref=page_internal) 
as an independent, nonpartisan and non-profit news enterprise whose mission is to 
produce original and citizen-driven reporting on Oromia, Ethiopia.  
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conditions and conflict during the Eritrea-Ethiopia war (the 30-year 
independence war till 1991 and the second war from May 1998 to 
June 2000). Likewise, the Ghanaians who came to the Netherlands in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s were driven by political conditions, 
instability and mass expulsion from Nigeria. Political connections to 
these migration experiences inform the relationship between 
members of the diaspora community and the government in the 
country of origin, as well as the nature of diaspora politics in the 
country of residence towards the country of origin. For political 
mobilisation, online/offline activities involve the use of websites and 
blogs targeting specific groups and audiences ‘here and there’, 
especially in the expression of political opinions and agitation. Home 
country governments and their supporters in the diaspora also use 
these technologies to counter diaspora activities.  
 
Online/offline diaspora activities target countries of origin at 
different levels; they can be focused on the immediate family or 
community at the local level, or target political conditions at the 
national level. As one respondent noted: 
 
Every now and then your mood is affected by what happened or what is happening 
six or seven thousand miles away. On your Facebook page, you might see the picture 
of a wounded or dead family member, a relative or a friend. You see it just a few 
minutes after it happened. The problem does not end in knowing what happened 
somewhere else. You must involve yourself in what happened or what is happening. 
You may be asked to contribute something, to give ideas, to help make decisions, and 
to give guidance’s or leadership. This is an everyday challenge for refugees in the 
diaspora. (GT, interview, face-to-face, 28 March 2011) 
Effects of interaction of diasporas with ICTs and digital 
technology  
Members of the Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas in the 
Netherlands make use of ICT and digital technology to stay 
connected and interact in a variety of ways, which include both 
embodied and disembodied presence (Van Stam, 2017). Digital 
technology facilitates telepresence, online interactions and access to 
disembodied information. The relational and emotional connections 
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and the need to share personal experiences inform the use of ICT and 
the choice of which type of technology serves the purpose best 
(cheap, instant, flexible and quality).  
 
Life in the diaspora is split between your country of residence and your country of 
origin. As someone who has lived in exile for the last 13 years, this is my daily 
reality. I lived in Nairobi Kenya and I have memories and connections from there. I 
have things to remember, I miss people I care about […] people I know from that 
time. I have experiences that I share with them. I have stories to tell, agonies that 
linger in my mind. I am here now, but I am virtually everywhere else. (GT, 
interview, face-to-face, 14 September 2016) 
 
Although members of the diasporas from the three communities 
studied make use of their online connectivity differently in terms how 
they relate to the government in their country of origin, from an 
associational perspective the use of online connectivity includes 
lobbying and advocacy. Digital technology provides possibilities for 
visibility and anonymity at the same time. At the associational level, 
online visibility serves as a way of conveying a message to target 
audiences in the diaspora and at home. Individuals also use these 
spaces (personal and group websites, blogs and Facebook) to present 
a wide variety of information to different audiences. For instance, 
images of Oromo youth behind the recent revolution in Ethiopia 
broadcast live and images of ongoing events such as police brutality 
have been rapidly and widely shared online and through social 
media.40 Using their agency, these exchanges were done in a manner 
that successfully established a strong link between those in the 
diaspora and back home in what could be described as ICT-enabled 
politics (Miller, 2011). Despite the disruption of connectivity under 
emergency conditions (between 2014 and 2018), members of the 
Ethiopian diaspora were able to link up with activists on the ground 
using mobile phones and digital technologies that bypassed the 
 
40 Since 2014, several protests took place in the two main regions of Ethiopia, 
namely, Oromia and Amhara. In reaction, the government declared a state of 
emergency from October 2016 till August 2017 and again on 16 February 2018 (see 
Human Rights Watch, 2018).  
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government block. As narrated by one respondent among the early 
generation:  
 
Access to mobile technology enables many of us to stay connected and follow the 
political developments on the ground in our regions of origin. The smart phones that 
diasporas sent to next of kin and various connections enabled local activists to 
communicate locally and share images of police brutality with those in the diaspora 
and international community. This is how news on the ground reached international 
media and organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
among others. (LA, interview, face-to-face, 10 May 2018) 
 
The respondent identified a strong ‘here and there’ life, which 
involved a mental presence in his country of origin through digital 
communication. 
Tensions generated by the increased cyber-based connectivity 
of diaspora communities 
Contextual factors both ‘here and there’ are a major influence on the 
evolution of diaspora communities and how they function in terms 
of their multiple layers of belonging. Firstly, they affect diaspora 
communities because the activities of diasporas are context bound, 
while at the same time transcending single nation-state borders. This 
duality of context, belonging and positionality in terms how diasporas 
function creates tension between these two contexts in terms of the 
online/offline connectivity of diaspora communities. These tensions 
emanate from the context of nations serving as locations for the 
networks to which members of these diasporas belong in cyberspace 
(see Bernal, 2005). 
 
Secondly, diaspora connectivity is a conduit of influences (identity, 
sense of belonging, loyalty and practices), which might escape state 
control or be controlled by states that attempt to control members of 
their diaspora in other states, for example, by surveillance, 
intimidation and other forms of control (DSP-Groep & Tilburg 





Reisen & Gerrima, 2016), as in the case of Eritrea. For example, a 
recent newcomer noted: 
 
The regime uses social media to reach out to people who listen and watch Eritrean 
TV stations via satellite. This is because many newcomers like us can access this 
information online – YouTube and Facebook – where the Eritrean regime and its 
agents in the diaspora place propaganda videos. (JA, interview, face-to-face, 21 
October 2016) 
 
Thirdly, members of Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas also 
seek to influence developments in their countries of origin through 
ICT-enabled politics (see Bernal, 2006). This includes information 
politics, digital disobedience and political activism, as demonstrated 
on various Eritrean Facebook sites.41 These discursive spaces 
(Internet and social media) have several dimensions and their use 
varies between the three communities in terms of how they engage in 
homeland politics in the country of residence. Mobilisation for 
political activities is linked to party politics in the country of origin 
and in the diaspora. This mainly applies to Ghanaians and Ethiopians. 
In the case of Ghanaians, many of the online discussions take place 
on websites,42 as well as on radio and television.43 For members of 
the Ghanaian diaspora, political activities include petitions to the 
government through the Ghanaian Embassy in the Netherlands or 
debating forums organised by the diaspora and visiting ministers and 
party leaders (see Ong’ayo, 2019). As for the Ethiopian diaspora, 
these mobilisations take on a confrontational dimension, as diasporas 
belonging to different ethnic groups and political parties take 
 
41 Examples include https://www.facebook.com/ERTREA/ and https://nl-
nl.facebook.com/EritreanPresss/. 
42 Examples include ‘Ethiopian: Union of Ethiopians in the Netherlands’ 
(Vereniging voor Ethiopiërs in Nederland), see http://www.ethioamsterdam.nl; 
‘Ghanaian: Modern Ghana’, see 
https://www.modernghana.com/section/DiasporaNetherlands; and ‘GhanaWeb’, 
see https://www.ghanaweb.com. 
43 For example, Adom TV (Amsterdam), AFAPAC Radio, Ghana Today Media, 
Ghanatta (radio & TV), Godiya Radio, Radio Akasanoma, Radio RECOGIN, 
Radio Voice of Africa, Sankofa TV, Spirit FM and Soul Hour Radio (Amsterdam), 




radicalised stances on the political situation in Ethiopia. In the case 
of Eritreans, their political mobilisation in cyberspace take two forms: 
in support of the government or in support of the various opposition 
groups. Mobilisation in support of the government by the Young 
People's Front for Democracy and Justice (YPFDJ), for example, 
focuses on recruitment, promoting the 2% tax of the diaspora by the 
Eritrea government, and organising festivals and demonstrations in 
defence of the image and position of the Eritrean government abroad 
(DSP-Groep & Tilburg University, 2016). An illustration of the 
Eritrean regime and use of ICT for surveillance and intimidation of 
its diasporas is provided by a recent arrival: 
 
In the middle of August 2016, I was called by YFPDJ using an anonymous 
telephone number at midday. I was told to stop my activities about change in Eritrea 
or else I will be killed. The call was made in Tigrinya, by a male voice, who said, 
“We advise you to stop”. (DG, Interview, face-to-face, 13 October 2016) 
 
In contrast, Eritrean opposition groups use ICT tools to engage in 
lobbying and advocacy targeting host country institutions on their 
policies towards the Eritrean government. For example, Eritrean 
opposition parties, NGOs and diaspora organisations based in the 
Netherlands used ICT within their networks to organise a protest in 
2002 against Dutch aid to Eritrea (Chairman of Eritreans for Justice 
and Democracy-Benelux, interview, face-to-face, Utrecht, 2 
December 2008). At the same time, among the newcomers within the 
Eritrean community, ICT has become an important tool for 
mobilisation through Eritrean Youth for Change. A respondent 
observed: “ICT offers alternative tools that enable our group to 
pursue freedom in Eritrea, rule of law, and constitutional change, 
providing those oppressed in Eritrea with a voice” (HZ, interview, 
face-to-face, 13 October 2016). Mobilisation around these activities 
takes on an online dimension and is influenced by the continued 
focus of these diaspora communities on the homeland, an aspect that 




Similarities and differences in how the various diaspora 
communities interact with technology (online/offline 
connectivity) 
The use of ICT and digital technology by Ethiopian, Eritrean and 
Ghanaian diasporas in the Netherlands further reveals both 
similarities and differences, which can be partly ascribed to contextual 
factors (i.e., the social, cultural and institutional environment in which 
these diasporas function) and partly to the characteristics of the 
diasporas (i.e., migration experiences, resources and capacities). 
Commonly shaping online/offline connectivity within the three 
communities are political factors, which are also a major driver of 
migration. This mostly applies to the first generation of Ethiopian, 
Ghanaian and Eritrean migrants, but can also be observed in 
contemporary migration out of Eritrea and Ethiopia (newcomers). 
These early arrivals play a connecting role for new migrants in the 
Netherlands through existing networks and families through offline 
connectivity. However, with the expansion of access to ICT and 
digital technology over the last two decades, these diaspora 
connections have become much more diverse, but still thick. For 
instance, mobile phone technology has been a critical factor in the 
migration journey, including the provision of information about 
routes and destination countries. Eritrean diasporas have been much 
more engaged with information technology than the other two 
diasporas studied, as this is the only way they can stay connected to 
family and friends left behind due to the political situation in Eritrea. 
In recent years, mobilisation by different Eritrean diaspora groups has 
been characterised by either loyalty to the government or opposition 
to the government. 
 
Nonetheless, there are some differences in the online/offline 
connectivity of the diasporas from the three communities. Variations 
in the availability of digital technology emanate from contextual 
factors (socio-economic and political) and technical conditions 
(connectivity, availability, access, affordable, flexibility and safety). A 
second determinant is the political context, which either gives space 
for the use of ICT or not. For example, members of the Ghanaian 
diaspora can experiment with and deploy a wide variety of emerging 
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technologies due to the availability of political space in Ghana. The 
relative political and economic stability in their country of origin 
enables them to transcend the online/offline demarcations due to the 
possibilities of returning and helping those left behind (and even 
sending communication gadgets to those left behind, thus speeding 
up connectivity and bridging the digital and communication divide). 
In contrast, Eritreans and Ethiopians have limited possibilities of 
physical return or bringing back items that could enhance 
connectivity. These contextual and technological factors have an 
impact on online/offline connectivity and how diasporas continue to 
stay in touch with their next of kin and others in their country of 
origin.  
Discussion 
This chapter examined online/offline diaspora connectivity within 
the Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diaspora communities in the 
Netherlands and its effect on mobility and transnational engagement 
between the country of residence and origin. This called for the 
adoption of a ‘here and there’ perspective (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; 
Waldinger, 2008, Ong’ayo, 2019) and the notion of agency to 
understand the intersection between context-related factors, 
technology and the agency of members of diasporas. This is examined 
using the theoretical notion of diaspora transnationalism (Vertovec & 
Cohen, 1999; Vertovec, 2008a; Faist, 2008; Erdal & Oeppen, 2013), 
which captures the ‘here and there’ linkages and diaspora practices 
influenced by technology. Notable within the notion of ‘here and 
there’ is the positionality of diasporas in terms of their multiple layers 
of belonging (Madsen & Van Naerssen, 2003), as well as transnational 
citizenship or trans-state loyalty (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2000; 
Waldinger, 2008).  
 
How diasporas interact with technology and function within an 
online/offline connectivity framework further links to the idea of a 
network society (Castells, 1996) and the changing social relations, 
identities, spaces and networks (Miller, 2011). Technology, as used by 
the diasporas in the three communities studied, can be argued to 
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facilitate cultural forms and immersive experiences (Miller, 2011), 
leading to new forms of communities and expressions of nationalism 
(Anderson, 1991). These social processes inform diaspora-state 
relations in terms of the politics of Internet governance and 
regulation (Glen, 2017) in the countries of residence and origin and 
effect the diaspora transnational practices undertaken through 
online/offline connectivity.  
 
The observed online/offline connectivity within the Ethiopian, 
Eritrean and Ghanaian diaspora communities in the Netherlands 
points to the relevance of agency. This agency in diasporas (Lacroix, 
2013; Ong’ayo, 2019) relates to their intersection with ICT and digital 
technology (Vertovec, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Hiller & Franz, 2004; 
Conversi, 2012). While how diaspora communities function within 
this framework may suggest technological determinism (Miller, 2011), 
the agency of diasporas (Ong’ayo, 2019; Lacroix, 2013), in 
combination with the social and economic conditions, influence the 
creative use of technology during transnational practices. As argued 
by Miller in his treatise on base, superstructure and infrastructure, 
technology not only affects society and culture directly, but is 
“enabling infrastructures, which are part of the ‘base’ in the base-
superstructure relationship between economy and culture” (Miller, 
2011, p. 224). Miller’s perspective confirms the agentic responsibility 
of diasporas in the creative use of technology in transnational 
practices that overcome disruptions to mobility by migration regimes 
or government surveillance, as well as facilitating digital disobedience 
and political activism (Miller, 2011). 
 
This chapter also demonstrates that while some online diaspora 
connectivity through digital technology is useful for staying 
connected and maintaining identities, it also influences offline 
interpersonal interactions and relationships, especially the use of 
social media. The observed online/offline connectivity of members 
of diasporas confirms the role of technology in the emergence of an 
information society (Castells, 1996), in which digital identity, 
networked society and collective virtual culture influence both the 
individual and collective identities that members of diasporas build 
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through the narratives they share online. These narratives contribute 
to community building, but also reconfigure identities (religious, 
ethnic and political). The dynamics generated by ICT and digital 
technology, as illustrated in the diaspora media, lead to changes in 
relations. These effects have been noted in the impact of tele-
presence and embodied presence (Miller, 2011; Van Stam, 2017) on 
interactions and connections from a distance in the context of 
fragmented families (Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017). These new realities 
in communication and interaction over long distances support 
Benedict Anderson’s idea of imagined communities (Anderson, 
1991), linked to the discursive construction and reconstruction of 
identity because of mobility and dispersion across different 
geographical locations. 
 
Linked to the findings of previous studies on Eritrean refugees in the 
digital era (Miller, 2011; Van Reisen & Gerrima, 2016; Van Reisen & 
Mawere, 2017; Van Reisen et al., 2017), I argue that ICT and digital 
technology is not only used by diasporas to their advantage (staying 
in touch, remittances, digital disobedience and political activism), but 
that governments also use the same tools to control and shape the 
identities of diasporas, through narratives and discourses (Van Reisen 
& Gerrima, 2016). The online data trail and disembodied personal 
information recorded during online activities enables the government 
to exert control over members of the diaspora (see Miller, 2011; Van 
Reisen et al., 2017). Respondents from the Eritrea community, 
especially those in the second wave (newcomers), and the majority 
from the Ethiopian community (mostly in the opposition) cited 
experiences with surveillance, control and intimidation by the 
government in their country of origin, while in the Netherlands. 
Others narrated the role of ICT in their migration trajectory, which 
included their use by traffickers and kidnapers. These findings 
corroborate studies on ICT-facilitated criminal activities, such as 
human trafficking for ransom (Van Reisen, Estefanos & Rijken, 2012; 
Van Reisen & Rijken, 2015; Van Reisen & Gerrima, 2016; Van Reisen 
et al., 2017). While useful for sharing information, staying connected, 
and helping to memorise events, diasporas can also experience 
traumatic events, through chatrooms and Facebook. As described by 
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various respondents, such experiences with staying connected 
through technology confirm observations about the increase in 
trauma through repeated sharing of images and stories of suffering 
(Kidane & Van Reisen, 2017) and the viewing of websites established 
by Eritreans during the war with Ethiopia to count or remember the 
dead (Bernal, 2013). 
 
This chapter highlights some significant features of online/offline 
diaspora connectivity and its implications for transnational 
engagement. Nonetheless, missing are the perspectives of the next of 
kin and governments in the countries of origin, which would 
strengthen more in-depth analysis of how governments engage with 
diasporas through ICT and digital technology (identity, imagined 
communities). Equally, more in-depth comparative analysis based on 
multi-sited studies on the link between online/offline diaspora 
connectivity and the reconfiguration of identities and transnational 
loyalties within a deterritorialised context could shed light on the 
impact of these dynamics from a ‘here and there’ perspective. This 
would contribute to a better understanding of how diaspora 
connectivity reconfigures the interactions and relationship between 
those who are mobile (migrants) and those who are immobile (in the 
country of origin). As circumstances vary depending on the context 
and over time, observing these processes in different places at 
different times could be useful, as the impact of online/offline 
diaspora connectivity was greater in Ghana and, to lesser extent, in 
Ethiopia, and unknown in Eritrea due to regime conditions (hence, 
this study relied mainly on information provided by Eritreans in the 
diaspora). 
Conclusion 
This research sought to answer the question: What is the 
online/offline connectivity of diaspora communities, and how does 
this connectivity affect their mobility and transnational engagement? 
This question was answered by looking at five sub-research questions. 
The first sub-research question looked at the ‘here and there’ 
manifestations of online/offline connectivity. Looking at how the 
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Ethiopian, Eritrean and Ghanaian diasporas in the Netherlands 
engage transnationally, the three diaspora communities can be 
described as highly involved in the use of ICT and digital technology 
in their interactions, which involve both online and offline 
connectivity. Diasporas from the three communities use ICT and 
digital technology in activities linked to identity formation and the 
maintenance of cultural ties, both ‘here and there’. The use of ICT 
and digital technology can be seen in the organisation of cultural and 
religious events. Such events are manifestations of the multiple layers 
of belonging of diasporas, which influence the nature of their 
engagement and the kinds of interactions they are involved in. 
Consequently, ICT and digital technology, in the form of tele-
presence and embodied presence, bring about changes in social 
relations among members of the diasporas and with their countries 
of origin (family ties, culture and traditions). These developments 
have led to the possibility of creating virtual communities, as families 
have become fragmented through migration.  
 
In relation to the second sub-research question, on the role of agency 
in how diasporas deal with multi-layered structural conditions 
through offline/online connectivity, the networks and connections 
that diasporas from the three communities maintain through 
online/offline connectivity also serve as mediums for the exchange 
of information about developments in the region of origin and 
globally. These exchanges between people and places, which focus on 
social, cultural and political developments, as well as remittances, 
have increased due to new communication technologies.  
 
Tensions arose among diasporas from the three communities, 
mediated by both access to ICTs and digital technology, as well as 
their use by the state to control diasporas or promote their 
engagement. Conversely, restrictive conditions on the use of ICTs 
and digital technologies affect mobility between the countries of 
origin and the Netherlands, even if diasporas maintain online 
connectivity. Diasporas from the three countries respond differently 
to the prevailing conditions (restrictive and open) in ways that create 
tensions (for the conflict-generated and regime-driven diasporas – 
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Ethiopia and Eritrea) and opportunities (for the diasporas from states 
that are stable – Ghana) at the same time. This is more so in cases 
where diasporas are in pursuit of maintaining connections with those 
left behind (immobile/offline) by countering state restrictions and 
control, surveillance and intimidation or through friendly engagement 
policies.  
 
This research revealed similarities and differences in how the various 
diaspora communities interact with technology. For example, direct 
engagement (offline participation) by Ethiopians and Eritreans has 
been hindered by repressive government policies. The diasporas from 
these two countries creatively use ICTs and digital technology and 
political/civic space in the country of residence, especially in 
opposition to the regimes in Ethiopian and Eritrea, to bypass the 
constraints put in place by the governments in the countries of origin 
and surveillance by the agents of these governments in the country of 
residence. In contrast, for members of the Ghanaian diaspora, their 
relatively open engagement has been facilitated by non-interference 
by the government in diaspora transnational activities.  
 
ICTs and digital technology enable diasporas to transcend the 
online/offline dichotomy as they maintain ties and links with those 
left behind and those in the diaspora. While the online/offline 
connectivity among diasporas may create tensions linked to the static 
conditions of those left behind or those not allowed to return or 
circulate, the close ties that diasporas maintain with multiple places 
and people inform their ingenuity in terms of platforms and tools for 
mobilisation, as part of their transnational engagement. These online 
platforms established by diasporas enable them to undertake transfers 
(financial and social remittances) with significant socio-economic and 
political impact, both in the country of residence and origin. 
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‘Europe is not Worth Dying For’:  
The Dilemma facing Somalis in Europe 
 
Melissa Phillips & Mingo Heiduk 
 
Introduction  
“The road to Europe is harder than before”, shared a young female 
Danish-Somali citizen (aged 
29), reflecting the changing 
attitudes in the Somali 
diaspora community in 
Denmark. This chapter 
investigates these changing 
attitudes towards Somali 
migrants and refugees coming 
to Europe in an irregularised 
situation (asylum seekers, 
victims of human trafficking 
and migrants without the 
required travel documents). It 
is based on empirical research 
conducted by the Danish 
Refugee Council’s Diaspora 
Programme and the Mixed 
Migration Centre between 
2016 and 2017, as part of a 
wider study on the relationships between diasporas and migrants 
coming to Europe irregularly, involving both Somali and Afghan 
diasporas (Nimkar & Frouws, 2018).44 
 
 
44 The full study included focus group discussions and an online survey. However, 
this chapter focuses on the focus group discussions data only. 
Diaspora communities in Europe are 
often perceived as facilitators of 
migration. But, this study found that, 
contrary to what is generally believed, 
their views of newcomers to Europe range 
from ambivalence to resentment. These 
perceptions are influenced by the negative 
migration climate in host countries and 
by their own status, which is often 
insecure. The perception of their own 
situation is affecting how they advise 
people back home who are considering 
migrating. Often their advice to potential 
migrants is that they should refrain from 
migrating. But, this advice is not always 
viewed as legitimate. 
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The objective of this research was to investigate diaspora responses 
to fellow nationals moving in an irregularised situation and bring 
these findings to existing discussions about the diaspora’s wider role 
in supporting their fellow nationals. The main research question is: 
What is the attitude of Somalis in the diaspora on irregularised migration by their 
countrymen and women? While diasporas are often assumed to be 
‘facilitators’ of the journeys of migrants in an irregularised situation 
(through the financial support they provide to their fellow country 
nationals) or seen by groups such as politicians as potential ‘blockers’ 
of migration policies (because they act as key sources of information), 
this chapter presents a more complex interplay, drawing out the 
multiple roles played by diasporas and the inter-relationship between 
diasporas and their co-nationals moving in an irregularised situation 
(Frouws, Phillips, Hassan, & Twigt, 2016). It highlights a range of 
attitudes towards newcomers, which include ambivalence and 
resentment, and widens understanding of the impacts of migrants in 
an irregularised situation on diasporas in their country of destination. 
It also examines the policy perspective of diasporas towards 
irregularised migration. 
 
The authors of this chapter have chosen to use the term ‘irregularised 
migration’ to highlight the social and political processes that place 
people in this situation (De Genova, 2002). The term ‘irregular 
migrant’ will not be used, because it labels the person as irregular 
rather than the travel method. Migrants may be fleeing war, political 
unrest or persecution. Some are victims of human trafficking or 
smuggling. Some are seeking a better life for themselves and their 
loved ones. Their situation is referred to as ‘irregularised’ because they 
do not have the necessary documents or authorisation required by the 
destination (and transit) countries. 
 
The research on which this chapter is based was carried out from 
2016 to 2017 in the context of the high level of attention on the 
number of migrants in an irregularised situation, including those 
originating from the Horn of Africa, seeking protection (as in the case 
of refugees) or better opportunities (as in the case of migrants) in 
Europe. People originating from Somalia have been known to use 
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both the Central Mediterranean Route through Libya, and the Eastern 
Mediterranean Route through Turkey to reach Europe (UNHCR, 
2018). In 2015, 12,433 Somalis reached Italy and 4,301 reached 
Greece through the above-mentioned sea routes. This number 
dropped to 7,281 across both routes in 2016, with a small number 
also reaching Spain from Morocco through the Western 
Mediterranean Route (UNHCR, 2018). This was due to an overall 
reduction in people using the Eastern Mediterranean Route after the 
European Union (EU) and Turkey signed a Statement of Cooperation 
in March 2016 to control the number of people leaving Turkey for 
Greece by sea. At the same time there was a shift in the profile of 
people using the Central Mediterranean Route towards West Africa. 
Despite this reduction, Somalis still comprise a significant proportion 
of new asylum seekers in Europe, with 11,890 people originating 
from Somalia submitting asylum claims in the EU in 2017 and the 
first quarter of 2018 (Eurostat, 2018).  
 
New arrivals join sizeable Somali diaspora communities in Europe. 
Such communities have been the subject of studies on remittance 
sending practices (see, for example, Horst, 2008) and contribute to 
development in their home country in multiple ways (Sinatti & Horst, 
2015). In the context of Denmark, the exact profile of Somali 
communities will be discussed later, however, they have been subject 
to increasing restrictions with a large number of Somalis with 
residence permits having their status reassessed by the Danish 
authorities with a view to potential revocation for people on 
subsidiary protection. There has been less attention paid to the 
relationship between diasporas and migrants in an irregularised 
situation, with the exception of some early research on diasporas and 
their impact on asylum flows (Crisp, 1999) and some mention in 
research on migrants in an irregularised situation (McAuliffe, 2013; 
Richardson, 2010). This is despite the evidence that people on the 
move maintain social connections with communities abroad while in 
transit (Frouws et al., 2016). By investigating the relationship and 
attitudes of diasporas towards irregularised migration and people 
arriving in Europe in an irregularised situation, this empirical research 
seeks to fill a gap in our knowledge about diasporas and migrants in 
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an irregularised situation, as well as propose future ways in which 
collaboration between diasporas, international organisations and 
governments can be established to assist in this critical area. A review 
of the existing literature on diasporas is detailed next.  
Defining diasporas 
Diasporas are comprised of migrants and refugees who live outside 
their country of origin in a new country of settlement, but have “taken 
active steps to preserve their identity as a distinctive community and 
have an ongoing orientation towards the homeland” (Jones, 2016, 
cited in Holliday, 2016). Diasporas can be in nearby neighbouring 
countries, which is commonly known as the ‘near diaspora’, or further 
away in the ‘wider diaspora’ (Van Hear, 2002, cited in Koser & Van 
Hear, 2003). Oliver Bakewell of Oxford University’s International 
Migration Institute asserts that there are four criteria that must be met 
for a group of people to constitute a diaspora, namely:  
 
(i) movement from an original homeland to more than one country, either through 
dispersal (forced) or expansion (voluntary) in search of improved livelihoods; (ii) a 
collective myth of an ideal ancestral home; (iii) a strong ethnic group consciousness 
sustained over a long time, based on a shared history, culture and religion; and (iv) 
a sustained network of social relationships with members of the group living in 
different countries of settlement. (Bakewell, 2009, p. 2)  
 
It is important to note that being a member of a diaspora is voluntary 
and not all people who move to another country consider themselves 
part of a diaspora or join formal diaspora organisations. Furthermore, 
former migrants and refugees may choose to maintain links with their 
country of origin without ascribing to diaspora membership.  
 
As a country, Somalia has long been affected by conflict and violence, 
which has caused the internal displacement of 825,000 people, with 
388,000 new displacements in 2017 due to conflict and violence and 
a further 899,000 due to disasters. In addition, there are 
approximately 500,000 Somali refugees living in neighbouring 
countries, Kenya and Ethiopia (Internal Displacement Monitoring 
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Centre, 2018). The prevailing conditions in Somalia and repeated 
efforts by the Kenyan government to close Dadaab camp in Kenya 
has influenced many Somalis to consider onward migration. Somalis 
undertake a form of secondary movement known as tahriib, which is 
the emigration of young Somali men and some women mainly from 
Somaliland and Puntland in search of better opportunities (Ali, 2016). 
Somalis have long been featured as one of the main groups 
attempting to move irregularly through Libya, with their numbers on 
the rise since 2012, although, as noted above, their numbers have 
been in decline in recent years (Eurostat, 2018). 
 
Somalis are also among the main nationalities seeking asylum in 
Denmark. Since 2011, asylum application figures for Somalis have 
declined by approximately 73% (between 2012 and 2016). During 
2016, asylum rates in Denmark declined from 21,000 applications in 
2015 to 5,959 in 2016, mainly due to increased border controls 
(Statistics Denmark, 2018). Nevertheless, due to the cumulative 
growth in Denmark’s migrant and refugee communities, including 
through family reunification, Denmark’s Somali diaspora is now 
estimated to comprise approximately 20,000 people (Statistics 
Denmark, 2018). There are also Somali diasporas in other European 
countries, the United States and Canada. Notably, Somalia’s 2016 
Foreign Policy made explicit reference to Somalia’s estimated two 
million diaspora members and the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has an Office of Diaspora Affairs (Obsiye & Hussein, 2016).  
 
Diasporas make multiple economic, social, cultural and political 
contributions to their countries of origin, including remittances, 
economic investments, the transfer of skills, and other philanthropic 
ventures, as well as playing a role in politics. For example, the ninth 
President of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, was a member 
of the Somali diaspora in the United States (Cismaan, 2017). 
Remittances to Somalia are estimated to be around USD 1.4 billion 
annually, representing 23% of Somalia’s GDP (World Bank, 2016). 
 
Social connectedness is one feature of the transnational ties that 
diasporas actively foster through global networks, which are based on 
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social, cultural, class, linguistic and ethnic links (Carling, 2008). 
Increasingly, these global networks are maintained through social 
media and information and communication technology (ICT), which 
allow for links to be developed and maintained across multiple sites, 
including places of origin, sites of exile and transit, and destination 
countries (Vertovec, 2004). Through such networks, a range of 
information can be shared, including information that is increasingly 
understood to influence decision-making about migration (Frouws et 
al., 2016). It has been asserted that diaspora, family and community 
members are generally more trusted sources of information than 
migration agents, brokers, smugglers and governments (Crisp, 1999; 
Ambrosini, 2016). Other research has shown that this trust continues 
when migrants and refugees arrive in destination countries, with 
diasporas and ethnic networks serving as an important source of 
assistance for settlement support and employment, as well as 
representing powerful examples of success (and failure) to others in 
their country of origin (Bloch & McKay, 2014).  
 
Beyond the general attributes of diasporas summarised here, few 
studies have explored in detail other attributes of diasporas, including 
their collective memory and shared consciousness, which are also key 
attributes of diasporas (Bakewell, 2009). This is important when 
focusing on the specific relationship between diasporas and migrants, 
as well as refugees moving in an irregularised situation. Diaspora are 
living in a host country and, by their very definition, have experiences 
in other economic, cultural and political situations. This may 
influence their attitudes towards those who are migrating or moving 
to seek asylum.  
 
The literature has highlighted the social connectedness of migrants 
and refugees moving along irregularised routes, including the high use 
of ICT, which connects them with the diaspora in their preferred 
country of destination (Frouws et al., 2016; Van Reisen et al., 2017; 
Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017) and how former refugees may offer 
information and organisational infrastructure to support irregularised 
migration (Crisp, 1999) and even pay ransoms for migrants and 
refugees held by smugglers and traffickers (Van Reisen, Estefanos & 
209 
 
Rijken, 2012, 2014; Jacobsen, Robinson, & Lijnders, 2013; Van 
Reisen & Rijken, 2015). Moreover, research on decision making 
among people moving to seek asylum, including those planning to 
move irregularly or those who have moved already, has highlighted 
links with trusted communities. However, such research notes that 
the information they receive from family and friends often does not 
contain granular details (Richardson, 2010); it also notes that the 
support provided is more generally linked to decision making 
(McAuliffe, 2013).  
 
Most of the research conducted so far has been from the perspective 
of people on the move, drawing on data collected from their 
experiences, with secondary information drawn from diasporas in 
some cases. These studies have reinforced a widely-held assumption 
that members of diasporas have a uniquely close relationship with 
people moving irregularly or are key influencers of migrants in an 
irregularised situation. In addition, research about smugglers indicates 
that they comprise a wide range of individuals (for instance, brokers, 
recruiters, guides, guards, drivers and hotel owners), and may also 
include migrants and refugees or former migrants and refugees (Tinti 
& Westcott, 2016), which supports this assumption.  
 
The assumption that diasporas influence co-nationals who may be 
seeking to migrate may be based on labour migration research, in 
which there has long been a focus on ‘intermediaries’ (brokers, agents, 
members of social networks etc.), who help migrants navigate the 
complex web of immigration policies and procedures including 
employer sponsorship (see, for example, Fernandez, 2013). 
Individuals, associations and organisations, together referred to as 
‘migrant institutions’, have in other contexts been shown to play a 
role in facilitating migration (Goss & Lindquist, 1995). Utilising the 
concept, but adopting a broader frame of reference, Maurizio 
Ambrosini, proposes that intermediaries can also be found 
supporting migrants during their irregularised migration journeys and 
settlement in destination countries, offering connections and 
providing services and help (Ambrosini, 2016). Ethnic networks and 
diasporas can be included in this broad definition of intermediaries, 
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although Ambrosini suggests that diasporas and ethnic networks are 
mainly involved at the destination country level. Others have shown 
smuggling and trafficking to be far more regionally interconnected 
(Van Reisen et al., 2017; Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017). The social 
connectedness of diasporas with people in their countries of origin, 
as described above, suggests that members of the diaspora can act as 
intermediaries at all stages of migration journeys.  
 
However, this view neglects other aspects of the social bond between 
diasporas and (irregular) migrants, such as the attitudes and 
perceptions of diasporas about people moving in an irregularised 
situation, the full extent of links diasporas have with migrants and 
refugees travelling in irregularised ways, as well as the potential role 
diasporas play, especially with regard to supporting policy 
development and programmatic responses in transit and destination 
countries that ensure protection and informed decision making and 
minimise the risks involved in these journeys. These aspects of 
diaspora involvement are discussed later in the chapter. The next 
section details the research methods used.  
Research methods 
The main research methods used for this study were a literature 
review and focus group discussions. As this was a preliminary study, 
the research was modest in size and the findings have limitations as 
to their generalisability. According to Danish government statistics, 
there are approximately 21,000 people residing in Denmark claiming 
Somali ancestry, of which around 11,700 are immigrants and the 
remainder, some 9,500 people, are their descendants (Statistics 
Denmark, 2018). The Danish Refugee Council’s Diaspora 
Programme works with Somali diasporas as a priority group and has 
access to some 800 members of Somali communities living in 
Denmark.45 Research participants were accessed for this study 
through the Diaspora Programme and a snowball sampling approach 
used to reach other community members. In addition, advertisements 
 




in English, Somali and Danish were placed on the Diaspora 
Programme’s Facebook page inviting people to participate in the 
focus group discussions. Two members of the Danish-Somali 
community who were employees of the Danish Refugee Council 
carried out the focus group discussions, which took place in 
Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense between 16 December 2016 and 20 
January 2017. Focus group discussions were convened for women, 
youth and asylum seekers. Participants were asked a range of open-
ended questions regarding their general perceptions and expectations 
about irregularised migration, connections with people on the move, 
any knowledge of trafficking and the dangers and risks people faced, 
modes of information sharing, support for integration provided on 
arrival, and their opinion about European migration and asylum 
policies. Focus group discussions generally lasted for 60–90 minutes 
and all focus group discussions were recorded and transcribed. 
 
In total, 27 Somali diaspora members (15 female; 12 male) took part 
in 6 focus group discussions. Given that this was an initial study with 
limited funding, targeting both the Danish-Somali and Danish 
Afghan diasporas, it was decided to purposively keep a small sample 
size to test the research tools. A further reason for maintaining a small 
pilot was the fact that, as noted above, there were Danish government 
actions ongoing at the time to review the status of subsidiary 
protection for Somalis, which had resulted in a level of stress and 
concern among the Somalia diaspora in Denmark. 
 
Importantly, all participants were advised that their anonymity would 
be protected and that participation in the study was voluntary and 
could be withdrawn at any time. Some participants expressed an 
eagerness to have the study findings made public in reports and 
articles so that a wider group of stakeholders could read about the 
challenges they faced, demonstrating that this research met the 
principles of action-research (Collie, Liu, Podsiadlowski, & Kindon, 




This chapter focuses on four components of the research findings, 
namely, general perceptions and expectations towards people moving 
irregularly from Somalia, connections to people on the move 
including information exchanges, the dilemma facing members of the 
diaspora community, and policy perspectives. The data cited below 
follows this structure and comes from the focus group discussions.  
General perceptions of people moving irregularly  
In general, most focus group discussion participants made a 
distinction between Somalis who arrived during early displacements, 
for example, during the 1990s, and those coming more recently. They 
characterised the profile of people leaving the country now as young 
people who have grown up during the civil war and are seeking better 
opportunities due to poverty. One male Danish-Somali respondent 
explained: 
 
I want to describe the new refugees and migrants as those who flee for their personal 
ambition and dreams instead of necessity, as those in the 90s did. Those who are 
fleeing now are not forced to flee, and they know there is a chance of them not reaching 
Europe given all the risks involved during their journey, and the images they have 
been told of Europe are completely different from the reality. They see it as the 
‘Promised Land’. (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, 
aged 35 years) 
 
In addition to outlining a profile of youth who are not seeing a future 
in Somalia, respondents also described a sense of urgency among 
people arriving more recently, as one female Danish-Somali citizen 
respondent explained:  
 
They want to finish their education quickly, get a job quickly and contribute right 
away. In a nutshell, they want to do the all the things that we Somalis have managed 
to do over a time span of 20 years in just 3–5 years, and that is not possible. (Focus 




Some respondents recognised that the Somali diaspora may have 
encouraged this movement through the investments they have made 
back in Somalia in businesses or by building houses in their home 
town, which may have sent a positive message about the lifestyle on 
offer in Europe. They also felt that new arrivals were drawn to 
Europe for specific things such as education, as compared to earlier 
groups, who were more likely to be focused on family reunification, 
for instance. During the focus group discussions some people were 
adamant that most people leaving Somalia are just looking to reach a 
safe place, rather than having a specific destination in mind. Others 
expressed resentment that new arrivals seemed selfish and impatient 
and were only interested in bettering their own lives, even to the point 
of ignoring the advice given by members of the diaspora. Reflecting 
that there was perhaps a lack of knowledge on the part of newly-
arrived Somalis about the challenges faced in Europe, compared to 
those in Somalia, one female Danish-Somali citizen pointed out that: 
“Peace also means not worrying about getting a job, or applying for 
asylum and being moved around in various detention or asylum 
centres across Europe” (Focus group discussion, female Danish-
Somali citizen, aged 29 years).  
 
These results suggest that members of the diaspora have a very 
different domain of knowledge and rely on other experiences 
regarding settlement in the host country than newly-arrived migrants. 
These experiences and knowledge are part of the integration process 
of Somalis in Danish society. As those who have newly arrived do not 
share this mindset, it can affect the image of the Somali diaspora, as 
was reflected in the antagonism evident during focus group 
discussions. The renewed focus on migrants in an irregularised 
situation impacted on the image of more established members of the 
Somali diaspora, especially in the media, such that one male Danish-
Somali citizen said: 
 
We who were refugees in the 90s have to start all over again with the process of 
establishing a good picture of Somalis, and that is even though we have Danish 
citizenship and passport. All the good stories and initiatives that we have 
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accomplished are flushed down the toilet, and we have to start all over again. (Focus 
group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 35 years) 
 
As well as the fact that newly-arrived community members have 
different perceptions and knowledge about Danish opportunities 
than established members of the diaspora, the Somali diaspora has 
different perceptions about potential Somali migrants, especially 
regarding their willingness to take risks. The risks of irregular 
migration are often a topic on social media. Hearing about the risks 
people take led one female Danish-Somali citizen to state: 
 
I would never sacrifice my body and soul for the possibility of maybe reaching Europe. 
I also have a friend who lost three of his toes due to the cold weather [walking in the 
snow in Turkey]. I can’t fathom how traumatising it is. (Focus group 
discussion, female Danish-Somali citizen, aged 29 years) 
 
Connections between diaspora and family members are maintained 
through the Internet, Facebook and WhatsApp. Being so close to the 
situation of people moving irregularly and witnessing the 
consequences seems to have led this respondent to develop strong 
feelings against the practice, with many other respondents reinforcing 
the sentiment that they did not condone irregularised migration. 
 
In addition, if a migrant is captured by traffickers during the migration 
journey, members of the diaspora can be asked to pay a ransom for 
his/her release. In one case a focus group discussion respondent 
observed a shift in his brother’s social media behaviour while he was 
studying in Uganda. After a certain point he realised that his brother 
had left Uganda to try to reach Europe by moving irregularly through 
Sudan and Egypt with a group of 25 other people, of which only 8, 
including his brother, survived. While the respondent did not report 
having to pay money to help his brother, other participants did 
mention paying ransoms to traffickers or smugglers or assisting 
financially to ensure the migrant’s survival when family members in 
Somalia were no longer able to help. In one case, having to pay a 




There is no potential positive outcome of them fleeing. It has economic and 
psychological risks when they flee, and we don’t know if all of them end up reaching 
Europe, because many die or are captured on their journeys. (Focus group 
discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 30 years) 
 
Many participants did not feel comfortable sending money to 
smugglers, but did so because it was often a case of life or death. One 
male Danish-Somali citizen added: “We don’t want to be responsible 
for them risking their lives to reach Europe – that is too much of a 
risk and too much of a burden to have on your shoulders” (Focus 
group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 30 years). 
Another male Danish-Somali citizen added: “In my view they are 
better to use the money on their farm or just invest the money in 
some other means, rather than risking their life trying to cross the 
sea” (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 45 
years).  
 
The precarious situation of many within the Danish-Somali diaspora, 
whose status is also in jeopardy or who were unemployed, meant that 
their ability to help was limited. Describing the process of collecting 
money to pay ransom, one female Danish-Somali citizen said: “Every 
pocket was searched, every outstanding debt with different 
individuals was recollected, I mean it is a big project to collect that 
amount of money” (Focus group discussion, female Danish-Somali 
citizen, aged 29 years).  
 
Interestingly, advice given by members of the diaspora to potential 
migrants prior to departure not to migrate is often not heeded. Advice 
to remain in the country of origin given by someone who is perceived 
as having achieved through migration what the potential migrant 
seeks does not carry a lot of weight.  
 
[…] That is, when we tell them that there is nothing in what they are seeking to 
find in Europe. They are reluctant and will not listen to what we have to say before 
they have experienced it on their own. (Focus group discussion, male Danish-




Such advice is given from the perspective of the diaspora, reflecting 
their knowledge, experiences and objectives.  
Connections with people on the move 
Reaffirming findings from other research, newly-arrived migrants and 
refugees were observed to be highly networked transnational people. 
People on the move remained connected throughout their journeys. 
This is both an individual and a global factor, as one male Danish-
Somali citizen explained: 
 
Globalization has contributed a lot to this refugee crisis in Europe. The Internet is 
easy to access nowadays. If some of their friends have migrated to Scandinavian 
countries, they are quick to send back pictures of their situations, and these pictures 
in my opinion are a false truth. Globalization has contributed to the world being 
quicker and, through communicating via social media, made the distance between 
each other smaller. The routes they take also depend on this quick communication. 
(Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 29 years) 
 
These networks are formed through the connections migrants have 
with diaspora communities and through the numerous links they 
develop in preparation for, and during, their journey. As one female 
Danish-Somali citizen remarked: 
 
The network these refugees and migrants require through their journeys is huge. We 
ourselves don’t even have so many connections. I personally know a handful of 
migrants, and they actually know, more than you, which countries have which 
requirements. (Focus group discussion, female Danish-Somali citizen, 
aged 29 years) 
 
Regarding the direct contact members of the diaspora have with 
newly-arrived Somalis, one male Danish-Somali citizen explained: 
 
I have been in contact, and can still get in contact, with refugees or migrants through 
some of my friends who are newcomers or others who have met them. I've also been 
in contact with extended family who have arrived in Europe, but also through my 
organisational activities, which are voluntary. I've given them advice numerous times 
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on the rules and regulations in Denmark and how to integrate into Danish society 
etc. (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 30 years) 
 
This direct engagement with family members, community members 
and others highlights the close interactions between newly-arrived 
Somalis and diaspora communities and, in some cases, suggests the 
trusted role members of the diaspora play as sources of information. 
The respondent above added that he felt he needed to give them 
‘realistic advice’ as to what is possible during their early settlement 
period in Europe, perhaps countering information given by 
smugglers or other community members. It is worth noting that 
respondents were also in contact with diaspora communities in other 
countries such as Canada and Australia and maintained contact with 
family, friends and previous colleagues, among others. A distinction 
was made by one respondent about the contact he had with Somalis 
during their journeys and on arrival in Europe. He described the 
contacts he had during journeys as being “very informal and indirect. 
In extreme cases they get our phone numbers and contact us directly 
or by social media” (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali 
citizen, aged 30 years). Whereas contact on arrival is through 
networks and can be made in person rather than over the phone or 
via social media. 
The dilemma faced by diasporas 
As illustrated earlier in this section, diaspora members are trying to 
manage their lives in their new host country and may regard 
irregularised migration as a bad choice. This puts members of the 
diaspora in a dilemma: although they regard irregular migration as a 
bad choice, due to their social bonds, they feel obliged to help their 
family members on the dangerous journey. This dilemma was pointed 
out in the focus group discussions. In one case when a person heard 
of another community member considering borrowing money to help 
family members pay smugglers to reach Europe, he argued with him 
and tried to discourage him. This was due to the level of debt he 
would be taking on, as well as the integration challenges facing new 
migrants in Denmark. However, another male Danish-Somali citizen 
made a distinction between paying for migrants in an irregularised 
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situation and supporting fellow nationals in need (Focus group 
discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 35 years). To this end, 
he explained how the diaspora invited people for social gatherings 
and ran programmes that encouraged active participation in sports, 
for example. Another female Danish-Somali citizen added that “we 
as Somalis help each other in every way we can, […]. I know I’m 
fortunate with the outcome of my life, so I don’t mind helping 
others” (Focus group discussion, female Danish-Somali citizen, aged 
29 years). Another male Danish-Somali citizen explained:  
 
Our initial standpoint as diasporas here in Denmark is that we don’t want them 
[other Somalis] to migrate to Europe and potentially risk their lives. We don’t want 
any bad things to happen to them. On the other hand, to be frank, they don’t have 
other opportunities in Somalia or Africa, and that is why they are looking towards 
Europe. The only thing we as a diaspora community can contribute with is 
information sharing. (Focus group discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, 
aged 29 years)  
 
Through their direct engagement, diaspora members can offer people 
considering irregular migration advice, due to their position as trusted 
members of the community. However many people still in their 
country of origin or in transit will not accept such advice and prefer 
to make their own decision based on other information sources.  
Policy perspectives 
Respondents were aware of the wider policy debates taking place in 
Europe at the time the research was conducted, including the 
externalisation of asylum procedures.46 Many were opposed in 
 
46 Externalisation policies describe extraterritorial state action to prevent migrants, 
including asylum seekers, from entering the legal jurisdictions or territories of 
destination countries or regions or to make them legally inadmissible without 
individually considering the merits of their protection claims. In Europe, the idea 
to externalise asylum procedures was first introduced in 2003, when British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s cabinet and Home Office circulated a policy paper called ‘A 
New Vision for Refugees’, which proposed that the European Union establish 
Regional Protection Areas (RPAs) near refugee-producing countries to  
contain refugees in countries of first arrival and to serve as places to which asylum 
seekers who had arrived in Europe could be deported (Noll, 2005). This proposal 
was withdrawn the same year due to lack of support, but the New Vision has 
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principle to irregularised migration for a number of reasons, but 
supportive of alternatives, including offering labour migration and 
visas for skilled people. A male Danish-Somali citizen suggested that 
the system should be: 
 
[…] more like the American system where you have quotas, because a person from 
Somalia can get into the US with a green card. […] I think the same system should 
come to Denmark. […] then everybody gets a fair chance. (Focus group 
discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 45 years) 
 
Another male Danish-Somali citizen respondent added that the 
money people get when they are repatriated could be used to realise 
opportunities in Somalia or other parts of Africa (Focus group 
discussion, male Danish-Somali citizen, aged 45 years). Overall, there 
was quite a lot of debate generated between those who supported 
helping people wishing to start a new life in Denmark and others who 
were opposed to the practice of irregularised migration. Some saw the 
challenges Somalis faced with integration and questioned the benefits 
of supporting people to come to Europe, either financially or 
emotionally. Notably, several diaspora members suggested they could 
play a role in helping with integration.  
Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter looked at the attitudes of Somalis in the diaspora on 
irregularised migration by their countrymen and women. The findings 
of the research show that the Somali diaspora in Denmark is not a 
homogenous group and is comprised of new arrivals, long-term 
residents and citizens, as well as being differentiated by age, gender 
and region of origin. A further distinction is generational: Danish-
born people of Somali heritage and older Danish citizens who were 
born in Somalia. It is important to keep in mind these distinctions 
when studying diasporas. However, the criteria mentioned by 
Bakewell (2009, p. 2) that diaspora have a collective memory and 
 
persisted through the years and is echoed loudly in the 2016 EU-Turkey Action 
Plan for stemming the irregularised flow of migrants and asylum seekers into 
the European Union (Frelick, Kysel & Podkul, 2016, p. 206). 
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shared consciousness is also important to keep in mind. In this 
research, members of the diaspora expressed a plurality of opinions, 
among which some trends can be identified, despite the limitations of 
sample size. These trends are discussed in this section. 
 
Firstly, diasporas were able to observe first-hand the changing profile 
of new arrivals reaching Europe by irregularised means. In particular, 
they saw the most recent group of Somalis arriving by boat to Europe 
as young and primarily seeking better opportunities due to conditions 
in Somalia. Respondents were reticent to characterise them as not 
deserving of protection, noting the risky journeys they had made and 
the hardships they had suffer both on route and in Somalia. However, 
diaspora responses were moderated by the policy changes taking 
place at the time, which were impacting on the more-established 
community, which faced review and possible withdrawal of their 
complementary protection status. This has led to concerns that 
newcomers were influencing Danish policy changes affecting 
established communities. One female Danish-Somali citizen shared 
that: “it feels like we always have to justify the newcomers’ actions. 
That we are the ‘go to guys’ whenever there is a negative story in the 
news. Of course we feel that” (Focus group discussion, female 
Danish-Somali citizen, aged 24 years). 
 
Secondly, like many other diaspora communities, Danish Somalis are 
transnationally connected to family, friends and communities in many 
parts of the world. Similarly, diaspora respondents reported that 
Somalis on the move were in touch throughout their journeys to share 
information, seek help and obtain advice. In this way diasporas can 
and do play a role as guides, both through family connections and 
through the formal associations of which they are a part. A 
consequence of being connected that left many people with 
conflicted feelings was being asked to pay ransom to smugglers for 
the release of migrants who were being held hostage. Respondents 
recognised the urgent life or death situation their compatriots were in 
and felt compelled to act. At the same time, they saw the sums of 
money being paid and believed it could be better spent in Somalia or 
the near region. A further issue was that many diaspora members 
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were in need themselves, often unemployed or, as noted above, at 
risk of return, and the sums of money being demanded are very high. 
Despite these reservations, diasporas remain a trusted source of 
information for people on the move, which continues after arrival in 
Denmark, and are regularly contacted on social media for assistance 
– although with the above-mentioned caveat: that advice given by 
diasporas that potential migrants should refrain from migrating is 
often not viewed as legitimate by potential migrants. 
 
Finally, based on their relationships with people on the move, 
members of the diaspora expressed attitudes towards policies and 
programmes, which could be better harnessed in a more organised 
manner. This included ideas about regularising migration and 
voluntary return programmes. Diasporas also help with integration 
into Danish society and other aspects of social integration for asylum 
seekers and other newcomers in times of need. This formal support 
is often done in a voluntary capacity without judgement as to how 
people have arrived, but instead based on need. These findings, based 
on a pilot study with a limited number of respondents, during a time 
when domestic policy towards Somalis seeking asylum in Denmark 
was in flux, indicate the need for more robust and substantive 
research in this area, which places the voices and opinions of diaspora 
communities at the centre. It also shows that diaspora communities 
can be a rich source of information on this topic.  
 
In an era where attention on people moving in an irregularised 
situation is at an all-time high, with policymakers seeking to find ways 
to address this phenomenon and other stakeholders trying to reduce 
risks and ensure protection for people on the move, this research 
highlights the unique relationships that diaspora communities in 
destination countries have with their fellow nationals, which extends 
to those moving in an irregularised manner. This study shows that 
diaspora communities have deep and contextualised knowledge about 
migrants and refugees based on their own experience and the close 
relationship they have with their fellow nationals as transnational 
socially-connected individuals. As a result, members of the diaspora 
hold opinions and expectations about irregularised migration and 
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people moving irregularly, while at the same time often maintaining 
links with them on route. Diaspora communities can contribute to 
policies in this area, including by suggesting alternatives to 
irregularised migration. Hence, diaspora communities should be 
considered an important stakeholder in future policy discussions 
about migration, in addition to their already growing role as 
supporters of integration, humanitarian and development assistance, 
and peace-building in many countries around the world.  
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Countering Radicalisation in Communities: 





The Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh, located next to Pumwani in 
Kamukunji Constituency, is nicknamed ‘little Mogadishu’ and hosts a 
thriving Somali community 
living in Kenya, including 
many businesses. In recent 
years, Kamukunji has been 
associated with violent 
extremism, following attacks 
by the Somali-based terror 
group Al-Shabaab. Al Jazeera 
summarised the most recent 
attacks as follows: 
 
2013: In September 2013, al-
Shabab fighters stormed 
Nairobi's Westgate Mall, firing 
indiscriminately at shoppers and 
killing 67 people in a siege that 
lasted 80 hours. 
[…] 
2014: In November 2014, 
members of Somalia’s al-
Shabab armed group hijacked a 
bus in Kenya and killed 28 non-
Muslims on board. 
[…] 
When the community in Pumwani 
realised that its mosque had been 
infiltrated by Al-Shabaab it tackled the 
problem at the community level, involving 
youth in the solution. It found social 
exclusion to be a root cause of 
radicalisation, as it gave rise to 
disorientation and frustration. The high-
handed security approach taken by the 
authorities was also found to be 
counterproductive, increasing the sense of 
exclusion felt by youth. Collaboration 
between leaders of different faiths and 
listening to the problems of youth formed 
the basis of a new approach. By providing 
youth with a future through education 
and income-generating activities, while 
involving them in leadership, the 
community was able to counter 
radicalisation at it roots and reignite 
pride in the community.  
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April 2015: Al-Shabab launched an assault on Garissa University College in 
Kenya, killing 148, mainly students. 
January 2016: Fighters from the Somali armed group assaulted a Kenyan-run 
military base for African Union peacekeepers, killing scores of Kenyan soldiers. 
January 2019: Two explosions and gunfire heard at an upscale hotel complex in 
Nairobi, Kenya's capital. (Al Jazeera, 2019) 
An Al-Shabaab spokesman explained to Al Jazeera why the attacks 
were carried out: “What happened … we did in revenge for what the 
non-believer government has done to innocent Muslims” (Al Jazeera, 
2019). The attacks were found to be connected to one of the mosques 
in in Pumwani, Riadhaa Mosque (International Crisis Group, 2014; 
Anzalone, 2012; UN Security Council, 2013; Murunga, 2012; 
Anderson, 2014). The mosque had been infiltrated by Al-Shabaab 
through its Kenyan branch, a group known as Al-Hijra (formerly the 
Muslim Youth Center), and became the epicentre for the 
radicalisation of youth in Kenya (Anzalone, 2012).  
 
This chapter reflects on ways to counter the radicalisation of Somali 
migrants and refugees in Pumwani ward in Kamukunji Constituency, 
Nairobi, Kenya. The study on which it is based is set in the context 
of perceived exclusion as a result of migration within Africa. Push 
factors such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, 
political and economic marginalisation are commonly believed to be 
the underlying root causes of radicalisation (Hassan, 2012). In 
addition, many scholars have pointed out that the social exclusion of 
youth feeds into the recruitment strategies of terrorist group (UNDP, 
2019; Chin, 2015; Costanza, 2015). At the same time, certain positive 
characteristics and benefits ‘pull’ vulnerable individuals to join such 
groups, including a sense of belonging, the strong bonds of 
brotherhood that are created, desire for reputation building, and other 
socialisation benefits (Hellsten, 2016). Political drivers are also 
present, but not usually discussed (Hegghammer, 2007). Once inside 
the criminal networks, youth often find that are unable to leave. It is 
from this perspective that this chapter seeks to explore a preventative 
model that can be applied to prevent vulnerable youth from joining 
violent extremist groups.  
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Kenya is taken as a case study to investigate the factors contributing 
to youth radicalisation. In particular, the study looks how the 
Kamukunji Community Peace Network (KCPN) in Punwami ward 
tackled the problem of radicalisation by involving youth in addressing 
their own issues and providing a different narrative on migration, and 
on Kamukunji in general, as a place they could be proud of. The main 
research question is: What are the factors identified by the KCPN as leading 
to the radicalisation of youth in Punwami and what was their approach to prevent 
youth from being recruited by violent extremist groups.  
Radicalisation in Kenya  
In developing countries and fragile states, powerful transnational 
criminal networks constitute a direct threat to the state itself, not 
through open confrontation, but by penetrating state institutions 
through bribery and corruption and by subverting or undermining 
them from within (Gastrow, 2011). Governments that lack the 
capacity to counter such penetration, or that acquiesce to it, face the 
threat of state institutions becoming dysfunctional and criminalised, 
and the very foundation of the state being undermined. As a result, 
more and more youth migrate across borders to other countries and 
continents to escape the situation, and those who cannot find what 
they seek join gangs, criminal organisations and terrorist networks 
(Gastrow, 2011).  
 
The 2019 study by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), Journey to Extremism in Africa, underscores that one of the 
main drivers of extremism in Africa is lack of inclusion (on the 
inclusion of youth, see also Chapter 21, Where are the Youth? The Missing 
Agenda in Somalia’s Constitution, by Istar Ahmed). This is a move away 
from the much publicised narrative calling for prevention 
mechanisms, based on military options and security (UNDP, 2019). 
In his opening remarks, Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary General, 
said: “I am convinced that the creation of open, equitable, inclusive 
and pluralist societies, of human rights and with economic 
opportunities for all, represents the most tangible and meaningful 
alternative to violent extremism” (UNDP, 2019). The report makes 
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the connection between violent extremism and lack of the attainment 
of development goals. These findings unequivocally underscore the 
relevance of economic factors in radicalisation, as multidimensional 
poverty leads to multifaceted grievances (UNDP, 2019, pp. 5–6).  
 
This understanding has profound policy implications for preventing 
the recruitment of especially African youth by violent extremist 
groups. Bashir (2016) and Mulata (2015) conducted extensive 
investigations into the factors that contribute to the radicalisation of 
youth in Kenya. Some of the main factors that emerged from their 
research were high unemployment, the marginalisation of certain 
regions, idleness, the false interpretation of religious teaching, and 
poverty. They also blamed poor governance, government repression 
in the form of counter-terrorism measures, and radicalised religious 
environments. In addition, the media was found to play a role through 
irresponsible reporting, fuelling discrimination and lighting the 
embers of radicalisation, and globalisation comes into play, as youth 
see other youth being brutalised or praised for atrocities committed. 
This view diverges from the popular belief, supported by some 
studies, that radicalisation is strongly driven by religion (Mills & 
Miller, 2017; Crone, 2016). The failure of authorities to listen to the 
complaints of local communities creates a fertile breeding ground for 
extremism and terrorist activities.  
 
In East Africa, Kenya is considered one of the key countries that is 
threatened by forced migration, trafficking, and recruitment by 
criminal gangs and violent extremist groups. Since 2008, Kenya has 
experienced a dramatic rise in violent extremism, with youth being 
recruited into crime and terror networks. Between 1970 and 2007, the 
country experienced 190 terrorist attacks, an average of five per year; 
since 2008, the average has escalated to 47 attacks a year. The 
overwhelming majority of these incidents have been attributed to Al-
Shabaab (Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke & Humphrey, 2016; Allan, 
Glazzard, Jesperson, Reddy-Tumu & Winterbotham, 2015). During 
the same period, there has been massive youth radicalisation, an 
increase in drug trafficking, the proliferation of guns from the warring 
regions, and increased migration across borders. Safety, security and 
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rule of law in Kenya have been tested (Finn, Momani, Opatowski & 
Opondo, 2016; Villa-Vicencio et al., 2016). Gastrow (2011) presents a 
vivid account of the situation in his reported titled, Termites at Work. 
A Report on Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya. The 
author refers to a conference by the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) Regional Programme for Eastern Africa in 
2009, which identified inadequate levels of awareness and 
institutional capacity to counter illicit trafficking, organised crime, and 
terrorism in the region (Gastrow, 2011). At the conference, the 
executive director of UNODC said that “in Eastern Africa, warning 
lights are flashing: we must respond immediately” (cited in Gastrow, 
2011, p. xii). In response, ministers from the 13 East African 
countries pledged their support for the programme. A few weeks after 
the conference, the UNODC executive director followed with a 
briefing to the United Nations Security Council in New York, in 
which he revealed that East Africa had become a receiver and transit 
zone for “30 to 35 tons of Afghan heroin”, which was being 
trafficked into the region (Gastrow, 2011). He said that the region 
was “becoming a free economic zone for all sorts of trafficking: 
drugs, migrants, guns, hazardous wastes and natural resources”. The 
report underlined the urgent need to strengthen governance in East 
Africa based on the rule of law (Gastrow, 2011). The threat posed by 
organised global crime in countries like Kenya is too serious to ignore 
(UNDP, 2019; Gastrow, 2011). 
 
Nearly a decade later, the report, Journey to Extremism in Africa (UNDP, 
2019) revealed startling new evidence to show that security-driven 
responses are often counter-productive and have been applied 
insensitively. These security-driven measures have not focused on 
rule of law and state accountability, citizens’ participation and 
protection, human rights compliance, or the accountability of state 
security forces to uphold these rights. The report identifies that the 
measures to strengthen security have overlooked key aspects, such as 
the ability of citizens living in high-risk environments to access justice 
and human rights, and the need for capacity building to support local 




The report also points out that without community-based 
programmes it may be impossible to fight violent extremism. Fuelling 
exclusion, the government runs the risk of perpetuating criminal 
power structures, which are overt drivers of recruitment by violent 
extremist groups in Africa. The report emphasises the need to 
reinvigorate state legitimacy through improved governance and 
accountability. This means moving away from an over-concentration 
on security-driven interventions to improved quality of life and better 
service delivery. Where the state is weak, citizens should be 
empowered to contribute to human development at all levels 
(UNDP, 2019; Rink & Sharma, 2018). Youth returning from 
migration are particularly vulnerable and, if not managed well, could 
be a threat to state security and the economic wellbeing of the 
community (Kana & Dore, 2014). Gielen (2015) observed that the 
role of the community they came from is crucial in building networks 
of help in the de-radicalisation of youth who want to reform after 
leaving terror groups (Dahl & Zalk, 2014). Therefore, communities 
are encouraged to embark on anti-radicalisation processes (IOM, 
2019; Bizina & Gray, 2014) and build strong relations with different 
groups in communities (Nalugala, 2017). 
Theoretical framework 
This study uses the theory of planned behaviour by Ajzen (1991; 
2011) and the concept of a human rights culture by Rorty (1998) as 
lenses through which to analyse the radicalisation of youth in 
Pumwani by violent extremist groups.  
Theory of planned behaviour and social norms 
Much of the literature on criminal and terrorist organisations has 
focused on the security aspects, but what is not discussed is the 
contribution of social norms to explain the participation of the youth 
in such groups. The theory of planned behaviour by Ajzen (1991; 
2011) takes social norms, as well as attitudes and perceived behaviour, 
into account when explaining behaviour. It links behaviour to 
intended behaviour. The theory started in 1980 as the theory of 
reasoned action, to predict an individual's intention to engage in a 
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behaviour at a specific time and place and was intended to explain all 




Figure 9.1. Theory of planned behaviour  
Source: Ajzen (1991) 
 
According to Ajzen (1991; 2011), a planned behaviour is a function 
of intention. Intention is built on the relationship between three 
factors: attitude towards the behaviour, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioural control. Intended behaviour is related to the 
three constructs. Firstly, individual attitude relates to the example of 
a vegetable vendor wanting to change our attitude about his products 
so we will actually buy them. Attitudes, combined with social norms 
and perceived control and norms, actually predict our intentions. The 
second is social norms. Our social values are the things that we 
perceive our social environment deems important, such as equality, 
honesty, education, effort, perseverance, loyalty, faithfulness, 
conservation of the environment, and many other concepts. Beliefs 
are judgments about us and the world around us – they are usually 
generalisations. The third factor is perceived behavioural control. The 
factors affecting behavioural control fall into categories according to 
the type of instructions given and by who (Kupp, Schmitz & Habel, 
2019), and the perception of what one can or cannot do. Perceived 
behavioural control can also lead directly to positive behaviour, 
because if you perceive that you must do something positive you will 


















Blackman, Buick, O’Flynn, O’Donnell & West, 2019). The question 
of who controls who, and how, raises the question of rights in 
different narratives within a given community and its culture. This 
brings us to the concept of a human rights culture and it relevance to 
our topic. 
Human rights culture 
Richard Rorty, in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), brings into 
the discussion a theoretical framework around human rights, 
rationality, and sentimentality. He talks of finding an alternative 
feature of what he calls ‘humanness’ (Tartaglia, 2011). As Rorty 
observes, “Traditionally, the name of the shared human attribute 
which supposedly ‘grounds’ morality is ‘rationality’ and ‘human rights 
culture” (Rorty, 1979, p. xx). For Rorty, the human rights culture is 
what is left of human rights when we give up the idea that there are 
natural rights grounded in some aspect of our humanity itself. This is 
the idea underpinning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which remains as relevant today as it was on the day it was proclaimed 
in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly. The extraordinary 
vision and resolve of the drafters produced a document that, for the 
first time, articulated the rights and freedoms to which every human 
being is equally and inalienably entitled, declaring that “all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (UN General 
Assembly, 2016).  
 
The commitments made by party states in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights are in themselves a mighty achievement. This 
Declaration promises to all the economic, social, political, cultural and 
civic rights that underpin a life free from want and fear (UN General 
Assembly, 2016). In 2015, the UN General Assembly reviewed the 
1948 UN Charter on Human Rights. Part of the conclusion endorsed 
by the General Assembly states that human rights are the inalienable 
entitlement of all people, at all times, and in all places – people of 
every colour, from every race and ethnic group, whether or not they 
are disabled, citizens or migrants, no matter their sex, their class, their 
caste, their creed, their age or sexual orientation. This means that 
governments of any nation that ratified the 2015 declaration should 
233 
 
ensure that all human beings, whether refugees, migrants or citizens, 
enjoy equal rights. However, for Rorty, there are certain rights that 
are culturally specific. He argues that a given society can surrender to 
what is universally called human rights, but at the community there is 
always a human rights culture (Rorty, 1979). 
 
In ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’, volume three of 
his Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Rorty sets out three 
pragmatic ways one can apply rationality and human rights culture to 
human rights (Rorty, 1998). The first argument is based on 
‘foundationalist’ philosophers like Plato, Aquinas and Kant, who tried 
to find premises that were true for all human beings. They developed 
a moral philosophy that argued that human beings were capable of 
having moral intuitions and justifying those moral intuitions 
independently. However, Rorty was unable to find such foundations; 
instead he purports that our moral community determines what is 
morally good, and we cannot go beyond our language and our 
historical conditions to find moral ‘truth-in-itself’. Rorty says that: 
 
The most philosophy can hope to do is to summarize our culturally influenced 
intuitions about the right thing to do in various situations. The summary is effected 
by formulating a generalization from which these intuitions can be deduced… That 
generalization is not supposed to ground our intuitions, but rather to summarize 
them. (Rorty, 1998, p. 171). 
 
The second reflection is based on Rorty as a pragmatist and is not 
about proving moral truths, but finding what works. This aspect of a 
human rights culture is about how best to fulfil the utopian vision 
sketched by philosophers like Plato, Aquinas and Kant; for instance:  
 
If the activities of those who attempt to achieve this foundationalist sort of knowledge 
appears to be of little use in actualizing this utopia. That is a reason to think there 
is no such knowledge. If it seems that most of the work of changing moral intuitions 
is being done by manipulating our feelings rather than by increasing our knowledge, 
that is a reason to think there is no knowledge of the sort that philosophers like 




Therefore, appeals to reason and knowledge carry little weight, 
according to Rorty. His argument focuses on what works. His 
conclusion is that “the emergence of the human rights culture seems 
to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge, and everything to 
hearing sad and sentimental stories” (Rorty, 1998, p. 172). This 
implies that those who use terrorist activities to hurt others, do not 
care that the victims are human beings. Their mind is set on what they 
see as the right thing to do. This conclusion forces Rorty to argue 
that: 
 
It does little good to point out to the people I have just described that many Muslims 
and women are good at mathematics or engineering or jurisprudence. Resentful young 
Nazi toughs were quite aware that many Jews were clever and learned, but this only 
added to the pleasure they took in beating such Jews. Nor does it do much good to 
get such people to read Kant and agree that one should not treat rational agents 
simply as means. For everything turns on who counts as a fellow human being, as a 
rational agent in the only relevant sense – the sense in which rational agency is 
synonymous with membership in our moral community. (Rorty, 1998, p. 177) 
 
The conclusion here is that hurting or killing another is not a problem 
if it is in line with the popular view. In this sense, rationality is 
superseded by adherence to cultural norms and views. 
 
The third aspect by Rorty explores the manipulation of sentiments, 
through sentimental education and the promotion of cosmopolitan 
utopias. Rorty states that we should remain profoundly grateful to 
Plato and Kant, “not because they discovered truths but because they 
prophesied cosmopolitan utopias” (Rorty, 1998, p. 173); but if we put 
foundationalism behind us, we could “concentrate our energies on 
manipulating sentiments, on sentimental education” and that would 
be the best way to promote such cosmopolitan utopias. For Rorty: 
 
That sort of education gets people of different kinds sufficiently well acquainted with 
one another that they are less tempted to think of those different from themselves as 
only quasi-human. The goal of this sort of manipulation of sentiment is to expand 
the reference of the terms ‘our kind of people’ and ‘people like us’. (Rorty, 1998,  
p. 176).  
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This means that local community leadership is fundamental in 
imparting the right education to its population, especially the youth. 
This corresponds with what the ethicist Annette Baier called a 
‘progress of sentiments’, whose progress is towards increasingly 
seeing the similarities between ourselves and others, instead of the 
differences (Baier, 1991, see also Baier, 1987). It is Baier’s work 
Progress of Sentiments that pushed Rorty (1998), as an anti-
foundationalist, to critique the popular notion that ‘bad people’ are 
just deprived of moral knowledge (Rorty & Baier, 1995). Instead, he 
argues that a well-functioning human rights culture results from two 
conditions, ‘security’ and ‘sympathy’. By ‘security’, Rorty means:  
 
…cultivating conditions of life which are sufficiently risk-free as to make differences 
from others not so essential to one’s self-respect, one’s sense of worth. And by 
‘sympathy’ I mean the sort of reactions Athenians had more of after seeing 
Aeschylus’s The Persians than before, the sort that whites in the United States had 
more of after reading Uncle Tom’s Cabin than before, the sort we have more of after 
watching television programs about the genocide in Bosnia. (Rorty 1998, p. 180). 
Research methodology  
The study presented here is an ethnographic case study of Pumwani 
ward in Kamukunji Constituency carried out from January to July 
2019. Kamukunji Constituency is located in the suburb of Eastleigh 
and has five wards, namely: Pumwani, Airbase (close to Eastleigh 
Airport), California, Eastleigh North and Eastleigh South (Gachie, 
2019). Pumwani ward was selected for this study because of the 
experience of this community with violent extremism and migration. 
Following the civil war in Somalia that broke out in 1991, many 
Somali people sought asylum in the Somali-inhabited enclaves in 
Kenya, such as Pumwani, as migrants or refugees. The Somali 
community is known for its entrepreneurial spirit and the migrants 
quickly established themselves in the business sector, investing over 
USD 1.5 billion in the Eastlands (Shire, 2019; UNHCR, 2019; 
Kenya/Somalia, 2019). According to UNHCR (2019), Kenya 
currently hosts over 257,000 Somali refugees, with an estimated 
22,000 people living and working in Nairobi, particularly in Eastleigh. 
236 
 
This study is based on discussions and interviews conducted over six 
weeks with the KCPN, which is formed by the leaders of all the five 
wards to run activities to divert the attention of youth away from 
criminal gangs and radicalisation leading to violent extremism. For 
the study, the researcher immersed himself in the community, 
including by participating in community meetings and holding 
conversations and interviews with community leaders and other 
members of the community. The researcher built trust through 
intermediaries who introduced him to the community, and by 
regularly visiting the site and participating in community meetings and 
conversations (held in Swahili and English). Notes were taken of the 
meetings, which were analysed and compared.  
 
The social environment in Pumwani ward is dominated by the large, 
and beautiful, Riadhaa Mosque. After the attacks in 2014, the 
Government of Kenya accused the leadership of the mosque of 
encouraging extremism. The leadership took responsibility to 
investigate the situation and discovered that local youth through the 
mosque were in fact involved in violent extremism, which had been 
infiltrated by Al-Shabaab. This study investigates the work of 
organisations, such as KCPN, including with interfaith groups and 
other community-based organisations actively working in Pumwani 
to support and guide the youth to prevent them from being 
radicalised. The KCPN was established in 2014 and officially 
registered as a community based organisation in 2016. From his 
interractions with KCPN leaders, the researcher learnt that there are 
other organisations actively involved in improving the situation in 
Kamukunji, including the Muslim Youth Alliance, Life and Peace 
Institute, Centre for Christian Muslim Relations in Eastleigh, and 
Foundation for Somalia. The next sections present the results of the 
research. 
The rise of extremism in Riadhaa Mosque 
The most startling revelation of the study, and perhaps the major 
driver of radicalisation in Punwami, was the relationship between the 
youth and the elders managing the Riadhaa Mosque. The mosque had 
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been taken over by youth prior to the attacks, and the elders had been 
pushed out. In trying to understand why this happened, the KCPN 
came to the following conclusion: 
 
First, the elders were infiltrated by radicals who misguided the youth into joining 
terror groups eight years back. The period 2009–2014 saw many youth join Al-
Shabaab. The Mosque had become a recruitment centre. Those who refused to agree 
were eliminated. Second, the elders were also not all supporting radicalisation. But 
now they were infiltrated by leaders with a different ideology. Third, the fear of police 
and fear of revenge from Al-Shabaab pushed the youth to unite and think of how to 
tackle the social challenges they faced. Fourth, The desire for a positive narrative 
could only succeed if the youth controlled the mosque, they thought. (Jairo, 
Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019) 
 
Control of the mosque also meant control of its funds: “The mosque 
generated a lot of revenue from well wishers. The youth leadership 
thought by controlling the Mosque, they would succeed in managing 
funds” (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 
2019). 
 
Omar and Salim Juma, who worship at the mosque, explained that 
the issue driving the conflict was that the money donated to the 
mosque was presumed by the youth as not being used to fight 
poverty. What was seen as lack of equal resource distrubution was a 
great driver of youth radicalisation and crime. So the KCPN and the 
mosque leadership looked for an amicable way that the youth and the 
elders could work together to solve these issues. Reconsidering the 
way the mosque was led was a priority for KCPN when it was 
established in 2014: 
 
KCPN suggested equal representation to enhance good governance in the Kamukunji 
Constituency. The youth might have thought of the mosque as having money they 
should use for their short term objectives, but the KCPN proposed long-term projects. 
The result was the formation of a credit lending entity to support the youth in 
borrowing money for business. While the mosque handled Muslim youth, the local 
faith-based groups were also encouraged to help other youth through their church. 
Those who were coming back from frontline engagement with Al-Shabaab were 
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induced into corrective and healing programes. One such programe is Kumekucha (a 
new dawn). (Orantes, Organizing Secretary and Youth Football Coach 
for KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019). 
 
The community organisations realised that the youth felt left out and 
they wanted to be heard. The problems of the youth included:  
 
…lack of employment, extreme poverty, fragmented families, environments of moral 
break-down, drug and alcohol abuse and petty crime, lack of education support, lack 
of law and order, and lack of community collaboration and leadership to resolve these 
issues. (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019) 
 
These problems gave rise to frustration and disorientation. The 
mosque leaders, decided to start income-generating activities as a way 
of countering extremism. The KCPN Chairman shared: 
 
There have been different narratives about the mosque and its leadership. But from 
my point of view, l say that the youth felt that the time had come for the leadership 
to respond to their needs. From 2008 to 2012 the leadership of the mosque was 
preaching about the bad things that the youth were experiencing in Kamukunji 
Constituency. They highlighted the poverty situation, broken homes, police brutality, 
and no identity cards which meant one could not get employment, unemployment. 
And now the issue of Al-Shabaab giving hope to the youth has became part of the 
narrative. (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 
2019) 
 
The leadership in the mosque was offering the possibility of joining 
Al-Shabaab, with the potential of having something to live for, a 
strong community and a goal in life: “Going to Somalia offered great 
opportunity, the leaders would say. No need to suffer but go to 
Somalia and join the Jihadi army, no papers, no identity card no police 
brutality” (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 
2019). 
 
However, the reality of joining Al-Shabaab did not give youth what 
was promised, and although many youth were disappointed, it was 
also very difficult to leave the group: 
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Once in Somalia, life was unbearable. Those who wanted to return found it extremely 
difficult. If they escaped and came back then they would be followed and killed. Spies 
were planted all over to flush out the returnees. If not killed by the security agents, 
then Al-Shabaab would use its own networks to kill deserters. So, for some, it was 
better to escape to Yemen, the Arabian Peninsular or to Europe… (Jairo, 
Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji Ward, 15 July 2019) 
 
The security approach taken in Kamukunji further aggravated the 
situation: 
 
The whole situation was guided by poor intelligence without the local community being 
part of the process. The interrogations by the security agents were so brutal that they 
exacerbated the situation. This played into the Al-Shabaab propaganda, instilling 
the sense that the youth were not wanted by the government. This promoted the 
alternative that it was better to fight and die as a Jihadi than to be beaten by the 
security forces. This pressure from the security agents saw many sympathisers join the 
Al-Shabaab movement. Some of the recruits came from public universities. The most 
well publicised was that of the Jomo Kenyatta University graduate with an 
engineering degree and a law student who was behind the 2015 Garrisa University 
Good Friday attack. (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 
15 July 2019) 
 
The security approach based on repression was counterproductive 
and when the KCPN was established it sought to develop a new 
approach. 
Establishing new social norms 
The KCPN identified six critical areas to work in to promote 
alternative social norms (Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, 
Kamukunji, 15 July 2019): 
 
• Security action that is based on desirable legal and social 
norms 
• Interfaith dialogue and the involvement of community 
leaders 
• Providing new role models of success to the youth 
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• Creating pride about Kamukunji Constituency as a historic 
place 
• Embedding education in a comprehensive development 
approach 
• Promoting youth participation in leadership  
 
First, the KCPN engaged in meetings with police and security forces 
to point out that their approach was counterproductive and that 
unless the youth in the community themselves were engaged, the 
problem of terrorism could not be addressed. It was emphasised that 
the security actions should be based on behaviour that would give an 
example to the youth and that was coherent with values that would 
promote security.  
 
The KCPN leaders decided that it was important to locate the 
problem within the community and closely worked with local leaders, 
who had much support. They contacted local Member of Parliament, 
Yusuf Hassan, himself a victim of violent extremism. During the 2013 
election campaigns a group of people threw a grenande at his feet 
tearing his leg muscles to shreds. He had to undergo multiple 
corrective surgeries on his leg. Another leader working with KCPN 
is a famous former footbal player, Orantes, who is inspiring to the 
youth and provides an important role model. He engages the youth 
in news platforms about Kamukunji Constituency. Orantes and 
others have been involved in improving the image of Kamukunji by 
looking at its rich history. 
 
In order to address the religious extremism, it was critical for KCPN 
to counsel the youth on faith. In order to do so, an interfaith 
programme was established to strengthen understanding and 
knowledge within and between the different faiths. KCPN partners 
with St John’s Community Centre to provide leadership training and 
counselling. St John’s also provides rooms in which both boys and 
girls can do their homework. KCPN works with the Programme for 
Christian-Muslim relations in Africa (POCMURA), Christian 
Muslims Interreligious Relations Network and local faith based 
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groups (within mosques and Christian churches) to advocate for 
interreligious dialogue.  
 
The young energetic Director of KCPN, Mr Juma Salim, told the 
researchers: 
 
Youth recruitment into violent extemism was tearing the community apart. Everyone 
looked at the Somali community as the breeding ground. The animosity was growing 
and hatred was burning inside everyone like twigs sprayed with petrol to burn. It was 
just a matter of time and the whole community would be at war with each other. This 
is when the community leaders from the Muslim and Christian fraternity started 
inter faith dialogue. From inter faith dialogue emerged the elders community from 
both faiths. (Salim Juma, Director of KCPN, interview Kamukunji, 17 
July 2019) 
 
The elders of the different faiths now meet regularly, including the 
leaders of the Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox faiths. This has had an 
important impact: 
 
We realised that there is a lot in common between our faiths. We started to 
understand that there is more in common than there are differences. There is no 
reason for us as leaders to create division. In fact we started to counsel understanding 
of the different faiths, and this also helped to increase knowledge of the own faith and 
a more pastoral approach to faith was the result. (Muslim religious leader, 
interview, Kamukunji, 17 July 2019) 
 
Due to the work on creating inter-religious understanding, the 
approach to education also needed to be revised: 
 
The community was forced to re-think how knowledge is imparted to the youth. The 
single system of education, where Madaras was the only system, was negotiated and 
the syllabus expanded to include other disciplines. Also, Madarasas expanded so 
that children from other faiths could learn together. (Salim Juma, Director of 
KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 17 July 2019) 
 
KCPN leaders established that out of every 10 radicalised youth 
joining violent extemist groups, 2 were well-educated sympathisers. It 
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was, therefore, critical to identify a response that would embed 
education in a comprehensive development programme. KCPN 
actively prepared and appointed youth leaders to lead the 
organisation, supported by elders of the community. Salim Juma is 
one of the youth leader, and works closely with other youth to lead 
the organisation. Girls and young women are also actively engaged as 
leaders in the organisation. On 1 August 2019 this led to the 
establishment of a further decentralised approach launched by 
KCPN, through the “formation of Kamakinji sub-county countering 
violent extremism network”. The meeting was attended by sub-
county leaders of different faiths (W, personal communication 
including photograh with Mirjam Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 1 August 
2019). 
 
Omar, one of the community leaders, a Muslim studying at Tangaza 
Catholic University in Nairobi, echoed Salim Juma’s input. He 
testified as follows:  
 
Due to the educational programme [University in the Slums Programme in 
Huruma], my mind has been opened and I have started seeing different realities 
about life, I did not know about. For instance, I did not see how different faiths 
could collaborate to fight extemism. But the exposure at Tangaza University slums 
programme and workshops at St John’s Community Centre, Pumwani, showed me 
that it is possible to learn from one-another. This has changed my mind about the 
Muslim faith in relation to other faiths. (Omar, community leader, interview, 
Kamukunji, 17 July 2019) 
 
Kamukunji has an important heritage. Established by white colonists 
on the bank of the river outside the histotic city of Nairobi, it has 
been a place of resistance. The freedom fighters used to meet in this 
area and people would assemble to take hope and inspiration from 
their speeches. The word ‘kamukunji’ actually means ‘assembly’. 
 
Freedom fighters like Kenyatta, Tom Mboya and Achieng Aneko 
lived and worked in Kamukunji in the 1950s. The house of Jomo 
Kenyatta, the first President of Kenya and father of the current 
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president, is located at the centre of Kamukunji. This important 
legacy was promoted to give youth a sense of pride and direction.  
 
During a tour to see the important locations in the area, I was 
introduced to more places of political importance. Since the 
introduction of multi-party democracy in Kenya, Kamukunji has been 
associated with change. The famous Sabasaba Rally on 7 July 1990 
was addressed there. In July 1990, Kenya experienced a momentous 
political development that not only shaped the present political scene, 
but also laid a strong foundation for the 2010 Constitution. In early 
July 1990, former Cabinet ministers Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia 
and Raila Odinga were arrested and detained for demanding the re-
introduction of multi-party democracy. Despite a ban by the 
government, thousands of Kenyans marched in defiance of a 
previously unchallengeable regime to make their way to Nairobi’s 
Kamukunji grounds to press the case for democracy. The marchers 
were led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Masinde Muliro, Timothy 
Njoya, James Orengo, Paul Muite, Gitobu Imanyara, and Martin 
Shikuku, among others – famously known as fathers of democracy in 
Kenya (Oluoch, 2013).  
 
Since July 1990, this gathering place, ‘Kamukunji’, has been used by 
politicians to launch new ideas in society. If one wants to be a national 
leader, he/she must address a ‘kamukunji’, a gathering of people, 
there. It is considered necessary to garner political support in 
Kamukunji if one is to rise to leadership in Kenya. 
Programmes to transform the youth  
Lack of protection is still one of the key concerns that youth express: 
“The pain and fear we have is for disappearances” (Participant, focus 
group dicussion, Kamukunji, 17 July 2019). Asked about such 
disappearances, one participant in the focus group discussion 
explained: “Security forces may come and lift you from your bed and 
you will never be seen again. You never return. We never hear from 
you again. We just don’t know what happened to you” (Parcipant, 
focus group discussion, Kamukunji, 17 July 2019). 
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In order to counter this fear, KCPN felt it had to come up with a 
clear approach to strengthen citizens’ rights and governance 
accountability in the Kamukunji area. To this end they set up regular 
meetings with relevant government authorities, including the police 
and security-related administration. This has helped to build trust and 
to fund ways of improving communication when problems arise 
(Jairo, Chairman of KCPN, interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019). 
 
In order to strengthen citizens’ rights, the following key approaches 
have been developed by KCPN:  
 
• Youth have been offered training on the Kenya Constitution 
and the law on marginalisation and anti-social behaviour. The 
organisation Kituo Cha Sheria provides legal aid education 
and has offered training as a key to changing youth’s 
understanding of their rights. Legal aid programmes have also 
been established to support youth and to help them when 
their rights are violated by the security or police forces or 
other authorities. 
• In order to deal with trauma, which is at a high level among 
members of the community, the project Kumekucha has been 
established to help youth and families to deal with the death 
of young people, through what they call a resilience 
framework. There are 282 families in this programme, which 
means these families have each lost relatives through crime or 
violent extemism.  
• KCPN has introduced the Chichanue Initiative to counter 
crime and extremism. At the start of 2019, the project brought 
together 310 participants to discuss ways of countering 
extemism through income-generating activities and other 
initiatives.  
• Some of the economic activities developed with the youth are 
motorbike transport, public toilets and hotshowers for a fee, 
miraa ‘khat’, games like ludo, spare-parts shops, open home 
industries like making baskets, and technical skills like 
plumbing and maintenance. 
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• New activities have been developed to support leisure 
activities to help build community spirit including football 
teams, running (including marathons), and training in DJing, 
music producing/promotion, dancing, photography, and 
social media, etc. Their most famous dance troupe is called 
FBI (Focus Beyond Initiative). The dancers from FBl won the 
national competition and are now competing in the US for 
the world title. KCPN feel encouraged by this group. It is a 
good example of their own endeavour to bring hope to the 
youth in Kamukunji Constituency. 
• A young leader, Whitney, has been empowered to establish a 
programme for single mothers who are very young, and there 
are many of them (W, personal communication with Mirjam 
Van Reisen, WhatsApp, 1 August 2019).  
 
Majengo Slum in Pumwani has been a known for prostitution since 
before World War II. Women are stigmatised and often traumatised 
from the violence they have experienced. This affects the youth. 
KCPN came up with a strong empowerment strategy. Women of all 
ages were organised into cooperatives to run transport. Women now 
operate minibuses, known as ‘Matatu’, as public transport. They also 
have motorbike riders working for them. One of the women leaders, 
called Fatima, explained that some women also had trained as events 
organisers, which could meant they could work setting up wedding 
receptions, political rallies, or fundraisers. In some wards, the women 
manage table bankings The Alamat Sacco for savings and credit 
lending is doing very well. With Kenya leading on mobile phone 
banking, the women have been very successful in credit lending. 
Khadija and Mueni are some of the women involved in event 
organising and credit lending. They acknowldge the good work done 
by KCPN. They say that youth in their community are busy now.  
 
Part of the fight for a wider space for democracy in Kenya is to give 
youth opportunities in education, which would prepare them for the 
workforce as well as for leadership. With KCPN on the ground, youth 
are going to university and acting as role models in Pumwani. For 
instance, Whitney is an engineering student at the Kenya Institute of 
246 
 
Highway Engineering. She passionately emphasied that: “Youth need 
an enabling environment in order to thrive. KCPN has embarked on 
building this space for youth” (Whitney, engineering student, 
interview, Kamukunji, 15 July 2019). Girls like Whitney are rallying 
other youth to go to school.  
Conclusion 
After the terror attacks by Al-Shabaab hit Kenya, the community in 
Kamukunji Consistency found itself fighting radicalisation within 
their own community, with Riadhaa Mosque as the epicentre. This 
chapter investigates the approach of the community-based 
Kamukunji Community Peace Network to counter the radicalisation 
of its youth. The theoretical framework for the study was provided 
by the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; 2011) and the 
concept of a human rights culture (Rorty, 1998). 
 
In order to achieve results, KCPN had to conduct an in-depth 
analysis of the problems that had led to the situation in which many 
of the youth were lured by extremist groups, supported by the local 
mosque, which had been taken over by radicalised youth. KCPN 
reconstructed the history of what had happened, but also listened to 
the youth about the problems that had resulted in their radicalisation. 
After identifying the frustrations and problems of the youth, KCPN 
set out a comprehensive strategy. It brought in youth leaders to direct 
the programmes, supported by elders in the organisation, and famous 
people and people of standing as positive role models for the youth. 
 
KCPN found that the violence committed by police and security 
forces to curb security challenges was counterproductive and 
exacerbated the marginalisation of the youth, who felt that they were 
not entitled to rights – which were there on paper, but not in reality. 
Rorty emphasises that rights are only available if there is a human 
rights culture supporting such rights. In discussions with the 
authorities, these problems were confronted and legal aid 
organisations were brought in to make sure that youth had access to 
justice and were knowledgeable about their rights.  
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An important component of the approach taken by KCPN was to 
strengthen social values among youth in the community through 
interfaith dialogue, which has helped the religious leadership to 
provide a common foundation for the community, based on a shared 
understanding of what people from different faiths have in common, 
rather than divisions. KCPN’s approach also focused on providing 
youth with positive examples and a positive image of their community 
and its history. These narratives about the important legacy of 
Kamukunji have strengthening a positive identity associated with the 
place.  
 
To tackle problems of marginalisation, a comprehensive approach 
was taken to provide education and livelihoods, as well as to support 
community organisation, including for women and girls. Today 
Kamukunji is thriving and, despite its challenges, has strong social 
cohesion; it is no longer seen as a breeding ground for radicalisation. 
In this chapter, I have argued that while the government could 
control crime through security enforcement, it was unable to prevent 
the radicalisation that occurred in Kamukunji. In Kamukunji, the 
local community stepped in to organise ways of managing behaviour 
among the youth by strengthening social norms. The elders and youth 
leaders were enabled to direct how the youth behaved at work, school, 
mosques and churches, and during leisure. By strengthening shared 
social norms, the KCPN directed the behaviour of youth in new and 
positive ways, which has been more effective than the repressive 
security approaches, which merely exacerbated the problem.  
 
Establishing strong social norms, through which youth find a place 
to contribute to the community and provide leadership for 
transformation, has been the key to addressing the problems of youth 
and providing them with a sense of participation in, and responsibility 
for, the community. By strengthening education on their rights and 
providing support to protect these, the norms based on the 
protection of human rights of people, from all faiths, were 
strengthened. The role of the community elders in supporting youth 
leaders to take responsibility for the protection and promotion of 
such rights has also helped to strengthen the accountability of the 
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Kenyan government and security forces for respecting and upholding 
these rights. While this may not always be the reality, the result has 
been strong norm setting in a rights-based approach, which has led 
to a rights-based culture of dealing with tensions and conflict. The 
youth in Kamukunji are now the owners of their future, and proudly 
hold the legacy of this historic place in their hands, associated no 
longer with violence, but indeed with kamukunji, the ‘assembly’.  
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Moving on to Make a Living: The Secondary 
Migration of Eritrean Refugees in Tigray, Ethiopia 
 
Bereket Godifay Kahsay 
 
Introduction  
In its 2016 report, the UN 
Commission of Inquiry on 
Human Rights in Eritrea 
found that there are grounds 
to believe that crimes against 
humanity have been 
committed in Eritrea since 
1991 (UN Human Rights 
Council, 2016, p. 83), 
resulting in thousands of 
youth fleeing the country. 
Tigray, in northern Ethiopia, 
is the main first destination 
for Eritrean refugees. 
Currently, there are four 
refugee camps and one 
screening centre open only to 
Eritrean refugees: Mai Ayni, 
Adi Harush, Hitsats and 
Shimelba – Shimelba being 
the oldest and Hitsats the 
most recent. 
 
Unlike in Eritrea, in Ethiopia, Eritrean refugees are free from 
indefinite conscription and the violation of their human rights 
(GSDRC, 2016, p. 1). They are provided with different basic services 
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
Lack of livelihood opportunities is 
driving Eritreans in refugee camps in 
northern Ethiopia to embark on 
dangerous secondary migration journeys. 
This study looks at the livelihood 
opportunities available to youth in the 
camps and identifies the challenges to 
such opportunities. Although many 
livelihood projects have been put in place 
in the camps, ironically, the major 
challenge facing these projects is secondary 
migration, as it results in drop-out. This 
study found that there is much that can 
be done to improve these projects, which 
are failing to create a sustainable income 
for refugees in the camps. The study 
points to the many possibilities available 
to counter secondary migration through 
an increased focus on livelihoods, 
education and youth employment.  
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and concerned organisations, including income-generating 
opportunities. However, many refugees move on from Ethiopia due 
to lack of education and employment opportunities, as well as lack of 
basic services in the camps (UNHCR, 2016, p. 21).  
 
To prevent secondary migration from Ethiopia to third countries, 
many livelihood projects have been put in place to support the 
refugees. Ironically, the major challenge facing livelihood projects is 
secondary migration, which results in beneficiary drop-out from 
training and income-generating programmes. For example, for the 
humanitarian organisation ZOA’s47 project Hope for Eritrean 
Refugees in Ethiopia (HOPE), the challenge is beneficiaries dropping 
out of vocational skills training (ZOA, 2016, p. 14). Hence, this 
chapter looks at why refugees are dropping out of livelihood and 
education projects, and if the lack of such services is a factor in 
refugees moving on from Ethiopia. 
Eritrean refugees in northern Ethiopia 
Eritrean refugees living in the refugee camps in Tigray have their own 
administrative structure. Every matter in the camps is managed by the 
camp’s Refugee Central Committee (RCC), with close supervision by 
the Ethiopian government’s Administration for Refugee and 
Returnee Affairs (ARRA). The RCC for each camp is responsible for 
selecting beneficiaries to receive support, including from livelihood 
projects.  
 
In Tigray, 75% of the registered Eritrean refugee population are 
children and youths (UNHCR, 2017b, p. 2). The youth category, 
which is defined as 15 to 24 years of age (UNHCR, 2017b), accounts 
for 40.3% of the camp population. Migration on from these camps is 
common among young Eritrean refugees, who initially seek 
protection in Shire, Ethiopia (USCRI, 2016, p.2), which is the capital 
of north-western Tigray and the location of four refugee camps. 
 
47 The author is currently working in Tigray as area manager for ZOA, creating 
livelihood opportunities to help young refugees refrain from embarking on illegal 
secondary migration.  
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Despite the high influx of refugees, the actual camp population of the 
refugee camps in Shire has remained relatively stable. In 2017, the 
registered number of refugees reached more than 150,000, but the 
actual camp population as at September 2017 was 38,321 (UNHCR, 
2017b, p. 1). By June 2018, the camp population had reached 40,820 
(UNHCR, 2018). From July 2017 to June 2018, there were 20,817 
new arrivals in the camp, out of which 17.7% were unaccompanied 
and separated children. For the same period, the number of refugees 
missing from the refugee camps with unknown destination was 
23,034 (UNHCR, 2018). Due to poor conditions within the Shire 
refugee camps and the lack of livelihood opportunities, refugees find 
it impossible to live comfortably and with hope for the future, and 
many move on.  
Research questions  
This study was conducted to investigate the livelihood situation in the 
refugee camps in Tigray, Ethiopia, with a special focus on livelihood 
projects implemented from 2015–2017 and the secondary migration 
of Eritrean refugees from Ethiopia. The research looked at the 
relationship between secondary migration and livelihood 
programmes by assessing the livelihood intervention strategies used 
by the implementing agencies and identifying the livelihood 
opportunities and challenges facing Eritrean refugees in the study 
area. 
 
The three main research questions were:  
 
• What are the intervention strategies of the livelihood projects targeting 
Eritrean refugees living in Tigray, northern Ethiopia?  
• What are the livelihood challenges and opportunities facing Eritrean 
refugees in Tigray, Ethiopia?  
• Why are Eritrean refugees moving on from Ethiopia, even when 




It is hoped that the findings of this research will provide input for 
policymakers, project designers, and practitioners dealing with the 
livelihoods of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia.  
Methodology  
The research design for this study was descriptive and explanatory. In 
the data gathering phase of the study, both secondary and primary 
data were used. The researcher used qualitative and quantitative data 
collection methods, including: a quantitative survey, focus group 
discussions, and key informant interviews, as well as the analysis of 
secondary sources, to ascertain the livelihoods of Eritrean refugees 
living in Tigray refugee camps and Shire town. The researcher 
supervised the data collection process, which was conducted by nine 
data collectors. Eight individuals participated in the survey, two each 
in Hitsats, Mai Ayni, and Adi Harush and one each in Shimelba camp 
and Shire town. One expert and some key informants participated in 
the focus group discussions. The data collection tools were developed 
in English, but the actual data were collected using local languages 
(Tigrigna and Kunama). The data collection was conducted from 28 
October to 15 November 2017. Table 10.1 summarises the 
respondents, sampling methods, and data collection methods used. 
 
Table 10.1. Respondents, sampling methods and data collection methods  
 
Respondents  Sampling method Data collection 
method 
407 households 
from refugee camps 
and Shire town 
Stratified (by camp), 
random sampling  
Questionnaire  




refugees in the 
refugee camps and 
Shire town 




9 groups from the 
RCCs in the camps 
and youth groups  
Representation from 




Stratified sampling was used to select 407 households from the 4 
refugee camps in Tigray and Shire town to participate in the survey, 
using simple random sampling to identify the actual sample 
beneficiaries. Accordingly, 128 refugees from Hitsats, 109 from Mai 
Ayni, 47 from Shimelba, 109 from Adi Harush, and 14 from Shire 
were sampled. Of the total number of respondents to the survey, 242 
(59.5%) were men and 165 (40.5%) were women. The sample 
households were taken from the refugee camps and Shire town based 
on their proportion. For the purposes of this study, a household was 
defined as a group of family members living together. The respondent 
taking part in the survey was the head of the household. In the case 
of more than one household residing in one shelter, only one 
household was asked to participate. A list of house numbers of the 
existing shelters was used as a sampling frame.  
 
In addition to the survey, 9 focus group discussions were held with 
RCC members and groups of youth (comprising youth who benefited 
from livelihood interventions and those who were never targeted by 
any organisation) in all camps. In addition, 12 key informant 
interviews were conducted with representatives of organisations 
implementing livelihood or education programmes and from the 
monitoring agencies to validate the findings. Only one of the key 
informants was a woman. The questionnaire aimed at gathering 
information on the extent to which the refugees had been targeted by 
livelihood projects, the application of livelihood strategies, the 
existing challenges and opportunities they faced, and the perspective 
of the refugees on leaving the camps. The key informant interviews 
and focus group discussions were designed to gather information on 
the beneficiary selection process, absolute value chain development, 
and relationship between livelihood projects and the secondary 
migration of refugees. The qualitative data sources were also used to 




The quantitative data was collected through an open data kit (ODK), 
using android mobile phones, and analysed via the software in its 
package. The general tools of analysis are descriptive and explanatory; 
hence, the data is presented in tables and using other numerical data 
presentation mechanisms. The qualitative data from secondary 
analyses, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews is 
presented using explanation tools to clearly describe the livelihoods 
of Eritrean refugees living in the Shire area. The next section presents 
the secondary analysis (of livelihood interventions in refugee 
settings), followed by the findings of the study (on livelihood project 
strategies, livelihood challenges and opportunities, and secondary 
migration) and a brief conclusion. 
Livelihood interventions in refugee settings 
Livelihood interventions are usually influenced by a variety of 
economic, social, political and environmental factors (De Vriese, 
2006, p. 31). A successful programme is one that considers many 
issues like physical location, the availability of food and natural 
resources, and access to markets, among other things (De Vriese, 
2006, p. 31). In the implementation of livelihood projects for 
refugees, various challenges exist in the form of both internal and 
external constraints. Lack of organisational capacity and expertise, 
inability to operationalise and achieve 'sustainability', difficulty in 
reaching the programme’s intended beneficiaries, and questionable 
positive impact are some of the main internal challenges facing 
livelihood projects in refugee settings (Phillips, 2004, pp. 6–8). 
External factors include restrictive governmental policies and 
practices and the limited scope of the refugee market (Phillips, 2004, 
pp. 6–8).  
 
In addition, “The host country’s asylum policy is indeed a defining 
factor in inhibiting or facilitating the ability of refugees to establish 
and secure their livelihoods” (De Vriese, 2006, p. 31). “[W]hen host 
governments do not allow refugees to settle amongst host 
communities or do not recognize diplomas or certificates, refugees’ 
access to the labour market may, in fact, be impeded” (De Vriese, 
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2006, p. 31). This is also the case in Ethiopia. Being able to drive and 
hold a driving licence, for example, is marketable and many refugees 
have an interest in this; unfortunately, such certification is not legally 
supported in Ethiopia. However, the Ethiopian government has 
recently made ‘Nine Pledges’ in support of refugees, one of which is 
“[t]o provide work permits to refugees […]” (UNHCR, 2017a, p.1). 
With these pledges, the Ethiopian policy is changing towards the 
Uganda model of integrating refugees which is widely praised by 
political and humanitarian actors (Bohnet & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2019). 
Livelihood project strategies in Tigray refugee camps 
Livelihood project strategies can be classified into supply and 
demand-side strategies. The supply-side strategies focus on the 
human or financial capital of refugees, e.g., building their skills and 
education, increasing their access to information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), or providing them with livelihood assets or 
financial resources. On the other hand, demand-side strategies aim to 
expand the link between refugees, employers, and markets for labour, 
goods and services, by either directly creating jobs or connecting 
refugees to employers (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016, pp. 6–7). The 
research findings on livelihood project strategies are presented in this 
section. 
Supply-side strategies 
A number of implementing organisations were found to be operating 
in the refugee camps in Tigray. The ARRA monitoring and evaluation 
officer listed the following organisations as providing services to 
refugees in the camps during the study period: the Norwegian 
Refugee Council, ZOA, Opportunities Industrialization Centers 
Ethiopia (OICE), the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus 
Development and Social Services Commission (also called Mekane 
Yesus), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
Innovative Humanitarian Solutions (IHS), World Food Programme, 
Natural Resource Development and Environmental Protection, and 
Catholic Relief Services (Tewedaj, interview with Michael, face-to-
face, Shire, 3 November 2017). These organisations have generally 
agreed on collective strategies for implementing livelihood projects. 
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These strategies, as described by experts from the implementing 
agencies, include creating livelihood opportunities for refugees to 
improve their household income/resilience, focusing on youth at risk 
of migration and vulnerable households (women-headed households) 
or individuals who do not have any external support; providing 
support for vulnerable women and youth groups to improve their 
income/resilience; working jointly with the key actors in all sectors 
and community-based structures; and adhering to the 75/25 
principle48 to address the livelihood issues of both refugees and local 
communities and ensure peaceful coexistence. Implementing 
agencies seek to generate strategically-designed, needs-based and 
market-driven livelihood opportunities to boost the camp and local 
economy. They often use beneficiaries to implement livelihood 
projects to ensure the sustainability and ownership of projects. In 
most cases, refugees’ interests and aspirations are taken into account 
through the RCC and, at some point, through their direct 
participation in livelihood projects. These strategies are aimed at 
providing refugees with the skills they need to enhance their 
livelihoods.  
 
To comprehend the supply-side strategies, the survey and focus 
group discussions looked in detail at the activities of livelihood 
projects. It was found that over the three years of the study (2015–
2017) such projects have provided refugees primarily with vocational 
skills training, business development skills training, and revolving 
funds to start businesses, as well as start-up materials such as livestock 
(such as chicken and goats) and agricultural materials including seeds 
for backyard gardening. Local and international humanitarian 
organisations, mainly, the Norwegian Refugee Council, ZOA, OICE 
and Mekane Yesus, have been involved in providing vocational skills 
trainings. According to the key informants, these organisations have 
 
48 The 75/25 principle (sometimes called the 70/30 principle) is a customary 
practice resulting from an agreement between implementing organisations, 
monitoring agencies (ARRA and UNHCR) and donors to take 75% of target 
beneficiaries from the refugee population in the camps and 25% from among those 
living in the host community, as explained by the ARRA monitoring and evaluation 
officer (Tewedaj, interview with Michael, face-to-face, Shire, 3 November 2017). 
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provided training in food preparation, barbering and beauty salon 
work, mobile and electronics maintenance, metal and woodwork, 
plumbing, tailoring, traditional garment making, leather crafting, 
electric installation, brick making, leather crafting for shoe and ball 
production, photography and videoing, construction, masonry, soap 
production, and ICTs. 
 
These trainings were selected based on market assessments, as stated 
by the livelihood experts from the implementing agencies. The first 
criterion for the provision of training was its feasibility in the local 
market, in and around the refugee camp. Practical factors were also 
considered, including the aspirations of the refugees and local laws.  
 
Although many organisations have been providing vocational skills 
training in the refugee camps, the key informant interviews revealed 
that the supply of start-up kits for youth who have completed training 
is limited due to lack of funds. Moreover, some organisations were 
giving vocational skills training in the form of educational 
interventions, without considering their application to future 
businesses in the camps. As a result, hundreds of trainees completed 
training subjects every semester, but their chance of obtaining 
employment or the required start-up kits was low.  
 
The RCC representatives in the focus group discussions said that 
some other livelihood implementing organisations were making start-
up materials available for all their graduates, as well as the graduates 
of other organisations. However, the time gap between completion 
of the training and the supply of start-up materials was found to affect 
migration intention, resulting in refugees moving on while waiting for 
the distribution of work materials. Many of the implementing 
organisations took months, if not years, to supply the materials to 
skills training graduates. Business development skills (mainly skills 
like financial management, preparation of business plans, and 
entrepreneurship skills) are also being provided in the refugee camps. 
Business development skills and entrepreneurship training is aimed at 
enhancing the skills and knowledge of the refugees to enable them to 
produce profitable and competitive business proposals and manage 
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their respective businesses. These trainings usually last for a 
maximum of five days and aim to enable the beneficiaries to identify 
business types of their choice to undertake in the camp and request a 
certain amount of cash or materials with which to start the business.  
 
The study found that the organisations implementing livelihood 
projects use different modalities. Some organisations are able to 
facilitate access to local financial institutions to enable beneficiaries to 
open saving accounts through partnerships with the local 
government, which monitors financial circulations. The Dutch NGO 
ZOA, for example, has developed a cluster association that allows 
business groups to have a common bank account with a local credit 
and saving institution in Hitsats camp called Dedebit,49 which, 
according to an ARRA programme officer, was a pioneer in 
facilitating this kind of service. Other organisations, in particular a 
local NGO called Mekane Yesus, have followed the self-help group 
modality, under which groups have a common bank account in which 
they make weekly savings, which results in them receiving a matching 
fund from the organisation.  
 
Agri-business, mainly the supply of chickens and goats, has been 
another livelihood intervention in the refugee camps. For example, as 
mentioned in ZOA’s annual report, Hope for Eritrean Refugees in 
Ethiopia, Mekane Yesus provided 900 goats and 1,000 chickens for 
300 and 200 households, respectively, in Shimelba camp in 2016 
(ZOA, 2016, p. 12). However, the distribution of chickens without 
food and appropriate coops has resulted in the death of chickens. 
Goat production is unrealistic in all refugee camps, as pointed out by 
the ARRA zonal monitoring and evaluation officer (Tewedaj, 
interview with Michael, face-to-face, Shire, 3 November 2017). The 
provision of agricultural materials for refugees and members of host 
communities, including small farming tools and seeds of different 
vegetables and cereals, was another livelihood intervention reported 
by the respondents.  
 
49 Dedebit is the name for a local saving and credit institution operating Tigray 
regional state, with many branches in urban and rural areas.  
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The livelihood implementing organisations appeared to be very 
strong in capacitating the refugee population to improve their living 
conditions. In the timeframe of the study, it was observed that supply-
side livelihood strategies were given a lot of attention and the 
resources received from donors were transferred to the beneficiaries 
in the form of training, working capital and assets such as animals. 
However, although there are many livelihood projects in the refugee 
camps, the survey found that only 45% of respondents had 
participated in a livelihood project between 2015 and 2017.50 This 
means that the livelihood interventions being provided do not match 
the number of refugees who need support: the refugees participating 
in the projects provided by existing agencies number hundreds each 
year, while tens of thousands of youth need such training. The survey 
also found that 28% of the youth who participated in the study have 
received vocational skills training alone or vocational skills training 
plus start-up capital in the form of cash or materials to start their own 
income-generating activities. From this group, only 39% of them 
ranked the quality of the vocational skills training as ‘very good’. 
 
From the 55% who said they had not benefited from any livelihood-
related activities in the stated timeframe (2015–2017), the survey 
found that 18% of them want to get vocational skills training, 8% of 
them want to acquire business development skills training, 26% of 
them want to obtain vocational skills training plus start-up capital to 
start their income-generating activities, 33% of them want to obtain 
basic business development skill training plus start-up capital to start 
their business, and only 3% of them want to be involved in agri-
business, while 12% said they want to be employed using their former 
 
50 By the time of data collection, there were 22,679 refugee households in the 
refugee camps and Shire town. From this figure, 39.5% (more than 9,000) were 
children and 12% were unaccompanied and separated children, which accounts for 
about 3,000 households. So, counting the beneficiaries, 45% is around 8,000 
households. The actual target of the Norwegian Refugee Council and ZOA in the 
study years was about 4,000 individuals. So, the findings show that the beneficiaries 
of all organisations in all camps that were targeted by livelihood projects appeared 
to be 45%. However, this figure may differ from camp to camp, as in Hitsats, for 
example, the number of youth is very high, which could result in them constituting 
less than 45% of livelihood beneficiaries proportionally.  
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qualifications. The reason why so few Eritrean refugees wished to 
find employment within the refugee camps is the very low monthly 
wage fixed for them by UNHCR and ARRA, which is only USD 26. 
As key informants from ARRA in Hitsats camp noted, refugees hired 
as social workers, child-friendly space animators, and community 
mobilisers etc. are not selected for any livelihood benefits, hence, had 
no other source of income than their monthly wage.  
 
In general, the study found that Eritrean refugees do want to receive 
business-related training and funds to start their own businesses. 
They usually prefer to continue using the qualifications they had 
previously used in Eritrea, instead of learning new skills from the 
organisations providing livelihood training. Generally, the livelihood 
intervention organisations are strong in providing supply-side 
livelihood strategies and considering the interests of the target 
beneficiaries. In addition, the services supplied seem to be congruent 
with the aspirations of the refugees, although the specific trainings 
and start-up support interventions were found to be somehow 
divergent from the interests of the beneficiaries.  
Demand-side strategies 
Demand-side livelihood strategies are those that deal with market 
linkages, the identification of demand for products and services, and 
government policies related to refugees’ economic activities. The 
majority of refugees surveyed (60%) perceived the business services 
being provided as market-oriented and agreed that the organisations 
providing livelihood programmes have considered the demands of 
the market when selecting business types. However, 23% of them said 
that the livelihood projects provided are not based on their livelihood 
aspirations. 
 
In general, most of the livelihood project interventions were 
strategically designed to meet the market demands of the refugee 
camps, as identified in the needs assessments and reviews of the 
implementation of similar previous projects. However, all livelihood 
project interventions experienced a big problem with market linkages, 
which has been given less attention by implementing agencies, as 
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explained by the ARRA zonal monitoring and evaluation officer 
(Tewedaj, interview with Michael, face-to-face, Shire, 3 November 
2017). To illustrate, the agencies did not work to create market 
linkages within the camp or with local markets, which resulted in most 
of the livelihood projects not producing the results they expected.  
 
The businesses started by refugees with the help of implementing 
agencies are experiencing problems selling their products and buying 
materials to increase their production scale. In addition to these 
market linkage problems, refugees are having difficulty obtaining 
camp exit permits to enable them to obtain raw materials for 
production and access to nearby towns to buy materials at wholesale 
prices, although the Ethiopian government has allowed refugees to 
access the nearby town with restricted camp exit licences, as stated in 
many of the focus group discussions. This, by implication, means that 
the livelihood strategies of the implementing agencies are imperfect 
in dealing with demand-side issues, particularly linking refugees’ 
businesses to local markets.  
Value chains 
The value chain concept refers to “the way in which a set of activities 
by numerous actors construct a product consumed by the end user” 
(Chawiche, 2005, p. 13). A value chain not only includes the 
production stage, but all nodes that influence, add value to, or reshape 
the product (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001, cited in Chawiche, 2005, p. 
13). So, the development of a value chain in this chapter refers to the 
establishment of a complete chain with value addition to all the nodes 
that appear on both the supply and demand side.  
 
Value chains have relevance to the success of any business. 
Understanding a value chain and opportunities to add value to each 
stage improves the camp economy and creates market linkages 
between refugees and refugees, and refugees and locals. Eventually, 
refugees are able to scale-up their businesses by learning from their 
business activities, thereby augmenting their earnings. A carefully 
developed value chain can diversify the livelihood opportunities of 
refugees and members of the host community, improve the 
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entrepreneurship skills and business knowledge of refugees, enhance 
the self-confidence of refugees, and help youth avoid falling into 
criminal activities or substance abuse.  
 
Figure 10.1 depicts the absolute value chain model used by 
implementing organisations in the refugee camps in Tigray. It is 
highly fragmented, which has possibly contributed to the under 
performance of the livelihood projects. The implementing agencies 
appear to be applying a model with disjointed bonds between the 
fundamental nodes of the livelihoods value chain. 
 
 
Figure 10.1. Absolute value chain model for vocational skills training (grey arrows 
represent the main chain; below the arrows are the sub-chains) 
 
Considering the above value chain model for vocational skills 
training, the model appears to be disjointed in many of the sub and 
main chains. Some of the problems with the chain, as mentioned in 
the focus group discussions, are as follows: 
 
• Livelihood projects target interested refugees without 
considering their probable future and the time they intend 

























































• Livelihood projects provide vocational skills training without 
conducting market assessments to select viable business types 
and regardless of access to working materials. 
• Working materials are distributed regardless of their viability, 
simply because the budgets are secured from donors.  
• Working materials are distributed (in cash or in kind) without 
ensuring that there are work places available or a proper 
power supply.  
• Business groups are granted permission to start trades or 
other activities that are not necessarily demanded in and 
around the camp. 
• A huge amount of capital is invested to train and fund 
refugees, but not on monitoring and following-up activities. 
 
Hence, it appears that the value chains used by the implementing 
organisations in the camps are fragmented and certain steps are 
skipped, contributing to the failure of livelihood projects to meet the 
expectations.  
Selection criteria 
To ensure livelihood projects succeed in enhancing the financial and 
technical capacity of refugees, the selection process (and criteria) of 
participants (whom to select for what capacity gap and resource 
delivery) used by implementing agencies must be well thought out. 
This study found that organisations select beneficiaries through 
community leaders, such as the RCC, zone and block leaders, and 
civic association leaders. Every agency implementing a livelihood 
project has its own selection criteria, and these can vary greatly; one 
may have several criteria while another may have limited criteria (as 
stated by representatives from ARRA and UNHCR, refugees and 
experts from the livelihood agencies). However, these organisations 
seldom went down to the grass-roots level to cross check the 
selection process. As a result, targeting errors like double targeting, 
omissions and sometimes biased targeting were apparent across all 
implementing agencies, resulting in conflicts of interests and the 
misuse of limited resources. Table 10.2 shows the selection criteria 
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used by the different livelihood implementing organisations for 
beneficiaries. 
 
Producing skilled youth who could be engaged in income-generating 
activities for themselves and their respective families is a common 
livelihood strategy. However, not every individual is interested in, or 
capable of, starting a business, as not everyone is endowed with an 
entrepreneurial mind. Therefore, projects need to select beneficiaries, 
not just for the sake of giving training, but also taking into account 
the end goal.  
 
The integration and coordination by organisations implementing 
livelihood projects was not as expected. Implementing organisations 
did not complement each other, but seemed to compete among 
themselves, resulting in the duplication of efforts and depletion of the 
limited funding available. However, some progress was achieved after 
the establishment of the Livelihood Working Group (LWG), which 
was initiated by the Norwegian Refugee Council. This working group 
has enabled livelihood agencies to discuss all matters to do with 
livelihood programmes on a monthly basis to eliminate some of the 
challenges and share some of the lessons learnt so as to enhance 
service delivery. Unfortunately, so far, there is no common working 
manual for livelihood projects (such as a standard operating 
procedures), which would reduce the replication of efforts. The 
formulation of such a manual or standard operating procedures 
manual could optimise the effective and efficient use of the 
inadequate resources available for livelihood projects, establish 
common selection criteria for beneficiaries, and align the aspirations 
of the beneficiaries with the programmatic interests of the livelihood 
agencies. Moreover, having a standard operating procedures manual 
could improve the implementation modalities of the implementing 










Beneficiary selection criteria for vocational skills trainings used in 2016  








Beauty salon  
120 students  • Beneficiaries must be interested/self-motivated to do business development/ 
vocational skills training and to start a business; to be part of a small homogenous 
group of 6–8 members and to contribute their own labour and materials to start an 
income-generating activity; and to work hard to achieve goals. 
• The first target group of beneficiaries shall be refugees with an already existing small 
business who require additional capital. 
• Preference will be given to more stable beneficiaries who have lived in the camp for 
more than 1 year and who will stay in the camp for at least the next 2 years.  
• Priority will be given to people with a disability, female-headed households with 
children, and individuals belonging to categories of refugee classified as extremely 
vulnerable. 
• Refugees with a large family size (at least greater than or equal to 3) and with very 
low income should be considered. 
• Beneficiaries should be youths aged 18–35. 
• Preference will be given to refugees with a failed migration process or who have not 
started the process yet.  







68 students  General requirements  
• Refugees who are vulnerable; motivated and have the ability to work; will stay for a 







Specific criteria  
• Poor and marginalised adults 
• Disciplined and free form socially-unacceptable habits 
• Interested in receiving training 
• Completion of at least grade 4 education 
• Youth and adults with disabilities 
• Destitute single women and female-headed households 
















students in all 
camps 
• 15–25 years old for long-term target beneficiaries and adults for short-term training 
• 50% female  
• Host community (50% of total Youth Education Pack [YEP] beneficiaries) and 
close to YEP centre/refugee community 
• Education background: refugees and host beneficiaries with low access to education 
and training opportunities for short-term skills training; host community 
beneficiaries for long-term skills training should have completed grade 10 
Vulnerability criteria: 
• Double orphans, child-headed households, former conscripts, youth, single 
mothers, other vulnerable people (people with disabilities/victims of conflict); one 
from each family is eligible and they must be without other education support, have 











• Every interested individual who is a refugee living in the camp can attend any of the 
training in every term. 
Source: Based on interviews with livelihood experts from each organisation in Shire (2–6 November 2017) 
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Livelihood challenges and opportunities 
Challenges 
Selection of appropriate beneficiaries is the first step in any successful 
project. Selecting people who cannot realise the aims of projects is a 
major obstacle to the success of livelihood projects in the refugee 
camps. In addition, selection errors in the type of activity provided 
(business and vocational skills training), as well as shortage of market 
linkages or deficiency of demand, are also major challenges for 
livelihood projects in the Tigray refugee camps. Many challenges are 
equally shared by all organisations and in all refugee camps. Shortage 
of basic utilities like water and energy, availability or delayed 
distribution of start-up kits, incorrect placement of business centres 
(locations), group-based support modalities (number of 
beneficiaries), and poor market linkages are challenges faced by most 
livelihood projects. Moreover, new business ideas are not being 
innovated in the refugee camps. Resource limitation, which is a 
problem for all livelihood projects in the camps, problems with loan 
disbursement and repayment modalities specific to microloan and 
revolving funds, lack of formal micro institutions that specifically 
support and facilitate loan provision and saving for refugees, and 
shortage of working spaces for urban refugees are issues mentioned 
by all agencies, but stressed by the Norwegian Refugee Council 
livelihood coordinator (Tewedaj, interview with Solomon, face-to-
face, Shire, 2 November 2017) . 
 
There are also some refugee-driven challenges for livelihood projects, 
like the localities in Eritrea from which the refugees came and ethnic 
group segregation, which can cause conflict among groups and result 
in the theft and misuse of the start-up kits for personal purposes. 
Refugees’ high expectations and limited motivation, as well as lack of 
commitment to spend time and effort to improve their livelihoods, 
were other critical challenges. Such refugee-driven problems have 
resulted in refugees dropping out of projects and sitting idle or 
engaging in secondary migration. Business skills gaps among selected 
beneficiaries, business selection problems (i.e., copying and pasting 
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business ideas), lack of interest in working in a team, and lack of trust 
in one another are challenges for livelihood projects. In most of the 
challenges mentioned by the refugees, there are hidden factors. To 
appropriately address each challenge, the root causes must be 
identified. In relation to lack of motivation and commitment and lack 
of trust among refugees, for example, livelihood projects need to ask 
‘why’ when planning project activities.  
 
There are also challenges posed by the local community. For example, 
conflict with the local community over the use of firewood and 
grazing of livestock mean that refugees are unable to easily access 
natural resources around the camps, as stated in the focus group 
discussions. The livelihood experts also said that there is conflict 
between the host community and refugees over the use of natural 
resources by the refugees.  
 
Programming related challenges can also be observed. Key 
informants reported that livelihood projects often fail to meet their 
intended outcomes, because they are based on a rough needs 
assessment, not a detailed and clear appraisal. Key informants also 
mentioned misunderstanding of the refugee context, lack of standard 
operating procedures, fragmented monitoring and supervision, and 
lack of coordination and partnerships among livelihood project 
implementing organisations as some of the major challenges facing 
organisations in the Shire area. Therefore, livelihood project 
implementing organisations need to professionalise their projects, 
particularly their project initiation and planning stage. Whatever 
project idea they wish to implement must be based on the actual 
context and should fit the existing needs of the beneficiaries.  
 
Remittances received from relatives abroad remain an important 
source of money for Eritrean refugees dwelling in urban areas. In 
addition, a few reported working as daily labourers. Remittances are 
also a source of income for refugees living in camps, but their main 
source of sustenance is the World Food Programme’s monthly food 
ration. The main constraints hindering urban refugees from 
participating in income-generating activities and diversifying their 
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sources of income include lack of working capital and access to credit, 
lack of technical skills, and lack of a workplace. There are no 
livelihood interventions for urban refugees by either the government 
or NGOs, except the recently launched Addressing the Root Causes 
programme (funded by Dutch Ministry of the Foreign Affairs) and 
Regional Development and Protection Programme (funded by the 
European Union) in Shire and Addis Ababa. These programmes have 
found that the small number of urban refugee households in Shire 
and the lack of commitment and excessive dependency of Eritrean 
refugees living in urban settings on livelihood programmes or 
remittances, specific to Shire town, are major challenges for 
livelihood projects for urban refugees (Abrha, interview with Kahsay, 
face-to-face, Shire, 24 October 2017). Conceivably, all the identified 
challenges could be solved through the existing structures and with 
existing resources, with strong collaboration among the responsible 
organisations, led by ARRA, the organisation that manages the camp.  
Opportunities 
Some of the opportunities in the camps that have positively 
contributed to the implementation of livelihood projects include the 
exemption of camp refugees from taxation on business activities, the 
provision of house rent and other support, the provision of technical 
and material support by livelihood agencies, the potential to sell 
goods or services on refugee and local markets, and the gridline 
connection that helps organisations conduct metal and woodwork 
training in Shimelba refugee camp, as mentioned in the focus group 
discussions. Moreover, the availability of the vegetable gardening 
centre in Shimelba camp and access to land for small business 
activities (like shops, cafes and restaurants) also present refugees with 
opportunities.  
 
Data collected from the interviews with key informants shows several 
opportunities that have positively contributed to livelihood projects, 
such as the existence of business franchises between the locals and 
refugees, a cadre of refugees and youth who have received vocational 
skills training, the availability of different structures like vocational 
skill training centres, and the availability of community-based 
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structures. The livelihood officer from Innovative Humanitarian 
Solutions added that the stable environment in Shimelba camp, 
availability of land for small business activities, peaceful coexistence 
between the two communities (refugee and local), and their language 
and cultural similarities have help in the execution of livelihood 
projects (Tewedaj, interview with Michael, face-to-face, 28 October 
2017). 
 
There are many unexploited opportunities that could positively 
contribute to livelihood programmes. The key informants pointed 
out the following: the proximity of camps to local towns, availability 
of refugee and local markets, availability of large numbers of educated 
and trainable youth, large cash flow inside the camps due to 
remittances, culture and language similarities, access to land to start 
small businesses, and the existence of vocational skills graduates. The 
survey found that about 39% of the respondents believe that 
refugees’ occupational backgrounds are one of the main 
opportunities underutilised by livelihood projects. In addition, 36% 
believe that existing demands in and around the camp present more 
opportunities. For example, the discussants in the focus group 
mentioned demand for bakery bread (although the production of 
bread has started in Adi Harush and Mai Ayni, the bakeries are not 
yet meeting market demand), dairy products, butchers, boutiques, and 
power suppliers. In addition, there is demand for metal and 
woodwork, electronic maintenance, agro-processing (industries like 
milk and meat factories), and leather crafts, which have good 
prospects for livelihood projects. The availability of large numbers of 
trained and experienced youth is also an opportunity that has not yet 
been exploited by livelihood projects.  
Reasons for secondary migration 
Secondary migration is the foremost challenge for livelihood projects, 
as it leads participants to drop out of programmes. The vast majority 
(85%) of the refugees who participated in this study considered lack 
of livelihood opportunities to be one of the main push factors for the 
secondary migration of refugees from camps in Ethiopia. In addition, 
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youth also move on due to lack of basic recreational facilities, services 
like water, energy, and shelter, and, most importantly, income-
generating opportunities. A total of 90% of the survey participants 
believed that the provision of livelihood opportunities for Eritrean 




Figure 10.2. Respondents’ perception (N=407) of the role of livelihood challenges and 
opportunities in secondary migration (2017) 
 
Secondary migration may also be due to an initial plan by refugees to 
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that having an initial plan to pass through Ethiopia was the reason for 
the secondary migration of refugees: “refugees seem programmed to 
flee Ethiopia, to just pass through; however, they do not know the 
next chapter of their life” (M, interview with Michael, face-to-face, 25 
October 2017). In this study, all livelihood project interventions were 
found to encounter this problem across all refugee camps. Moreover, 
the focus group discussions revealed that the refugees themselves 
believe that the initial plan to leave Ethiopia is the reason why 
Eritreans go to third countries, even when supported by livelihood 
projects. 
 
When participants were asked in an open-ended question why 
refugees are leaving Ethiopia, even when supported by livelihood 
projects, some said that some youth are invited by their families to go 
to third countries. The diaspora community, therefore, plays a role in 
the secondary migration of Eritreans living in Tigray. The role of 
smugglers is also substantial. Furthermore, the lack of 
communication opportunities with relatives back in Eritrea is an 
additional push factor for refugees to leave Ethiopia and move to 
Sudan or another country where there is access to direct phone calls.  
Conclusion 
This study looked at three research questions: What are the 
intervention strategies of the livelihood projects targeting Eritrean 
refugees living in Tigray, Ethiopia? What are the livelihood challenges 
and opportunities facing Eritrean refugees in Tigray, Ethiopia? And, 
why are Eritrean refugees moving on from Ethiopia, even when 
supported by several livelihood projects?  
 
Looking at the first research question, the intervention strategies of 
livelihood implementing organisations working with refugees in 
Tigray can be broken into two categories, supply-side strategies and 
demand-side strategies. Supply-side strategies include the provision 
of vocational skills and business development training, distribution of 
working capital in cash or kind, the supply of livestock, and provision 
of agricultural materials. Demand-side strategies include creating 
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market linkages and ensuring demand for the products and services 
being promoted. However, many of the businesses started under the 
livelihood projects are having difficulty finding markets for their 
products and accessing raw materials (market linkages). In addition, 
refugees have difficulty obtaining camp exit permits to enable them 
to access raw materials from nearby towns. Hence, while most 
implementing agencies had strong supply-side strategies, their 
demand-side strategies were found to be imperfect, particularly in 
linking refugees’ businesses to local markets. Livelihood projects have 
also been criticised for not selecting appropriate beneficiaries, failing 
to create absolute value chains, and not coordinating among 
themselves or developing common operation standards, such as 
selection criteria for beneficiaries and a start-up capital distribution 
modality. Moreover, lack of value chain development has resulted in 
the limited success of livelihood programmes in the camps, which 
impacts on secondary migration. 
 
In relation to the second research question, the study found many 
livelihood challenges and opportunities in the refugee camps. Some 
of the major challenges include: linking refugee businesses with 
demand and local markets (demand-side challenges), conflict between 
Eritrean refugees of different ethnic origin, theft and misuse of 
resources by refugees, as well as high expectations and limited 
motivation and commitment to improve their livelihoods (refugee-
driven challenges), conflict over resources such as firewood and 
grazing land (challenges originating from the local community), and 
lack of detailed and clear appraisals, misunderstanding of the refugee 
context, lack of standard operating procedures, fragmented 
monitoring and supervision, and lack of coordination and 
partnerships among livelihood project implementing organisations 
(programming-related challenges). There are also numerous 
livelihood opportunities in the camps, such as the existing 
infrastructure in the camps, availability of basic services, existence of 
training centres, refugee potential (human resources), existing 
demand in and around the camps, and availability of natural 
resources. However, because most of interventions are based on 
shallow assessments, several opportunities (such as refugees’ existing 
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skills and occupational backgrounds and markets in and around the 
camp) have been underutilised by livelihood projects. These failures 
impact on the success of projects, which in turn impacts on secondary 
migration.  
 
To answer the third research question, why are refugees migrating on 
from Ethiopia when supported by different livelihood implementing 
organisations, the study found the following. First, the problems with 
livelihood intervention strategies, especially on the demand-side, and 
the fragmented value chain mean that these projects are failing to 
meet the goal of creating a sustainable income for refugees in the 
camps, who are moving on in search of a better life. Second, the 
number of livelihood beneficiaries targeted and the number of youth 
living in the refugee camps needing livelihood projects does not 
match; the livelihood implementing organisations are reaching 
hundreds, whereas tens of thousands of youth need such 
interventions every year. Third, significant numbers of refugees are 
crossing the Eritrea-Ethiopia border with the intention of passing 
through on their way to a third country. Therefore, regardless of the 
provision of livelihood projects by implementing organisations, a 
proportion of Eritrean refugees are still moving out of Ethiopia. 
 
Therefore, it is concluded that flanking measures are needed that will 
strengthen the sense that a sustainable livelihood in Ethiopia is viable. 
Such measures include the matching of skills and business 
opportunities, strengthening basis conditions in the camps and 
ending the operations of human traffickers in the camps as these 
encourage refugees to engage in secondary migration. 
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In the past few years, Ethiopia has introduced an open-door policy 
towards refugees from 
Eritrea, who are welcome on 
Ethiopian soil. However, the 
need for a durable solution 
remains stalled in practice. 
According to the United 
Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), 
over 18,000 Eritreans fled 
their country to Ethiopia in 
the first 9 months of 2017 
(UNHCR, 2017). Most of the 
Eritrean refugees are situated 
in refugee camps in Tigray 
region in northern Ethiopia. 
The chance of them 
returning safely to their 
country of origin remains 
very low, unless there is a 
positive shift towards human 
rights in Eritrea. Therefore, a 
solution is needed that can 
provide these refugees with 
dignified prospects for their 
future through livelihoods and integration into the local community 
in the host country (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016).  
Until recently, Eritrean refugees in 
Hitsats refugee camp in Ethiopia did not 
have access to income-generating 
activities. This contributed to a sense of 
hopelessness and motivated secondary 
migration. Basic conditions for livelihoods 
have been inadequate – refugees have not 
had the right to work, to obtain a drivers’ 
licence or live outside the camps. 
However, there has been a political shift 
in Ethiopia, which has brought new and 
positive attention to refugee issues and a 
focus on harnessing their potential. 
Combined with recent developments in 
the political and policy streams in 
Ethiopia, such as the adoption of the 
Nine Pledges and revision of the Refugee 
Proclamation, it seems that a policy 
window may be opening for refugees’ 





Access to a sustainable livelihood is essential for refugees living in the 
camps, as well as urban refugees, in order to prevent secondary 
migration and the dangers associated with it, which include human 
trafficking. In addition, livelihood programmes can enhance self-
reliance and lower the dependence of refugees on humanitarian aid 
(Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016). The low access of refugees to livelihood 
activities has been a concern in policy-making and academic circles, 
as well as among practitioners, in the past years.  
 
The present chapter aims to analyse the dynamics of livelihoods in 
the refugee camps in northern Ethiopia. With the presumption that 
access to livelihoods is a crucial entry point for strengthening 
refugees’ self-reliance and prospects, the present study looked into 
the main sources of income-generating activities, limitations and 
obstacles faced by refugees and the practices of organisations working 
with the refugees in the camps relating to livelihoods.51  
 
According to UNHCR, ‘self-reliance’ is the social and economic 
ability of people to fulfil their needs and exercise their rights in a 
sustainable manner (UNHCR, 2005, 2012). In order to achieve a 
durable solution for refugees, UNHCR has developed the 
Development Assistance for Refugees framework, which, among 
other things, aims to facilitate the “empowerment and enhancement 
of productive capacities and self-reliance of refugees” (UNHCR, 
2003). The Development Assistance for Refugees framework 
highlights two prerequisites needed for livelihood programmes to 
lead to self-reliance: the political will of the host government and 
access to socio-economic activities (UNHCR, 2003). While this study 
looked at the access of refugees to income-generating activities, the 
political will of the host government was not included in the empirical 
research, but is reflected in the literature review. 
 
 
51 See also Melicherová (2018), which presents the full case study on which this 
chapter is based. 
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The next sections in this chapter outline the theoretical framework 
for this study, including Kingdon’s (2014) policy streams, human 
rights in international law and the need for a human rights culture. As 
several research works show, there is a close link between human 
rights protection and livelihoods (Jacobsen, 2002; Horst & UNHCR, 
2006). These sections are followed by the research question and the 
methodology used during data collection in Hitsats refugee camp. 
The literature review is then presented, followed by the findings of 
the empirical study, including the livelihood opportunities for 
refugees in Hitsats, as well as refugees’ main sources of income. The 
access of refugees to income-generating activities in the camp is also 
examined, as well as the main obstacles that prevent refugees from 
pursuing livelihoods. The chapter then looks at the basic needs of 
refugees and how they are provided in the camp, as well as some of 
the practices of the organisations based in the camp. The final section 
presents some concluding remarks. 
Multiple streams of the policy agenda 
In recent times, the refugee question has become high on the political 
agenda of various countries. Kingdon, in his multiple streams theory, 
looks at how particular issues reach the decision agenda. He describes 
three separate, but loosely-coupled streams – the problem stream, the 
policy stream, and the political stream (Kingdon, 2014). The problem 
stream is where legitimate issues that need to be addressed are 
identified. Problems can be identified through feedback procedures, 
such as reports or reviews, or through other systems introduced by 
the government to monitor a specific situation (Kingdon, 2014). 
Refugee integration and the enhancement of refugees’ livelihood has 
been recognised as a problematic issue by several actors (International 
Rescue Committee, 2018; Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016; Samuel Hall, 2014; 
Carciotto & d'Orsi, 2017).  
 
To frame a problem in a particular way requires conceptual and 
political effort. However, problems do not get resolved on their own, 
without political will and an explicit policy framework. It is, therefore, 
important to develop ideas for solutions, discuss the ideas within 
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specific platforms, and combine and change existing ideas. Kingdon 
(2014) affiliates this process with the policy stream, during which 
there is discussion and debate among various stakeholders, such as 
researchers, academics and policymakers. Although a wide variety of 
ideas are considered, there are some general criteria that have to be 
taken into account, including technical feasibility (the solution has to 
be possible to implement), value acceptability (it should fit with the 
country’s values), and anticipation of future or unexpected 
constraints (such as budget constraints) (Kingdon, 2014). 
 
The enhancement of self-reliance through economic empowerment 
and access to livelihoods has a strong place in UNHCR’s protection 
mandate (UNHCR, 2012). The study of livelihoods has also been 
pursued by various development actors, which have developed 
different frameworks52 in order to address the importance of this 
issue. However, it is important to note that the literature does not 
indicate which framework is the most appropriate for refugees 
(UNHCR, 2006). In addition, new policies, frameworks or ideas have 
to be backed up by the political will of the state, which is referred to 
by Kingdon as the political stream. 
 
The primary actors in the political stream are the various government 
actors, such as the prime minister, president, parliament, and other 
political appointees. Within this group, general agreement is formed 
primarily by bargaining and making compromises to build a coalition. 
The political considerations can be influenced by the national mood, 
as well as organised political forces such as political parties, interest 
groups, pressure groups or influential political individuals. A major 
source of political opportunity can arise from political change in the 
country and change in key personnel. If a new government comes to 
power, particularly if it is formed by a different party, political 
opportunities may change significantly. 
 
 
52 Examples are the Department for International Development (DFID), CARE, 
Oxfam, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), all of which have 
developed livelihood frameworks. 
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When an existing problem, the political will to address the problem 
and a new political environment (the three streams) are coupled 
together at a particular time a policy window opens (Kingdon, 2014). 
A policy window can open because a particular problem is brought 
to attention by an unexpected situation or government observations, 
or it can open because of an administrative change in the government. 
When a policy window is open, policy entrepreneurs have to be ready 
to push the issue onto the decision agenda. If a problem is identified, 
but no suitable options exist to solve it, it will be unlikely to make it 
on to the agenda. Similarly, if there is political will, but the issue is not 
considered a pressing problem, it is also likely to fall short of the 
agenda. But when all three streams exist and a window opens, policy 
entrepreneurs have to be ready to take action immediately (Kingdon, 
2014). 
Human rights in international law 
One of the factors preventing refugees from pursuing livelihoods is 
the restriction of the rights of refugees. However, some of these 
rights are guaranteed under international human rights and refugee 
law (Jacobsen, 2002; Horst & UNHCR, 2006). Refugees, like other 
individuals, should be enabled to fulfil their potential and support 
themselves by engaging in employment. Access to lawful employment 
is a fundamental human right, and there is a wide range of 
international and national legal frameworks protecting the right to 
work. However, when it comes to refugees, legal provisions 
regulating the right to work vary. One of the most relevant 
international legal instruments concerning the rights of refugees is the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. Refugees’ right to work is covered by three articles in this 
Convention: Article 17 (Wage-earning employment), Article 18 (Self-
employment) and Article 19 (Liberal professions) (UN General 
Assembly, 1951). Article 17 (1) provides for a minimum standard of 
treatment for those refugees engaged in wage-earning employment. 
States that are signatories to the Convention are obliged to secure the 
enjoyment of the right protected under Article 17 through their 
national legislation. Additionally, a host country has to grant the same 
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access to the labour market to refugees as any other non-national is 
granted (University of Michigan Law School, 2010). 
 
Even though the 1951 Convention is a pivotal source of law 
protecting refugees’ right to work, it does not guarantee a job for 
refugees. Furthermore, as identified in Craven’s commentary, states 
are not obliged to create work opportunities based on the preferences 
of individuals seeking work (Craven, 1995). Instead, work can be seen 
as “a gateway through which refugees may provide their value to a 
receiving country, [and] rebuild their lives with dignity” (Wirth, 
Defilippis & Therkelsen, 2014, p. 11). 
 
The 1951 Convention has to be read and examined together with 
other human rights treaties. The right to work is established in Article 
23.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Preamble 
of the Convention particularly points to the principles upheld by the 
Declaration. The right to work is also enshrined in Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN 
General Assembly, 1966; UN General Assembly, 1948). 
 
For international legal provisions to be effective, it is necessary that 
they be recognised on the local level, which means that they need to 
be brought into national legislation (Rorty, 1993). Signatory states are 
bound to enforce their obligations under international law by, among 
other things, bringing them into national law. Only national 
legislation and implementation on the ground can bring these 
provisions into existence and, thus, connect theory with practice. 
Therefore, it is vital for the present research project to see to what 
extent the described human rights are recognised in local law and 
practice, which depends to some extent on the human rights culture 
in the host country. 
Human rights culture 
The term ‘rights’ has been described by contemporary philosopher 
Shelly Kagan as “horrendously ambiguous” (Kagan, 1997). However, 
as Rhoda Howard-Hassmann (2012) writes, all human beings are 
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entitled to human rights merely by virtue of being biologically human. 
Hence, individuals do not have to earn rights, as they inhere in them 
unmediated by social relations. Richard Rorty’s contribution to the 
discussion explains that “nothing relevant to moral choice separates 
human beings from animals except historically contingent facts of the 
world, cultural facts” (Rorty, 1993, p. 116). He continues that 
‘rationality’ is a human attribute that grounds morality and denies that 
there are any morally relevant “transcultural facts” (Rorty, 1993). 
Rorty claims that a culture in which human rights are respected is the 
bare minimum level of morality. The idea of a ‘human rights culture’ 
emerged strongly after Wold War II. A human rights culture is what 
is left of human rights when one gives up the idea that there are 
natural rights present in some aspect of our humanity itself (Rorty, 
1993). Human rights are represented by human rights treaties, 
conventions and agreements. However, the treaties do not bring 
human rights into existence. Rights can be only attained once they are 
positively recognised as rights. The concept of a human rights culture 
represents a basis for their realisation. 
Research questions 
The current study was conducted in Hitsats camp (which was 
established to accommodate Eritrean refugees) in order to improve 
our understanding of the access of Eritrean refugees to livelihoods. 
To meet this objective the following research question was posed: To 
what extent do Eritrean refugees have access to livelihood opportunities and to 
work in refugee camps in Ethiopia and how do Kingdon's multiple streams align 
for agenda setting on this issue?  
 
These questions are approached through the following sub-questions: 
 
• What is the policy of the Government of Ethiopia in relation to 
livelihoods and the right of refugees to work?  
• What access to income-generating activities do refugees in Ethiopia have?  
• What are Eritrean refugees’ main sources of livelihood? 
• Which obstacles and opportunities do refugees face within the camp setting 
in accessing livelihoods? 
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• What are the basic needs of refugees and how are they provided for in the 
camp setting? 
• What practices have been established by organisations within the camp 
with regard to refugees’ livelihood activities? 
Methodology 
This study consisted of a literature review and an empirical study, 
both quantitative and qualitative. The literature review was conducted 
on the existing policies and livelihoods in refugee camps in Ethiopia. 
The empirical study can be characterised as ethnographic research 
and was based on two visits to Hitsats refugee camp, which is situated 
on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. Hitsats camp is the youngest of four 
refugee camps for Eritrean refugees in Tigray region, Ethiopia. The 
camp is set in challenging climate conditions, including hot 
temperatures and strong aridity. At the time of the field research, the 
camp hosted around 13,000 Eritrean refugees, however, the precise 
number is difficult to estimate due to the high influx and out-flux of 
refugees. 
 
The first visit, in December 2017, was aimed at identifying the 
livelihood options available to refugees in the camp, as well as the 
obstacles and practices related to earning a livelihood within the 
camp. This was done by collecting quantitative data through a survey. 
The qualitative interviews were conducted during the second visit, in 
January/February 2018. The population studied during the research 
visits encompasses refugees (both men and women) who had been 
living in Hitsats refugee camp at least 30 days prior to the day of data 
collection, as well as the staff of organisations that are active in the 
camp (non-governmental organisation [NGO] workers). A total of 94 
questionnaires were collected from refugees in the group sessions and 
7 questionnaires were collected separately from NGO workers (see 
Table 11.1).53 In addition to the questionnaires, qualitative interviews 
were conducted to deepen the understanding of refugees’ livelihoods 
in Hitsats camp. 
 
53 All tables and figures in this chapter contain original data collected during 
empirical study by the author. 
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The study population of refugees was divided into two groups during 
the selection process: those who had received vocational training by 
Zuid Oost Azië (ZOA), an international relief and recovery 
organisation, and those who had not. Participants from both groups 
were aged 18 years and older and had resided in the camp for more 
than 30 days prior to the date of data collection. The first group of 
refugees was selected with the support of ZOA from the list of 
refugees who had participated in its vocational skill trainings 
initiatives. For this group, stratified sampling (based on gender) was 
used (random sampling from the list of male and female beneficiaries 
of the ZOA training), which resulted in 47 returned questionnaires. 
The data were gathered in 4 sessions, of maximum 12 participants 
each, held in Hitsats camp. The sessions were divided according to 
gender due to convenience during the selection process. 
 
The second group of refugees was selected with support from local 
fieldwork assistants who helped with the distribution of 
questionnaires among refugees who had not participated in the ZOA 
training programmes. Two non-probability sample techniques were 
used. At first, a convenience sampling technique was used to select 
participants on the basis of convenience in terms of availability, reach 
and accessibility. Then a snowball sampling method was implemented 
for further selection of participants. The gender balance was 
respected during the whole selection process. For these groups, data 
were gathered in 5 sessions of maximum 12 participants each, held in 
Hitsats camp. For this group, 47 questionnaires were also collected. 
 
During each session, a local translator and fieldwork assistant were 
present. Each question was read to the participants by a translator in 
the local language and the participants were given time to fill in the 
answers. In some cases, additional questions were asked by the 
participants to clarify the questions. Participants who faced problems 
with literacy or other difficulties were helped by fieldwork assistants 
to fill in the answers.  
 
The quantitative data collected was transferred into Excel and 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software to prepare 
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a platform for analysis. Each participant and completed questionnaire 
was allocated a specific code. In order to establish whether there is 
statistical evidence that the associated population means are 
significantly different, an independent samples t-test was carried out 
in SPSS.  
 
When it comes to the representativeness of the study sample of both 
refugee groups, several considerations need to be taken into account. 
As the research question focuses on the livelihoods of the refugees 
within the camp setting, the interviews of refugees took place in real-
life situations to maximise the accuracy of representative samples. In 
order to ensure that the input from both genders would be 
represented equally, the study sample was split into men and women. 
The criterion that the participants needed to have resided in the camp 
at least 30 days prior to data collection was aimed at increasing the 
likelihood that the selected samples would reflect upon the livelihood 
situation within the camp. However, it is important to note that the 
occurrence of sample bias cannot be excluded entirely from the 
research. It is possible that mistrust of refugees towards the 
researcher or towards the fieldwork assistants misled the study 
sample. In addition, the research on trauma relief conducted within 
Hitsats camp (Kidane & Stokmans, 2018), observed the presence of 
individual as well as collective trauma, which may have affected the 
overall performance and participation of refugees in the study sample. 
Because of these limitations, the overall representativeness of the 
sample group selected from the refugee population can be 
questioned.  
 
The NGO workers were selected using the snowball sampling 
method, which was carried out with the help of ZOA. In total seven 
questionnaires were collected. Six questionnaires were contribution 
by ZOA employees, out of which two were distributed in Hitsats and 
four in Shire (the city near Hitsats camp). One questionnaire was filled 
in by an employee of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Having 
experience with livelihood programmes within the refugee camp was 




Table 11.1. Overview of quantitative analysis 
 





beneficiaries of ZOA 
skill trainings 
Stratified and 















The second data collection followed the analysis of all collected 
material from the quantitative study. The purpose of the second 
phase was to conduct qualitative interviews with refugees and NGO 
workers to deepen the understanding of livelihoods within the camp. 
The questions used for the qualitative interviews were based on the 
questionnaires used during the quantitative data collection. 
Respondents were asked to elaborate upon the questions. Interviews 
with refugees were conducted in a group setting, during which a local 
translator assisted with interaction and communication between the 
interviewer and interviewees. Respondents were selected based on the 
convenience sampling method, with the help of a fieldwork assistant. 
In total, four refugees participated in the interviews (three men, one 
woman). Interviews with NGO workers were held separately in the 
English, and the selection process was based on convenience 
sampling. Four conversations with NGO workers were recorded and 
transcribed into a word document. One conversation was conducted 
off the record and only the notes were captured from this interview. 
Migration policy in Ethiopia 
According to UNHCR, approximately 916,678 refugees were 
registered in Ethiopia as of 31 March 2018 (UNHCR, 2018). The 
largest group of refugees fled from South Sudan, followed by refugees 
from Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan. Several reports show that despite 
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Ethiopia’s open-door policy towards refugees, refugees face several 
restrictions and obstacles in relation to entering the labour market 
(Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016; Carciotto & d'Orsi, 2017; Samuel Hall, 
2014). This section (and the next) presents the results of the literature 
review and helps answer the first sub-research question. 
 
From a legal perspective, Ethiopia is a party to the 1951 Convention, 
the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, as well as the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Organization of African Unity, 1969; Organization 
of African Unity, 1981). As discussed earlier, the 1951 Convention 
upholds the right of refugees to work in Articles 17, 18 and 19. The 
1969 Convention is complementary to the 1951 Convention, but has 
no specific provision protecting refugees’ right to work, however, the 
African Charter upholds the right to work under Article 15. Ethiopia’s 
national legal framework also deals with the rights of refugees in the 
Refugee Proclamation No. 409 of 2004. Although this Proclamation 
grants some rights to refugees, the legal right to work remains 
restricted (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2004). Refugees 
in Ethiopia are eligible to work only to the extent that the law allows 
other foreign nationals to do so (Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, 2004, Article 21[3]). Furthermore, as recognised by Zetter 
and Ruaudel, “Ethiopia’s Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs only 
grants work permits to foreigners when there are no qualified 
nationals available and in practice does not grant work permits to 
refugees” (Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016, p. 25). It is, therefore, welcomed 
that the Government announced the revision of the Refugee 
Proclamation to expand the rights granted to refugees under this 
instrument (International Rescue Committee, 2018). 
 
In September 2016, Ethiopia adopted an ambitious plan with ‘Nine 
Pledges’ aimed at improving the lives and livelihood conditions of 
refugees residing on Ethiopian territory. These pledges extend and 
strengthen policies in thematic areas such as work and job creation, 
education, out-of-camp policies, documentation and local integration 
(Samuel Hall, 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2017). 
Since 2018, the situation in Ethiopia has been developing rapidly, due 
295 
 
to new political shifts.54 In May 2018, the Council of Ministers 
approved a draft refugee proclamation to implement a 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, which provides a 
platform for the Nine Pledges and will, thus, improve the integration 
process for refugees (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2017; 
Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs, 2018). In addition, 
the new bill aims to align its protection measures with the 
international and regional instruments adopted by Ethiopia (Abiye, 
2018). 
 
One of the Nine Pledges is to build industrial parks to expand the job 
opportunities for refugees and host communities (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Ethiopia, 2017). However, as the International Rescue 
Committee points out, there are several challenges with industrial 
parks. Primarily, they are unlikely to generate significant outcomes for 
job creation in the near-term. Also, the selection process, training of 
refugees, and transportation to the parks could prove too timely, 
costly and unsafe. It is, therefore, important that the planning for new 
job opportunities for refugees goes beyond the introduction of 
industrial parks (International Rescue Committee, 2018). 
 
Despite the positive initiatives of the Ethiopian government in 
forming new policies, the current situation leaves refugees in Ethiopia 
unable to enter the formal labour market. The integration of refugees 
and protection of their rights has been recognised as a problem, 
which the new policy instruments are trying to address. The new 
developments in the political stream have aligned with these 
instruments and opened a policy window. However, at this moment, 
it remains unclear what change this will bring for refugees on the 
ground.  
 
54 Restrictive policies may face a wind of change with the approach of the new 
Ethiopian government, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Since taking office in 
April 2018, he has adopted a number of reforms, declaring peace with Eritrea and 
promising to reform civil society and the situation for refugees (Sengupta, 2018). 
296 
 
Livelihood opportunities for refugees in Ethiopia 
Several studies show that access to income-generating activities 
remain low, both inside and outside refugee camps (Zetter & 
Ruaudel, 2016; Samuel Hall, 2014, Melicherová, 2018). The following 
factors have been recognised as constraining access to livelihood 
opportunities for refugees in Ethiopia (UNHCR, 2013; Zetter & 
Ruaudel, 2016; Moses Okello, 2014): 
 
• Restrictions on freedom of movement: Under the Refugee 
Proclamation No. 409, Article 21(2), Ethiopian authorities 
designate where refugees and asylum seekers shall live 
(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2004). Until 2009, 
Ethiopia enforced a strict policy of encampment for all 
refugees. Since then, an out-of-camp policy has been 
implemented to allow Eritrean refugees to leave the camps as 
long as they are able to sustain themselves financially or are 
supported by relatives living outside the camps. 
• Lack of work permits: Ethiopian authorities do not grant work 
permits to refugees, which prevents them from entering the 
formal labour market. 
• Discrimination: Many refugees complain that they are subject 
to discrimination, which makes it difficult to find stable 
employment. 
• Lack of job opportunities and language barriers: Lack of job 
opportunities, language barriers, lack of experience and lack 
of market information also hinder access to livelihoods for 
refugees in Ethiopia (Samuel Hall, 2014, p. 7). 
 
Access to livelihoods for refugees in camps in Ethiopia is very low, 
especially for young refugees. The largest source of employment for 
camp refugees who are working is with institutions, NGOs or the 
Ethiopian Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) 
(Samuel Hall, 2014). Exclusion from the formal sector means that 
refugees have to engage in informal labour, which exposes them to 
the risk of abuse, exploitation and, in the case of young women, 
sexual harassment. The research conducted by Samuel Hall 
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Consulting found that camp refugees engage in the following 
economic activities (Samuel Hall, 2014, pp. 2–30): 
 
• Petty trade: Refugees establish their own small shops with 
various products. The size, range of products and monthly 
revenue55 varies. 
• Construction-related services: Skills such as electricity, woodwork 
and metalwork are particularly supported by shelter 
programmes. 
• Personal services: Shops offering services such as beauty 
parlours, hairdressing salons and barber shops have been 
established in the camps. 
 
The work in the camps is irregular, which contributes to the financial 
insufficiency and lack of self-reliance of the refugees. This makes 
most refugees dependent on aid provided by UNHCR and NGOs in 
the camps and motivates refugees to look for alternatives outside 
camps. However, not that many refugees apply for the out-of-camp 
programme, because of obstacles such as lack of relatives who could 
sponsor them, or no guarantee of accessing a livelihood in urban areas 
(Samuel Hall, 2014, p. 39). 
Livelihoods in Hitsats camp 
This section presents the results of the empirical research conducted 
in Hitsats camp and helps answer the remaining sub-research 
questions. In total, 94 refugees took part in the survey in Hitsats 
camp. Due to the sampling procedure used, men and women were 
represented equally (47 of each gender) in order to observe whether 
gender differences affected livelihood and work opportunities. Even 
though the gender balance was preserved within quantitative data 
collection, the qualitative interviews found that male refugees 
dominated the overall camp population: “In every aspect, there is a 
dominance of male refugees. In [the] overall demographics [of the 
camp], even in our training and livelihood activities, male refugees are 
 
55 Smaller shops reported monthly revenue of between 50 and 150 Ethiopian birr 
(ETB), while larger ones reported up to ETB 550. 
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dominant” (NRC worker, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, 
Hitsats, 30 January 2018). 
 
In addition to being dominated by young male refugees, some other 
interesting demographic phenomena were noticed in the camps 
during the analysis, which are confirmed by other research studies 
mentioned in the literature review. Almost 80% of the refugee 
respondents, both men and women, are between 18 and 30-years old, 
which means that a high proportion of young Eritreans are forced 
into migration. As Hitsats camp is the youngest in the region, all 
newly-arrived refugees are situated there, unless they ask for family 
reunification in one of the other camps. The demography is also 
fluctuating, as many young refugees leave the camp within a short 
period of time after their arrival. However, a significant number of 
Eritreans have been living in the camp for several years. This is 
because they lack the resources to undertake secondary movement in 
search of a better future. It is difficult to assess whether living in 
Hitsats camp is a positive choice for these refugees. 
 
Those who have the chance, opportunity or power have left the camp. People who live 
in this camp are those who didn’t have any chance or power to go. In this camp it is 
only those who don’t have money, [or] support. But those who have relatives or money 
have left. (Interviewee 4, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, 
Hitsats, 1 February 2018) 
 
One of the consequences of migration at an early age is that refugees 
have often missed out on receiving a full education. Respondents to 
the questionnaires did not have problems with literacy, however, the 
majority had 10 or less years of education (54% and 33% of female 
and male respondents, respectively). Consequently, the range of 
knowledge or practical skills that refugees managed to develop before 
they were forced to flee Eritrea remains low. 
Refugees’ main sources of livelihood 
Despite the low access to regular income-generating activities, 
refugees conceded that they had previously accessed specific sectors 
through which they had earnt their livelihood. A major sector that 
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provides opportunities for refugees to earn some income is 
institutional employment. Alongside institutions, refugees engage in 
petty trade, personal services (such as beauty parlours, hairdressers, 
and barbers), construction work and technical services (mainly for 
male refugees). Refugees in Hitsats are not allowed to own a piece of 
land and, therefore, access to agriculture livelihoods is lacking. The 
qualitative interviews confirmed that refugees are able to access 
livelihoods through sectors, even though this access is inadequate. 
 
There are several opportunities in petty trade, personal services, and small businesses 
– like shops. Those are the main sources of livelihood activities. The main gap is in 
small industries – like leather craft and soap making. Even agriculture like dairy, 
poultry, and home-gardening is lacking. (ZOA worker 2, interview with 
Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 14 December 2017) 
 
In total, 87.5% of respondents have not been able to find 
employment in the same sector as they worked in Eritrea. This is 
closely related to the fact that most of the refugees are very young 
and did not have the opportunity to gain experience in the labour 
market before fleeing Eritrea. 
Access by refugees to income-generating activities 
The study demonstrated that any kind of income-generating activity, 
even through informal channels, is severely hinder by several factors. 
Table 11.2 illustrates, how many respondents had access to work in 
the 30 days prior to the day of data collection. The independent 
samples t-test revealed (t=0.933, df=91, p=0.353) that gender does 
not play a significant role in whether or not the refugee had work in 
the past month. The vast majority of refugees do not receive any 
regular income from other sources (e.g., family), which leaves them 
dependent on humanitarian aid. Even those refugees who have 






Table 11.2. Refugees who had worked in the past month  
  
Worked last month Total 
Yes No 
Gender Female 5 42 47 
Male 8 38 46 
Total 13 80 93 
 
The irregular character of income-generating activities in the camps 
prevents young Eritreans from developing self-reliance, even those 
who have had the opportunity to access livelihood programmes. Only 
15 respondents claimed to work regularly, however, many refugees 
continuously search for opportunities, even when their access to 
activities leading to income is irregular. 
 
One of the interviews with NGO workers revealed some interrelation 
between motivation to search for livelihood opportunities and market 
demand: 
 
Refugees need sound businesses within the camp. As long as there is a satisfactory 
opportunity in terms of market linkage, they are interested [to search for 
opportunities]. If they see that the link to the market is missing, they might not be 
interested. In existing businesses [the missing link] leads to drop-out [from the 
business activities]. (ZOA worker 1, interview with Melicherová, face-to-
face, Hitsats, 14 December 2017) 
 
Figure 11.1 provides an overview of the motivational factors that 
keep refugees participating in income-generating activities. The 
largest motivational factor is ‘self-sufficiency’, which was indicted by 
84% of respondents. Refugees seem to be more than willing to use 
their talent and potential through their work and leave behind 
dependency. An independent samples t-test was done to compare 
genders in relation to all eight motivational factors. The results 






Figure 11.1. Factors motivating refugees to engage in income-generating activities 
 
The qualitative interviews revealed, however, that beneficiaries of 
livelihood programmes often lose their motivation to continue with 
a particular livelihood activity (e.g., a business activity), which may 
lead to drop-out: “A loss of motivation in a beneficiary is often a 
problem. Most of them are young. They expect to have a short-term 
benefit and [, at the same time, a] huge benefit” (ZOA worker 2, 
interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 14 December 
2017). 
Obstacles and opportunities to access livelihoods 
A wide range of obstacles have been observed among the 
respondents, which explain the low access of Eritrean refugees to 
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considered to be the main constraining element by refugees, which 
makes it difficult for them to gain an additional income. The 
independent samples t-test showed that the interaction between the 
two genders and lack of the market information variable is significant 
(t=2.284, df=92, p= 0.025).  
 
Except for a few micro-businesses, like beauty salons, shops, cafés, 
and restaurants, very few income-generating activities have developed 
in the camp, which is closely linked to the demographics and the 
constant secondary movement of refugees. Even refugees who own 
a small business face challenges on a daily basis to sustain the business 
and generate a small income from it. 
 
I try to work. Mentally, it helps me. I have my small business, but I don’t have a 
good income. In order to have an income, I need customers. But these people [refugees 
within the camp], they don’t have money. If they don’t have money, how come they 
can come to the café to eat? Sometimes you open the doors and for two, three days no 
one comes. I try to work. But how do I get people to come here? There is no good 
ground for work. These people are very, very poor. The money they get is not enough 
for a living. (Interviewee 3, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, 
Hitsats, 1 February 2018) 
 
Some people have the opportunity to open a café or a shop, but it is very difficult 
because they don’t have customers. I don’t have the will to open a café nor a shop 
[when] I see that they [owners] are not working. (Interviewee 4, interview with 
Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018) 
 
The restrictions on the freedom of movement of refugees affect their 
ability to find work in urban areas. In order to be eligible to leave the 
camp legally, a refugee has to obtain written permission from ARRA, 
which requires the holder to return to the camp after a predefined 
period. For the majority of Eritreans it is impossible to meet the 
eligibility criteria for the out-of-camp policy, which would entitle 
them to work in cities. Also, the remoteness of the camp brings 
challenges for refugees with small businesses, as it is difficult to secure 
supplies: “There is no chance to go to other cities to work. You need 
special permission to go. Such conditions do not encourage you to 
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work (Interviewee 4, interview, with Melicherová, face-to-face, 
Hitsats, 1 February 2018). 
 
Table 11.3. Obstacles identified by refugees and their relation to gender 
 
Obstacles Gender Total 
Female Male 
Restriction of movement 18 25 43 
Lack of work permit 22 16 38 
Discrimination 13 6 19 
Lack of job opportunities 36 34 70 
Language barrier 9 12 21 
Lack of experience 5 8 13 
Lack of education 9 13 22 
Lack of market information 2 9 11 
Lack of acceptance by the host 
community 
8 3 11 
 
The qualitative interviews confirmed the severity of the lack of 
income-generating activities. 
 
It is very difficult to live here [in the camp], [both] mentally and physically. Because 
it is very hot here. There are no work opportunities; only for few people. … Sometimes 
there is some opportunity to build [shelters], but it is for a short time. When you 
finish, there is no work anymore. (Interviewee 3, interview, with 
Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018) 
 
Even for existing activities, it is very challenging to generate some 
income due to the low level of market opportunities: “In any type of 
livelihood activities, the market is not encouraging. Alongside the skill 
trainings and getting support investments, they [refugees] have to be 
linked to the markets which is tough work for the NGOs” (ZOA 




Basic needs of refugees and how they are provided for 
All of the constraining factors cause Eritrean refugees to struggle to 
meet their basic needs on a regular basis. Life in Hitsats brings only a 
few opportunities to generate income, which makes refugees highly 
dependent on assistance from UNHCR. However, both refugee 
respondents, as well as NGO workers, reported many challenges with 
the aid provided (Table 11.4). In particular, many complained that the 
monthly food supplies provided by the World Food Programme do 
not last for the whole month. Each person receives 10 kilograms of 
wheat and ETB 60 (approximately USD 2), which has been reduced 
from ETB 100 (approximately USD 3.5). In addition, refugees receive 
0.9 litres of oil, 1.5 kilograms of pulses, and 0.25 kilogram of salt. 
 
Only 10 kilograms of wheat are given to the people. It is not enough. Maybe it is 
enough for two or three weeks. But after that, what are they doing if they don’t have 
any money? [In order] to manage for one month, the people cook and eat together 
[rather than] alone. … It is difficult. When I see it, I am disturbed. (Interviewee 
1, interview, with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018) 
 
It is very difficult to live here. We don’t get enough food. Even the food they give us 
is not enough. …and because people don’t have enough food they are exposed to 
illness. (Interviewee 4, interview, with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 
1 February 2018) 
 
Another problem is water supply. There are constant shortages, even 
though water taps were installed in Hitsats. The international refugee 
standard prescribes 20 litres of water per person per day: “Sometimes 
there are problems with distribution. Sometimes refugees do not get 
even 20 litres [of water] per day. So they go to rivers or water holes, 
and they use unsafe water. That is a challenge” (NRC worker, 
interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 30 January 2018). 
 
This time the water [situation] is difficult. For example, now there is a shortage of 
water. Only two jugs are allowed per house per day. Forty litres is not enough. We 
can buy water from the locals who have wells, [we have to pay] 2 ETB for 20 litres. 




There is a shortage of water. We can buy water, but it is not safe. Nobody knows 
whether it is clean or not. Even during the rainy season, people go to wash in the 
river. But it is not good. It brings some allergies. …The situation with water is 
getting worse. (Interviewee 4, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, 
Hitsats, 1 February 2018) 
 
Each refugee who arrives in Hitsats is granted a shelter. However, 
challenged by the lack of space, refugees have to share shelters with 
many others. There can be as many as 10 people assigned to share 
one shelter. 
 
Nine or ten people live together in one house. But we are different. We have different 
ethnicities, culture; we came from different villages, cities; we don’t know each other 
or our behaviours. So it is very difficult to live in one house like this. I don’t live with 
my family nor my friends. Instead, I live with different people who came from different 
regions. (Interviewee 2, interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 
1 February 2018) 
 
Lastly, the low level of access to energy adds another struggle to the 
daily reality of refugees. The lack of wood and coal, which are 
essential for cooking, obliges refugees to search for alternative 
solutions: “[A] furnace without coal is nothing” (Interviewee 1, 
interview with Melicherová, face-to-face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018). 
Consequently, refugees often cut trees to get some firewood for 
cooking. This creates tension and causes clashes between refugees 
and the host community. 
 
We don’t have [fire]wood or coal. We have to pay for it. If we try to take wood from 
locals [host community] we may fight with them, or they may beat us, or we may 
[end up in] a detention centre. (Interviewee 2, interview with Melicherová, 





Table 11.4. Needs of refugees and how they are provided for 
 
Need  Number of respondents 
 Provided by 
assistance  
Earnt additionally  
Food  92 88 
Water  90 82 
Transport  11 78 
Health care  85 69 
Sanitation  16 83 
Communication 
(mobile, Internet)  
6 90 
Clothing  12 91 
Education  90 12 
Access to energy  9 85 
Practices of organisations 
Several organisations based in the camp are keen to promote and 
support livelihood programmes and build greater self-reliance. 
Refugees are highly motivated to take part in the programmes offered 
and to obtain certificates, which they may use in the future even after 
leaving the camp. All the procedural and technical aspects of 
livelihood programmes initiated by NGOs have to be approved by 
ARRA, the governmental agency present in the camp. 
 
Various NGOs run programmes to enhance the capacity of refugees 
through vocational skills trainings and by providing start-up materials 
and micro-loans for small businesses. Vocational skills trainings are 
provided inside the camp for refugee as well as host communities. 
Each NGO provides these training independently based on the 
assessment conducted prior to the start of livelihood programmes. 
Long-term programmes of six months include training on skills such 
as furniture making, food preparation, garment making, and 
construction. Short-term trainings of three months cover laser work, 
metal work, and beauty services such as hairdressing. Upon receiving 
vocational training, participants receive business skills training. After 
graduating from the trainings, organisations provide micro-loans and 
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start-up kits for groups to start their own small businesses. NGOs are 
highly dependent on donors and have a limited budget; therefore, not 
every graduate qualifies for start-up materials, as the demand is much 
higher than amount of resources. 
 
Organisations have to face a lot of limitations and challenges, which 
is closely linked to their limited budget and capacity. This study also 
found that multiple NGOs are providing the same type of trainings, 
which leads to duplication and saturation of the market. This is due 
to lack of horizontal cooperation between organisations during the 
assessment phase and livelihood planning. “To train people is not 
enough. To put them in a good business market and to give them a 
market is good” (Interviewee 1, interview with Melicherová, face-to-
face, Hitsats, 1 February 2018). 
 
The connectivity of refugees to the economic market outside the 
camp is non-existent, which dramatically decreases their chances of 
generating enough income to sustain their business activities, which 
at the same time increases the vulnerability of refugees. 
  
There are also dependency problems. You help them [refugees] to start up a business, 
and they feel like you will support them all their life here. NGOs try to help them 
within their limited budget and capacity, but [refugees’] expectations of NGOs are 
a lot higher. They feel like you always have to be there to support them rather than 
[they] strengthen themselves. These syndromes are [present] there. It is a problem to 
make livelihoods really sustainable. You see that their businesses collapses and they 
start to go down. (ZOA worker 1, interview with Melicherová, face-to-
face, Hitsats, 14 December 2017) 
 
Both the qualitative and quantitative data confirmed that the 
livelihood programmes in the camps cannot be considered 
sustainable. Sustainability in livelihood planning is essential, and it 
also helps to prevent secondary migration movements. The 
Sustainable Livelihood Framework of the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) qualifies a 
livelihood as sustainable when it does not depend on external 
assistance, when it recovers from external shocks and stresses, and 
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when the long-term productivity of natural resources is preserved 
(DFID, 1999). Therefore, it is necessary to shift from short-term to 
long-term planning with a holistic approach. Nevertheless, further 
research is needed in order to understand how sustainability can be 
embedded within livelihood programmes for refugees. 
Conclusion  
Thousands of young Eritreans are forced to flee their country every 
year to seek a safe and dignified life. However, their dreams and 
visions of a life in dignity vanish in the inhospitable reality of the 
refugee camps. The challenges are diverse and interlinked, but they 
have one common denominator – all of them take away hope and any 
visible prospect of self-reliance. The refugees are left in limbo. This 
chapter look at the access of Eritrean camp refugees to livelihood 
opportunities in Ethiopia and whether or not a policy window 
(Kingdon, 2014) has opened to put refugees’ livelihood issues on the 
decision-making agenda. Despite the international legal instruments 
that Ethiopia has adopted, the right to work for refugees has not been 
legislated into national law and is not implemented in practice. The 
rights of refugees cannot be fully attained, as explained by the concept 
of a human rights culture (Rorty, 1993), as they are not fully 
recognised and implemented in practice.  
 
The empirical study found that Eritrean refugees in Hitsats have low, 
almost non-existent, access to income-generating activities. A major 
sector that provides employment for camp refugees is institutional 
employment; refugees are also engaged in petty trade, personal 
services (such as beauty parlours, hairdressing, and barbering), 
construction related work and technical services (mainly for male 
refugees). However, the lack of income-generating opportunities, 
even in the informal sector, and the irregularity of existing ones leave 
the majority of Hitsats’ refugees highly dependent on humanitarian 
aid and the assistance provided by UNHCR. Searching for work 
alternatives outside the camp in urban areas is also not a viable option, 
due to the restrictions on freedom of movement defined in Ethiopia’s 
out-of-camp policy (Samuel Hall, 2014), as well as the lack of 
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resources of refugees. As well as restriction of movement, the study 
found ineligibility for work permits and lack of employment 
opportunities to be major obstacles to accessing livelihoods. 
According to the Development Assistance for Refugees framework, 
the access of refugees to socio-economic activities is one of the 
essential prerequisites for self-reliance. Given the fact that refugees 
cannot rely on regular income, the social and economic ability of 
refugees in Hitsats to fulfil their own needs is unattainable (UNHCR, 
2003).  
 
Based on the interviews with refugees and NGO workers, it appears 
that monthly rations of food for camp refugees are not sufficient to 
sustain them. Refugees tend to cook, eat and manage food rations in 
groups in order to sustain themselves. In addition, the study found 
that access to water, shelter and energy are highly challenged within 
the camp setting. Refugees often do not even get the 20 litres of water 
a day prescribed by international standards. In addition, water 
purchased from the water wells to supplement that given is not 
purified and may lead to health problems. Low access to power also 
brings complications for refugees, who depend entirely on coal and 
firewood for cooking. In desperation, refugees often cut down trees 
for firewood, which causes tension between refugees and host 
communities. The remoteness of Hitsats camp contributes to these 
problems. Due to poverty and the hardships faced in camp, young 
refugees have to strive hard to supplement their food, water and coal 
supplies. However, it is impossible to do so without regular income 
or remittances from family members or friends. Even those refugees 
who have established micro-businesses in the camp are affected, as 
they do not have enough customers on a regular basis.  
 
Despite the endeavours of several NGOs to promote livelihood 
activities for refugees, the element of sustainability is lacking in 
livelihood programmes in Hitsats camp, which is proven by the high 
number of drop-outs from these programmes. Even though 
sustainability was not explicit part of the present research, it was 
observed that in order to bring about long-term solutions, a holistic 
approach needs to be adopted, together with improvement of 
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horizontal cooperation between NGOs. According to ILO, in cases 
where the environment is not sufficient to link refugees to the market 
and public services, the skills of refugees are not utilised to the full 
extent (ILO, 2017). Subsequently, this prevents refugees from 
integrating into the host society (Jacobsen & Fratzke, 2016), in this 
case into Ethiopian society. 
 
The results of the present study show that young Eritrean refugees 
live in a vicious cycle, where one challenge leads to another. This 
evokes feelings of frustration and hopeless among the refugees. 
Consequently, refugees often opt to move on from Hitsats camp, in 
search of a better future. The need for better livelihood programmes 
remains high. The concept of refugee livelihoods, however, cannot 
be resolved on its own without looking at the problem holistically. It 
is not the mere creation of job opportunities and providing skill 
training that will result in self-reliance and lead to resilience. 
Livelihoods should be considered within the policy mechanisms 
available in the host country (Samuel Hall, 2014). A comprehensive 
study carried out in Northern Uganda showed that the improvement 
of livelihoods is possible only when trauma relief is taken seriously 
within the livelihood programming (Van Reisen, Nakazibwe, 
Stockmans, Vallejo, & Kidane, 2018; also see Kidane & Stokmans, 
2018 regarding Hitsats and Shimelba refugee camps). 
 
These problems have been recognised, not only by refugees on the 
ground, but also by policymakers and the government. Combined 
with recent developments in the political and policy streams in 
Ethiopia, such as the adoption of the Nine Pledges and revision of 
the 2004 Refugee Proclamation, it seems that there is hope for 
refugees’ livelihood issues to reach the decision agenda. As Kingdon 
(2014) explains, the problem stream and policy stream have to be 
supported by a positive political climate in order to introduce specific 
agenda setting. Over the past years, Ethiopia has gone through great 
political change and shifts which appear to have been a factor in 
pushing issues relating to refugees onto the agenda. However, at the 
time of the empirical data collection, it appears that the policy window 
has not completely open and the implementation of rights on the 
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ground is still lacking. While the political shift, led by the new prime 
minister, has brought new attention to refugee issues, it remains 
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Young and On their Own: The Protection of Eritrean 
Refugee Children in Tigray, Ethiopia 
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Introduction 
Many children around the world are at risk of losing parental care and 
protection. This risk 
increases in emergency 
situations. The danger to 
refugee children, in terms of 
their safety and wellbeing, 
when they have lost their 
parents or caregivers is high. 
The sudden and violent 
onset of emergencies, the 
disruption of families and 
community structures, as 
well as the acute shortage of 
resources affect the physical, 
psychological and 
developmental wellbeing of 
children in refugee camps. 
Additionally, losing the care 
and protection of their 
families or caregivers puts 
children at increased risk of 
abduction, human 
trafficking, unlawful 
recruitment or use by armed groups, sexual abuse and exploitation, 
and loss of identity (UNHCR, 1994; UNICEF, 2017). Ethiopia has 
ratified important international conventions to protect the rights and 
safety of children (United Nations, 1989; UNCRC, 2013). 
Unaccompanied children are fleeing 
Eritrea for many reasons, including to 
avoid being conscripted into indefinite 
National Service. Once in Ethiopia, they 
end up in refugee camps in Tigray. This 
chapter investigates whether the protection 
of unaccompanied and separated refugee 
children adheres to the standards set in 
the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. It investigates the 
serious challenges resulting in the lack of 
provision of basic needs and social services 
for children in the camps. This 
inadequate level of protection is the cause 
of secondary migration which puts 
unaccompanied and separated children in 
vulnerable situations where they might 




Additionally, national policies and laws have been developed to 
enforce the protection and rights of children (FDRE-ARRA, 2017).  
 
This chapter presents the results of research conducted in Tigray, 
Ethiopia in 2017 and 2018 on unaccompanied and separated Eritrean 
children in the refugee camps near the Eritrean border. The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 
1989) and the Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and 
Separated Children (ICRC, 2004) are applied to assess the four 
refugee camps in Ethiopia that receive most of the Eritrean refugees. 
The first author is the head of the Shire operation of the 
Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), which is 
responsible for coordinating the Ethiopian refugee operation, and is 
responsible for the research reported in this chapter. The second 
author is a researcher on unaccompanied children and youth from 
Eritrea in the refugee camps in Tigray. He conducted his own 
research in the same period as the first author, which has been 
published separately (Schoenmaeckers, 2018). His contribution to 
this chapter was to check and organise the original data for the 
chapter. Although the research is only an initial explorative study, it 
gives a direct and first-hand insight into the situation of the children 
in these refugee camps. 
 
In terms of the structure of this chapter, the next sections outline the 
context of the study, including the Eritrean-Ethiopian border war, the 
refugee camps in northern Ethiopia and the legal framework for child 
protection in Ethiopia. The research questions are then set out, 
followed by the methodology. Then the main findings of the study 
are presented from the perspective of the children, NGOs and child 
protection officers, and committee members. Finally, some 
conclusions are drawn. 
The Eritrean-Ethiopian border war 
After British and Italian rule, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in the 1960s. 
The result of this annexation was a border war for independence that 
lasted 30 years. Eventually, the Ethiopian army was defeated in 1991 
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and, within a few years, a statehood referendum was held in Eritrea. 
In 1993, the new nation was born. Unfortunately, Eritrea’s unstable 
relations with its bordering countries collapsed rapidly and, in 1998, 
a five-year border war culminated in the slaughter of more than 
100,000 people on both sides (Connell, 2016).  
 
Since its independence from Ethiopia, Eritrea has developed a culture 
of secrecy, intolerance and absolute control, claiming that this is 
necessary to defend its sovereignty. The regime, headed by President 
Isaias Afwerki, has been accused of crimes against humanity by the 
United Nations Commission of Inquiry (UN Human Rights Council, 
2016). This has resulted in an exodus of refugees from Eritrea over 
the last years, with over 5,000 people leaving Eritrea each month due 
to lack of fundamental freedoms, conflict and indefinite National 
Service (Kibreab, 2009; Tewolde-Berhan, Plaut & Smits, 2017; Van 
Reisen & Estefanos, 2017). 
 
The number of Eritreans crossing the Ethiopian border has increased 
over the last five years, and accelerated after the peace negotiations 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea started in 2017. The Shire operation of 
ARRA, which is responsible for four refugee camps in Tigray, has a 
total registered population of 72,772 people, residing in one of four 
refugee camps: Mai Ayni, Adi Harush, Hitsats and Shimelba. The 
Endabaguna Screening and Reception Centre in Tigray received over 
12,701 new arrivals from January to August 2018. Of this, 2,534 were 
unaccompanied and separated children (UNHCR, 2018d). After the 
peace agreement between both countries was signed in September 
2018, a significant increase in refugees was measured at Endabaguna. 
Between 3 and 12 October, a total of 5,475 new arrivals were 
transferred from the border to Endabaguna and 6,987 were 
transferred from Endabaguna to Mai Ayni, Adi Harush and Hitsats 
(UNHCR, 2018a). The total inflow between September and 
December 2018 was 29,753. The inflow of unaccompanied and 
separated children under the age of 18 was 4,894 in that same period. 
The total population of unaccompanied and separated children in the 




Eritrean refugees arriving in Tigray find themselves in a tense 
situation. Besides a lack of basic resources like timber and water, 
struggles between Eritreans and Tigrayans revolve around nationality, 
land, identity and political destiny. These struggles are difficult and 
painful due to the bloody wars these people have fought against each 
other, although they are essentially ethnically the same (Reid, 2003). 
The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (later the People’s Front for 
Democracy and Justice) and the Tigray’s People’s Liberation Front 
have played a major role in these tensions. Over the decades, 
differences in the tactics and ideologies of these former allies have 
corrupted the relationship and led to violence and contestation over 
resources, land and identity (Woldemariam & Young, 2018). 
Refugee camps in Ethiopia 
Tigray is located in the north of Ethiopia and has received many 
refugees from Eritrea over the years. Eritrean refugees are provided 
with shelter and basic resources in four main refugee camps in 
Ethiopia: Mai Ayni, Adi Harush, Hitsats and Shimelba. Although 
ARRA carries the main responsibility for the refugees, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and various 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) assist ARRA in a variety of 
ways, include by providing food, water and hygiene facilities, as well 
as education and livelihood programmes (Chapter 11, Inhospitable 
Realities: Refugees’ Livelihoods in Hitsats, Ethiopia, by Kristína 
Melicherová).  
 
Most of the unaccompanied and separated children are cared for by 
the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and provided shelter in 
Hitsats refugee camp, which is the newest refugee camp in Tigray. In 
the Shimelba refugee camp the situation is different than in the other 
camps. Shimelba is the oldest camp and was established in 2004. The 
camp is community based and 41% of camp residents are under 18 
years of age. The people who live in Shimelba are from the Kunama 
ethnic group. This is the smallest ethnic group in Eritrea and is found 
mainly in regions near the Ethiopian border. Their language is Nilo 
Saharan, which is unrelated to the dominant languages in Ethiopia 
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and Eritrea, making communication a serious issue (Lo Dolce & 
Thompson, 2004; UNHCR, 2018b). 
 
Unaccompanied and separated children in the refugee camps are 
carefully received and protected. They live in special care 
arrangements. These arrangements include community care, foster 
care, and kinship care. In kinship care, relatives or acquaintances of 
the children’s family are responsible for the children. In foster care, 
the children live together with other refugees who offer to take 
responsibility for the children and care for them in their home. 
Community care is the most common arrangement, in which the 
children live with each other in group housing in communities. Each 
community has about 10 shelters and 5 to 10 children live in each. 
Social workers take care of the children and live together with them. 
They are refugees themselves and have good relationships with the 
children. The organisation and coordination of the unaccompanied 
children in community care is carried out by the NRC 
(Schoenmaeckers, Al-Qasim & Zanzottera, 2019). 
 
The overall refugee coordination in the camps is executed by ARRA 
and the UNHCR. The International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are partners in 
resettlement and the provision of basic needs. NGOs in the camps 
provide livelihood programmes, education, protection and health 
care services. Beside the NRC, the NGOs currently active in the 
refugee camps include Innovation Humanitarian Solutions, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Medicine Sans Frontier 
Holland, the Dutch humanitarian organisation Zuid Oost Azië 
(ZOA), the Danish Refugee Council, and the International Refugee 
Committee, among others. In addition to providing relief and basic 
services, these NGOs support the refugees in organising themselves 
into committees. The refugee camps have well-established 
community-based structures where men, women and children are 
represented by different committees. The committees that are 
included in this research are the Child Welfare Committee, Refugee 
Central Committee and Children’s Parliament (UNHCR, 2018b; 
UNHCR, 2018c). The latter, the Children’s Parliament, was formed 
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to allow children in the camp to actively contribute to their own 
welfare. They organise meetings in which issues such as food 
distribution, leisure time activities and security are discussed. The 
Children’s Parliament does not have legal power, but acts as a 
consultative group. The children who are members can be from all 
different care arrangements, but most active members live in 
community care.  
Legal framework 
On 14 May 1991, Ethiopia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (United Nations, 1989). Ethiopia has made much 
progress since then in terms of child protection and wellbeing. It has 
ratified various international conventions and treaties over the years 
in order to protect children and to protect and respect human rights 
in general (UNCRC, 2013). In particular, ARRA takes measures to 
ensure the protection of refugee children from discrimination and 
abuse. It also ensures that refugee children have access to free medical 
care, education, and social and psychological assistance. The 
provision of a secure environment and accommodation is one of its 
main tasks (UNCRC, 2013). 
 
The Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and 
Separated Children state that: 
 
All children are entitled to emergency care and provision for their basic subsistence. 
Assistance for separated children must adequately meet their basic needs at a 
standard comparable to the surrounding community and should be provided in a way 
that reserves family unity, keeps children with their relatives or other care-givers and 
does not lead to separation. In emergencies, interim care must be provided for children 
separated from their families until they are reunited, placed with foster parents or 
other long term arrangements for care are made. This may include fostering, other 
forms of community-based care, or institutional care. (ICRC, 2004, p. 42)  
 
The definition and function of foster parents or legal guardians varies 
in different countries. The term guardianship refers to the designation 
of responsibility to an adult or organisation responsible for ensuring 
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that the child’s best interests are fully represented. According to 
Articles 3 and 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNICEF, 1989), a guardian is responsible for administrative and 
judicial proceedings involving the child. A guardian is responsible for 
ensuring that the child is properly represented, that his or her views 
are expressed and that any decision taken is in his or her best interests. 
Under the Convention, unaccompanied and separated children 
should be provided with access to appropriate health care. When 
children live in crowded environments like refugee camps, they 
become more vulnerable to infectious diseases than otherwise. 
Therefore, it is important that the food that is provided to the 
children be balanced and constitutes a nutritious diet, taking into 
account their cultural eating habits and the diet of the local 
community (ICRC, 2004, p. 48). 
 
In addition, the right to education needs to be protected. Like all 
children, refugee children also have the right to receive a proper 
education. In the case of unaccompanied or separated children, 
education programmes need to be organised in such a way that they 
do not encourage or prolong family separation. In addition, access to 
education should be promoted and monitored. The Interagency 
Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children state 
that it is desirable for separated refugee children to return to their 
country of origin with diplomas or certificates, obtained in the host 
country (ICRC, 2004, p. 49). 
 
Key elements of children’s psycho-social recovery “are the early 
meeting of basic needs, structured activities to restore a sense of 
normality, and care and nurturing” (ICRC, 2004, p. 50). In addition, 
it is crucial for the child’s psychosocial wellbeing that family-
reunification is realised where possible: 
 
One of the main principles behind tracing and reunification is that recovery from 
harm is most likely to take place when children are cared for by people whom they 
know well and trust. For children who cannot be reunited with their families, it is 
important to promote community-based care that builds on local culture and provides 
continuity in learning, socialization and development. […] When there is a need for 
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specialized interventions, local resources should be explored and supported if they are 
in the best interests of the child. (ICRC, 2004, p. 50) 
 
Furthermore, according to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), the national government is the primary body 
responsible for coordinating programmes at the national and local 
level: 
 
National child-welfare services or local authorities should provide an overall 
framework for, and coordinate action on behalf of, separated children. Organizations 
should support government efforts to review policies and legislation to ensure that they 
are in line with international agreed standards. When there is a lack of ability or 
willingness to apply internationally agreed standards or when government structures 
and policies are disrupted, responsibility for protecting separated children can be 
delegated temporarily to organizations that have a mandate or expertise in this area. 
Support for the government should be continued in order to allow its services to take 
over coordination of the work as soon as possible. (ICRC, 2004, p. 67) 
 
It is the duty of UNHCR and UNICEF to contribute and assist the 
government in fulfilling these responsibilities (ICRC, 2004, p. 67). 
The Ethiopian government has taken measures in order to address 
these issues. The basic principle the Ethiopian government relies on 
is the best interests of the child. This principle is applied in measures 
for providing basic services, like accommodation, food, water and 
education, but also leisure-time activities and protection.  
 
The government is collaborating intensively with UNHCR and 
international partners in order to meet the standards contained in the 
guidelines (UNCRC, 2013). In September 2016, the Ethiopian 
government made ‘Nine Pledges’ to improve the lives of refugees. 
One of the pledges was specifically targeted at children: to increase 
the enrolment of refugee children in preschool, primary, secondary 
and tertiary education, without discrimination and within available 
resources. The other pledges relate to all refugees and include: 
expansion of the ‘out-of-camp’ policy to benefit 10% of the current 
total refugee population; provision of work permits to refugees and 
to those with permanent residence, within the bounds of domestic 
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law; provision of work permits to refugees in the areas permitted for 
foreign workers, by giving priority to qualified refugees; making 
available irrigable land to allow 100,000 people (among them refugees 
and local communities) to engage in crop production; building 
industrial parks where a percentage of jobs will be committed to 
refugees; provision of other benefits such as issuance of birth 
certificates to refugee children born in Ethiopia, possibility of 
opening bank accounts and obtaining driving licenses; enhancing the 
provision of basic and essential social services; and allowing the local 
integration of those refugees who have lived in Ethiopia for 20 years 
or more. The planning of these pledges started with the roadmap 
published in August 2017 and includes actions to implement them 
(FDRE-ARRA, 2017). 
Research questions 
This study assesses the situation of unaccompanied and separated 
children in Mai Ayni, Adi Harush, Hitsats and Shimelba refugee 
camps in Tigray, northern Ethiopia. It investigates whether the 
protection of unaccompanied and separated refugee children adheres 
to the standards set in the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (UNICEF, 1989) and the Interagency Guiding Principles 
on Unaccompanied and Separated Children (ICRC, 2004). The 
chapter examines some of the key principles, as set out in the legal 
framework. The purpose of the study is to inform government 
agencies and organisations seeking to improve the wellbeing and 
protection of Eritrean refugee children in Tigray. For the purposes of 
the study, unaccompanied children (or minors) are defined as: 
“children who have been separated from both parents and other 
relatives and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or 
custom, is responsible for doing so” (ICRC, 2004, p. 13). Separated 
children “are those separated from both parents or from their 
previous legal or customary primary caregiver, but not necessarily 
from other relatives. These may, therefore, include children 




The research question is: To what extent is the reception and protection of 
unaccompanied and separated children in Tigray executed according to the 
principles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children? 
 
In order to answer this question, the following sub-questions are 
posed: 
 
• Is the provision of basic needs and social services for unaccompanied and 
separated refugee children in the refugee camps in northern Ethiopia 
adequate?  
• What is the role of child protection officers in giving care and support to 
the unaccompanied and separated children?  
• What are the main challenges involved in the reception and protection of 
unaccompanied and separated children? 
• What is the situation regarding the onward movement of unaccompanied 
and separated children and the associated risks of smuggling, trafficking 
and kidnapping?  
Methodology  
Data collection 
This study used a mixed methods approach in which quantitative and 
qualitative data was gathered and analysed (Bryman, 2012). The 
geographical scope of the study included children who live in the four 
refugee camps in Tigray: Mai Ayni, Adi Harush, Hitsats and Shimelba. 
The data was collected during 2017 and 2018.  
 
Primary sources of data include data gathered directly from 
unaccompanied and separated children, as well as child protection 
officers, caregivers from kinship care and foster care arrangements, 
and social workers. Key informants from ARRA, UNHCR, NRC, 
Innovation Humanitarian Solutions, Child Welfare Committee and 
Refugee Central Committee were also approached. The child 
participants included children who live in community care and who 
are members of the Children’s Parliament. The quantitative data 
includes descriptive surveys, which enabled the researcher to assess 
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the situation of the wider target population in the camps. In addition, 
observations were made throughout the whole data collection period. 
Secondary sources of data include policy documents, manuals, 
discussion papers, and reports regarding children who live in the 
refugee camps. 
 
The fundamental part of conducting research with children is 
obtaining parental consent. As the parents of the unaccompanied and 
separated children are absent, consent is required from the local 
authority and the person legally responsible for the child in order to 
ensure the child’s safety. Consequently, informed consent is another 
key principle for conducting ethical research with children. This is not 
only to protect the wellbeing of the children, but also to respect their 
sense of control (Hopkins, 2008). 
 
Prior to the data collection, a request letter was sent to the ARRA 
zonal office in Shire in order to introduce the aim of the research and 
obtain permission. After permission was granted and ARRA directed 
the permission letter to the camp offices, the objective, purpose and 
focus of the study were discussed with the UNHCR child protection 
officer and NRC child protection coordinator. Sensitive issues 
regarding the children, planning and management were thoroughly 
discussed. 
 
The research methods used included surveys, interviews, focus group 
discussions and observations. The surveys were carried out to explore 
the main issues. In order to better understand the answers provided 
in the survey, the researcher followed up in interviews and focus 
group discussions. The focus group discussions gave the respondents 
the security to discuss sensitive issues, whereas the interviews were 
used to better understand responses in terms of their meaning on a 
more personal level. The interviews were also used to discuss the 
questions with resource persons, and their answers are also included 
in the analysis.  
 
The surveys and interviews with the children took place in the homes 
of the children and ranged from 50 to 90 minutes each. The focus 
326 
 
group discussions were conducted in the Child Friendly Space and 
took between 1 and 2 hours. The interviews with key informants from 
the organisations were conducted in their offices and took between 
60 and 90 minutes. 
 
The surveys and interviews were translated into/conducted in the 
local language Tigrinya. Field notes were taken throughout. These 
notes were carefully reviewed for accuracy. Afterwards, the data was 
translated and organised according to the most frequently used 
words, phrases and sentences. The data was then analysed and is 
presented here in tables and narrative.  
 
Observations were conducted throughout the research of the 
children’s living conditions inside their houses and their relationships 
and interactions with their neighbours and caregivers. Observations 
were also made during the food distribution programme, in the 
communal kitchen, at the Child Friendly Space, and at school to see 
how the children participated.  
Sample 
As at December 2018, the total population of unaccompanied and 
separated children living in one of the four refugee camps in northern 
Ethiopia was 10,533 (UNHCR, 2018d). A sample of 200 (150 boys 
and 50 girls) children, who live in community care arrangements took 
part in the survey. In addition, 34 child protection officers from 
ARRA, UNHCR, NRC and Innovation Humanitarian Solutions were 
interviewed and 100 (of a total of 402) committee members and social 
workers took part in the focus group discussions. The committee 
members who participated included children and adults who were 
members of the following committees: Refugee Central Committee, 
Children’s Parliament, Child Welfare Committee and social workers 
(Gebreyesus, 2018). The social workers who participated included the 
caregivers who provide the children with care in the different 





Table 12.1. Number of respondents and data collection methods used  
 
 Method Male Female Total 
Unaccompanied and 




150 50 200 
Child protection officers 
(ARRA, UNHCR, NRC, 
Innovation Humanitarian 
Solutions) 





Welfare Committee and 




70 30 100 
 
More males than females participated in the study, as there are more 
males in the camp than females. The focus group discussions were 
held in groups of 20 persons. A total of 5 focus groups were 
organised. Table 12.2 gives the respondents per age group category. 
 







No. % No. % No. % 
Unaccompanied and 
separated children (in 
community care) 
120 60% 80 40% - - 
Child protection officers 
(ARRA, UNHCR, NRC, 
Innovation Humanitarian 
Solutions) 




(Refugee Central Committee, 
Children’s Parliament, Child 
Welfare Committee and 
social workers)  
- - 40 40% 60 60% 
Total 120 36% 120 36% 94 28% 
 
A total of 120 of the unaccompanied and separated children were 11–
15 years old; the other 80 were 16–18 years old. All 34 child 
protection officers were above 18 years old and 40 of the committee 
members were 16–18 years old. The other 60 were above 18 years 
old. Table 12.3 sets out the education level of the respondents. 
 
Table 12.3. Education level of respondents 
 








No. % No. % No. % 
Unaccompanied and 
separated children (in 
community care) 
40 20% 145 73% 15 7% 
Child protection officers 
(ARRA, UNHCR, NRC, 
Innovation Humanitarian 
Solutions) 




Parliament, Child Welfare 
Committee) and social 
workers 
30 30% 55 55% 15 15% 




As outlined in Table 12.3, 40 of the children who participated in the 
study were in grades 1–4, 145 were in grades 5–8, and 15 were high 
school students. All 34 child protection officers were degree holders. 
Of the members of the committees, 30 were in grades 1–4 or had 
received a (any) certificate, 55 were in grades 5–8 or held a diploma, 
and 15 were high school students or degree holders. 
Results 
This section presents the results and is organised according to the 
research method used.  
Survey of unaccompanied and separated children  
The survey was conducted among 200 unaccompanied and separated 
children who are living in community care. Of the 200 children, 143 
(72%) had been living in the camp for 1 or 2 years and 57 (28%) had 
been living in the camp for 3 or 4 years. All 200 children said that they 
lived together with 5 to 10 other children in one house. In Table 
12.4,56 the main reasons given by the minors for leaving Eritrea are 
given. The children could choose 1 of 4 reasons, which were selected 
based on explorative research. If the child had a different reason for 
leaving, they were allowed to give this reason. 
 
As Table 12.4 shows, 23 (12%) of the unaccompanied and separated 
children left Eritrea to access better education in Ethiopia, 37 (18%) 
came to reunite with their family members who live in Ethiopia, 33 
(17%) came due to peer pressure and the other 107 (53%) children 




56 All tables and figures in this chapter contain original data collected during 
empirical study by the authors. 
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Table 12.4. Main reason for leaving Eritrea 
 




















23 12% 37 18% 33 17% 107 53% 
 
Tables 12.5–12.8 present the results of the survey regarding 
availability, accessibility and quality of services in the camp. These 
tables show the questions asked in the survey and the responses of 
the children. Some items from the surveys are not provided in tables 
and only explained in the text under the items to which they relate. 
 
Table 12.5. Accessibility of services 
 
  Yes No 
What services are 
accessible at your 
location? 
1. School  197 99% 3 1% 
2. Play and 
recreational 
centres 
196 98% 4 2% 
3. Community 
library  
77 38% 123 62% 
4. Food services 
(communal 
kitchen) 
188 94% 12 6% 
5. Health services 197 99% 3 1% 
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6. Water and 
sanitation 
facilities 
147 73% 53 27% 
7. Vocational skills 
training  
130 65% 70 35% 
8. Protection and 
assistance 
200 100% - - 
 
As Table 12.5 indicates, the majority of the respondents said that 
most services are accessible at their location. Only the community 
library (62%) and, to a lesser extent, vocational skills training centres 
(35%) and water and sanitation facilities (27%) are mentioned as not 
accessible by a significant number of children. Not all refugee camps 
in Tigray have a functional community library and vocational skills 
training courses are not attended by the youngest children, who are 
going to school. Water and sanitation facilities are insufficient in all 
four camps, mainly due to a lack of potable water. This explains the 
high negative responses to these. 
 
Table 12.6. Quality of services 
 
  Yes No 
Which services are 
you happy/ 
satisfied with the 
quality of? 
1. School 200 100% - - 
2. Play and 
recreational 
centre 
17 8% 183 92% 
3. Community 
library 
53 27% 147 73% 
4. Food services 
(communal 
kitchen) 
77 38% 123 62% 
5. Health services 113 57% 87 43% 
6. Water and 
sanitation 
facilities 
97 48% 103 52% 
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7. Vocational skills 
training  
77 38% 123 62% 
8. Protection and 
assistance 
177 89% 23 11% 
 
All of the respondents said that they are happy or satisfied with the 
quality of the school and most said that they were also happy with the 
protection and assistance services (89%) provided in the camp. Just 
over half, or 113 (57%) respondents, said that they were satisfied with 
the health services – 87 (43%) were not. The majority were not 
satisfied with the community library (73%), play and recreational 
centres (92%), food services (62%), water and sanitation facilities 
(52%), and vocational skill training centres (62%). It is surprising that 
all 200 children said they were satisfied with the quality of the school 
as there was no secondary education available in the camp where most 
of the unaccompanied minors were housed at the time the research 
was conducted.  
 
To the question what services should be improved regarding 
availability, accessibility or quality of services, the vast majority of the 
children claimed that all of the services should be improved. In 
addition to the services listed in the survey, most also suggested that 
alternative energy sources, shelters, resettlement procedures, and care 
givers and house mothers should be improved. 
 
Table 12.7. Services received from NGOs in community care arrangements 
 
  Yes No 
What kind of 
material/services do 
you receive from NGOs 
that implement 
community care? 
1. Clothing 77 38% 123 62% 
2. Shoes 3 1% 197 99% 
3. Household 
utilities 
147 73% 53 27% 






97 48% 103 52% 
6. Alternative 
energy 
17 8% 183 92% 
7. House 77 38% 123 62% 
 
Regarding the materials and services children in group care 
arrangements receive from NGOs, most of the respondents said that 
household utilities (73%) and food items (73%) are provided to them. 
The majority also said that shoes (99%) and alternative energy sources 
(92%) were not being provided. More than half indicated that 
clothing (62%), personal sanitary materials (52%) and houses (62%) 
were not provided by the implementing NGOs. Pertaining to the 
frequency of the material provision, most of the respondents 
answered that they receive the materials and services as needed (i.e., 
no time was indicated).  
 
All of the children said that they receive three meals per day. In the 
community care arrangements, 99% of the children indicated that 
housemates prepared food for each other in shifts. Only 1% of the 
children said that house mothers prepared the food. However, they 
emphasised that some materials or food ingredients provided to them 
were not sufficient for their daily consumption and prioritised the 
following issues as lacking: alternative energy; sugar, oil, onion, pulse 
and tomatoes; clothing, shoes and blankets; and potable water.  
 
Table 12.8. Negative impacts on quality and insufficiency of services 
 
  Yes No 
Is there any negative 
impact or consequence 
that the insufficiency or 
quality of services has 
1. School 
dropout 
196 98% 4 2% 
2. Secondary 
movement 
183 92% 17 8% 
3. Deviant 
behaviour 
123 62% 77 38% 
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147 73% 53 27% 
5. Drug and 
alcohol 
abuse 
103 52% 97 48% 
 
The children were also asked what kind of negative impact the lack 
of sufficient or quality services had on them. According to the 
respondents, this led to school dropout, being forced to engage in 
secondary migration, deviant behaviour, exposure to child labour, and 
drug and alcohol abuse. School dropout (98%) and secondary 
movement (92%) were highlighted by most respondents as negative 
impacts.  
Interviews with NGOs and child protection officers 
Interviews were conducted with the protection officers at ARRA, 
UNHCR, NRC and Innovation Humanitarian Solutions. Most child 
protection officers highlighted that they facilitate family reunification 
for the children. Additionally, they assess the children for the most 
suitable care arrangements and develop standard operating 
procedures for the children. However, most confirmed that children 
do not participate in capacity-building activities. They also said that 
there were deficiencies in personnel and children do not have 
adequate guardians and teachers. They said that the protection 
officers do not analyse the strengths and weaknesses of social welfare 
and child protection systems, actors and services. Furthermore, the 
child protection officers do not adapt, develop or establish 
information management systems, agree on policies and procedures 
for safe storage and the sharing of information and the provision of 
basic needs for children is not based on UN standards.  
 
Child protection officers highlighted the main challenges as follows: 
 
• Labour abuse among the children 
• Inadequate access to water and sanitation 
• Unsafe shelters 
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• Lack of foster care families 
• Lack of adequate food programmes 
• Smuggling and human trafficking 
• Secondary movement 
• Lack of voluntary repatriation 
• Lack of durable solutions, such as resettlement 
• Harsh environment 
• Inconsistent best interest determination (BID)57 
• Long distance to high school 
• Lack of alternative energy and light 
• Lack of Kunama interpreters at the Endabaguna 
Screening and Reception Centre 
 
The majority of child protection officers said that they facilitate family 
reunification for the children, aim to work in the best interests of the 
child, including assessing the children for the most suitable care 
arrangement. Additionally, they have established standard operating 
procedures for the protection and reception of children.  
Focus group discussions with committee members 
Focus group discussion were held with the members of the Refugee 
Central Committee, the Child Welfare Committee, children residing 
in community care, children from the Children’s Parliament, 
caregivers from kinship and foster care arrangements, and social 
workers. The main purpose of the focus group discussions was to 
assess the main challenges that occur in the lives of the children in 
the four camps. Five focus group discussions were organised with 20 
participants in each group. In the focus group discussions, everyone 
was given the right to speak freely and express their opinions. In this 
subsection, the main points raised by the participants are outlined for 
each theme presented in the discussions. 
 
57 “A ‘best interests determination’ (BID) describes the formal process with strict 
procedural safeguards designed to determine the child’s best interests for 
particularly important decisions affecting the child. It should facilitate adequate 
child participation without discrimination, involve decision-makers with relevant 
areas of expertise, and balance all relevant factors in order to assess the best option’’ 
(UNHCR, 2008, p. 8). 
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What is the situation regarding the onward movement of unaccompanied and 
separated children and the associated risks of smuggling, trafficking and kidnapping?  
 
The participants of the focus group discussion emphasised that there 
is not such a high level of onward movement of children from the 
camps associated with smuggling or trafficking. The main illegal 
movement of children from the camp is towards Eritrea, mostly of 
children from the Kunama community and to a lesser extent from 
Tigrinya communities. Nevertheless, the onward movement towards 
Eritrea is of high risk. Children who leave for Eritrea are mostly 
leaving to see their families. The absence of adequate child and youth 
activities that anchor them to the camp account for this irregular 
migration. Additionally, the participants of the focus group 
discussions pointed out that according to them there is only a small 
number of children who leave for Sudan and Libya, but this group is 
at increased risk of smuggling and trafficking. 
 
Is adequate shelter available for unaccompanied and separated children?  
 
On this topic the participants said that there are insufficient separate 
shelters allocated for unaccompanied and separated children living in 
the camp. They live in the houses of their relatives and foster families. 
At the time of the research, some newly-constructed shelters were 
allocated for families that foster unaccompanied and separated 
children, but these still did not cover the need for shelters for all 
children. Currently, families in the camp are fostering children in their 
own houses, which they build themselves and have little living-space. 
The discussion participants emphasised that appropriate shelters 
must be constructed for foster families in order to encourage 
fostering parents to take children. Some participants stated that the 
main challenge is not only lack of shelters for unaccompanied and 
separated children, but the lack of adequate shelter in general.  
 
Is there adequate access to the community-care food programme in the camps for 





Is there sufficient funding for the provision of clothes, shoes and hygiene items for the 
unaccompanied and separated children?  
 
The participants of the focus group discussion pointed out that the 
budget for unaccompanied and separated children is inadequate. They 
pointed to the situation in one of the other camps, where community 
care programmes are supposedly better. They highlighted that 
children in other camps who live in community care get better 
support regarding clothing and food than children who live in foster 
care in the Shire camps. Additionally, they stated that the cash support 
for families taking care of unaccompanied and separated children is 
also inadequate. Furthermore, children do not receive clothes, shoes 
and hygiene materials regularly. The supplies are not need-based and 
some supplies are not suitable for the children. They stated that in 
some cases, the inadequate supply of clothing and other materials is 
causing children to drop out of school.  
 
Is there adequate power supply in the communal kitchens for cooking injera58? 
 
The focus group discussants stated that the camp they were residing 
in was not connected to the national grid line and that there is no 
electricity in the communal kitchens. The two communal kitchens 
that are constructed were not functional at the time of the research. 
Additionally, collecting firewood was banned by the local 
government, which aggravates the problem. 
 
Do the children attend school?  
And  
What obstacles are observed that lead the children not to attend school? 
 
Regarding education, the participants stated that in this school year 
the enrolment rate of students was high at the beginning of the year 
due to collaborative work done by the education stakeholders. But 
 
58 Injera is a sourdough-risen flatbread made of flour in Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
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the dropout rate has increased over time. The participants stated that 
good follow-up opportunities are provided by Innovation 
Humanitarian Solutions for unaccompanied and separated children 
who dropout. They outlined the main challenges as: 
 
• The harsh, hot environment of the camp (especially for 
those who attend classes in the afternoon) 
• Poor follow-up of dropouts by teachers, the Parent, 
Teachers and Student Association and the Refugee Central 
Committee  
• The long distance to the school 
• The dominant focus of parents and children on durable 
solutions like resettlement 
• Teachers who repeatedly missed classes 
• Inadequate clothes, shoes and other supportive materials 
• Low awareness among children about their rights and 
school rules and regulations 
• Corporal punishment 
 
Are durable solutions available for the children? 
 
On this topic, the participants said that there is no opportunity for 
family reunification provided by the ICRC for children who return to 
Eritrea illegally. The only durable solution available is resettlement. 
However, the best interest determination process is not done on a 
regular basis due to the absence of the UNHCR child protection 
officer. In addition, children with specific needs do not always apply 
for a durable solution, despite having health or social problems. The 
participants stated that best interest assessments were done for 
several unaccompanied and separated children with specific needs by 
Innovation Humanitarian Solutions, but that the best interest 
determination process is delayed. The participants also said that 
providing kinship care and foster care is becoming a reason for delays 
in the resettlement process for these families (i.e., if a person who is 
in the process of resettlement is also provided with kinship care or 




Is there adequate budget through UNHCR and WFP for supplementary feeding in 
the camp? 
 
During the focus group discussion, the participants said that 
supplementary food provision is available in the health centre 
through budgets from the UNHCR and WFP. However, they noted 
that there is no specific supplementary food contribution targeting 
unaccompanied and separated children. Unaccompanied and 
separated children will get supplementary food if they fulfil the 
criteria for this service. They also stated that school children get extra 
meals at school. 
 
Do the child protection officers fulfil their duties and responsibilities to support 
unaccompanied and separated children?  
 
The participants stated that they are doing their best to support 
unaccompanied and separated children, and to protect them from any 
abuse and onward movement. Although, they highlighted again the 
absence of the UNHCR child protection officer. They also noted that 
there has been a delay in data correction by ARRA in terms of the age 
and names of children. 
 
The absence of a Kunama interpreter at the Endabaguna Screening 
and Reception Centre is another issue outlined by the participants. 
This can lead to incorrect data being recorded for children 
registered by UNHCR and other organisations. 
Discussion and conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to assess the situation of Eritrean 
unaccompanied and separated refugee children in Tigray. The 
research attempts to answer the question: To what extent is the 
reception and protection of unaccompanied and separated children 
in Tigray executed according to the principles of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Interagency Guiding 
Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children? The data 
provides important first-hand insights from the refugee camps. 
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However, it should be kept in mind that the research was an initial 
explorative study and more extended research is needed to draw firm 
conclusions.  
 
Both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Interagency 
Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children are 
implemented in Tigray. However, serious issues were raised during 
this research, indicating that these principles are not being fully 
complied with. For instance, the children said that they live in groups 
of 5 to 10 children in one house. These groups are too large, which 
affects privacy and hygiene. The quality of services and materials was 
generally described as low and insufficient. The lack of basic 
resources such as water, food, shelter and electricity make life 
difficult. Lack of materials and services was highlighted as a reason 
for school drop-out, secondary movement, deviant behaviour, and 
drug and alcohol abuse.  
 
Based on the results of this study, it appears that the child protection 
officers are not able to fulfil their duties and responsibilities in the 
current situation. The workload of the UNHCR child protection 
officer is too heavy and his hours too limited. This results in much 
time when the officer is unavailable in the refugee camps. The 
absence of the child protection officer is highlighted as a main 
obstacle to adequate care and protection for unaccompanied and 
separated children in the camps. With the Nine Pledges made by the 
Ethiopian government in September 2016, these issues should 
improve considerably, which should strengthen the opportunities for 
children to study and work in Ethiopia, thereby creating a more 
conducive situation for the children.  
 
For children who cannot be reunited with their families, it is 
important to promote community-based care that builds on local 
culture and provides continuity in learning, socialisation and 
development. Caregivers play a key role in promoting children’s 
confidence, trust and security. In the current situation, the caregivers 
are often refugees themselves, who know the culture and the 
background of the children, which makes the care situation 
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community-based and inclusive of the local culture (Schoenmaeckers, 
Al-Qasim & Zanzottera, 2019). In addition, teachers in the camp 
should receive extra training in appropriate ways of responding to 
children who are separated from their families and have emotional 
and behavioural problems.  
 
In conclusion, all partners (UNHCR, ARRA, NRC, Innovation 
Humanitarian Solutions, etc.) should work together to fill the gaps in 
the provision of basic needs and social services for refugee children. 
Every organisation should have a child protection policy and strategy 
in place at all levels in order to fully comply with the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Interagency Guiding 
Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children.  
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Home, but not Home: Reintegration of Ethiopian 
Women Returning from the Arabian Gulf 
 
Beza L. Nisrane 
 
Introduction  
While the migration experiences of domestic workers in Arabian Gulf 
countries59 and high-income 
Asian countries has received 
increased attention of late 
(Demissie, 2018; Gikuru, 
2013; Human Rights Watch, 
2014), their reintegration in 
their home country upon 
return has not been well 
explored. In general, studies 
on female domestic workers 
and their reintegration have 
concentrated on their 
negative migration 
experiences (Anbesse, 
Hanlon, Alem, Packer, & 
Whitley, 2009; De Regt & 
Tafesse, 2015; Frantz, 2008; 
Gikuru, 2013; Jureidini & 
Moukarbel, 2004; Ketema, 
2014; Wickramage, De Silva & Peiris, 2017). This chapter looks at the 
reintegration of Ethiopian female domestic migrants into their home 
country upon return from the Arabian Gulf, with a particular focus 
on the role of interpersonal relationships and sense of belonging. It 
 
59 The Arabian Gulf countries (also referred to as Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries) are Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and 
Bahrain. 
Ethiopian women returning from the 
Arabian Gulf face many challenges with 
reintegration. Often migration does not 
bring about the economic gains and 
improved social status expected. This 
study found that betrayal by close family 
members, social expectations about 
money and gifts upon their return, and 
negative social perceptions about returnees 
affects their sense of belonging, influencing 
the returnees’ remigration intention. 
There is a need for more in-depth 
investigation of return policies and the 
social dynamics within families entangled 




also examines the effect of their post-migration experiences on their 
intention to re-migrate. 
Migration to the Arabian Gulf 
The migration of female domestic workers to the Arabian Gulf 
usually takes the form of temporary migration, whereby migrants are 
invited to the host country by a particular employer for a specific 
duration, in most cases two or three years. After arrival in the 
destination country, whether the migrant has positive or negative 
experiences depends on the subjective behaviour of the sponsor or 
employer. Even though some migrants have positive migration 
experiences, the majority have negative experiences (Jureidini & 
Moukarbel, 2004; Ketema, 2014; Nisrane, Morissens, Need & 
Torenvlied, 2017).  
 
The migration experiences of domestic workers in the Arabian Gulf 
have been equated with slavery by some scholars (Jureidini & 
Moukarbel, 2004). African female migrants, mostly from Kenya, 
Ethiopia, or Uganda, are subjected to various forms of physical, 
sexual, verbal and financial abuse (Gikuru, 2013; Minaye, 2012). 
Excessive workload, constrained movement and isolation, starvation, 
forced servitude, rape, and denial or underpayment of wages are 
recurrent issues (Anbesse et al., 2009; Gikuru, 2013; Minaye, 2012). 
Migration experiences such as these have a significant impact on the 
reintegration of return migrants (Cassarino, 2004; Ketema, 2014; 
Nisrane et al., 2017; Van Houte & De Koning, 2008). Some point to 
the kafala labour sponsorship system,60 which is found in most 
Arabian Gulf countries, as being linked to the exploitation and abuse 
of domestic migrant workers (Mahdavi, 2013; Murray, 2013; Pande, 
2013). However, human trafficking activities also play a significant 
role in their vulnerability and suffering (Fernandez, 2013; Minaye & 
Zeleke, 2015).  
 
60 A system that binds migrant workers to their employer or sponsor in Arabian 
Gulf countries (Bajracharya & Sijapati, 2012). 
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Coming home: The difficult task of reintegrating  
Cassarino (2004) argues that the successful reintegration of returnees 
requires mobilising financial, social and human capital in the host 
countries. However, domestic migrants in the Arabian Gulf have 
limited options for accruing such capital. This directly affects their 
economic reintegration upon return. Structural barriers associated 
with the kafala system – such as inability to change employer, financial 
exploitation by employers, and inability to access financial institutions 
– constrain the economic reintegration of returnees (Nisrane et al., 
2017). In addition, physical, sexual, and psychological abuse and 
exploitation during migration affect the mental and physical health of 
returnees, playing an adverse role in their economic and social 
reintegration (Anbesse et al., 2009; Habtamu, Minaye & Zeleke, 2017). 
However, despite the exploitative and abusive working conditions, 
women often re-migrate to Arabian Gulf countries (Gardner, 2012). 
This calls for an examination of the post-return conditions affecting 
reintegration and remigration intention.  
 
This chapter looks at two main questions. First: What new dynamics in 
interpersonal relationships unfold in female Ethiopian former domestic migrants’ 
(hereinafter called returnees61) lives after returning from the Arabian Gulf? And, 
second: How do female Ethiopian returnees’ interpersonal relationships affect 
their sense of belonging and, in turn, their reintegration into their home country 
and remigration intention? The study builds on existing studies that aim 
to understand the reintegration of female return migrants from the 
Arabian Gulf by focusing on the changes that the migration 
experience brings to the social relationships of the returnees. It also 
pushes the discussion of their reintegration one step further by 
moving beyond migration experiences and identifying social factors 
embodied in the home country context that affect the successful 
reintegration of returnees and possible social issues that trigger 
remigration. It is hoped that the findings of this study will help to 
develop various social support programmes that facilitate the social 
 
61 As all the returnees who participated in this study were former domestic workers, 




and economic reintegration of returnees from Arabian Gulf 
countries. The next sections present the conceptual framework for 
the study (sense of belonging theory), the method used to collect the 
data, followed by the findings, concluding remarks and policy 
recommendations.  
Theory of Sense of Belonging  
Relationships and interrelatedness with the environment are what 
makes life meaningful (Lambert et al., 2013; Stillman & Baumeister, 
2009); they are the essence of our day-to-day life. Relatedness to 
others in the environment, which is most often used to express 
interpersonal attachment, is a fundamental human need that helps 
individuals obtain social support and makes their life meaningful 
(Hagerty, Lynch‐Sauer, Patusky, & Bouwsema, 1993). An individual’s 
relatedness to others in the environment is best conceptualised using 
‘sense of belonging’ theory. A sense of belonging is defined as the 
evaluative feeling or perception that people have of their acceptance 
in their environment by the people around them – or the degree to 
which they ‘fit in’ (Hagerty, Lynch-Sauer, Patusky, Bouwsema, & 
Collier, 1992). Hagerty et al. (1992) state that for someone to belong 
the following antecedants must exist: energy and desire for 
meaningful involvment and shared characteristics with other people 
in the environment. The opposite of belonging and connectedness is 
social exclusion, which refers to a person’s perception of being 
excluded and rejected from a desired relationship, which can be as 
painful as physical pain (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Relationships 
and positive interactions with others are vital for people to function 
well in their environment.  
 
A number of empirical studies have shown that people who are more 
socially integrated and who have healthy relationships with others 
have better general wellbeing and adjust better (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2014; Cohen, 2004; Hagerty, Williams, 
Coyne, & Early, 1996). Positive interpersonal relationships with 
others are associated with a high level of cognitive and social 
achievement (Martin & Dowson, 2009). Conversely, negative 
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interactions have an adverse effect on health and wellbeing 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The importance of having positive 
relationships with those around us is not limited to health and 
wellbeing, but extends to other facets of our life. Individuals become 
more productive through social interactions and by connecting to the 
environment (Kitchen, Williams & Chowhan, 2012; Levett-Jones & 
Lathlean, 2008; Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007; Pooley, Cohen & Pike, 2005; 
Prusak & Cohen, 2001). Hence, positive relationships are important 
in the reintegration of female returnees from the Arabian Gulf. In line 
with this, Cassarino (2004) asserts that having social networks and 
relationships is vital to the reintegration of return migrants, as they 
provide crucial emotional support, which facilitates the economic and 
social reintegration of return migrants.  
 
However, there are factors that may inhibit people’s desire to interact 
with their community and lead to a low sense of belonging, such as 
stigma and poverty (Stewart et al., 2009; Walton & Cohen, 2007). 
Based on a comparative study of high income and low income people 
in Canada, Stewart et al. (2009) acknowledge that being poor, ashamed 
or stereotyped, limits people’s ability to initiate and maintain social 
relationships. Stigma has been found to have a negative impact on the 
social relationships of Asian female domestic returnees from Arabian 
Gulf countries (Bélanger & Rahman, 2013; Dannecker, 2005). Past 
trauma also affects returnees’ social interactions and sense of 
belonging to their home community. The findings of Ketema (2014) 
found that sexually-abused female returnees from the Arabian Gulf 
find it difficult to create healthy relationships with men in their home 
community after their return. Positive social relationships and a sense 
of belonging are important for the economic and social development 
of returnees, as well as their integration into the home community. 
 
The theory of Sense of Belonging helps to evaluate social 
relationships and people’s connection to their environment. It has 
two attributes: first, valued involvement, which is “the experience of 
feeling valued, needed and accepted” and, second, ‘fit’, which refers 
to a “person’s perception that his or her characteristics articulate with 
or complement the system or environment” (Hagerty et al., 1992,  
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p. 173). Sense of belonging is a psychological state and social 
interactions, companionship, membership and networks are the 
means by which belongingness is observed physically (Hagerty et al., 
1992; Lee & Robbins, 1995). Return migrants’ interactions with their 
family, friends and community indicate their sense of belonging to 
their community. It must be noted, however, that sense of belonging 
not only refers to positive interactions with others, but also to 
positive, meaningful, and long-term bonds with members of the 
community that bring about a feeling of being valued and fitting into 
the environment (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).  
 
Based on the above conceptualisations, in this study, sense of 
belonging is defined as a returnee’s feeling of being loved and 
accepted as a valued member of the community and of fitting into 
their environment, evidenced by positive social interactions and the 
reciprocity of love within the community. By analysing the lived 
experience of female Ethiopian returnees from domestic work in the 
Arabian Gulf, this study aims to examine the new dynamics that the 
migration experience brings to the interpersonal relationships of 
returnees and evaluates their sense of belonging to the home 
environment and how it affects their reintegration and remigration 
intention. 
Methodology 
This ethnographic study is based on field work conducted in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia by the author from January 2015 to March 2017. The 
findings presented in this chapter are part of a larger study that 
focuses on the socio-economic reintegration of Ethiopian female 
return migrants (see Nisrane et al., 2017). The data was collected 
through focus group discussions and in-depth individual interviews 
with 48 female Ethiopian former domestic workers who had returned 
from Arabian Gulf countries and where living in Addis Ababa. The 
returnees were recruited through purposeful and snowball sampling 
methods (see Table 13.1). As reintegration is a matter that requires 
time, all selected participants had been residing in their home country 
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for at least a year and the majority for three years at the time of data 
collection. 
 
Table 13.1. Sampling method used to select respondents for interviews and focus group 
discussions 
 
Sampling method Referred by Respondents 
Purposeful AGAR Ethiopia 11 
LIVE-Addis 12 
WISE 8 
Snowballing Other respondents 17 
Total 48 
 
Data for this study was collected in two phases. In the first phase, 
from January to March 2015, 14 individual interviews were 
conducted. In the second phase, from January 2016 to March 2017, 
22 individual interviews were conducted with new respondents and 6 
follow-up interviews with interviewees from the first phase. Follow-
up interviews helped to show changes in the social and economic 
reintegration of returnees after a year’s interval. A total of 26 
returnees participated in the focus group discussions (14 of these also 
participated in the individual interviews) in both phases. 
 
Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussion topics were 
prepared in English, translated to Amharic (local language) and then 
back to English for the analysis. The major discussion themes focused 
on economic and social reintegration, as well as migration experiences 
in the host country. Probing questions were used as needed. 
Individual interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in 
the local language (Amharic) at places chosen by the respondents, 
including their homes, cafeterias and parks, training centres and, in 
some cases, the interviewer’s house or office. The returnees were fully 
informed of the research objectives and assured about the 
confidentially of the information provided. Written or oral consent 
was obtained. Focus group discussions lasted on average 1 hour and 




Ethnographic studies also rely on informal data collected through 
informal interviews and field notes (Agar & Hobbs, 1982). 
Accordingly, the field data for this study is complemented by field 
notes taken at various personal and social events in the return 
migrant’s community, including weddings, children’s birthday parties, 
graduation ceremonies, and meetings/training events organised by 
local non-government organisations (NGOs). To give a new 
perspective on issues surrounding the social and economic 
reintegration of female returnees and to substantiate the data, 
interviews were also conducted with three coordinators and 
representatives of local NGOs (AGAR Ethiopia, LIVE-Addis, 
WISE) and one official from the Ethiopian Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs using a semi-structured interview guideline. The 
interview questions asked of NGO coordinators focused on what 
major social and economic reintegration challenges returnees face and 
what social support is provided by NGOs and the government to 
ensure their successful reintegration.  
 
All discussions and interviews were audio taped. A transcript was 
made from the audiotape in Amharic by the author and a research 
assistant. The transcribed documents were subsequently translated 
into English by a linguist and rechecked by the author for consistency 
of meaning with the original transcripts. The individual interviews 
provided detailed accounts of experiences, in contrast to the focus 
group discussions, which were more general. However, both forms 
of data collection yielded similar findings and the results complement 
each other. After re-reading the interviews and focus group 
discussion transcripts, relevant data (related to returnees’ 
interpersonal relationships and sense of belonging to their 
community) were selected from the interview transcripts and focus 
group discussions.  
 
In the first stage of analysis, themes that showed changes in the 
interpersonal relationships of returnees with people in their home 
community because of the migration experiences were identified and 
coded to identify shared experiences and differences. ATLAS.ti 
qualitative software was used to facilitate the coding process for the 
355 
 
data from both the focus group discussions and individual interviews. 
A comparison was made to delineate specific categories in the 
description of situations, interpersonal relationships, and migration 
and return settings. In the second stage, identified themes were 
further analysed to identify their relationship with home country 
socio-cultural settings and attitudes. The attributes of sense of 
belonging – such as feeling loved, fitting in, and being accepted – 
were often explicitly found in the narrations and sometimes implied, 
despite the fact that the questions focused on general migration and 
reintegration experiences and challenges. In the final stage, the 
relationship between sense of belonging and reintegration and 
remigration intention was analysed and is presented in the next 
section, with quotes that represent the most common experiences of 
returnees. 
Findings: Interpersonal relationships, belonging and 
reintegration 
The study found that the social relationships of female migrants 
change dramatically upon their return. Three major themes emerged 
as affecting the interpersonal relationships of returnees with members 
of their family and community: first, conflict between returnees and 
close family members related to betrayal; second, the expectation of 
members of their family and community that returnees had resources; 
and third, stigma and negative social perceptions of returnees held by 
members of their family and community. These factors intersect and 
overlap with each other, together creating a low sense of belonging 
among returnees to the home community. They are also linked to the 
poor reintegration of returnees into their home country and the 
emergence of remigration intention.  
Conflict with family related to betrayal  
The need to belong is characterised by stable, positive, and conflict-
free social contact with individuals to whom a person feels connected 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In this study, it was found that conflict 
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often arises between close family members62 and the returnees from 
Arabian Gulf countries. The study also found that family was at the 
heart of the migration process, with economic deprivation of the 
family being mentioned as the main reason for the migration of 
female migrants in the first place. Forty per cent (40%) of the 
returnees measured their success by what they did for their family 
members, even if they had no income or savings for themselves upon 
return. Supporting parents in household consumption, sending 
siblings to a better school, supporting family members to obtain 
better health care, renovating the family house and buying household 
furniture were mentioned by returnees as some of the benefits of their 
migration. The vast majority (81%) of respondents reported not 
having their own income and being financially dependent on their 
families upon return. For some, receiving the blessing of their parents 
(‘mirkat’ in the local language) is the best reward for their toil in a 
foreign country. One participant, who stayed in Saudi Arabia for 22 
years supporting her family, and had no savings or income at the time 
of data collection, reported being happy regardless of the fact that she 
was now dependent on her family for her financial needs.  
 
I am happy I could make my family happy. Of course, they [her family] did not save 
any money for me, but I don’t complain much because my family’s happiness is my 
reward. That makes me a very happy woman. Happiness is not always measured in 
terms of money […]. To tell the truth, I couldn’t change anything for myself. I am 
not changed at all. I am 41 years old now and I live with my family. (Focus group 
discussion 4, Addis Ababa, 2015) 
 
The above quote illustrates the love and sacrifice of some returnees 
for their family. It also reveals a sense of loss and dissatisfaction on 
the part of the returnee for losing her youth in a foreign land and 
being financially dependent on her family in her 40s. This kind of 
narration was common among returnees. In most cases returnees 
used such a narration to accept the fact that their migration 
experience did not benefit them directly. Most returnees mentioned 
 
62 ‘Family’ in this study refers to parents, siblings, spouse, children and, in some 
cases, close relatives such as uncles, aunts and cousins. 
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often that they regretted leaving their education to go to the Arabian 
Gulf in order to improve the living conditions of their family, 
although a few reported being happy about their decision. Many 
returnees are elementary or high-school dropouts, which makes it 
difficult for them to find even low-skilled jobs upon their return. High 
inflation and lack of savings and marketable skills makes it difficult 
for returnees to participate in income-generating activities in their 
home country. The average length of stay in the host country for the 
participants in this study was 8 years (minimum 6 months; maximum 
22 years). Some returnees described how time flies and how their 
youthful beauty was lost in a foreign land striving to help their family 
and not themselves.  
 
Paradoxically, despite their claim that their migration was for the sake 
of their family, almost all of the returnees expected their family to 
save money from the remittances they sent and reported feeling 
betrayed that they did not. In most cases, the family members of 
returnees spent the money without saving any for the returnees. Only 
three returnees who participated in this study reported that their 
family members saved some of the money they sent and that they 
were able to use it for their reintegration. The majority sent 
remittances to their parents and siblings, while a few sent it to their 
husband or fiancée. Some returnees who sent money to their partner 
later learnt that the money was wasted on alcohol and drugs, an affair 
or even marriage with another woman. Based on the narrations of the 
participants in the individual interviews, some returnees (40%) 
specifically told their family members how much to use and how 
much to save, others (44%) trusted family members to save as much 
as they could, and some (16%) either said nothing about saving or 
saved money in their own account. A few participants tried to 
understand the dire economic situation that their family was in and 
did not blame them for not saving money; however, about half of the 
participants reported feeling betrayed. One returnee shared the 
following: “I sent all the money I have worked for to them [her 
family]. When you find out that your own family do not keep their 
word, you feel betrayed. Thus, you want to go back” (Interview 23, 
Addis Ababa, 2015). As reflected in her narration, this returnee felt 
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betrayed because the action she is complaining about involved people 
she saw as close to her. 
 
Besides violation of trust, there are other factors that are a source of 
conflict between returnees and their family members. For example, 
when the sacrifice made for the family and their response is not 
congruent it can negatively affect the interpersonal relationships 
between the returnee and their family members: “I quarrel with my 
family and tell them that I have suffered a lot for their sake. But when 
you are broke, nobody cares. This makes you sick. When you have 
money, they like you” (Interview 27, Addis Ababa, 2017). As live-in 
domestic workers often send their entire salary63 to their family 
members, they are financially dependent on family members upon 
their return, which is another source of conflict between the returnees 
and their family members. The returnees claim they are regarded as a 
burden. Regret and disappointment is clear when they talk and when 
they reflect on what the future holds for them without any savings or 
marketable skills to enable them to successfully reintegrate into their 
home country. In both focus group discussions and individual 
interviews, not only negative interactions and lack of reciprocity were 
problems, the returnees’ sense of being valued, loved, and accepted 
was also low.  
 
The returnees seem to be trapped in a vicious cycle of going and 
coming. The majority of returnees who participated in this study had 
migrated more than twice to Arabian Gulf countries. As is reflected 
in the above quotes, betrayal, particularly by close members, not only 
results in a low sense of belonging, but also gives rise to an intention 
to re-migrate. The study found that, next to economic reasons, 
negative interactions and low sense of belonging in the family and 
community are the main reasons for female returnees from Arabian 
Gulf countries to re-migrate. Fifty per cent (50%) of the returnees 
said they may consider going back if the official route is opened (at 
the time of the field work it was closed by the Ethiopian government 
 
63 Under the kafala system, migrant domestic workers are only allowed to work as 
a live-in maid for one sponsor and prevented from going out, hence, they often 
send their entire salary home as they do not have local expenses. 
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following the reported exploitation and abuse of Ethiopians in 
destination countries). By the end of data collection, 8% of the 
returnees who participated in the study had left through illegal means, 
20% said that they did not want to go back, while the rest were 
undecided. One participant shared the following: “I get upset when I 
look at my life. I benefited neither here nor there. This always make 
me ask questions such as where will I end up and what is my destiny” 
(Interview 28, Addis Ababa, 2017).  
 
In summary, 84% of the returnees expected their family members to 
save some of the money they sent home for their reintegration upon 
return. However, trust-based remittance management appeared to be 
counterproductive to the reintegration of the returnees for two 
reasons. First, the violation of trust and lack of reciprocity (not getting 
enough love or recognition for the sacrifice they made for their 
family) disrupted interpersonal relationships between family 
members. Second, migrants’ families generally did not save any of the 
remittances, which meant that returnees did not have any financial 
capital to use for their reintegration. Negative interpersonal 
interactions meant that the returnees did not receive the emotional 
support required to successfully reintegrate back into the community. 
In addition to creating conflict and negative social interactions, 
betrayal by their close family members affected the returnees’ 
perception of being loved and valued. When the expected reciprocal 
love was not received from family members, the returnees questioned 
whether the sacrifice they had made for their family by working in the 
Arabian Gulf countries was worth it. Feelings of regret, 
disappointment and hopelessness were reflected in the discussions 
with returnees. The sense of belonging to the family (being valued 
and needed and fitting in) was low for most returnees. In some cases, 
negative social interactions and low sense of belonging in the 
community were found to be a source of remigration intention.  
Expectation of resources 
As well as conflict with close family members, this study found that 
social expectations associated with working abroad also negatively 
affect the interpersonal relationships of returnees. There is a strong 
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conception in Ethiopian society that people who migrate abroad 
come back with a lot of money. Return migrants are confronted with 
this assumption and are expected to bring financial and material gifts, 
not only for nuclear family members, but also for members of their 
extended family, close neighbours and friends. In relation to this, 
three themes emerged: first, pressure to meet social expectations; 
second, the shame associated with not meeting social expectations; 
and third, being rejected for not meeting social expectations. These 
factors negatively affected the personal interactions of returnees and 
their sense of belonging to the community, creating a barrier to their 
successful reintegration. 
 
Trying to bring various financial and material gifts for family 
members, relatives and others is a very stressful experience for 
returning migrants. The migration experience of female domestic 
migrants in the Arabian Gulf is characterised by inability to change 
employers and financial exploitation, including underpayment and 
denial of wages. In addition, the migrants send their money 
periodically to family members in the home country, making saving 
or buying gifts extremely difficult, if not impossible. The majority of 
returnees reported trying to meet this expectation, even if they did 
not agree with the norm or did not have the financial resources to do 
so. Returnees think about and prepare for this expectation before 
they return to their home. ‘Ekub’, a traditional Ethiopian financial 
cooperative, is one form of social membership that is practised 
among freelance migrants64 that enables returnees to buy gifts upon 
their return. This system is followed by close friends who trust each 
other and members contribute money periodically ahead of time for 
a specific purpose. Some are able to bring gifts for close as well as 
extended family members, neighbours and friends. However, family 
members and relatives sometimes do not find the quality or type of 
gift satisfactory.  
 
 
64 Freelance migrants are those who work in the host country independently from 
a sponsor or for a fake sponsor, in other words, illegally. 
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Most returnees care about the social norm of gift giving, although it 
is described by many as ‘yulignta’ (being too concerned about the 
opinion of others). Family members also want to show off the fact 
that they have sent a daughter abroad by giving gifts to relatives, 
neighbours and friends. Most of the returnees cannot meet this 
expectation, at least at the level that satisfies their relatives, 
neighbours and friends, for various reasons. This affects their 
interpersonal relationships and sense of belonging in the community, 
as they have to deal with the rejection that comes from not fulfilling 
the norm. For example, one returnee described the irony of the social 
norm and how it forced her to isolate herself:  
 
I was frustrated and used to lock myself up in the house. All your relatives expect 
you to give them money or a gift. If you migrate to the Arabian Gulf for two months 
with a salary of 3,000 birr [USD 100] and one works within the country with a 
salary of 50,000 [USD 1,667], just because that individual went abroad people 
expect that person to come with a bag full of money. Most of my relatives were 
disappointed in me as they were expecting something from me… I was frustrated so 
much and regret coming back here. I had nothing, but my relatives did not 
understand, or did not want to understand, at all the situation I was in. (Interview 
1, Addis Ababa, 2015) 
 
The rejection and shame this returnee experienced is well reflected in 
her narrative and was a common experience among the other 
returnees who participated in the study. As a result, the returnee’s 
interpersonal relationships with significant others were affected and 
she had a low sense of belonging (feeling loved and valued and fitting 
into the environment) to the extent that she questioned whether 
returning was the right decision. The sense of shame associated with 
not being able to satisfy social expectations and coming home empty 
handed is strong. Some returnees explain how the shame of coming 
home empty handed prolonged their stay in the host country with a 
lot of suffering and isolated them after they returned home. Social 
expectations have a great impact on the social relationships of 
returnees and their sense of belonging. The social interactions and 
relationships of female return migrants are also affected by the shame 
associated with a failed migration experience and inability to continue 
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the role of bread winner for the family. The data also shows that the 
majority of returnees live with the guilt and shame associated with an 
unaccomplished migration goal, which the migrants generally 
respond to by isolating themselves:  
 
If you don’t have money, nobody loves you even your family, friends and your 
boyfriend. If you are broke nobody likes to be around you […]. You see, people need 
you when you have money. I don’t have money so nobody wants me and I don’t need 
them also. I really don’t have social engagements. (Interview 10, Addis Ababa, 
2015) 
 
Being valued and respected is one element of belonging. Most 
returnees believe that their family members love them and respect 
them only when they are a source of income. This creates uncertainty 
in terms of fitting in to the environment when they do not have 
financial resources.  
 
Not being valued or respected is not the only issue for return 
migrants, they also experience rejection for coming home empty 
handed. For example, one returnee, who had a very bad migration 
experience with high isolation, heavy workload, denial of salary for 
one year, starvation, and psychological trauma (threat of being killed 
by her employer), was extremely happy to come back to her home 
country alive. However, her close family members did not accept her 
warmly, instead she experienced rejection and exclusion: 
 
My relatives expected me to give them some money. When they realised that I had 
nothing, they started to keep away, hate me […]. I kept my distance from my 
relatives as they couldn’t accept me with an empty hand […]. I don’t understand 
why my relatives blame me for not giving them money. They expect a lot just because 
I went to the Arabian Gulf. Only God knows what I have been through. They 
think I have money and I don’t want to share it with them. That is really very 
disappointing. (Interview 9, Addis Ababa, 2015) 
 
Such rejection plays an adverse role in the reintegration of returnees. 
As belonging focuses on the quality of relationships and the strength 
of the bonds in interpersonal relationships. The fact that conflict 
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arises mostly with close family members affects returnees’ sense of 
belonging. The study found that returnees experienced various 
traumatic incidents at the hands of their employers and agents (both 
Ethiopian and Arab) while in the host country. Few migrants had a 
good migration experience. Most stated that they were subjected to 
sexual abuse, starvation, isolation, beating, overwork, forced 
servitude to other households, degrading verbal comments, 
psychological trauma such as death threats, and attempted killing. 
These factors by themselves have an impact on the interpersonal 
relationships of returnees and their connectedness to others in their 
community. For example, as documented in this study and a study by 
Ketema (2014), women who are sexually abused exhibit low or no 
interest in becoming involved in another intimate relationship upon 
return. In addition to traumatic experiences in the host countries, 
experiencing rejection from loved ones upon return may have 
undesirable consequences, affecting both the mental and physical 
health of returnees (MacDonald & Leary, 2005) and their social and 
economic reintegration.  
 
The expectation that returnees have a significant amount of material 
and financial resources is not limited to family members and relatives 
of returnees. Returnees also reported that it was difficult to start or 
maintain spousal relationships because of this belief. In Ethiopian 
society, men are regarded as the provider for their family, however, 
changes in this gender role requirements were also evidenced by the 
data. In this study, the participants acknowledged that it was hard to 
trust men and that their romantic relationships often ended if the 
returnee did not accumulate financial or material resources from their 
migration. The majority of respondents claimed that men approached 
them thinking that they had money and, when they found out that 
they did not, no longer want to be with them. The following quote 
from one of the interviews exemplifies this: 
 
I had a boyfriend before traveling to the Arabian Gulf. But he married another 
woman while I was there [...]. He cheated on me. I worked hard to build our future. 
I used to send a lot of money to him, but he wasted it all on another woman. It was 
devastating. I don’t trust men anymore [...]. Once my friend arranged a date for me. 
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She introduced me to a guy. On our second date, he asked me how much money I 
have. He said, “I bet you have a lot of money; I heard you returned from Arabian 
Gulf”. (Interview 28, Addis Ababa, 2015) 
 
Violation of trust, rejection and not being valued for who they are, 
but what they might have, were dominant themes in the narrations of 
returnees in relation to their post-return experiences. Repeated 
rejection and betrayal by men led the returnees to avoid social 
interactions: “I don’t trust anyone. What I believe is that they will take 
advantage of me and leave me alone just as my family did. Therefore, 
I don’t trust anyone” (Interview 23, Addis Ababa, 2017). This 
contradicts the strong desire of most returnees to start their own 
family. Inability to form a family and have children is considered to 
be one of the major costs of the migration experience by returnees. 
The returnees regret wasting their youth in a foreign country and feel 
that their marriage prospects have declined. They also acknowledge 
the pressure from parents and the community. Only 7 of the 48 
returnees who participated in this study are married or have been 
married (three had divorced because of conflict related to the 
migration) and have children. The relationship between marital 
partners is also spoilt by lack of trust and perceived or real infidelity. 
However, 17 of the returnees had children, mainly out of wedlock 
and before their migration. Almost all of the returnees reported that 
they left their children in the care of their mothers when they 
migrated. The returnees also reported that their children sometimes 
rejected them due to the long separation, which resulted in low or no 
attachment.  
 
I always have a fight with my daughter and have no peace at home […]. We have 
not been together for long and she doesn’t like me at all. She doesn’t have a tiny bit 
of love or respect for me. I worked so hard in a foreign land to change her future, but 
lost the love of my child. (Interview 10, Addis Ababa, 2015) 
 
In summary, rejection by close family members or others because of 
expectations that the returnees have financial or material resources 
impacts on the various interpersonal relationships of the returnees 
and raises uncertainty about how they fit into the home environment. 
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The vast majority of returnees respond to this rejection by isolating 
themselves and avoiding social interactions. This finding is in line 
with other studies on relatedness, which found that people who are 
less connected feel distant and perceive themselves to be outsiders, 
often finding it difficult to interact with the social world (Lee, Draper, 
& Lee, 2001). Inability to meet expectations was frustrating for most 
returnees. Having no or few financial resources was a shameful 
experience and often made returnees restrict their social 
engagements. This strengthens other findings that postulate that 
being poor restricts people’s desire for relationships and sense of 
belonging (Stewart et al., 2009). Being financially dependent on their 
families after return is common among the returnees. At the same 
time, stepping down from the expected status attached to working 
abroad was a shameful experience and a barrier to becoming involved 
in a low paying job for some of the returnees. In general, the above 
findings indicate that the social expectations on returnees create a low 
sense of belonging because of rejection, shame and doubts about 
fitting into the environment. Not meeting people’s expectations 
results in rejection by society in the home country and self-isolation 
by the returnees. This may affect the social and economic 
reintegration of returnees and their remigration intention. 
Negative perceptions and stigma 
Negative perceptions and stigma can lead to poor interpersonal 
relationships and, hence, affect a person’s relatedness to their 
environment and sense of belonging. Social perceptions of the 
migration experience of women to the Arabian Gulf are generally 
negative. The returnees described being stereotyped and stigmatised 
by people in their home community. Two dominant stereotypes were 
associated with female returnees from the Arabian Gulf. First, the 
returnees were identified as mentally unfit (weird or crazy) and, 
second, they were considered promiscuous and associated with sex 
work or prostitution. These stereotypes and stigma created a barrier 
to migrants interacting with people in the community. The migration 
experience puts a mark of disgrace on the female returnees for life. 
The returnees explained how difficult it is to deal with such negative 
perceptions given the fact that they cannot exclude the migration 
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experience from their life. For example, one returnee who was 
rejected by her own family, as they thought she was working as 
prostitute while she was in the host country and wrongly associated 
her weight loss with HIV infection, explained the feeling of isolation, 
betrayal and rejection she felt:  
 
I hated going outside and meeting people. I didn’t even agree with my family and I 
was crying all the time. I didn’t go out and I stayed home for a long time […]. At 
the beginning, I even wanted to be a prostitute or go back there again. I tried to 
commit suicide once […]. When I came back here at first, I did not work and did 
not have any money. I guess my family expected a lot from me. I came here with 
empty pockets. […]. When my employers took me to the office and I knew they 
were going to send me back to my country, I was really disappointed and tried to 
kill myself. (Interview 23, Addis Ababa, 2017) 
 
This quote shows the stigma, rejection and isolation that the returnee 
experienced. This returnee migrated to the Arabian Gulf twice and 
how her family treated her after she returned the first time caused her 
to attempt suicide. There is evidence that suicidal ideation (Kissane 
& McLaren, 2006; Vanderhorst & McLaren, 2005) and the experience 
of stigma (Walton & Cohen, 2007) are associated with a low sense of 
belonging. The majority of returnees reported experiencing stigma 
and rejection from people with whom they had desired relationships. 
This shows that the ‘home country’ is not always an environment in 
which returnees feel at home – a home they aspire to return to and 
feel safe, loved, valued and accepted in. Negative interactions and 
conflict with family members was a trigger for some returnees to 
migrate again. Returnees reported travelling back to Arabian Gulf 
countries on multiple work contracts (see also Fernandez, 2010). 
Economic reasons were often mentioned as a cause, such as 
unemployment or low wages. However, negative social interactions 
with family members also contribute greatly.  
 
The returnees admitted that the negative perceptions of returnees had 
some truth (some returnees had been engaged in sex work in the 
Arabian Gulf), but they are disappointed that all returnees are judged 
because of the activities of some women. There are female migrants 
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who are locked in the house and never see the sun until the end of 
their contract, others are sexually abused or raped. However, these 
returnees are also perceived as a ‘bad’ woman. Regarding being 
involved in prostitution, the returnees reported that many migrants 
escape from their sponsor because of exploitation and abuse or to 
earn a better income (as ‘freelance migrants’). This act immediately 
changes the status of the migrants in the host country from legal to 
illegal. The runaways need to sustain themselves economically and 
often turn to, or are forced into, sex work. The returnees also 
admitted that many returnees from the Arabian Gulf suffer from 
mental health problems and attribute the cause to ill treatment, the 
poisoning of migrants by employers (to keep them for longer or to 
avoid paying their salary), isolation and other traumatic experiences 
in the host country (see Anbesse et al., 2009 and Habtamu et al., 2017).  
 
Their migration experiences influenced the behaviour of some 
returnees. The returnees who participated in this study admitted that 
they are easily irritated, speak loudly, isolate themselves, wear a lot of 
makeup and jewellery, use strong perfume, dress in colourful or 
sparkly clothes, and wear a lot of accessories. The respondents 
provided an explanation for some of these behaviours; for example, 
speaking loudly is associated with the ‘mukeyaf’ (air conditioner) in the 
houses in the Arabian Gulf – it makes noise, so every member of the 
house speaks loudly. Irritability is often associated with frustration 
and shame due to the failed migration and being financially dependent 
on their family instead of a provider. Dressing colourfully and using 
a lot of makeup relates to their identification with the host country 
culture.  
 
Sense of belonging encompasses feeling valued and loved by others 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Most returnees stated that they are not 
taken seriously in most interactions with their family members and in 
the community and that they are not desired for marital relationships. 
Some returnees reported hiding their migration experience for fear of 
rejection and so as not to jeopardise their relationships, including 
intimate relationships. Stereotyping greatly damages their desire to 
form a family or maintain already established marital relationships. 
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This puts pressure on the returnees, as marriage is highly valued in 
Ethiopia and regarded as completing womanhood. Not fulfilling this 
desired relationship can cause alienation and detachment from 
society. The study found that stereotypes and shame are a cause of 
poor social interaction and low sense of belonging in returnees’ lives. 
Some of the participants in this study are isolated and do not feel 
accepted in the community, as evidenced by the following quote: 
 
[…] I did not experience anything bad, but working in the Arabian Gulf made me 
fearful. I felt ashamed. I could not go along with friends. I became sensitive to what 
people were saying and felt like they were trying to hurt my feelings. I didn’t want to 
go out and meet friends, but rather chose to stay in the house. (Interview 3, Addis 
Ababa, 2015) 
 
Stereotypes associated with the migration experience bring about 
changes in the self-perception of returnees, their social interactions 
and sense of belonging. The perceptions of others affect their self-
worth (Buckley, Winkel & Leary, 2004). It challenges their feeling of 
fitness for and acceptance in the social environment, which adversely 
affects their social and economic reintegration. Another indication 
that returnees suffer isolation, have poor social interaction and a low 
sense of belonging is that 80% reported staying home most of the 
time and only going out for weddings and funerals; the rest 
mentioned going to church or the mosque, in addition to mandatory 
social engagements such as funerals. This limited social interaction 
also relates to their limited economic resources (Nisrane et al., 2017). 
However, shame associated with unachieved migration goals, stigma 
and negative social perceptions contributes to this behaviour. 
Conclusion and recommendations 
This study investigated the new dynamics that unfold in the 
interpersonal relationships of female Ethiopian domestic migrants 
upon their return from the Arabian Gulf. It also looked at how their 
interpersonal relationships affect the returnees’ sense of belonging, 
reintegration and remigration intention. It found that negative social 
interactions resulting from betrayal by close family members, social 
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expectations about money and gifts, and negative social perceptions 
about returnees affected their sense of belonging to the home 
community. These factors impacted on the returnees’ feeling of being 
loved and valued and raised uncertainty about them fitting into the 
home environment. In turn, these factors influenced the returnees’ 
desire to stay in their home country and their remigration intention.  
 
Negative interpersonal interactions mean that returnees do not 
receive the emotional support required to successfully reintegrate into 
the home community. Not being accepted, or even being rejected, by 
people in the community, including by close family members, and 
inability to bring about significant economic changes in their own life, 
apart from in their family’s life, made the returnees question whether 
they fit into the home environment and whether migrating to the 
Arabian Gulf was worthwhile in the first place. About 50% of the 
returnees said that they may consider going back if the official route 
was reopened, 8% had already left through illegal means by the end 
of data collection, 20% said that they do not want to go back, while 
the rest were undecided. The study indicates that negative social 
interactions is among the factors influencing remigration intention, as 
is low sense of belonging. Low sense of belonging, next to economic 
reasons, explains why returnees are willing to return to the Arabian 
Gulf, despite the risk of exploitative and abusive working conditions. 
Hence, reintegrating into the home community is not only dependent 
on the migration experiences of the returnees in the host country, but 
intertwined with various social issues in the home country. Positive 
social interactions and a sense of belonging are important for return 
migrants to successfully reintegrate, socially and economically.  
 
For the returnees who participated in the study, the migration 
experience did not bring about personal economic gains and 
improved social status, as expected. Instead they incurred social costs 
that cannot be measured in monetary terms. The study found that 
although the family of the migrants experienced some positive 
economic and social changes, the majority of returnees did not have 
any savings of their own from their migration, making them 
economically dependent on their family upon return. This study also 
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casts doubt on the claim by other studies that migration to the 
Arabian Gulf is an empowering experience for women and leads to 
upward movement on the social ladder (Kifleyesus, 2012), in line with 
Ketema (2014).  
 
This study provides valuable insights into how home country social 
issues may impact on the reintegration of female domestic workers 
returning to Ethiopia from the Arabian Gulf and their intention to 
re-migrate. It serves as a starting point for the further analysis of 
experiences and issues facing returnees in their home country in 
relation to reintegration. It also provides a self-evaluation of the 
returnees’ sense of belonging to their home community. However, it 
has some limitations related to its scope, which might guide future 
researchers. First, the participants in this study were all living in Addis 
Ababa, whereas a significant number of women migrate to the 
Arabian Gulf from rural parts of Ethiopia. Hence, the social 
perceptions and social interactions uncovered in this study may not 
represent the situation of returnees in rural areas. Second, this study 
used the personal stories of returnees to evaluate social perceptions. 
Triangulating the results by using various sources, such as family and 
community members, is suggested for future research. Third, this 
study found that female returnees are perceived as socially unfit 
because of stereotypes associated with their migration. Similar 
findings were made in other studies conducted in Asia (Bélanger & 
Rahman, 2013; Dannecker, 2005). This similarity may arise because 
of the existence of a patriarchal social structure in both places. 
However, our study did not analyse patriarchy or gender roles, which 
was the case in the other studies. Indeed the social perceptions, and 
the treatment, of male and female returnees are different. The 
majority of participants in this study acknowledged that Ethiopian 
men generally lead a loose lifestyle, having many intimate 
relationships with women, including exploiting vulnerable female 
migrants while in the host country.65 However, the stereotype of 
 
65 They persuade the migrants to escape from their sponsors; once the women leave 
their employers they become illegal, hence, the agents and brokers force the 
migrants into sexual relations in exchange for job placement and a house where 
they can stay. 
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promiscuity is mainly associated with female returnees. This study did 
not include the accounts of male returnees, so is unable to answer 
whether a difference exists in the treatment of female and male 
returnees. However, it is important to see if patriarchy plays a role 
and it is suggested that future researchers explore this issue.  
 
The experience of belonging is not only beneficial to the returnees, it 
also impacts on the community and society at large. A sense of 
belonging is associated with a higher level of achievement and 
productivity, which impacts on the community and society over a 
period of time. Hence, it would be beneficial to society at large to 
implement policy interventions to improve the reintegration of 
Ethiopian female domestic migrants returning from the Arabian 
Gulf. Four policy recommendations can be drawn from this study.  
 
• First, social support and counselling programmes that 
address problems with interpersonal relationships should be 
provided.  
• Second, one reason why migrants send their entire salary to 
family members in their home country is because they do 
not have anywhere to save it while they are in the host 
country (Nisrane et al., 2017). The option they have is to 
either keep it with them or save it with their employer, both 
of which are risky. Hence, creating a remittance system that 
cultivates the independence of migrants will help them to 
develop positive relationships upon their return, as well as 
facilitate better economic reintegration through savings.  
• Third, depending on family members for financial needs is a 
cause of negative interactions and low sense of belonging. 
Hence, education programmes and vocational training 
should be provided to returnees to allow them to become 
financially independent, especially given that many of the 
migrants are elementary or high-school dropouts.  
• Finally, to address the issues of unrealistic social 
expectations and negative social perceptions, media 
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Shattered Dreams: Life after Deportation for 
Ethiopian Returnees from Saudi Arabia 
 
Shishay Tadesse Abay 
 
Introduction 
Ethiopia is one of the major labour sending countries in the world 
and the largest refugee 
hosting country in Africa 
(ILO, 2017). Although the 
Ethiopian economy, as well 
as its population, has shown 
high growth in recent years, 
this growth has not been 
accompanied by a significant 
reduction in poverty or job 
creation, particularly for the 
burgeoning youth population 
(ILO, 2017). Consequently, 
many Ethiopians consider 
out-migration as the only 
way to achieve a better 
standard of living (De Regt & 
Tafesse, 2015). In fact, the 
landscape of migration from 
Ethiopia has changed in 
recent decades from that 
born out of conflict to 
irregular migration,66 mainly 
driven by economic reasons, reflecting the dynamic nature of the 
 
66 Migration is considered ‘irregular’ when it takes place outside the legal and 
regulatory norms of the sending, transit, and destination countries (Reitano, Adal, 
& Shaw, 2014). 
In 2013 and 2017, more than 243,000 
Ethiopia migrants were expelled from 
Saudi Arabia, many without fulfilling 
their migration goals. These migrants face 
huge challenges in re-establishing their 
lives in Ethiopia. Migrants and their 
families usually invest huge sums of 
money, selling assets and taking loans, to 
send a family member abroad. 
Involuntary return exposes returnees to 
an unwelcome reception by their families 
and feelings of shame about failure, 
hindering reintegration and influencing 
returnees to re-migrate. While 
deportation is often seen as a logical policy 
to respond to increasing numbers of 
migrants, this chapter shows the sad 




issue and the factors that drive it (Zewdu, 2018; Fransen & 
Kuschminder, 2009). Although the exact number of Ethiopian 
migrants is hard to ascertain, the brutal beheading of 30 Ethiopians 
in Libya by Islamic State (ISIS), mass deportation of Ethiopians from 
Saudi Arabia, and numerous killings of Ethiopians in South Africa 
and Yemen reflect the magnitude of the problem (IOM, 2014).  
 
Although Ethiopians migrate to many destinations, Saudi Arabia is 
one of the most popular for unskilled Ethiopian labour migrants. A 
report by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) on the 
trends involved in Ethiopian migration revealed that in less than five 
years (2012 to March 2016) around 317,136 Ethiopian migrants 
arrived in Yemen, mostly aiming to transit to Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf States (RMMS, 2016). This is substantiated by empirical 
evidence that estimates that about 60–70% of Ethiopians migrating 
to countries in the Middle East, mainly Saudi Arabia, are irregular 
migrants (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015). Consequently, two rounds of 
deportation of Ethiopians have been carried out by the Saudi Arabian 
government. In the first round, 163,000 irregular Ethiopian migrants 
were forced to return to Ethiopia after an amnesty period came to an 
end in November 2013 (IOM, 2014). In the second round of 
deportations, more than 80,000 Ethiopians were expelled from Saudi 
Arabia between March and June 2017, following the expiration of a 
90-day grace period (IOM, 2017). Studies on the lived migration 
experiences of Ethiopian return migrants from the Middle East show 
that they are often exposed to physical, sexual, and emotional abuse 
during the course of their migration (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015; 
Abebaw, 2012; Fernandez, 2010). 
 
Although migration to Saudi Arabia is widespread in Ethiopia, it is 
particularly prevalent in the Tigray region. Data from the Tigray 
Region Bureau of Youth and Sports Affairs and the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) show that, as of June 2014, there 
were 30,191 returnees from Saudi Arabia in the region deported 
between November 2013 and April 2014. This figure accounts for 
22% of the 163,000 Ethiopian deportees at the national level (Tigray 




In order to reduce the likelihood of remigration, it is important to 
develop interventions aimed at helping returnees reintegrate into 
Ethiopian society. However, evidence shows that migrants who 
return involuntarily often face huge challenges in re-establishing their 
lives in their countries of origin (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015; Kleist & 
Milliar, 2013). Furthermore, the reintegration of a sizeable number of 
returnees is challenging and expensive for poor countries like 
Ethiopia that do not have the capacity to provide regular and 
comprehensive assistance for returnees (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015). It 
has also been argued that livelihood restoration is more complicated 
for returnees when migration is an established household livelihood 
strategy, which is often realised through collective decisions and 
finance-pooling (Kleist & Milliar, 2013).  
 
Scholarly works that focus on exploring the reintegration challenges 
of return migrants, particularly involuntary returnees, show that 
multifaceted issues ranging from structural issues in the place of 
origin (such as poverty and unemployment) to personal problems 
(such as disdain for local job opportunities, desire to get rich 
overnight and lack of skills) hinder the reintegration of returnees. A 
study conducted on the involuntary return of Ghanaian migrants 
from Libya revealed that the unfavourable mode of return, the high 
level of dependence by migrants’ families on remittances, and 
unfavourable local conditions hinder the reintegration of returnees 
(Mensah, 2014). Similarly, findings on Basotho male return labour 
migrants to South Africa show how the limited human capital of 
returnees, lack of psychological preparedness for post-return life, and 
lack of support make the reintegration of returnees into their home 
communities problematic (Morojele & Maphosa, 2013).  
 
To date, few studies have been conducted in Ethiopia to examine the 
problems Ethiopian return migrants from the Middle East have 
reintegrating. The overwhelming majority of studies focus on the 
reintegration challenges of female returnees. Research conducted by 
Nisrane, Morissens, Need and Torenvlied (2017) in Addis Ababa on 
female return migrants from Saudi Arabia found that the migration 
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setting (which usually impedes preparedness to return), the personal 
traits of the migrants, and the absence of post-return assistance were 
major obstacles to the economic reintegration of female returnees. In 
another study, the absence of post-return employment and a 
sustainable source of income, the deteriorating health status of 
returnees, their lack of capital and the lack of support from external 
bodies were identified as the main challenges to the successful 
reintegration of Ethiopian female return migrants from Saudi Arabia 
(Alemu, 2018). Furthermore, based on a study of 168 Ethiopian 
involuntarily returned migrants from Saudi Arabia (both men and 
women), De Regt and Tafesse (2015) found that lack of preparedness 
to return is the primary reason for the poor social, psychological and 
economic reintegration of returnees in their communities. All of these 
researchers confirmed that the vast majority of returnees did not 
achieve their migration goals and were unable to re-establish their 
livelihoods at home and, hence, were contemplating re-migrating. 
Apart from this, there is evidence that the loss of the expected gains 
from and goals of migration, the reception of families following 
deportation (Kleist & Milliar, 2013), transnational ties and networks, 
and socio-cultural feelings of failure held by deportees affect their 
reintegration (Schuster & Majidi, 2013). However, little is known as 
to how these factors affect the reintegration process of Ethiopian 
returnees deported from Saudi Arabia.  
 
International migration is a multi-dimensional global phenomenon 
and has become a hot topic of debate in today’s world. This is due to 
the fact that migration impacts on the health, security and wellbeing 
of people, as well as the economies of both sending and receiving 
countries (Jamie, 2013). This chapter seeks to further our 
understanding of the effects of deportation on return migrants. The 
argument is that the deportation of people against their will and the 
resultant failure of deportees to meet their migration goals, the 
negative reception by family members, and the socio-cultural feelings 
of shame about failure make the reintegration of deportees 
problematic, motivating remigration. Thus, the question this chapter 
seeks to answer is: What are the effects of the deportation of Ethiopian 
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migrants from Saudi Arabia on their reintegration in the home country and 
remigration intention? 
 
The chapter is divided into nine sections including this introduction. 
The next two sections present a brief review of the literature on the 
pre-migration expectations of migrants – their dreams of a better life 
for themselves and their families – and the effect of deportation and 
returning home empty-handed. This is followed by a description of 
the methodology used and the characteristics of the respondents. The 
findings are then presented in four sections which explore the effect 
of the pre-migration perceptions, expectations and migration goals of 
returnees and their families; the negative reception of returnees by 
their families after deportation; the migrants’ socio-cultural feelings 
of shame about failure; and their transnational ties and networks on 
their reintegration and remigration intention. This is followed by a 
brief discussion and conclusion. 
Dreams of a better life  
Unlike in the 1970s, in recent years migration from Ethiopia has been 
mainly driven by the desire to improve livelihood and wellbeing. 
Despite the substantial economic growth in the country, many 
Ethiopians still consider migration as the only way to achieve a better 
standard of living (Schroder, 2015; De Regt & Tafesse, 2015; Zewdu, 
2018; Estifanos, 2017). Limited employment opportunities for 
educated people in urban areas and the dwindling share of resources 
in the rural areas of Ethiopia have pushed numerous youth, and their 
families, to perceive migration as a short cut to liberation from 
poverty. Parents in rural areas appreciate having a family member 
abroad, despite the dangerous routes they take and the hardships they 
might suffer in their lives as migrant workers (Maru, 2016). Due to an 
inability to satisfy the basic needs of their family members and the 
(perceived) better living conditions of the families with migrant 
children abroad, parents often encourage their children to migrate 
(Maru, 2016; Gebre-Egziabher, Abay, Fekadu, Gebreegziabher & 




In relation to this, a study conducted among migration prone 
communities in southern Ethiopia shows that communities have a 
strong positive perception of migration, and families who send their 
children abroad are accorded high social status in the community 
(Estifanos, 2017). Even in the recent past, religious leaders have 
encouraged parents to send their children abroad by saying that 
migration is something opened by God for communities to prosper 
and, as a result, communities organise farewell programmes to collect 
money for potential migrants and receive blessings from religious 
leaders (Zewdu, 2018; Gebre-Egziabher et al., 2017; Maru, 2016; 
Kanko, Bailey & Teller, 2013). In relation to this, Estifanos (2017) 
points out that despite the challenges migrants face in the course of 
their migration, remittances sent back home by migrants are essential 
to improve the living standards of the families left behind. Hence, 
remittances are not only an important reason for migrating, but also 
an insurance for the migrant and poverty-stricken families left behind 
(Zewdu, 2018).  
 
Prior to the 1970s, migration from Ethiopia was prevalent among 
educated and urban people in the country. However, currently, those 
migrating include illiterate youth from rural areas. A study done on 
potential migrants in the southern part of Ethiopia found that 
migration has become something everybody wants to try. The 
overwhelming majority (79%) of the research participants reported 
that going abroad is one of the things most youth in the community 
want to experience (Gebre-Egziabher et al., 2017). Another study 
conducted on Ethiopian return migrants from the Middle East and 
South Africa found that 55% of the returnees do not believe that 
working in Ethiopia will help to change their own and their family’s 
life for the better; similarly, 65% of returnees believe that Ethiopian 
youth can change their life for the better by working abroad (Minaye 
& Zeleke, 2017). To this end, Zewdu (2018) pointed out that among 
the youth in Ethiopia, migration has replaced conventional 
aspirations of attending school and securing government jobs. The 
success stories of some pioneer migrants and the physical 
transformation some Ethiopian migrants and their respective families 
have enjoyed mask the risks of migration, blinding prospective 
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migrants, even when the risks are explained to them (Estifanos, 2017). 
This emanates from the fact that prospective migrants in Ethiopia 
often seek out positive stories, while discounting reports of negative 
experiences (Busza, Teferra, Omer & Zimmerman, 2017) and migrate 
with a predetermined plan, namely, to send remittances back home 
and invest business activities upon their return (Nisrane et al., 2017; 
Zewdu, 2018). 
Returning empty-handed: Deportation and reintegration  
In Ethiopia, the migration of one member of a family abroad for work 
is often part of a household livelihood diversification strategy, 
essential for survival and a buffer against varied and multiple crises 
(Ali, 2018; Fernandez, 2011). However, realising the goals of 
migration is not as simple as most potential migrants expect. Despite 
the positive perceptions and expectations of returnees before 
migration, the actual migration experiences of most returnees show 
that the situation in destination countries is not necessarily as 
perceived. As a result, a state of dissonance is created due to the 
misalignment of the perceptions and expectations of migrant 
returnees before they migrate with the actual reality experienced at 
the destination.  
 
It is well documented that Ethiopian migrants to the Middle East are 
susceptible to different abuses. Overwork, denial of food and medical 
treatment, withholding of their salary, salary not commensurate with 
workload, denial of communication, confinement and rape are some 
of the reported experiences faced by Ethiopian migrants in the 
Middle East (Abebaw, 2012; Fernandez, 2010). Although migrants 
experience countless forms of abuse at the hands of their employers 
and other actors in destination countries, they are seldom in a position 
to tell their families about these negative experiences. Rather, they 
prefer to tolerate the undignified and abusive treatment in order to 
achieve their migration goals (Ali, 2018), which includes remitting the 
money they earn back home to improve the lives of their families. A 
study conducted on female Ethiopian return migrants in Addis Ababa 
and migrants in Kuwait revealed that the majority of the interviewed 
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women had been remitting most, if not all, of their salaries to support 
their birth family (Fernandez, 2011). The sending of remittances back 
home on a regular basis, permits families to improve their livelihoods 
and social status in the community, which, in turn, leads to the 
development of a positive mindset about migration on the part of 
their families. Under such circumstances, families are generally not 
receptive to negative stories about the migration experiences of their 
children. Hence, the positive feeling families have about migration 
hinders their acceptance of the negative information.  
 
Following the end of the grace period announced by the Saudi 
Arabian government for irregular migrants to leave the country, 
irregular migrants who stayed were hunted by the security forces, 
detained and then deported to their country of origin. During their 
arrest and detention, many migrants experienced innumerable 
violations, including the looting of their belongings, torture, denial of 
food and water, and sexual abuse. A study conducted on some of the 
deported returnees in Addis Ababa showed that, due to the sudden 
crackdown, many returnees were forced to leave Saudi Arabia empty-
handed (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015). De Regt and Tafesse (2015) found 
that out of the 168 returnees surveyed, only 44.2% were able to bring 
back some of their belongings, but most returned empty-handed. 
Similarly, Kuschminder (2014) found that most Ethiopian returnees 
do not achieve their financial goals of migration or change their living 
situation in Ethiopia, as the challenges they face during migration do 
not allow them to do so. 
 
The negative migration experiences of migrants not only destroy their 
dreams, but also have negative repercussions on the livelihoods of 
their families, as the primary migration objective is usually to improve 
the impoverished economic situation of their family and their lives 
upon return. Involuntary return means the end of remittances. 
Households in which remittances from migrants constitute the sole 
or largest source of income are left vulnerable (Zewdu, 2018; Kleist, 
& Milliar, 2013). The situation becomes worrisome if migrants or 
their families have fallen into debt to finance the migration process. 
In his study on Ethiopian female migrants, Ali found that the end of 
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remittances creates social tension between the returnees and their 
families and can lead to estrangement (Ali, 2018). The divergence 
between the high expectations of the families of migrants, on the one 
hand, and the accumulated negative migration experiences of the 
returnees, on the other hand, can create unpleasant relations between 
returnees and their families. The situation is worse if returnees are 
dependent on their families, causing additional strain on scarce 
resources.  
 
In communities with high expectations about the economic 
outcomes of migration, the shame of returning empty-handed can be 
intense. Thus, some involuntary returnees choose to isolate 
themselves to avoid gossip and social degradation (Kleist & Milliar, 
2013). Furthermore, migrants who were marginalised in the 
destination country often face stigmatisation and marginalisation in 
their country of origin after return (Haase & Honerath, 2016). As a 
result, many deportees suffer from health problems, post-traumatic 
stress, and depression, which may deteriorate if their families and 
communities do not understand or believe their negative experiences 
(Kleist & Milliar, 2013).  
 
Therefore, the positive expectations of families about migration and 
the unwelcoming reception of unsuccessful returnees by their families 
are some of the challenges to the successful reintegration of return 
migrants (Kleist & Milliar, 2013). In some cases, local communities 
assume that returnees are financially better off than non-migrants in 
the community. This misconception can negatively affect the morale 
of returnees in their endeavours to reintegrate.  
Methodology and characteristics of participants  
This chapter is based on research conducted for the author’s PhD in 
two administrative woredas67 of Tigray region, Ethiopia, namely: Saesie 
Tsaedaemba and Ahferom. Saesie Tsaedaemba and Ahferom are in 
 
67 A woreda is an administration classification in Ethiopia below the level of a zone 




the Eastern and Central zones of Tigray region, respectively. These 
zones are characterised by a history of frequent drought and the 
people in these zones often suffer from acute food shortages. As well 
as recurrent drought, the causes of food insecurity in these areas 
include lack of arable land, erratic rainfall, and degraded natural 
resources (Berhe, 2013).  
 
As of July 2014, there were 30,192 returnees in Tigray region 
registered as deported from Saudi Arabia between November 2013 
and April 2014 (IOM, 2014). Of these, 20,400 (or 68%) originated 
from the Eastern and Central zones of the region (Tigray Region 
Bureau of Youth and Sports Affairs, 2014). Compared to other areas 
in the region, these zones are hotspots of irregular migration, mainly 
to Saudi Arabia. Hence, from these zones, these two woredas – Saesie 
Tsaedaemba and Ahferom – were purposely selected for the study, 
on account of the number of deportees in each woreda. Finally, 
respondents were selected from the list provided by officials at the 
kebele (smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia) level using systematic 
random sampling technique.  
 
A mixed research approach was used, combining both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. First a survey was carried out among 218 
returnees who had registered in their respective districts. The sample 
population encompassed deportees who were formerly residents of 
the districts and who had returned in the two phases of mass 
deportation from Saudi Arabia (November 2013 to April 2014 and 
March to July, 2017). The term ‘return migrant’ is used 
interchangeably with ‘returnee’ and ‘deportee’ in this study to refer to 
a person who migrated from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia and was 
returned involuntarily to Ethiopia (deported from Saudi Arabia).  
 
The survey data were collected using an interviewer-administered 
structured questionnaire, which was filled in by four trained 
enumerators. This tool was deployed in order to collect quantitative 
data to enrich and triangulate the qualitative data gathered. The 
qualitative data were collected using focus group discussions and in-
depth interviews. Two focus group discussions were held, one in each 
387 
 
woreda. The participants of the focus group discussions included 
members of the local community, return migrants and parents of 
returnees. Each focus group discussion had 9–12 discussants. In-
depth interviews were carried out with 15 return migrants: 6 in 
Ahferom and 9 in Saesie Tsaedaemba. Key informant interviews were 
undertaken with carefully selected representatives of offices in the 
study areas whose formal or informal engagement with the 
community gave them knowledge of the subject in question. Key 
informants included representatives of the Women and Children 
Affairs, Youth and Sport Affairs, Labour and Social Affairs offices in 
the study woredas and the Tigray Region Bureau of Youth and Sports 
Affairs. Guidelines were prepared for the focus group discussions, 
key informant interviews and in-depth interviews in English and then 
translated to Tigrigna, the local language of the informants. The data 
were analysed using thematic analysis. Four themes emerged as 
common to all participants after careful analysis of their responses.  
 
Regarding the characteristics of respondents to the survey, 75.2% 
(n=164) were men and 24.8% women. In terms of age distribution at 
the time of migration, the majority of respondents 84% (n=183) were 
young adults aged less than 35 years with a mean age of 28 years. 
There were no respondents to the survey aged less than 18 years old 
at the time of migration. In relation to the literacy status and 
education level of the returnees at the time of migration, 10.1% of the 
respondents were illiterate, and 42.7% had achieved elementary 
(grades 1–8) education and 41.7% had achieved secondary (grades 9–
12) level. Only 5.5% had a tertiary education.  
 
In terms of place of residence before migration, slightly more than 
half (51.4%) of the respondents to the survey were from rural areas 
and 48.6% were from urban areas. Although previously dominated by 
urban dwellers and relatively educated people, the migration of rural 
dwellers and less educated people has become common in Ethiopia, 
particularly in Tigray region (Abay & Kassaye, 2015; Berhe, 2013). 
With regard to the employment status and occupation of the 
respondents at the time of departure, 45.4% were employed, 34.4% 
were unemployed and 20.2% were students. The majority of the 
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returnees who were employed before migration were engaged in 
agriculture, which is seasonal in nature in Ethiopia, and the others 
were employed in the informal sector, which generally does not 
generate a sustainable income. In terms of marital status, 58.3% of 
the respondents were never married before migration, almost 32% 
were married and the remaining 9.7% belonged to other categories 
(widowed, divorced and separated). The following sections present 
the findings of the study under each of the four themes that emerged. 
Perceptions, expectations and goals of migration  
The study investigated the pre-departure perceptions, expectations 
and goals of migration of returnees (deportees) from Saudi Arabia in 
Saesie Tsaedaemba and Ahferom woredas, in Tigray region of 
Ethiopia. As reported by the majority of respondents, returnees had 
a broadly held positive perception about the rewards of migrating and 
working abroad before they migrated. For many rural youth and less 
educated people in the study areas, the Middle East, mainly Saudi 
Arabia, is seen as a place where money is plentiful and success is 
certain. Consequently, many youth (both male and female) drop out 
of school, leave their jobs, and lease out family land in order to 
migrate. Even though returnees were somewhat aware of the risk of 
abuse, death and other negative experiences during the migration 
journey and at the destination, they reported seeking and recounting 
positive success stories of early migrants and ignoring reports of 
negative experiences. They often argued that life is predetermined, 
whether you migrate or not, implying that it is your fate to have either 
positive or negative experiences. As reflected by the participants, the 
selective exposure of returnees to the positive side of migration 
before they migrated and the structural problems (poverty and 
unemployment) in the study areas resulted in them developing a 
strong positive perception of migration before they migrated. For 
instance, A8 explained the perception he had about migration before 
his departure:  
 
I had a positive mindset about working abroad as the only way of changing my and 
my family’s life for the better. I had tried all the possibilities at home, but I couldn’t 
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succeed. Earning a living is difficult here and even harder for uneducated people like 
me. Hence, I preferred to migrate with the expectation of securing a better job and 
income. However, my migration experience was really horrible; I paid 20,000 
Ethiopian birr [USD 860] to traffickers, took a long journey on foot without water 
to drink, and experienced frequent intimidation and abuse by the traffickers. Due 
to my sudden deportation, I left there [Saudi Arabia] with only two months’ salary 
and my dream of a better future has been totally destroyed. (A8, face-to-face 
interview with author, Ahferom, 30 December 2017) 
 
The respondents described structural problems at the place of origin, 
such as lack of job opportunities and a decent income, as the major 
reasons for them to leave in the first place. During my field work in 
Ahferom, I witnessed a significant number of idle youth sitting along 
roadsides in Enticho town. In Saesie Tsaedaemba, the rugged nature 
of the topography, recurrent droughts and general degradedness of 
the area have left youth with little or no options for gainful 
employment. Consequently, communities in these woredas use 
migration as a livelihood strategy. T6, a 36-year-old female, recounted 
her dreams and expectations about migrating to Saudi Arabia: 
 
Economic problems and inability to get a job after I completed my TVET [technical 
and vocational education and training] were the main reasons that forced me to 
emigrate. On top of that I had the responsibility of caring for and supporting my 
family (my grandmother and my two kids). Hence, I decided to migrate to Saudi 
Arabia where I believed I could realise my goals and expectations – change my life 
and educate my kids properly. (T6, face-to-face interview with author, Saesie 
Tsaedaemba, 25 June 2018)  
 
Socio-cultural factors, like the desire of youth to get rich overnight 
and returnees’ pre-migration exposure to successful returnees in their 
locality were reported as among the factors that influenced 
respondents to develop a positive mindset about migration.  
 
According to the in-depth interviewees, seeking better-paid jobs and 
enough income to improve their and their family’s lives were the main 
goals of migrating to Saudi Arabia. However, many respondents said 
that they failed to achieve their migration goals and returned home 
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empty-handed. Being illegal migrants, they were forced to return back 
to their homeland by the Saudi government. The deportation 
happened quickly, before the migrants were ready for the process of 
return. Hence, instead of improving their life, many ended up in 
financial trouble. One respondent, a 26-year-old male returnee from 
Ahferom, shared the following:  
 
I had been in Saudi Arabia [Riyad] for two consecutive years working illegally as a 
daily labourer in the construction sector. Following the Saudi government’s sudden 
and unexpected deportation order, I was forced to return home without my wages. I 
left four months’ salary behind because my employer was not in a position to pay my 
salary, so I was forced to leave it. So I did not bring back enough capital to enable 
me to reintegrate at home and now I am dependent on my family. (11G, face-to-
face interview with author, Ahferom, 29 December 2017)  
 
In short, even though, respondents reported having a positive 
mindset about migration and working abroad before departure, their 
actual migration experience did not meet expectations. The majority 
of the respondents did not achieve their migration goals and this, in 
turn, inhibited their reintegration upon return. Many returnees were 
in a worse situation than they were when they left and were 
contemplating re-migrating, despite the challenges that they had faced 
the first time around.  
Negative reception by families 
In order to explore the effect of the migrants’ families’ reception on 
the reintegration of returnees, we need to look at the pre-departure 
perceptions and expectations of families, their involvement in the 
initial migration decision-making process, and the benefits they 
derived from the migration of their family member. The results of the 
in-depth interviews carried out with families and returnees revealed 
that many families and parents have positive perceptions of 
migration. They saw migration as enabling people to generate more 
income than local employment. Consequently, parents often 
encourage their children to migrate by telling success stories of some 
pioneer migrants and returnees in their neighbourhood. Interviewees 
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said that only narrating success stories of migration and the reluctance 
of returnees to tell their families about their negative migration 
experiences has led to the development of a positive perception of 
migration among families. In most cases, migration was arranged and 
the final decision made collectively by household members. Parents 
and family members chose to send the migrant abroad because they 
perceived life in Saudi Arabia to be desirable; they believed that youth 
can easily make a large amount of money and the family can then 
receive remittances on a regular basis. N5, a 52-year-old father of a 
returnee, recounted the history of migration in the community and 
the value the community attaches to migration:  
 
In our district [Ahferom] migration began early. Many people have been migrating 
to Eritrea (before the border conflict), Israel and Sudan. Although there has been a 
change in destination, migration is continuing and this has become the norm in the 
community at large. Most of the households in the community have one or more family 
member with a migration history. This reflects the positive perception of migration. 
Families who send their children abroad are accorded a high social status in the 
community, compared to their counterparts. (N5, focus group discussion, 
Ahferom, 30 December 2017)  
 
As explained by the respondents, the majority of parents were 
involved in instigating and financing the migration, and expected that 
their financial investment would be returned. This is substantiated by 
the survey data, which found that 57.4% (n=125) of the sample 
returnees funded their migration costs through their parents or 
borrowed from relatives. In return, out of 218 respondents, 85% 
(n=185) reported sending remittance home while they were working 
abroad. As indicated by both the survey and qualitative data, migrants’ 
remittances were used mainly for household consumption (food, 
clothes, education, health and social activities) and loan repayment, as 





Table 14.1. Use of money remitted by family of migrants 
 
Purpose Frequency % (n=185) 
Household consumption 96 51.9 
Loan repayment 48 25.9 
Purchase assets 13 10.3 
Saving 28 11.9 
Total 185 100 
  
Being irregular in status, returnees were unable to save the money 
they earnt at the destination, but instead had to send it home to their 
families (although getting the money back was a problem). It was 
argued that remittance contribution in preserving family welfare, 
providing quality of life, and generally reducing the vulnerability of 
the household is undeniable. B2, a 24-year-old female returnee, 
explained as follows:  
 
We [the youth] do have a responsibility to care for and support our families: for 
instance, I was in Saudi Arabia for almost two years working illegally as a maid 
and I sent money to my parents living in a rural area mainly to buy agricultural 
inputs and construction materials to renovate their old hut. However, it is untrue to 
say that all families who have a family member who has migrated are benefiting from 
migration. The lucky ones are few compared to the extent of migration in our locality. 
(B2, focus group discussion, Saesie Tsaedaemba, 13 June 2018) 
 
In short, the majority of returnees reported supporting their families 
back home from the income they earnt while abroad. However, as 
viewed by the families of returnees, the support they obtained was 
not as life changing as they expected; it was allocated mainly to daily 
household consumption and repaying debts. Even worse, there were 
unfortunate families whose investment in the migration of their 
family member was lost. N5, a 52-year-old father of a returnee, 




Some lucky families have been benefiting from the migration of their family members, 
mostly the families of early migrants. However, currently, many families are becoming 
destitute because migration has wiped out their meagre resources. For instance, when 
my son repeatedly nag me to let him migrate, I spent 45,000 Ethiopian birr [USD 
1,667] for his migration expenses. Unfortunately, he returned [deported] empty-
handed after he had stayed four months in Saudi Arabia. (N5, focus group 
discussion, Ahferom, 30 December 2017) 
 
This excerpt shows that sending a family member abroad constitutes 
a major investment on the part of the family, who may sell household 
assets on the assumption that they will be repaid one day. However, 
as reported by the majority of families and returnees, their 
expectations and goals of migration are often not realised. It was 
argued that the untimely, involuntary return of migrants not only 
disrupts individual returnee’s hopes and plans, but also those of the 
migrant’s family, especially if they are unable to repay the loan they 
took to finance the migration. Returnees stated that they had intended 
to stay in Saudi Arabia at least until they had repaid the money that 
they borrowed. A4, a 23-year-old female returnee, recounted her 
migration process as follows:  
 
The community that I live in is prone to migration and when I was a student, I saw 
youth migrating abroad and succeeding, so I started contemplating how to migrate. I 
perceived that education would not bring about the same immediate gains as 
migration and decide to migrate illegally. To arrive at my destination [Saudi Arabia] 
it took me six weeks, although I thought the journey would take only two. Until I 
arrive in Saudi, I spent 40,000 Ethiopian birr [USD 1,481]. I borrowed from my 
elder brothers. I was working as a house maid for one year and then deported empty-
handed. Now, I have nothing at my disposal, let alone to re-establish my live and 
reintegrate. I am unable to repay the debt I took and my family have become 
unhappy, which has created hostility with my family. (A4, face-to-face interview 
with author, Saesie Tsaedaemba, 12 June 2018)  
 
The above excerpt shows that the unplanned return of migrants 
creates a stressful experience for the returnees and their families. 
From the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, it became 
clear that for households who relied on relatives and friends to loan 
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them money to pay for migration, involuntary return without being 
able to repay the debt represented a particular economic setback for 
the entire family. Returnees interviewed stated that due to the 
economic loss incurred, returning to a situation of debt created an 
unwelcoming reception by their families and relatives and subsequent 
decrease in the care and support they received from their families. 
This often hindered the reintegration of returnees into their 
community of origin. The returnees who participated in the focus 
group discussions shared that borrowing money for migration has 
ruined their reintegration. The returnees who borrowed money from 
their parents, friends and financial institutions and did not pay it back 
are treated very badly. In addition to this, the communication among 
family members and the returnees is not smooth; most of them said 
that, as a result, they are not happy living with their families and prefer 
to re-migrate.  
 
As explained by the returnees and their families, the untimely 
deportation of migrants not only negatively influences migration 
investment, but also ruins the livelihoods of low-income families who 
rely on remittances to subsidise their livelihoods. For instance, 7M, 
one of the participants in this study, described the extent to which his 
family was dependent on his earnings:  
 
Fortunately, I stayed three and half years in the destination country [Saudi Arabia]. 
When I was there, I sent money to my family once every three months and my family 
[my two kids and wife] were entirely dependent on that money for their livelihood 
and expenses. Now, being the only breadwinner in the family, I am unable to support 
my family and I am looking for possible options to re-migrate. (7M, focus group 
discussion, Saesie Tsaedaemba, 13 June 2018)  
 
In short, the majority of interviewees reported that their family’s high 
level of dependence on remittances, which ended due to deportation, 
and the negative reception by family members hindered their 
reintegration and motivated them to want to re-migrate. It was argued 
that families in which remittances from migrants constituted the sole 
or largest source of income are particularly vulnerable, especially 
those returnees who were not able to support themselves upon their 
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return and became dependent on their families. It was explained 
during the discussions that although the families did not share their 
grievances explicitly with the returned family member, they were 
disappointed with their child's unexpected deportation, the loss of 
support (remittances) and the additional strain placed on their limited 
household resources. The following quote from an interview with 7W 
explains the situation: 
 
My family’s reaction and reception when I returned back home was good; however, 
eventually, some of my family members became unhappy realising that the financial 
support from remittances had ceased. They were expecting at least to buy a house and 
educate my little siblings; but I was unfortunately not able to do all these things 
during my stay abroad. They do not see the challenges I have gone through; rather 
they only care about my money. I sent all I earnt abroad and I have nothing. This 
has created a bad relationship with my family. Now, I am determined to re-migrate 
again. (7W, face-to-face interview with author, Saesie Tsaedaemba, 12 
June 2018)  
 
In the same vein, key informants explained that at first families usually 
welcome the returnees back at their return. This is because they do 
not know the situation. They expect the returnee to come back with 
at least with some money to enable him/her to lead their life. But, as 
time passes, and when they realise that the returnee has been deported 
without enough money, they became unsupportive. Family members 
often compared returnees to other migrants who have returned with 
money. This influences returnees to think of re-migrating. Without 
networks and support from their family, reintegration into a 
community is difficult, if not impossible.  
Socio-cultural feelings of shame  
As reported by the majority of returnees, the ultimate objective of 
their migration was to earn a better income to improve their 
livelihood and that of their family. However, most of the returnees 
were unable to achieve this objective due to unplanned deportation 
and the inability to use the money they had sent back home. A focus 
group discussion with returnees and their families revealed that when 
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families and communities had high expectations of migration, 
returning empty-handed created anxiety and feelings of shame about 
failure in returnees. In addition, key informants explained that in 
communities where migration has become the norm, the inability of 
returnees to fulfil families’ expectation regarding the economic 
outcomes of migration resulted in the development of feelings of 
shame, loss, failure and stress on the part of returnees, which 
hindered reintegration. This shame is not only felt by the returnees, 
but by the whole family. The feeling was worse in returnees who were 
unable to repay the debt taken to finance their migration. As 
described earlier, A4 was unable to repay her migration debt: “Now 
my family does not know my address and I have no relationship with 
them, because I am afraid to see them” (A4, face-to-face interview 
with author, Saesie Tsaedaemba, 12 June 2018). 
 
In addition, many interviewees said that the assumption by family 
members and relatives that the returnees had money, when the reality 
was different, made them nervous. All these sentiments made 
returnees feel inferior and uncomfortable living in their place of 
origin and hindered their reintegration. Most of the return migrants 
said that they spent most of their time with other returnees in other 
areas, usually in nearby towns. Furthermore, the involuntary return 
and interruption of hopes not only made the returnees feel like 
failures, but also made them behave badly towards family members. 
This behaviour also negatively affected relationships with family 
members and hampered the social and emotional reintegration of 
returnees. It was found that returnees who had maintained no or little 
contact with their families and friends in their countries of origin 
encountered difficulties establishing social networks upon their 
return, which are key to reintegration.  
 
Many returnees explained that they are perceived by the community 
to have money, merely because they were abroad. They said that 
members of their community did not understand or believe their 
experiences, instead referring to returnees as ‘deportees’ (tiruz for 
man and tirzti for woman), which has negative connotations. In 
addition, members of local communities stereotyped all returnees as 
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having mental problems, having been raped, and as disobedient to 
their families and the community at large. This skewed perception of 
returnees made them feel ashamed and hindered their reintegrating 
into the community. A 24-year-old female returnee, explained the 
situation as follows:  
 
After I returned back home, I lived in the village with my family for three weeks, 
but later I became upset by the gossip and defamation by the local community. These 
things made me nervous in my village and forced me to leave permanently to live in a 
small town called Enticho [Ahferom] with other returnees whom I knew when we 
returned back home together from Saudi Arabia. (9Z, face-to-face interview 
with author, Ahferom, 29 December, 2017)  
 
On the other hand, it was pointed out that returnees often 
underestimate the local employment opportunities that are available. 
In the survey, it was found that although the majority of returnees 
were from rural areas, they did not want to live and look for job 
opportunities there. Similarly, in the focus group discussions, it was 
highlighted that returnees often do not want to work in low paid jobs, 
because they assume this will not improve their life. Returnees 
generally did not want to work in their local area if the job did not 
generate the minimum income they expected. They simply 
contemplate and gather information on how to re-migrate, instead of 
looking for ways to reintegrate.  
Transnational ties and networks  
Research has shown that if individuals who are involuntarily returned 
have close family members or relatives in the deporting country, the 
impulse to return is very strong (Schuster & Majidi, 2013). In the 
present study, it was found that, in addition to the aforesaid 
challenges, transnational ties that link returnees with family members 
and relatives abroad hinder the reintegration of returnees. The survey 
data showed that 33.5% (n=73) of the sample returnees had family 
members or relatives either in the destination country (Saudi Arabia) 
or other countries. Social capital (meaningful ties with relatives and 
family members abroad) provides a foundation for the dissemination 
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of information as well as for patronage or assistance, which increases 
the likelihood of returnees re-migrating. The survey revealed that, 
from the total sample of returnees who had family members or 
relatives in Saudi Arabia or other countries, 57.5% (n=42) reported 
that they intended to re-migrate. In comparison, the figure for the 
respondents who had no family members or relatives abroad, but 
intended to migrate was 42.1%. Using the chi-square test, it can be 
said that a statistically significant difference in the intention to re-
migrate was found between returnees who have family members or 
relatives abroad and those who do not (χ2=4.66, df=1, P=0.03) 
(Table 14.2). The role of relatives or family members who live in the 
potential destination country is immense in perpetuating migration in 
the study areas. Here is an excerpt from an interview with a returnee 
(A3) that shows the effect of transnational ties and remittances in 
reinforcing irregular migration from the study areas.  
 
Since my return in May 2017, I have been doing nothing. I have no job, but have 
become dependent on the support I get from my elder sister who lives in Saudi Arabia. 
Now, I do not want to stay here anymore: my sister is insisting that I re-migrate and 
I am waiting for her to send me money to help cover the cost of migration. (A3, face-
to-face interview with author, Saesie Tsaedaemba, 13 June 2018) 
 






















































The key informant interviews held with representatives of 
government offices, mainly the Youth and Sports Affairs office at 
Ahferom, also confirmed that the majority of returnees who re-
migrated had family members, relatives or friends abroad. For 
instance, there were 3,989 returnees (deported from Saudi Arabia in 
the period 2013–2015) in the district, of whom 1,040 had re-migrated 
within one year after returning, paying a large amount of money to 
traffickers, which they received from family members and relatives 
who live abroad (Ahferom Woreda Youth and Sports Affairs Office, 
2016).  
Discussion and conclusion 
The results of the study on the pre-departure perceptions and 
expectations of people migrating from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia 
revealed that returnees see Saudi Arabia as a place of milk and honey, 
where money is plentiful and success is certain. Although returnees 
were aware of the serious security risks and increased legal difficulty 
with being in Saudi Arabia, many of them had positive perceptions 
about migration before they migrated. The selective exposure of 
returnees to positive rewards and the success stories of early migrants 
and disregard for reports of negative migration experiences influence 
returnees to develop a positive perception about migration before 
they migrate. However, the majority of interviewees acknowledged a 
significant difference between their perceptions prior to travel and 
the reality they experienced at the destination. There was an 
overestimation or idealisation of the advantages to be reaped from 
migration on the part of the returnees and their families.  
 
The returnees in this study had primarily migrated in pursuit of 
economic betterment for themselves and their family members left 
behind. This corroborates previous research findings that Ethiopians 
consider migration a good way to earn and secure a promising future 
(Busza et al., 2017). In earlier times, especially in the 1970s, migration 
from Ethiopia was mainly driven by political factors. However, since 
the 1990s, the primary motives behind migration from Ethiopia are 
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economic factors: to move out of poverty and to augment family 
living standards. However, this study found that the majority of 
returnees did not achieve their migration goals owing to their 
untimely involuntary return and inability to bring back enough capital. 
This result complements the findings of previous research on 
Ethiopian female return migrants (see Ali, 2018; Alemu, 2018; 
Nisrane et al., 2017; Zewdu, 2018; De Regt & Tafesse, 2015; 
Kuschminder, 2014).  
 
In addition to the structural problems (poverty and unemployment) 
in the place of origin, which motivated returnees to migrate in the 
first place, this study found that experiences of deportation and 
thwarted migration goals add three factors that make the reintegration 
of returnees difficult and remigration more likely in the study areas: 
the negative reception of returnees by family and community 
members, the socio-cultural feelings of shame about failure held by 
the returnees, and the existence of transnational ties and networks of 
returnees. A study done by Schuster and Majidi (2013) demonstrates 
that cross-border migration is an expensive business, one that usually 
requires family support. Similarly, in the present study, it was found 
that family members and relatives usually invested large amounts of 
money to send a family member abroad, for which they leased out 
their land, sold assets and borrowed money from friends, relatives 
and financial institutions, on the assumption that they would be 
repaid one day from the returns of migration (Carling & Carretero, 
2008). In a place like Ethiopia where there is no regular institutional 
support in times of crisis, household assets are an insurance against 
adversity for many rural and urban families. However, the unplanned 
involuntary return of a family member not only disrupts individual 
returnee’s hopes and plans, but also those of the migrant’s family in 
the following ways: First, the deportation of the migrant before they 
can achieve their migration goals leads to depletion of household 
assets that could have been invested locally or saved for the future. 
Second, in addition to the loss of household assets, inability to pay 
back loans taken to finance migration exposes families to conflict 
with the returnees and the creditors, and even financial ruin. Third, 
401 
 
deportation of a family member also affects the livelihood of low-
income families, who rely on remittances for their daily subsistence.  
 
When families and relatives have high expectations of migration, 
returning empty-handed creates an unwelcoming or negative 
reception for returnees from their families, which damages the 
relationship between returnees and their families. A study done by Ali 
on Ethiopian female returnee migrants found similar results. In that 
study all the female returnees said that they were welcomed by their 
families at first, however, many of them eventually encountered 
criticism. As the migrants’ support for the family diminished, family 
members became unhappy, which created conflict (Ali, 2018). In 
addition to the accumulated negative migration experiences, the 
unwelcoming reception of returnees by family members exacerbated 
any existing post-traumatic stress or depression of returnees. Lack of 
understanding about the pain that returnees had suffered during their 
migration cycle and lack of support from family members compelled 
many returnees to hide themselves from the eye of their families, 
obstructing their reintegration. In addition to lack of understanding 
and support, misconceptions about return migrants held by local 
community members negatively affected the morale of returnees, 
which hindered their reintegration prompting them to re-migrate.  
 
In addition to the negative reception of returnees by families, socio-
cultural feelings of shame about failure held by returnees was found 
to be one of the factors hindering their reintegration. A study done 
on Senegalese migrants by Carling and Carretero (2008) had similar 
findings: in this study returnees were not only frustrated and angry, 
but also spoke of a sense of shame in relation to having failed and 
come home empty-handed. On top of the negative migration 
experiences of the returnees, the feeling of failure to meet personal 
and family expectations leads to hopelessness, social isolation and low 
self-esteem on the part of returnees, which hinders their reintegration. 
Schuster and Majidi, in a study on Afghan deportees, argue that the 
power of shame about their failure to meet expectations should not 
be underestimated and that it puts pressure on returnees to re-migrate 




In this study, it was also found that the presence of transnational links 
and networks that connect returnees with family members or 
acquaintances in the destination country affect the reintegration of 
return migrants. Evidence shows that if an individual who has been 
involuntarily returned has close family members or relatives in the 
country from which they were deported, the impulse to return is very 
strong (Schuster & Majidi, 2013). The encouragement and pressure 
to re-migrate coming from family members and relatives living in the 
destination country hinder the reintegration of return migrants.  
 
In conclusion, unless the structural problems (poverty and 
unemployment) that cause people to migrate in the first place are 
addressed, involuntary return without meeting personal and family 
hopes exposes returnees to an unwelcome reception by families and 
feelings of shame about failure, which lead to depression, hindering 
reintegration and influencing returnees to re-migrate. Thus, for 
migrants who are involuntarily returned and who have negative 
migration experiences, the mere provision of post-return material and 
financial support may not lead to their successful reintegration. 
Hence, improving the prevailing structural problems and the 
provision of psychosocial, moral and emotional support from family 
members, relatives, friends and communities at large are imperative.  
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Life after the Lord’s Resistance Army: Support for 
Formerly Abducted Girls in Northern Uganda 
 
Primrose Nakazibwe & Mirjam Van Reisen 
 
Introduction 
When the guns were finally 
silenced in Northern 
Uganda, many people had to 
live with the after-effects of 
war in their daily life.68 The 
armed conflict in Northern 
Uganda had lasted 20 years. 
It was declared officially over 
in January 2007 by the 
government. The conflict 
between the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) and 
the National Resistance 
Movement, the ruling 
political party in Uganda had 
been extremely violent and 
left deep scars. 
 
The civil war in Northern 
Uganda started in 1986 when 
 
68 This chapter presents some of the findings of a study titled Cost Benefit Analysis of 
Cash Transfer Programs and Post Trauma Services for Empowerment of Women in North 
Uganda (EWP-U), which was carried out from 2015 to 2019 (Van Reisen, 
Nakazibwe, Stokmans, Vallejo & Kidane, 2018). The study was conducted by a 
consortium of institutions: Tilburg University, Mbarara University of Science and 
Technology, Makerere University and Isis-Women's International Cross-Cultural 
Exchange (Isis-WICCE). We gratefully acknowledge the support of the 
Netherlands Science Organisation (NWO).  
When girls abducted by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army in Uganda realised 
their dream of returning home, the reality 
was not what they expected. Often with 
children fathered by the rebels, they found 
themselves outcast and ill prepared for 
life. These girls are deeply traumatised as 
a result of the abuse and sexual violence 
experienced in captivity, which is 
compounded by the discrimination 
experienced on return. The government’s 
rehabilitation programme needs to 
address these issues by reaching out to 
these girls with psycho-social support and 
mental health services, as well as 
improving their livelihoods by securing 
access to land and helping them develop 
the skills they need to survive.  
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the National Resistance Army, later renamed the National Resistance 
Movement, took power in Uganda and the LRA decided to fight the 
new government. The LRA began as an evolution of the Holy Spirit 
Movement led by Alice Lakwena. When Lakwena was exiled, Joseph 
Kony took over. However, with the change of leadership, the rebel 
group lost regional support, which forced Kony to engage in self-
preservation, including stealing supplies and abducting children to fill 
his ranks. The rebels, thus, embarked on a campaign of terror, which 
included child abduction, mutilation, murder and general destruction. 
The conflict was concentrated in the Lango and Acholi ethnic sub-
regions of Northern Uganda, including Kitgum District.  
 
This chapter focuses on the experiences of the former abductees ten 
years after the end of the war in the context of the rehabilitation effort 
by the Government of Uganda in the north. In 2015, when this study 
was undertaken, the support provided by the Government in 
Northern Uganda was focused on social protection programmes 
which offered cash or in-kind livelihood support to the members of 
impoverished communities. The objective of the social protection 
programmes was to help the region regain its resilience. But has this 
objective been attained in the context of the severe trauma 
experienced by the population in Northern Uganda? 
 
This study investigates the trauma suffered by the girls abducted by 
the LRA in Northern Uganda and how they are coping now as young 
women with the traumatic events that happened and how they have 
been able to reintegrate back into their communities and participate 
in social protection programmes initiated by the government. The 
main research question is: How has the trauma experienced by the girls 
formerly abducted by the LRA affected their reintegration as young women 
returning to their original communities, including their ability to access government 
social protection programmes? This research question is approached 
through the lens of the feelings as information theory (Schwarz, 
2010). This theory holds that feelings present themselves as 
information. Therefore, in populations with high trauma, it can be 
expected that the resulting negative feelings affect the impact of social 
protection programmes. The hypothesis of the study was that the 
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trauma, left unaddressed, would dampen the results of the efforts of 
rehabilitation through the social protection programmes. This 
chapter provides a qualitative assessment of the study that was carried 
out in Kitgum, located in the far north of Uganda, bordering South 
Sudan. 
War trauma in Northern Uganda 
Many people in Northern Uganda, including women and children, 
were left to deal with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result 
of the atrocities committed by the LRA and the National Resistance 
Movement. The abduction of children by the rebels left many severely 
traumatised, and their return home did not erase the horrific 
experiences. When they returned, they found themselves in a wider 
community that had also experienced a lot of trauma due to the 
atrocities committed by the rebels. They had to deal with their 
personal trauma as well as the collective trauma suffered by their 
community. The civil war in Northern Uganda left the whole region 
devastated by traumatic experiences, leaving citizens to handle their 
feelings on their own after the war ended (Logan, 2016). Previous 
studies conducted in Uganda have indicated that many survivors of 
the war still suffer the effects of the war (Ovuga, 2005; Ovuga, Oyok 
& Moro, 2008; Roberts Ocaka, Browne, Oyok & Sondorp, 2009). 
Many of those diagnosed with mental health problems suffer from 
depression, alcohol abuse, anxiety and suicidal tendencies, which are 
all signs of untreated trauma (Ovuga, 2005).  
 
War and political conflict are gendered phenomena that affect men 
and women differently. According to the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against Women (Ward, 2005), there is a 
growing body of data that brings to light the sexual violence and 
torture of civilian women and girls during periods of armed conflict 
over the last decade. Women and girls in Northern Uganda 
experienced all the forms of atrocity suffered by women and girls in 
conflict situations. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the trauma 
experienced by women and girls, notwithstanding the reality that men 
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and boys were also severely traumatised by the experiences described 
in this chapter. 
Social protection programmes 
Social protection is at the heart of attaining the Sustainable 
Development Goals of the Global Agenda 2030 and Africa’s Agenda 
2063 (Guloba, Ssewanyana & Birabwa, 2017). African countries have 
taken on this agenda by incorporating social protection policies and 
programmes into their plans of action. Uganda has embraced this call 
of action at different times, as needed and as financial resources have 
allowed. After the end of the war, the Government of Uganda rolled 
out many social protection programmes that specifically targeted war 
affected districts, alongside the implementation of national 
programmes aimed at poverty eradication and the modernisation of 
agriculture. 
 
Some of the social protection programmes that have been put in place 
and implemented by the Government of Uganda are the National 
Social Security Fund, National Pensions Scheme, Northern Uganda 
Social Action Fund, Orphans and Vulnerable Children grant, 
Universal Primary Education, Universal Secondary Education, 
Universal Health Services, cash for work schemes, Community 
Driven Development Programme, Agricultural Livelihood Recovery 
Programme, Karamoja Livelihood Improvement Programme, and 
Social Assistance Grant for Empowerment (SAGE), under which 
there is the Senior Citizen Grant and Vulnerable Family Grant. Much 
of the interventions on trauma were carried out by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs) 
with limited capacity and small coverage. This chapter looks at the 
experiences of formerly abducted girls in accessing these programmes 
after they returned home.  
Theoretical framework: Feelings as information 
The discussion of trauma in this chapter draws on the theory of 
‘feelings as information’ to explain the impact of trauma on an 
individual’s decisions and life. Schwarz (2010) understands human 
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thinking as informed by a variety of subjective experiences, including 
moods and emotions, metacognitive feelings and bodily sensations. 
This theory explains that mood affects the judgement of individuals 
and they respond and make decisions differently depending on their 
mood. Individuals in a happy mood are more likely to report higher 
life satisfaction than those who are sad (Bower, 1981). The theory 
assumes that people attend to their feelings as a source of 
information, with different types of feelings providing different types 
of information and, hence, different reactions (Schwarz, 2010). 
 
People suffering PTSD tend to have sad moods resulting from 
painful experiences in their life. The definition of PTSD, as given by 
Ovuga and Larroque (2012, p. 183) – “a psychiatric condition, which 
develops after a person experiences, witnesses, is confronted with or 
hears about emotionally stressful and painful experiences beyond 
what a human being can bear” – offers insights into the impact of 
PTSD on the emotions and feelings of the victims.  
 
An individual’s feelings may result in different emotional expressions. 
Emotions exist as signals to underlying appraisal patterns (Schwarz, 
2010). People traumatised by war tend to develop self-blame, guilt, 
and loss of self-confidence and self-esteem (Ovuga & Larroque, 
2012). This leads to emotional numbness, which often accompanies 
the traumatic experience of people with PTSD, which causes severe 
loss of control over personal routines and dignity, with a pervasive 
loss of sense of the future with the victim living day-by-day (Herman, 
1997; Ovuga & Larroque, 2012). This leads to sad moods resulting in 
low life satisfaction, which impacts negatively on their self-drive to 
change the circumstances of their lives after the war. Thus, for people 
suffering from PTSD, managing their traumatic experiences may be 
important to restoring their emotional wellbeing and enabling them 
to reintegrate into their community.  
 
The experiences that lead people to suffer from PTSD cause a sense 
of helplessness in the affected individuals, as a result of fear and 
horror, which impact negatively on their mood. Hence, people 
suffering from PTSD experience negative feelings, which negatively 
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affects the information they hold about themselves. Ovuga and 
Larroque, (2012: p. 184) noted that “victims develop selfblame, guilt 
feelings, loss of self-confidence and self-esteem. Emotional 
numbness that accompanies the traumatic experience causes severe 
loss of control over personal routines and dignity with a pervasive 
loss of sense of the future”. The Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1991) can help explain how negative emotions leading to 
negative information may lead to negative behaviour towards one-self 
and towards the community (through perceived negative attitudes). 
Perceived negative social norms towards the highly traumatised group 
may further impact on behaviour (Chapter 1, Roaming Africa: A Social 
Analysis of Migration and Resilience, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia 
Stokmans, Munyaradzi Mawere & Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher). 
The expectation is that people suffering from a high level of PTSD 
may, therefore, not fully benefit from opportunities, as the negative 
feelings dominate, not allowing them to see or grasp the 
opportunities.  
 
In this study, the phrase ‘room to manoeuvre’ is used to imply the 
interplay between actions and competences, which is agency 
(Simonton & Montenach, 2013; Samman & Santos, 2009). The World 
Bank defines agency as the “the ability to make decisions about one’s 
own life and act on them to achieve a desired outcome, free of 
violence, retribution, or fear” (World Bank, 2014, p. 3). This 
definition sees agency as: “women’s access to and control over 
resources; freedom of movement; freedom from the risk of violence; 
decision-making over family formation; and having a voice in society 
and influencing policy” (World Bank, 2014, p. 2). The World Bank’s 
definition is based on the assumption that agency is something 
someone can receive from somewhere else or can be ‘given’ by those 
in authority (Nakazibwe, 2017). However, agency is more than 
observable actions. Although it tends to be operationalised as 
decision making, it can also take a number of other forms (Kabeer, 
1999). Thus, this study adopts the definition of Kabeer (1999, p. 438), 
who defines agency as “the ability to define one’s goals and act upon 
them”. Kabeer explains that agency takes many forms, including: 
“bargaining and negotiation, deception and manipulation, subversion 
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and resistance as well as more intangible, cognitive processes of 
reflection and analysis and it can be exercised by individuals as well 
as by collectives” (1999, p. 438). Meyers (2002) adds that agency is an 
innate skill that helps an individual to exercise her own will and that 
women can discover themselves through their ‘agentic skills’. 
Therefore, the understanding and application of agency in this study 
identifies formerly abducted women as actors who pursue conscious 
and unconscious goals to determine their life through interpretative 
and narrative frameworks that help them make sense of their world 
and how they relate to it after returning home.  
 
This study further uses the concept of ‘intersectionality’. In this 
chapter, this is defined as “the interaction between gender, race and 
other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, 
institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes 
of these interactions in terms of power” (Davis, 2008, p. 68). 
Intersectionality enables differentiation between women and sheds 
light on how age, marital status, ethnicity, physical and mental health 
and other variables impact on the participation of people and to help 
understand how people in different circumstances may use their 
room to manoeuvre.  
Methodology 
This study is part of a mixed method research measuring the effect of 
support programmes on social-economic resilience. The research is 
conducted in a real-life natural setting. The purpose of the qualitative 
research was to help interpret a quantitative survey carried out among 
470 women (Chapter 16, Is Trauma Counselling the Missing Link? 
Enhancing Socio-Economic Resilience among Post-war IDPs in Northern 
Uganda, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, 
Zaminah Malole & Bertha Vallejo). In the survey it was found that 
the women receiving psycho-social support scored significantly 
higher than women receiving support in the form of social protection 
on social-economic resilience. The women receiving both psycho-
social support and social protection scored significantly higher than 
all groups, while the score of control group did not change. These 
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results point to the importance of addressing post-traumatic stress as 
part of building social-economic resilience. In this chapter we 
investigate why unaddressed trauma negatively affects social-
economic resilience, even in the context of attempts aiming to regain 
resilience through social protection. It aims to describe in-depth a 
wide range of varied experiences, allowing the different lived 
experiences of participants to be acknowledged. In this way it follows 
the notion that quantitative findings are the result of different real 
individual experiences. 
 
The chapter is based on the qualitative analysis of themes that 
emerged from the stories shared by the women who participated in 
the study. The findings presented in this chapter were from interviews 
conducted in July 2015 in Kitgum District. Kitgum was one the 
districts worst affected by the conflict, due to its location on the 
border with South Sudan, which was a base for the LRA. The 
participants were purposively selected from the list of girls who had 
been supported by the Kitgum Women Peace Initiative (KIWEPI) 
after the end of the war. KIWEPI is a local NGO based in Kitgum, 
providing mental health services to the women who returned from 
the war and giving them practical support such as training or 
livelihood support.  
 
The 10 participants selected for the interviews were all formerly 
abducted and were at the time residing in Kitgum District. A number 
of the women interviewed were young girls at the time of their 
abduction. The study also included two key informants: the director 
of KIWEPI and the Kitgum District Development Officer. These 
key informants shared their expertise, knowledge and views on the 
local context, changes over time, and their experiences with the 
women. The office of KIWEPI selected the participants for this 
study. The study used interviews as a data collection method with an 
interview guide to facilitate the interviews. The interviews took the 
shape of story-telling. In order to avoid re-traumatisation, it was left 
to the respondent to decide what experiences they wished to share 




The interviews were conducted at KIWEPI by a senior team of 
experienced researchers in the context of investigating events with 
severe violence. The researchers had been introduced to the 
organisation by Isis-Women’s International Cross Cultural Exchange 
(Isis-WICCE), a Uganda-based NGO specialising in providing 
support to severely traumatised women and with a long track-record 
of working in Northern Uganda. The interviews were carried out by 
a team of trained researchers, including an expert on trauma from 
Isis-WICCE. Through KIWEPI the interviewers built the trust of the 
women and were able to hold in-depth interviews. These interviews 
caused deep distress, but it was necessary to conduct them to 
understand some of the current causes of impediments to social-
economic rehabilitation in the region. Although some of the extracts 
of the interviews may sound distressing and unreal, the KIWEPI-
team of professionals confirmed the veracity of the stories and 
confirmed that there are many stories of similar situations. 
 
The research-team was headed by a team leader who asked the 
questions during the interviews, while the rest of the team took notes. 
Each interview lasted about 45 minutes. The interviews were 
conducted in local language and translated to English. All the women 
interviewed for this study were aged between 23 and 35 years at the 
time of the interview. They all had a child born to the rebels or had 
lost a child born to a rebel. The names used are not the real names of 
the women, for purposes of confidentiality, but are known to the 
researchers. 
 
The situation in Kitgum is important for understanding the social 
dynamics in Northern Uganda. The stories contained in the 
interviews are testimony to the LRA’s cruel treatment of very young 
children, snatched from their parents and communities. This cruel 
war had an impact on Northern Uganda at large with different 
dynamics occurring in different places as a result of it.  
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Choice of research site 
Interviews held in other locations revealed different traumatising 
experiences affecting people and communities at large. To give some 
examples. In Barlonyo people narrated the severe traumatisation as a 
result of the mass-attack and massacre by the LRA in 2004. The attack 
claimed the lives of 124 people; although the real number is still 
disputed by community members, some suggesting that it was more 
than 300 people. It also left hundreds injured (Site visit, Barlonyo, 26 
January 2017 and 21 February 2017) In Amuria, women told of the 
severe hardship of their communities, who during the war were held 
for protection in detention centres guarded by the government 
troops. Lack of food and water forced the women into prostitution 
resulting in widespread HIV & AIDS among the community (Focus 
group discussion, 9 July 2015). In other locations, such as in 
Kaberamaido and Bukedea, women also explained the hardship they 
faced due to HIV & AIDS, leading to further deprivation and 
poverty, which they had overcome by organising themselves to give 
psycho-social support and start a small credit system. In Lira, the 
researchers were able to speak to young men, who were engaged as 
child-soldiers during the war, and who equally had a hard time re-
engaging with their communities, who regarded them with much 
mistrust and misgiving (Site visit, Lira, 26 January 2017). In regions 
such as Katakwi, respondents spoke of the fear of attacks by 
neighbouring communities and cattle-raids, due to the general 
lawlessness in the region during the war (Focus group discussion, 9 
July 2015).  
 
This chapter focuses on the in-depth qualitative interviews held in 
Kitgum as a background to understanding the intensity of the post-
war trauma experienced for returnees from the LRA.  
Abduction of children forced to live with the rebels 
This section provides a brief narration of some of the stories of 
formerly abducted girls and women, explaining their ordeal during the 
time of their abduction and their stay with the rebels. These narrations 
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serve to provide understanding of the experiences in Northern 
Uganda, particularly in Kitgum. 
Abwoli (32 years) 
 
My name is Abwoli, and I come from Matiri Lagor Village, Kitgum District. I 
was 11 years old when I was abducted along with three other girls. We were going to 
town from home when all of a sudden, we realised strange movements in the nearby 
bush. The rebels were hiding in the trees watching us as we walked. As we proceeded 
one of the soldiers jumped down with a gun and forced us off the road and we entered 
the bush where we met hundreds of other soldiers. They slapped us and undressed us 
and touched us everywhere. Then we had to walk for one week without rest to Sudan. 
We were forced to carry things beyond our capacity. We were told if we failed to carry 
our load, they would cut off our breasts. There was no drinking water, we would 
drink urine; the soldiers would tell the girls to pee and they would drink the urine as 
there was no water. The girls would try to touch the soil and get water out of the soil. 
They gave me to an old man without teeth from Gulu; he told me he would look after 
me as a kid before he turned me into his fourth wife. He forced me to have sex with 
him in return for food and clothes. I stayed back in the barracks as a sex slave. 
After about 8–10 months, I realised that I was pregnant. I was left in the hands of 
my co-wives, who mistreated me almost to death. They did not love me, they would 
sometimes cook and not give me food. I would steal food [cries]. My husband returned 
when I was about to give birth and I was taken to Juba for an operation on a 
stretcher. Then the baby came. (Abwoli, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 1 
July 2015)  
 
This interview speaks to the deep distress and fear of very young girls, 
suddenly cut off from their families, sexually violated and raped, and 
living in fearful circumstances without any support. There was a deep 
sense of powerlessness and hopelessness, while the situation 
appeared completely out of their control.  
Amoti (23 years) 
 
My name is Amoti, I came from Lamo district. I was I was 13 years old studying 
P5 when I was abducted along with my two sisters and three other girls on our way 
back from school. [Breaks down and cries for about two minutes. She is carrying a 
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baby whom she keeps shaking as she cries]. Someone told us in class that the place 
was not safe, the teachers did not release us, thinking the fights would be far away 
until later in the evening when we were released to go home. On the way, as we ran 
home, we were stopped by a young boy who later appeared to be with the rebels. The 
young boy was used by the other seven rebels to distract us while the rest of seven 
rebels were hiding around the same place. The seven rebels came out and arrested us 
as we spoke to the young boy and took us to a cassava plantation. In the cassava 
plantation, we found many other rebels who were cooking as they had been looting. 
On arrival in the plantation, we were divided into the youngest and the older ones. 
The very young ones were sent back home. My youngest sister was sent back home 
with our books. However, my other sister and I were separated that day and until 
now I have never seen her again. We kept walking. In my group, there was a 
commander who had kids and I was allocated to carry the children. We kept on 
rotating around the villages of Gulu for about nine months. Most of the time there 
was nothing to eat, you just ate raw sweet potatoes. (Amoti, interview, face-to-
face, Kitgum, 1 July 2015) 
 
This was another very emotional interview. The loss of her sisters 
caused a lot of distress, especially not knowing where they were. From 
the interview it seemed that the respondent felt guilty in not 
protecting the other girls, despite her young age at the time of the 
abduction. Being among the eldest she felt responsible for the safety 
of the others and suffered a lot of pain from the sense that she had 
failed them. This also caused a lot of distress in returning, knowing 
that she had been able to escape, but unable to return her siblings and 
friends safely. The feeling was that she was still hoping to find them 
and that they were very present in her current life. Not knowing 
whether or not they were alive made the loss even more difficult to 
bear and she had not been able to close the loss. 
Akiki (25 years) 
 
In September 2003, I was abducted at night with my sister and brothers by the 
rebels. They tied me to the others and also my brother was tied with the boys. It was 
at 23:00 at night. We walked for a long time and the soldiers cooked, but we were 
not allowed to eat. We started walking at 6:00 am without stopping until 18:00 
pm. We rested one hour, cooked food. This time they gave us something to eat, then 
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we started walking again. Every day was like that, resting only one hour in the 
evening, walking towards Soroti. We walked for four days until we were in Soroti. 
After several lootings and abductions, finally we moved to Sudan. They started 
raiding villages and adding more people to the group. We were heading to where Kony 
was. When they got someone from 10 to 18 they would not kill you because you 
could carry things. I was trained to become a child soldier and I was trained to kill. 
I was among the groups of rebels that attacked and looted many villages. I spent 
seven years in the bush. (Akiki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 
2015) 
 
This interview speaks to the inability of the abducted children to 
determine their actions. Trained as a child-soldier, this girl – along 
many other girls and boys – committed war crimes before escaping 
and returning to the community. The young woman appeared numb 
and emotionless. It was explained by the KIWEPI team that being 
both victim and perpetrator makes it much harder to be accepted 
back into the community on return. From the interview, it was clear 
that the trauma resulting from what had happened to her and what 
she had done was alive. Feelings of guilt, remorse and confusion were 
part of the painful and honest narration of her story. 
Dehumanisation and narrow escape 
In order to ensure the submission of the abductees to the fighters, 
the children were exposed to severe inhumane treatment. The 
following are some of the stories the women shared. 
Amoti (23 years) 
 
As time went by, they took away my child and made me carry 8–10 chickens and 
jerry cans. Then there was a boy who befriended me, because I was hurting a lot. He 
told me that we would escape together [crying]. One day we asked another rebel 
whether the barracks were far away. We were told, “You are far”. However, we 
smelt a cigarette, we knew soldiers were around. I was carrying the chickens and the 
jerry cans and I had to carry them so careful that they would not make noise. We 
decided to escape on that day. We took a different direction from the other rebels. On 
our way we heard a gunshot and realised that that the soldiers had ambushed the 
rebels. We were lucky, as this meant that the rebels would not pursue us. The soldiers 
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kept shooting and shooting until the rebels started dispersing. The government soldiers 
threw a bomb, and the soldiers came to see who had died. I hid in the hole that the 
bomb had made. I was lying down when the soldiers came and I put my hand up. 
That is how I escaped from the rebels after a painful experience. I lost my sister, and 
all hope of finding her has vanished. (Amoti, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 
1 July 2015) 
 
This young woman suffered deeply from the abduction, the loss of 
her sister, the loss of the child she gave birth to, and the treatment 
she experienced in the bush. Her narration centred on the long walks 
at night, during which she was forced to carry the chickens and jerry 
cans without making any noise. On these walks, she must have had a 
deep fear for her life. Any noise could trigger a counter-attack. The 
soldiers were ruthless in instilling fear in the porters. Today, this sense 
of fear seemed to override all other feelings and she went into great 
detail in explaining how she made sure not to trigger any noise during 
the dangerous trek of the militia. 
 
Life in the rebel camps was full of life-threatening events, which 
happened almost every day, and many abductees reported that it was 
difficult to imagine that one would live to see the following day. They 
were forced to kill to survive, becoming used to death. Atwoki 
explained: 
 
When we were still with the rebels, we were given drugs to smoke, especially on days 
when horrible incidents happened. I remember the day one of the leading commanders 
was killed, we were given drugs to smoke and while I was very high on drugs, I killed 
my own cousin. Up to today, I still feel responsible for the death of my cousin and 
every time I think about it, it brings me a lot of pain [cries]. (Atwoki, interview, 
face-to-face, Kitgum, 1 July 2015) 
 
Women and girls were raped and later divided among soldiers for 
wives, often experiencing their first pregnancy in very difficult 
circumstances at a very young age. Health complications from rape 
and deliveries not attended by skilled medical personnel left many 
girls and women with complications, such as fistula, affecting their 
lives thereafter. One of the women interviewed complained “I have 
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issues with my breast – it is bleeding. I have cists on my back and on 
my breast – maybe from the heavy carrying” (Abwoli, interview, face-
to-face, Kitgum, 1 July 2015).  
 
Atwoki shared the following story:  
I was 12 when I was abducted. One of the worst memories that I experienced when 
I had just been abducted was the slaughtering of a pregnant woman as a sign that if 
any one of us attempted to escape, we would go through the same treatment. They 
continued to kill women in the same way during the raids. When the rebels saw a 
pregnant woman they would open up the woman’s womb and if found that she was 
pregnant with a boy it was stoned and if a girl they put a stick in her private parts. 
(Atwoki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, July 2015) 
 
Killing or dishonouring the new life that pregnant women carry is a 
way to dehumanise captives, forcing them into submission, instilling 
fear and removing their humanity, particularly hope for a future (Van 
Reisen, 2014). The level of fear instilled in the children was extreme 
and it would have prevented many from escaping. Yet, despite this, 
those we interviewed, and others, found the courage to make use of 
an unexpected moment escape to their community. 
Abwori (32 years) 
 
In 2001, when my child was eight months, I was able to escape [from the rebels]. 
Whenever we would go to fetch water we would talk about the escape, choosing the 
group members carefully so that they would not disappoint. Then one day at nine at 
night we all escaped. There were five girls with children, one who was pregnant and 
four without a child. They [the rebels] realised that we had escaped and started 
following us. There was shooting behind us. We ended up in Sudan barracks, and 
then the Arab soldiers brought a van that drove us to a house that looked like a 
store. They later shipped us to Khartoum and we were four months in Khartoum. 
We were locked up in a place; we would just move out to eat and go back inside. 
(Abwori, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015) 
 
While the girls longed for an escape and used all their imagination and 
bravery to succeed in fleeing their daunting circumstance, the escapes 
were themselves also severely traumatising events. The stories of how 
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they escaped demonstrate that despite ill health and carrying the 
children fathered by the rebels, the women still urged and longed to 
be free in order to give their lives meaning and they engaged in 
courageous ways of escape. After several months or years, many girls 
found their way back home through their own action. 
 
The escapes added further trauma to the already serious trauma of 
the abduction and captivity by the rebels. From the interviews, it was 
clear that the women had not recovered from these experiences. The 
stories were at times told in monotonous, disengaged, mechanistic 
voices. In other interviews the women’s narrations evoked deep 
emotion and distress over what had occurred. These events were still 
triggering extremely deep emotions and negative feelings. Often these 
feeling were paired with a sense of having failed others and low self-
esteem and self-worth. KIWEPI appeared as an important source of 
mental health support. The little pride they expressed was related to 
the steps they had taken to increase their resilience and to look after 
themselves. KIWEPI professionals told us that in order for them to 
make small steps forward, they first had to accept their situation. 
The unreceptive return to the home community 
Having longed to return to their lost home, escaping from the rebels 
was like winning the lottery for those who survived the abduction and 
life with the rebels. The fact that they would finally re-join their family 
brought these girls a lot of joy. Many girls who escaped or were 
rescued by the army were taken to military points designated for 
collection and rehabilitation, before being reunited with their families. 
Those who had families to go back to went straight home, while those 
with no place to go remained at these centres until the war ended, 
when they re-joined their community as homeless children.  
 
However, when the girls returned home, they received a mixed 
reaction from their families and communities. The girls who were 
lucky enough to have parents alive received both a warm and cold 
reception. A warm reception came from their parents who were 
happy to have their children back and treated them as survivors. 
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However, the wider community did not receive them the same way. 
During their abduction, many girls were forced to kill their own 
relatives or friends and those who returned home after they escaped 
or were rescued by the government soldiers brought back ugly stories. 
The parents of these children were sometimes forced to send their 
children away to keep peace with others in the community, whose 
children had died at their own child’s hands.  
 
In addition, some of the girls returned with children fathered by the 
rebels. These children reminded parents who had lost their children 
of the rebels. While the abducted girls were (partially) welcome, their 
children were not. However, the girls did not have any alternative but 
to keep their children. So, the only option was to move with their 
children to a faraway place where they were not recognised as ‘wives 
of the killers’. Jobless and without any support, most of these girls 
ended up in Kitgum Town. Many of them ended up marrying to 
survive in this new place. Many reported that their new husbands did 
not welcome their children or support them with education. One of 
the respondents narrated: “When I reached home, my stepmother 
started to abuse me and my child, calling him the ‘rebels’ child’. I 
could not stand it and had to leave home and come to Kitgum Town” 
(Akiki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015). 
 
Many of the girls opted to get married because it was the only sure 
way they could be supported. However, some of the girls found it 
difficult to find a husband because of the stigma attached to being 
formerly abducted. One of the girls shared: “When I came from the 
bush I found another man, but he did not know I was from the bush 
and when he found out he ran away, but I was pregnant” (Atoki, 
interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015). 
 
However, some girls found husbands who married them even after 
knowing that they had once been abducted. Unfortunately, many of 
these new husbands never accepted the children that the girls bore 
from the rebels and they had to either force their husbands to live 
with their children or send them to a relative who would take care of 
them. According to the Kitgum District Development Officer, these 
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children were now terrorising the communities in the towns, because 
they knew that the community did not welcome them. Furthermore, 
the vast majority of these children did not attend school, hence, grew 
up uneducated and prone to all sorts of negative behaviour. The 
negative feelings between the community and the children of the 
returnees fathered in the bush, translated into negative information 
about each other, exacerbating mutual hostility and negative 
behaviour towards each other. 
Living a traumatised past 
An epidemiological survey carried out in 2004 by the Ministry of 
Health in Uganda found rates of up to 50% for depression in the 
most severely conflict-affected districts (such as those in Northern 
Uganda), compared to 8% in districts not severely affected by war 
(Kinyanda, Hjelmeland & Musisi, 2004). In a cross-sectional study of 
2,875 individuals in 8 districts in Northern Uganda, Pham, Vinck and 
Stover (2009) found that over half (56%) of the respondents and over 
two-thirds of those who experienced abduction met the criteria for 
PTSD, and that female participants were more susceptible than males. 
 
Through the Ministry of Health, the Government of Uganda has been 
involved in the treatment of people diagnosed with mental-related 
health risks through the Butabika National Referral Hospital in 
Kampala. In order to enhance the mental health service delivery in 
the northern districts, Ugandan government institutions (the Ministry 
of Health, Butabika National Referral Hospital, and Makerere 
University Department of Psychiatry) and the Peter C. Alderman 
Foundation initiated a public-private partnership in which they 
established trauma clinics in four districts: Arua, Kitgum, Gulu and 
Soroti (Nakimuli-Mpungu et al., 2013). The clinics were based on 
group counselling for those experiencing depression and post-
traumatic stress. Despite the efforts by the government to ensure 
support for women and girls who had been abducted, many did not 
receive much support when they returned due to the limited time they 
spent in the reception centres. They were not allowed to heal first 
before being returned to their families and, hence, ended up taking 
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the trauma with them into their new life and often mixed response of 
those receiving them. 
 
When the women and girls returned from rebel captivity, they were 
very traumatised by their abduction and life in captivity with the 
rebels. They had been subjected to all sorts of brutal and life-
threatening treatment. The abduction in some cases took place during 
gunfire exchange between the rebels and government soldiers, leaving 
many dead. They were separated from their families, sometimes as 
very young children, and taken into the hands of new, strange and 
ruthless fighters.  
 
Unfortunately, when they returned home, many of these girls were 
unable to get professional assistance to manage their trauma. The few 
that returned home through government assistance were only given 
support for a short amount of time by the government and then 
encouraged to go home. Some were taken through the traditional 
ritual of reconciliation without dealing with the trauma. One of the 
respondents said, “they took us home to do the rituals; step on a raw 
egg for reconciliation and I was accepted back in the community” 
(Atenyi, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015). 
 
Another woman shared her story, as follows: 
I came back in 2004 when I surrendered, we were taken to Kichua. Here, they gave 
us a rapid therapy before returning us to our families; I was there for one month. We 
were counselled to live with one another and to forgive. They announced on the radio 
and my uncle heard my name and came to pick me up. I was still very bitter with 
everyone and it’s my uncle’s wife that sent me to KIWEPI to receive counselling. 
(Amoti, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum 11 July 2015) 
 
Another woman narrated the following: 
When I returned home, I did not get much counselling. When we were rescued, I was 
brought to Entebbe and after taking us through amnesty arrangements, we were 
connected with our families. I came home with all the anger and frustration. 
Sometimes when I feel angry, I just want to kill someone. (Akiki, interview, face-
to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015)  
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NGOs have provided some of the women with further trauma 
management services with semi-professionals, including KIWEPI, 
opened to support girls affected by the war to reintegrate into the 
community. KIWEPI provides former child soldiers with a place to 
meet and share their past with people who have been through similar 
experiences. This ‘talking’ therapy has helped women and girls to 
open up and speak about what happened; even though they will never 
be able to erase the stories from their minds, at least they have been 
able to share their stories, put them in perspective and compare their 
own stories with those of others.69 This has allowed them to re-
evaluate their situation and themselves. One of the respondents noted 
that: “Before I got counselling, my mind was not working well, but 
now I am positive. I have been able to start a small business to 
support my family” (Akiki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 1 July 
2015).  
 
Through the psycho-social counselling a more positive feeling and 
mindset has been obtained. The sharing of stories helped women to 
understand that they were not alone, and that other women were also 
experiencing similar situations. This has allowed them to assess their 
situation more positively. Those who had received training from 
organisations such as KIWEPI, took up the skills they learnt and 
started small businesses to enable them to survive and support their 
children. The decision to start their own life as small entrepreneurs in 
order to survive was a result of the motivation they received from 
their fellow women, who took the step to establish themselves as 
independent women, despite the challenges they faced. Some of these 
women decided to look for help from their relatives to start 
something, but many of them did not receive any support. They felt 
that there was no way they could obtain support from the 
government, because many of the government programmes 
supported people in groups and they were unable to enrol in these 
groups, because of social stigma. Having overcome the negative 
 
69 Religious institutions have also played a large role in supporting girls returning 
from abduction, but, unfortunately, the damage is often too much for some girls to 
recover from with the support of priests alone. 
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feelings, they now looked for alternative opportunities. In this way, 
the women found their own way of surviving. 
The social protection gap  
The Government of Uganda has put in place many social protection 
programmes for the rehabilitation of the survivors of the war in 
Northern Uganda. Many of these programmes target specific 
categories of people, such as the elderly, youth, women and people 
with disabilities. One would imagine that formerly abducted women 
and girls would benefit from these programmes. However, generally, 
the severely traumatised returnee women who participated in this 
study were unable to access these programmes because of social 
stigma and discrimination by members of their community. One of 
the women noted that “getting amnesty is not getting peace, rather to 
get peace of mind is to get a piece of land and a house, where the 
children can be safe and go to school, and to get work” (Atenyi, 
interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015). 
 
The women need resources, such as land, to support themselves and 
have a sense of belonging, so that they are empowered to live a decent 
life. Unfortunately, in Uganda, the government did not look at 
formerly abducted women and girls as a special category requiring 
special attention. Many of the social protection programmes offered 
by the government target general categories of people such as women, 
youth, and people with disabilities. Women are seen as a homogenous 
group by such programmes. The state of their mental health is not 
taking into consideration. This explains why none of the 10 girls 
interviewed in this study had received any support from the 
government’s social protection programmes. One of the girls 
explained: 
 
Apart from the mattress I received from Kichua, where we were taken to process our 
amnesty, and a false promise of corrugated iron sheets, I have never received any other 
support from the government. A formerly abducted girl is seen as a social outcast who 
cannot mix with other women, so we are always left out of government programmes. 
(Akiki, interview, face-to-face, Kitgum, 11 July 2015) 
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Many of the women interviewed in this study had decided to start 
their own life, without the support of social protection programmes, 
displaying personal resilience. Many had taken bold steps to stay away 
from abusive partners and relatives who did not welcome them (and 
their children) back and started a new life with minimal support from 
organisations such as KIWEPI – sometimes with nothing. With the 
little help provided, some of the women took personal initiatives to 
counsel themselves to find better alternatives to life, rather than 
mourning their past life experiences, and to face the challenges that 
emerged when they returned home.  
Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter presents the results of in-depth interviews conducted 
among ten girls abducted by the LRA who managed to escape and 
return to their communities, as well as two resource persons 
(professionals supporting the women). The interviews confirm the 
deep trauma that the women are still experiencing, despite the long 
time that has passed since these events happened. Some of the stories 
shared by the respondents were traumatising even for the researchers 
who listened to them. Some of the stories came across as very alive 
and present in their current situation. The mental processing of the 
traumatic events was not complete – and in some case had not even 
begun it. As a result, the participants felt that the triggers of the 
trauma were still present in their life. The mental trauma impacted 
negatively on their day-to-day life and the situation was worse for 
those who had physical pain from health complications like fistula. 
 
Many formerly abducted girls who returned from their ordeals felt the 
loss, guilt and shame associated with their life with the rebels. The 
women continue to face many challenges in supporting themselves 
and the children fathered by the rebels. Despite their high 
expectations of being able to return home, they experienced a sense 
of abandonment by their families and communities. They were forced 
to live on their own, which made it difficult for them to reintegrate 
into the community. Many of the women interviewed were rejected 
by their communities when they returned, hence, they were unable to 
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associate with them. This discrimination does not allow women to be 
part of the groups formed in their communities to benefit from 
government programmes. 
 
Hence, isolation partially explains why these women were unable to 
access government social protection programmes directed towards 
rehabilitation in the region. When targeting women or youth in 
groups, rather than as individuals, government social protection 
programmes often miss out on the most severely traumatised women. 
Thus, many of them continue to live lives on the margins of society 
with little hope of receiving support. This study has established that 
some of women may not be able to access government programmes, 
even though they are targeted. The women and girls suffering from 
severe trauma need affirmative action to reach out to them and 
empower them to benefit from government programmes. 
 
In a research related to this study, it was found that women in 
Northern Uganda who received psycho-social support performed 
better in terms of social economic resilience then women who 
received only social protection programmes (Chapter 16, Is Trauma 
Counselling the Missing Link? Enhancing Socio-Economic Resilience among 
Post-war IDPs in Northern Uganda, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia 
Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, Zaminah Malole & Bertha Vallejo). 
This chapter shows that severe traumatic events result in negative 
feelings about one’s self and the community, resulting in a high degree 
of helplessness and disempowerment. Women who received psycho-
social support, from organisations such as KIWEPI found that they 
could transform themselves with a more positive mindset, allowing 
them to generate opportunities, despite the considerable difficulties 
they faced. Those who found the support to move on with their life 
shared many interesting stories about how they were able to 
manoeuvre within the constraints of their households and with 
limited access to government support. Hence, the women no longer 
look at themselves as victims of the wars, but rather as actors in their 
society who desire to survive, like any other human being. The 
women can be recognised as agents of change, who can inspire other 




Any effort to support the women who were abducted as young girls 
and returned to their communities, stands to empower and 
strengthen them. But what this chapter shows is that the government 
needs to reach out to these vulnerable women through psycho-social 
support and mental health programmes, to prepare them for the 
rehabilitation process. The government can and should further help 
them to integrate in their communities with resources such as land 
and support them with specific social protection programmes. These 
women should also be given tailor-made courses in basic skills, as they 
many have missed out on basic education. 
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Is Trauma Counselling the Missing Link? Enhancing 
Socio-Economic Resilience among Post-war IDPs in 
Northern Uganda 
 
Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, 
Zaminah Malole & Bertha Vallejo 
 
Introduction 
In 1986, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) started a war in Northern 
Uganda with extreme 
brutality, resulting in the 
nearly total destruction of the 
region and internal 
displacement of many people 
(Van Reisen, Nakazibwe, 
Stokmans, Vallejo & Kidane, 
2018). As a consequence of 
the military operation of the 
Uganda People’s Defense 
Forces (UPDF) in Southern 
Sudan, civilians found 
themselves crushed between 
the UPDF and the LRA 
(Apuuli, 2006), and the 
Ugandan Government 
ordered that they move to 
government camps or 
‘protected villages’, fuelling 
the internally displace people (IDP) crisis and increasing the 
vulnerability of these communities (Lomo & Hovil, 2004; Mukwana 
& Ridderbos, 2008). It was then that Northern Uganda experienced 
the worst humanitarian crisis with more than 2 million IDPs (Lomo 
& Hovil, 2004). The Government of Uganda initiated the Peace, 
The civil war in Northern Uganda left 
communities traumatised and suffering 
from post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). Although many government 
programmes have been implemented for 
rehabilitation, those with PTSD are 
often unable to grasp the opportunities 
presented due to underlying trauma. This 
study found that psycho-social support 
and trauma counselling increases the 
ability of people with PTSD to cope with 
hazard and misfortune. Importantly, the 
study found that psycho-social support 
directly and significantly increases socio-
economic resilience and enhances the 
effects of social protection programmes.  
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Recovery and Development Plan in 2007 and commenced full scale 
implementation in 2009. The overall goal of the plan was to stabilise 
Northern Uganda and promote rehabilitation through the socio-
economic development of communities (Van Reisen et al., 2018). 
Population surveys conducted after the civil war suggest that people 
still suffer from traumatic war experiences (Nakimuli-Mpungu et al., 
2013) and these findings are confirmed by qualitative research (see 
Chapter 15, Life after the Lord’s Resistance Army: Support for Formerly 
Abducted Girls in Northern Uganda, by Primrose Nakazibwe & Mirjam 
Van Reisen) and quantitative analysis of trauma of the community 
measured through the Impact of Events Scale (Van Reisen et al., 
2018). Studies have also found that the government lacks health 
services to help traumatised community members (Van Reisen et al., 
2018). In this chapter, we focus on the interaction of trauma and 
socio-economic development that is facilitated by providing social 
protection to vulnerable communities in Northern Uganda. 
 
Social protection or social security is regarded as a human right 
(Ulriksen & Plagerson, 2014). The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) defines social protection as “the set of policies and 
programmes designed to reduce and prevent poverty and 
vulnerability throughout the life cycle. Thus, social protection policies 
are vital elements of national development strategies to reduce 
poverty and vulnerability across the life cycle” (ILO, 2017, p. 2). 
Social protection for vulnerable groups plays a vital role in inclusive 
and balanced growth in developing and least developed countries 
(Sahu, 2011). Due to several factors such as globalization, changes in 
development practices, as well as increased attention on citizenship, 
governance and human rights, social protection in developing 
countries has increased in recent years (Oldekop et al., 2016; Serena 
& Shelley, 2014; Norton, Conway & Foster, 2001).  
 
In the Ugandan context, social protection refers to public and private 
interventions to address the risks and vulnerabilities that expose 
individuals to income insecurity and social deprivation resulting in 
undignified lives (MGLSD, 2015). It is regarded as a national initiative 
to reduce poverty levels among vulnerable Ugandans, contributing to 
437 
 
the development of the nation, strengthening household productivity 
and capacity for income generation (National Planning Authority, 
2013, 2015; Norton, Conway & Foster, 2001; MGLSD, 2015). In 
Uganda, social protection is geared towards reducing poverty, 
supporting excluded citizens to access services, providing a 
foundation on which to build productive livelihoods and enabling 
citizens to live a life that is secure and dignified. 
 
In assessing the effectiveness of social protection programmes, a 
macro-economic perspective is often taken with a focus on average 
income in a region as a proxy for poverty, ignoring vulnerability 
(Fiszbein, Kanbur & Yemtsov, 2014). This is not surprising, as the 
literature on social protection, particularly in developing countries, 
shows that social protection programmes (such as the programmes 
supported by the World Bank) mostly have a narrow emphasis on 
targeting poverty and inequality through social transfers and benefits 
(Houtart, 2005), leaving resilience and vulnerability unattended.  
 
In this chapter, we question the macro-economic perspective on 
poverty by drawing attention to agency: how people perceive 
opportunities and threats in their current situation, as well as their 
routine ways of evaluating situations and responding accordingly. 
According to this perspective, perceived opportunities can be 
enhanced by social protection, but also by other policies and 
programmes that reduce vulnerability or promote socio-economic 
resilience. By focusing on agency to enhance socio-economic 
resilience, instead of providing financial help to reduce poverty, it 
becomes clear that a change in mindset, from reacting to problems, a 
hazard or danger, to pro-active behaviour that is future oriented, can 
improve (individual) livelihoods. Such a change in mindset may be 
helpful to understand the effectiveness of social protection provided 
to communities of displaced people. As indicated in the introduction, 
many communities in Northern Uganda took in large numbers of 
IDPs suffering from war-time experiences (Human Rights Watch, 
2003). The civil war in Uganda disrupted the social fabric, especially 
in rural communities, leaving many people traumatised and living in 
poverty (Dermatis & Kadushin, 1986; Van Reisen at al., 2018). In 
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such a post-war context, the agency of people may be impaired to the 
extent that members of the community see no opportunities and only 
threats, due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Van Reisen et 
al., 2018). 
 
The research question addressed in this chapter is twofold: Does 
support to relieve trauma (PTSD) enhance (social and economic) resilience? And, 
does support to relieve trauma increase the effectiveness of social protection 
programmes on (social and economic) resilience in vulnerable and traumatised 
communities?  
 
Most of the discussion on social protection is focused on its (macro) 
economic impact (Fiszbein et al., 2014) and not on the agency of 
people to shape their own future. However, we argue that the 
sustainable economic impact of social protection assumes that people 
are able to generate their own income and, as a consequence, have 
the agency to shape their own future. Therefore, this research adds to 
the existing literature on social protection, by providing lessons and 
insights for the inclusion of underlying vulnerabilities (such as PTSD) 
as important elements in the design and implementation of 
sustainable social protection programmes. 
 
The chapter is articulated as follows: the next section introduces the 
key concepts underlying the analysis: social protection, resilience, and 
trauma. This is followed by a review of social protection programmes 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda in particular and the methodology 
used in this study. Then the results of the empirical research are 
presented, followed by a discussion of the main findings and 
conclusion, including policy recommendations. 
The key concepts: Social protection, socio-economic resilience, 
and trauma  
The concept of social protection is not defined unequivocally in the 
literature, as its description often refers to frameworks that articulate 
specific aspects of the multi-dimensional nature of poverty and 
describe the causal mechanisms that reduce poverty – compare, for 
439 
 
example, the definitions of social protection by the World Bank (n.d.), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2016, p. 4) and Asian 
Development Bank (2003, p. 1). However, at an abstract level, social 
protection can be regarded as a human right and, as set out above, 
can be described as “the set of policies and programmes designed to 
reduce and prevent poverty and vulnerability throughout the life 
cycle” (ILO, 2017, p. 2). Vulnerability and resilience are related 
concepts,70 where vulnerability refers to conditions that make people 
susceptible to harm and resilience denotes coping with and 
recovering from a hazard that has already occurred (Bergstrand, 
Mayer, Brumback & Zhang, 2015, p. 392). 
 
Social protection programmes are believed to play a significant role 
in reducing poverty and vulnerability, and are viewed as powerful 
tools for governments, policymakers and donors (Waqas & Awan, 
2017). A general aim of social protection is to “enhance the capacity 
of poor and vulnerable people to escape from poverty and enable 
them to better manage risks and shocks” (OECD, 2009). In this 
context, capacity is a characteristic of individuals and can be 
understood as the power to do something or related to what people 
are actually able to do and to be (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 36; Nussbaum, 
2011, p. 18; Sen, 2009, p. 19). According to this line of reasoning, 
social protection programmes enhance the capacity of poor and 
vulnerable individuals. The idea is that, due to this enhanced capacity, 
one is able to escape poverty and become less vulnerable. 
 
In this chapter we focus on the socio-economic resilience of 
individuals, as a proxy for the capacity vulnerable people have to 
escape poverty. Socio-economic resilience at the individual level is 
not well defined in the literature. For the operationalisation of social 
resilience, objective indicators at the community level are often used, 
and in operationalising economic resilience, research often focuses on 
objective macroeconomic indicators (Cutter, Burton & Enrich, 2010; 
 
70 There is no universally agreed definition of these two terms. Cutter (1996), for 
example, identifies 18 different definitions of vulnerability across different 
disciplines. Similarly, when we talk about resilience in social sciences, definitions 
vary from equilibrist to evolutionary approaches (Simmie & Martin, 2010). 
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Röhn, Sánchez, Hermansen & Rasmussen, 2015). These indicators 
are related to the resilience of a community, area or country, but they 
have only an indirect relationship with the agency of an individual 
living in those places. This operationalisation was used as it gave the 
researchers an idea about the indicators of social and economic 
resilience at the individual level. In our study, ‘social resilience’ refers 
to individual abilities, and perceived social support, while ‘economic 
resilience’ focuses on perceived income security.  
 
According to the literature, the capacity people have to operate and 
function in every day’s life is affected by trauma, as people who are 
exposed to traumatic events can experience stress responses such as 
avoidance, sleep disturbances, hyper-arousal and hyper-vigilance 
(Chrousos & Gold, 1992; Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002). Repeated or 
constant activation of such a stress response (by, for example, cues 
that trigger such memories) is referred to as post-traumatic stress 
disorder and creates a state of fear, hopelessness and even horror 
(Yehuda, 2002). Moreover, trauma survivors who develop PTSD 
frequently perceive themselves as less valued by the community and 
experience a reduced sense of belonging (Catherall, 1989, p. 295). We 
believe that this negative state of being affects their capacity or 
agency, as people regard feelings as informative about opportunities 
and threats (Schwarz, 2011; Van Reisen, et al., 2018; Kidane & 
Stokmans, 2019). Consequently, those who suffer from PTSD are less 
socio-economically resilient. If trauma is not healed, people have 
trouble exerting their agency, remain vulnerable and lack resilience.  
 
By focusing on capacity, the effectiveness of social protection 
programmes is framed from a social-psychological perspective that 
supplements the macro-economic emphasis commonly used. In the 
macro-economic view, it is assumed that the invisible hand of Adam 
Smith can regulate, for example, the food market by means of supply 
and demand, and based on individual interest. According to this idea, 
providing people with (slightly more) money increases their access to 
the food market, which increases demand (and prices will rise), which 
makes it more profitable for individuals to enter the supply chain of 
the food market. Consequently, supply increases and prices drop, but 
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more people are actively engaged in the economy. However, this line 
of reasoning assumes that individuals have the capacity or agency to 
grasp the opportunities provided by the social protection programme 
to produce food. This capacity may not exist in severely traumatised 
people. Therefore, the relationship between trauma and social 
protection needs to be further investigated. Hence, this research 
hypothesizes that trauma support is necessary to enhance the socio-
economic resilience of severely traumatised vulnerable people and 
that this support interacts with social protection programmes to 
enhance socio-economic resilience, which in turn reduces poverty. 





Figure 16.1. Conceptual framework to reduce poverty of traumatised vulnerable people 
Social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda in 
particular 
Social protection is important for the first goal of the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) – end poverty in all its forms everywhere 
(Kaltenborn, 2015; UNRISD, 2016) and can be targeted in nine areas: 
child and family benefits, maternity protection, unemployment 
support, employment injury benefits, sickness benefits, health 
protection, old age benefits, disability benefits, and survivor benefits 
(ILO, 2017, p. 2). Social protection programmes – including cash 
transfers, in-kind transfers, food transfers, school feeding, subsidies, 
and humanitarian and disaster relief programmes (Fiszbein et al., 
2014) – are believed to alleviate short-term deprivations, regularise 













(Burchi, Scarlato & D'Agostino, 2018). However, as the conceptual 
framework in Figure 16.1 suggests, these effects assume that the 




Figure 16.2. Domains of social policy 
Source: Adapted by the authors from Gentilini and Omamo (2011, p. 331) 
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, social protection programmes started to 
spread in a significant fashion in the late 1990s, mostly promoted by 
the World Bank (2001), with other international organisations 
introducing interventions within a relatively short timeframe (Niño-
Zarazúa, Barrientos, Hulme & Hickey, 2012). In the case of Uganda, 
the government acknowledged that social protection is a state 
obligation and integrated it in its national policies as early as 2004 
(MGLSD, 2011, cited in Van Reisen et al., 2018). Over the years, 
Uganda’s social protection programmes have included the Direct 
Income Support programmes, the National Social Security Fund, 
National Pensions Scheme, the Northern Uganda Social Action 
Fund, the Orphans and Vulnerable Children programme, Universal 
Health Services, Cash for Work Schemes, the Parliamentary Pension 
Scheme, Universal Primary Education, and Universal Secondary 
Education (Van Reisen et al., 2018). Social protection policy in 
Uganda mainly targets vulnerable groups including unemployed 
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orphans and vulnerable children, and vulnerable women. The social 
protection policy is based on eight principles: individual and family 
involvement; timeliness, reliability and sustainability; transparency 
and accountability; universalism and inclusiveness; a human rights 
based approach to service delivery; gender responsiveness; dignity; 
and equity (MGLSD, 2015).  
 
There are both informal and formal social protection mechanisms in 
Uganda. Informal or traditional mechanisms include family and clan 
support systems, mutual assistance schemes and neighbourhood 
support groups, while formal mechanisms can be categorised as either 
social security or social care and support services. Social security is a 
preventive intervention to mitigate income shocks and social care and 
support services aim at providing a wide range of services to the poor 
and vulnerable (MGLSD, 2015). 
 
Food insecurity, understood as lack of access to food, is a chronic 
challenge, more intensively in rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa.71 In 
these areas, social protection is frequently implemented through cash-
transfers programmes. Empirical evidence shows that large cash 
transfers, together with regular and reliable payments, are significant 
and determining factors in reducing food security (Berhane, Gilligan, 
Hoddinott, Kumar & Taffesse, 2014; Tiwari et al., 2016). This effect 
is achieved in two ways (Burchi et al., 2018; Hidrobo, Hoddinott, 
Kumar & Olivier, 2018; Tiwari et al., 2016): by improving direct access 
to food (e.g., by increasing household purchasing power) and 
increasing household accumulation of productive assets through 
which food security can be achieved (e.g., increasing agricultural 
production and crop diversification). However, as the conceptual 
framework suggests, this second way can only be achieved if the 
people involved mentally perceive that they are capable of investing 
in productive assets such as seeds. 
 
 
71 Rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa are characterised by a high concentration of 
subsistence agriculture, poor infrastructure, low local administrative capacity and 
low access to services (Burchi et al., 2018). 
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In Uganda, food insecurity is targeted by the Direct Income Support 
programmes, which are the core of the Uganda social security. Direct 
Income Support (also known as social transfers or cash transfers) 
provides regular and reliable, small transfers (cash, cash-vouchers and 
in-kind) to vulnerable people and households to provide them with a 
minimum income that can be spent as they wish. These programmes 
include the Social Assistance Grant for Empowerment, which 
encompasses the Senior Citizen Grants and Vulnerable Family 
Grants, Community Driven Development Programme, Agricultural 
Livelihood Recovery Programme, Karamoja Livelihood 
Improvement Programme, Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, 
and Operation Wealth Creation, formerly the National Agricultural 
Advisory Services (MGLSD, 2016, cited in Van Reisen et al., 2018). 
 
As indicated above, social security programmes in Uganda are 
designed to provide people with tangible assets (such as money, cash-
vouchers and in-kind) and it is assumed that people use these assets 
wisely. By focusing on the assets provided and not on the people who 
receive them, little (if any) attention is paid to the agency of people to 
perceive themselves as resilient enough to overcome the next 
problem or hazard. This focus is problematic in communities of 
displaced people such as in Northern Uganda, as these communities 
suffer from (severe) trauma. For those traumatised people, food 
security programmes are not always regarded as a new start (or 
positive opportunity), but merely as temporary relief of a bad 
situation. In this study, we will explore to what extent receiving 
trauma counselling in conjunction with food security programmes 
can improve the socio-economic resilience of the individuals involved 
and interacts with the impact of social protection programmes. 
Setting and methodology 
To study the impact of trauma counselling on socio-economic 
resilience, we conducted a study targeted at women in Northern 
Uganda, an area with many internally displaced persons who are still 
suffering from post-war hazard, caused by abductions, killings, and 
other brutalities (Human Rights Watch, 2003). During the study 
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(March-April 2016), several social protection programmes were 
found to be operational, such as the National Agricultural Advisory 
Services, Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, Uganda Social 
Assistance Grants for Empowerment, Restocking Programme, 
Community Driven Development programme, and Youth 
Livelihood Programme (for a description of these programmes, see 
Van Reisen et al., 2018). Despite these government initiatives, which 
mainly focus on social protection (cash, cash-vouchers, and in-kind), 
Isis-Women’s International Cross Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE) 
noticed that the aspect of trauma management and healing for 
survivors was lacking and started programmes targeted at women to 
fill this gap. 
 
As a first step in the research, the team visited potential study sites 
and established contact with local women’s groups and local leaders 
(see Chapter 15, Life after the Lord’s Resistance Army: Support for Formerly 
Abducted Girls in Northern Uganda, by Primrose Nakazibwe & Mirjam 
Van Reisen). During this phase, the team identified potential study 
sites together with local resource persons with expertise on the local 
communities. The participants were sampled from women living in 
vulnerable rural and remote situations. This procedure ensured that 
the team was studying a reasonably similar population in terms of 
gender-specific aspects of trauma; access to social protection and 
trauma support programmes; and socio-economic gender-based 
characteristics.  
 
In order to investigate the effect of cash and trauma counselling, four 
groups of respondents were distinguished, based on whether they 
were receiving: 1) social protection (cash-transfers, cash-vouchers, or 
in-kind, received from the Government of Uganda); 2) trauma 
counselling (provided by NGOs or district bodies); 3) both cash 
transfers and trauma counselling (defined parallel to the previous two 
groups); and 4) no social protection or trauma counselling (control 
group). The respondents were purposively assigned to one of these 




During the study, the team interviewed 471 women (n=471) with an 
average age of 42 years (standard deviation 15.55), who had traumatic 
experiences related to the violence in the area, as well as physical and 
gender-based violence. These respondents lived in different districts, 
located in north-eastern Uganda (Lira: 25.7%, Katakwi: 27.8%, 
Amuria: 10.4%, and Kitgum: 36.1%). Most respondents were famers 
(almost 84%). Furthermore, our research indicated that about 84% 
experienced high levels of PTSD. Analyses revealed that the four 
groups did not differ in the level of PTSD experienced (Van Reisen 
et al., 2018, p. 211). 
 
The interviews consisted of three parts. In the first part, the 
respondents were asked questions about their socio-demographic 
characteristics. The second part consisted of the Impact of Events 
Scale-Revised (IES-R; see Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez, 1979) to 
measure PTSD. The last part tapped into socio-economic resilience 
(SER).  
 
SER consisted of six subscales that relate to the different aspects of 
socio-economic resilience identified in the foregoing. Social resilience 
includes: individual abilities, which was operationalised with three 
subscales: ‘capability’ (6 items: ability to pay bills, get information, 
acquire skills, communication skills), ‘empowerment’ (12 items: ability 
to act independently and out of free will, improved self-esteem), and 
‘worry’ (8 items: worrying about all kind of things); perceived social 
support, operationalised with two subscale: ‘social embeddedness’ (5 
items: the social bonds an individual has in her family, community 
and the leadership of the community) and ‘trust in the system’ (2 
items: trust in the government, which taps into rights and access to 
services). The second part of socio-economic resilience – economic 
resilience – was operationalised with one subscale: ‘perceived income 
security’ (13 items: the ability to make money, save money and 
manage money). Each item was answered on a five-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Analysis 
revealed that the reliability of all subscales is above 0.7, which is 
considered appropriate (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998). 
Item-analyses indicated that the subscales are somewhat intertwined 
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with correlations ranging from 0.06 to 0.606 (for a full description of 
the subscales and their analyses, see Van Reisen et al., 2018).  
Results 
In this section, we explore three hypotheses that are put forward by 
the conceptual framework in Figure 16.1.  
 
• Trauma counselling has a positive effect on the socio-
economic resilience of individual in vulnerable and 
traumatised communities. 
• Social protection (cash, cash-vouchers, in-kind) have a 
positive effect on the socio-economic resilience of individuals 
in vulnerable and traumatised communities. 
• Trauma counselling enhances the effect of social protection 
on the social-economic resilience of individual in vulnerable 
and traumatised communities. 
 
In order to investigate these hypotheses, we conducted an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) for two factors (social protection: yes/no; trauma 
counselling: yes/no) for each of the subscales of the SER-tool 
separately and controlled for age (covariate), education level (4 levels: 
never been to school, attended primary education, attended 
secondary education, attended tertiary institution) and employment (5 
options: farming, business, professional job, none). The averages for 
each group per subscale of the SER are displayed in Figure 16.3. 
 
We will first discuss the results of the first component of socio-
economic resilience: individual abilities, consisting of the subscales 
‘capability’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘worry’. As Figure 16.3 suggests, 
there are differences between the groups in terms of ‘capability’: those 
who received both social protection and trauma counselling scored 
slightly higher than the other groups. But the ANOVA revealed72 no 
 
72 An ANOVA makes use of an F distribution to test the significance of the 
difference between the groups involved. The extent the groups differ is indicated 
by an F-value (F) and its significance depends on the degrees of freedom that goes 
along with this test. The degrees of freedom are indicated between brackets just 
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significant effect of social protection (F(1, 450) = 1.16; p > 0.10) or 
trauma counselling (F(1, 450) < 1), and no significant interaction 
effect between social protection and trauma counselling (F(1, 450) < 
1). There were no differences on the ‘capability’ subscale according 
to age (F(1, 450) < 1). However, significant differences were detected 
according to education level (F(3, 450) = 5.41; p < 0.050); the lower 
the education level, the lower the score on ‘capability’. And also 
according to employment (F(4, 450) = 3.92; p < 0.05); women with a 
business or a professional job (but not farming) had a higher score 
than those without a job. 
 
The next subscale is ‘empowerment’. Figure 16.3 shows that the 
groups who received both social protection and trauma counselling 
scored highest. The ANOVA indicates that both social protection 
(F(1, 450) = 3.59; p < 0.05) and trauma counselling (F(1, 450) = 3.11; 
p = 0.08) have a significant effect; those who received either social 
protection or counselling (or both) indicated a higher ‘empowerment’ 
than those who did not. However, the interaction effect between 
social protection and trauma counselling was not significant (F(1, 
450) < 1). Moreover, there were significant differences on the 
‘empowerment’ subscale according to age (F(1, 450) = 3.37; p = 0.07; 
the higher the age, the more ‘empowerment’ the respondents 
reported. No significant effect was detected for education level (F (3, 
450) < 1) or employment (F(4, 450) = 1.18; p > 0.10). 
 
The subscale, ‘worry’, should be interpreted negatively (the higher the 
score on ‘worry’ the more a person worries). With this in mind, Figure 
16.3 suggests that those who received only trauma counselling had 
the least ‘worry’. The ANOVA revealed that those who received 
social protection worried significantly more than those who did not 
receive social protection (F(1, 450) = 4.94; p < 0.05). No significant 
effect was detected for trauma counselling (F(1, 450) < 1). The 
interaction effect between receiving social protection and trauma 
counselling was significant (F (1, 450) = 8.261; p < 0.05), indicating 
 
after the F (df1, df2). Df1 is related to the number of groups involved in the 
comparison and df2 is related to the number of respondents included in the 
comparison (Hair et al., 1998). 
449 
 
than when receiving both cash and counselling, ‘worry’ increases. 
‘Worry’ is not significantly affected by age (F(1, 450) < 1), education 
level (F(3, 450) = 1.086; p > 0.10) or employment (F(4, 450) < 1). 
 
 
Figure 16.3. Average score for each group per SER subscale 
 
The second component of socio-economic resilience is perceived 
social support, with two indicators: ‘social embeddedness’ and ‘trust 
in the system’. Figure 16.3 suggests that the groups score almost equal 
on the subscale ‘social embeddedness’. The ANOVA indicated no 
significant effect of social protection (F(1, 450) < 1) or counselling 
(F(1, 450) < 1), and no significant interaction effect (F(1, 450) < 1). 
Furthermore, there were no differences in ‘social embeddedness’ 
according to age (F(1, 450) < 1) or education level (F(3, 450) < 1). 
However, a significant effect according to employment was detected 
(F(4, 450) = 3.39; p < 0.05); those without a job scored lower for 
‘social embeddedness’ than the other employment groups. Regarding 
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social protection scored highest on ‘trust in the system’. The ANOVA 
does not come to the same conclusion. It appears that social 
protection has no significant effect (F(1, 450) = 2.272; p > 0.10), 
while trauma counselling does have a significant effect (F(1, 450) = 
5.725; p < 0.05). But, surprisingly, this effect is in the opposite 
direction: those who received counselling had less faith in the 
government than those who did not. Again, the interaction effect 
between social protection and trauma counselling was not significant 
(F (1, 450) < 1). Moreover, there was a significant effect according to 
age (F(1, 450) = 10.35; p < 0.05); the higher the age, the more faith 
respondents had in the government. No significant effect was 
detected according to education level (F(3, 450) = 1.081; p > 0.10) or 
employment (F(4, 450) = 1.439 p > 0.10). 
 
The last component of socio-economic resilience pertains to 
economic resilience and is covered by perceived income. Figure 16.3 
shows that those who received neither social protection nor trauma 
counselling had the lowest perception of their income security and 
those who received both social protection and trauma counselling had 
the highest perception of their income security. But, the ANOVA 
suggests that there is no significant effect of social protection (F(1, 
450) = 1.38; p > 0.10), and no significant interaction effect between 
social protection and trauma counselling (F(1, 450) <1). However, it 
shows that trauma counselling has a significant effect (F (1, 450) = 
3.53; p = 0.06); those who received trauma counselling scored higher 
on ‘perceived income security’. As expected, marginal, but significant, 
differences were detected according to education level (F(3,450) = 
2.19; p = 0.08); the higher the education level, the higher the 
‘perceived income security’. There was also a significant difference 
according to employment (F(4, 450) = 7.03; p < 0.05); women 
without a job scored lower on the ‘perceived income security’ than 
the other employment groups. Again, age had no significant effect 




The study was based on the purposeful sampling of women living in 
vulnerable remote rural areas in Northern Uganda and investigated 
the effect of existing programmes on socio-economic resilience in a 
natural setting. Such research has several weaknesses. Firstly, 
background variables may be correlated with receiving social 
protection (in this case: cash, cash vouchers, or in-kind) and trauma 
counselling. In this study, we tried to counteract this weakness by 
controlling for gender (the study only pertained to women), age (as a 
covariate in the analysis), education level and employment (both 
factors in the analysis). The second weakness is that there were several 
social protection programmes and trauma counselling interventions 
available at the time of the research and that individuals received such 
support during the last year. So, there is quite a variation in the 
important key variables (social protection and trauma counselling) 
which are not controlled in this study. Due to these variations, one 
can only make claims about general tendencies.  
Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter, we problematized the mainly macro-economic 
perspective of social protection programmes, such as those 
implemented in Northern Uganda. This perspective assumes that the 
market can regulate supply and demand. This line of reasoning 
assumes that individuals have the agency to grasp the economic 
opportunities available to them. However – and importantly – this 
logic neglects the fact that individuals live in poverty for a reason. If 
that reason is rooted in war, violence, and displacement and is 
combined with trauma, people may not have enough agency to take 
advantage of the economic opportunities that are on offer.  
 
The second weakness of the macro-economic approach is that it 
focuses on general indicators of poverty and neglects specific factors 
that affect the resilience of individuals. If social protection is to 
contribute to sustainable development, individuals should become 
more resilient so that they can cope with and recover from a hazard 
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that has already occurred. In this chapter, we introduce the concept 
of socio-economic resilience to measure the effectiveness of social 
protection programmes to contribute to sustainable development at 
the individual level. Socio-economic resilience is regarded as a proxy 
for an individual’s capacity to overcome poverty and it concerns 
individual abilities (three subscales), perceived social support (two 
subscales), and perceived income security (one subscale).  
 
Focusing on socio-economic resilience opens up new opportunities 
to design social protection programmes. In this study we looked at 
trauma counselling as an alternative programme to enhance socio-
economic resilience in vulnerable communities of IDP’s in Northern 
Uganda, who suffer from post-war hazard, which impairs their 
capacities, due to PTSD. The research questions addressed in this 
chapter are: Does support to relieve trauma (PTSD) enhance (social and 
economic) resilience? And, does support to relieve trauma increase the effectiveness 
of social protection programmes on (social and economic) resilience in vulnerable 
and traumatised communities affected by war, conflict and violence?  
 
This study investigated six indicators of social-economic resilience, 
which can be arranged in three main components. The first one is 
individual abilities: ‘capability’ (ability to pay bills, get information, 
acquire skills, communication skills), ‘empowerment’ (ability to act 
independently and out of free will, improved self-esteem) and ‘worry’ 
(worrying about all kind of things). The results can be summarised as 
follows: ‘Capability’ was not affected by social protection nor trauma 
counselling. ‘Empowerment’ was positively influenced by both social 
protection and trauma counselling. The last indicator, ‘worry’, 
produced some unexpected effects. Receiving social protection 
increased worry. This result can be explained by prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which states that losses weigh heavier 
than gains. This means that individuals are loss averse. As receivers 
of social protection are dependent on the government, this 
dependency may strengthen the thought of losing the support in the 
future, which causes worry. This perceived dependency on social 
protection became stronger when participants also received trauma 
counselling. Due to the counselling, the individuals involved were less 
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troubled by PTSD, were healthier and, as their trauma was less severe, 
were more able to reflect on and worry about the potential loss of 
government support. Overall, the results regarding the perceived 
changes in individual abilities suggest that trauma counselling 
programmes are as effective in increasing a traumatised persons’ 
ability to cope with hazard and misfortune as social protection 
programmes are. 
 
The second component is perceived social support, which consists of 
‘social embeddedness’ and ‘trust in the system’. The results revealed 
that both social protection and trauma counselling had no effect on 
‘social embeddedness’. Unexpected results were found for the 
construct ‘trust in the system’. Social protection had no effect, on this 
subscale, but trauma counselling had a negative effect. So, by 
receiving trauma counselling individuals had less faith in the 
government. These results suggest that individuals who received 
trauma counselling became more sceptical about the social services 
component of social protection and that social protection has a 
minimal effect on the perception of the social context individuals are 
operating in.  
 
The last indicator of socio-economic resilience pertains to the 
economic aspect. In our research, it was operationalised as ‘perceived 
income security’. The results indicate that social protection did not 
affect ‘perceived income security’, but trauma counselling did (even 
after controlling for age, education level and employment). These 
results are contrary to those reported by, for example, Fiszbein et al. 
(2014), who suggest a positive effect of social protection on poverty 
reduction. The lack of such a positive effect in this study may be 
explained by the volume of social protection that individuals received. 
In the situation we studied, the amount was rather small and, as 
research indicates (Berhane et al., 2014; Tiwari et al., 2016), large cash-
transfers together with regular payments ensures impact. Importantly, 
the positive effect of trauma counselling is inexplicable from an 
economic perspective, as those individuals did not receive any cash. 
Here trauma counselling impacted positively on agency by enhancing 
the perception that one can manage one’s own future. By receiving 
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trauma counselling an individual is enabled to handle the PTSD more 
effectively and perceives more opportunities (which were already 
there in the situation, but not recognised as such) to participate 
economically. The results regarding economic resilience suggest that 
trauma counselling is slightly more effective than social protection in 
enhancing ‘perceived income security’ and that trauma counselling 
alone can enhance socio-economic resilience. The findings are 
confirmed by the study of Kidane and Stokmans (2019), in which 
trauma counselling was provided by means of the Self Help Low Cost 
Post Traumatic Stress (SHLCPTS) programme made available by an 
App on a mobile phone, which was also found to be effective on its 
own in increasing socio-economic resilience.  
 
Overall, the results of the study suggest that trauma counselling is a 
valuable tool to enhance the socio-economic resilience of traumatised 
individuals and deserves a more prominent place in combination with 
social protection programmes provided to vulnerable people. The 
results also suggest that trauma counselling is at least as effective in 
enhancing socio-economic resilience as (small amounts of) social 
protection programmes are. Trauma counselling is not necessarily 
costly or hard to arrange. In this study, the trauma counselling was 
organised by Isis-WICCE and provided by women from the 
community, without formal training in psycho-social or psychiatric 
treatment. The programme took an informal, community based, non-
medical approach to dealing with trauma. It was based on self-help 
groups to relieve trauma and to achieve collective healing (Van Reisen 
et al., 2018). This study found that trauma counselling increases the 
ability of people with PTSD to cope with hazard and misfortune and 
that psycho-social support directly and significantly increases socio-
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Roaming Lifestyles: Designing Social Protection for 
the Pastoralist Afar in Ethiopia 
 
Zeremariam Fre & Naomi Dixon 
 
Introduction 
Roaming with their cattle across three countries, Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Djibouti, the Afar people live 
a pastoralist lifestyle in arid 
lands. Challenged by climate 
change and droughts, their 
resilience is at stake. The 
Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP), 
implemented by the 
Ethiopian government, aims 
to support their resilience by 
strengthening their 
productive capacity. But, 
how can the PSNP succeed 
in the Afar Regional State, 
possibly one of the most 
difficult regions in which to 
implement a social security 
programme, not in the least 
because the Afar people are 
moving within and across the 
region? 
 
Chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia is not just a modern problem, but 
one that has recurred throughout history; for example, it is believed 
that a third of the population perished in the Great Famine in the late 
19th Century. Between 1998 and 2005, anywhere between 5 and 14 
The pastoral lifestyle of the Afar people 
poses a challenge for social protection 
programmes, such as Ethiopia’s 
Productive Safety Net Programme 
(PSNP). This study looked at whether 
the design of this programme is relevant 
for the highly mobile Afar and if it has 
improved their socio-economic resilience. 
The study found that while the PSNP 
has the potential to contribute to the 
resilience of the Afar, their socio-political 
context needs to be better appreciated and 
reflected in programme design to increase 
local relevance. Efforts to improve the 
programme are certainly worthwhile given 
that it has the potential to contribute to 
the socio-economic resilience of the Afar. 
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million Ethiopians relied on food aid (Devereux, 2006). This may 
have supported the basic survival of beneficiaries, but is criticised for 
creating aid dependency, as it failed to offer any long-term solution 
or protect household assets, the depletion of which left households 
even more vulnerable to poverty. 
 
The Millennium Development Goals, launched in 2000, set tangible 
targets for global development that included the eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger. These were then revisited and expanded 
on by the Sustainable Development Goals, which began in 2015 and 
will be reviewed in 2030. The Government of Ethiopia has aligned 
itself to the African Union 2063 Agenda, ‘The Africa We Want’. In 
line with this, the Ethiopian government has pursued various 
development policies to increase agricultural productivity, improve 
disaster prevention and management, diversify livelihoods and 
increase food security with the aim of achieving sustainable growth. 
These policies are provided as social protection policies, rolled out in 
Sub Sahara Africa (Chapter 16, Is Trauma Counselling the Missing Link? 
Enhancing Socio-Economic Resilience among Post-war IDPs in Northern 
Uganda, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia Stokmans, Primrose Nakazibwe, 
Zaminah Malole & Bertha Vallejo). One such policy is the PSNP, 
which was launched by the government in 2005, together with the 
World Bank and various other development partners. The 
programme initially targeted food insecure households in various 
highland regions and was expanded to the lowlands of the Afar and 
Somali regions in 2009, at which point the programme integrated with 
the Climate Smart Initiative (CSI) to prioritise climate resilience 
(House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2011). 
 
Ethiopia is both the largest landlocked country in Africa and the 
second most populated country in the Sub-Saharan region, with a 
current estimated population of approximately 100 million (CIA, 
2017). Historically, as witnessed across the African continent, the 
Horn of Africa has been considerably disadvantaged by wider socio-
economic processes. Ethiopia, which is located in the Horn of Africa, 
is marginalised in the globalised trade economy, while also being 
disproportionately impacted on by the effects of climate change. 
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Despite proportionately high rates of economic growth which, the 
World Bank (2017) estimated at nearly 11% per year between 2003 
and 2015, the country has a low Human Development Index, ranking 
174 out of 185 countries (Government of Ethiopia & UNOCHA, 
2017). Furthermore, over 25 million Ethiopians are categorised as 
living in poverty.  
 
Ethiopia has extreme geographical variations including both tropical 
and desert climatic zones. For example, the north of the country 
receives less than 5% of the precipitation received by the south-
western highlands, which has 2,200 mm per year, compared to only 
100 mm per year in the north. The country has long been susceptible 
to drought and regularly experiences food insecurity. Historical trends 
show that Ethiopia’s temperature has increased by up to 1.3°C over 
the last century, with increases of up to 2.2°C predicted by mid-
century (IPCC, 2014). It is expected that significant weather events 
will become more severe and more regular.  
 
Farming is the cornerstone of Ethiopian livelihoods and relies on 
predictable rainy seasons. As Shitarek explains: 
 
Ethiopia’s economy is based mainly on agriculture, including crop and livestock 
production, which contributes 45% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
more than 80% of employment opportunities and over 90% of the foreign exchange 
earnings of the country (Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). However, the Ethiopian 
economy, particularly agricultural development, is extremely vulnerable to external 
shocks like climate change, global price fluctuations of exports and imports and other 
external factors. (Shitarek, 2012, pp. 1) 
 
Changes to climatic conditions could cause further land degradation, 
making it both harder to grow crops, but also to locate vegetation to 
sustain cattle. Consequently, the country is increasingly at risk of food 
insecurity and chronic famine in the coming decades.  
 
The sustainable development of Ethiopia is further strained by the 
impact of rapid population growth. The fertility rate (average number 
of births per woman) is currently at 2.45 (World Bank, 2017) and, if 
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the current growth rate is maintained, the country's population will 
exceed three hundred million by 2050. Already, cultivated land has 
expanded widely to meet the sustenance needs of the growing 
population. Forests, woods and grasslands have been considerably 
depleted, leading to land degradation.  
 
As part of its strategy to deal with poverty and food insecurity in 
Ethiopia, the PSNP is being implemented, including in the Afar 
Regional State in north-eastern Ethiopia. This chapter looks as the 
implementation of this programme in the Afar region and its impact 
on communities. The main research question is: Is the design of the social 
protection programme PSNP relevant for the Afar in Ethiopia and how has the 
programme improved the socio-economic resilience of this community? 
Research methodology 
The research presented here is an explorative case study of the 
implementation of the PSNP in Afar Regional State of Ethiopia. The 
methodology consisted of a desk review, information gained by 
interviewing Afar academics with relevant experience from Samara 
University, and observations made while spending time in the Afar 
region and with officials managing the programme. The documents 
reviewed consisted of programme documents, reports and 
assessments related to the implementation of the PSNP in Ethiopia 
and the Afar region. Two main questions were asked: 1) in what way 
is the design of the PSNP targeted to the specific situation of the Afar, 
and 2) what assessments are reported of the PSNP in terms of 
increasing the socio-economic resilience among the Afar. In this way 
in-depth insight was gained into the planning and preparatory 
processes for the implementation of the PSNP, the challenges that 
occurred during implementation, and the impact of the research on 
the beneficiaries, the Afar people.  
 
The study follows Burawoy’s (2009; 2013) extended case method. In 
this approach the researcher explores the terrain with an open mind 
without a predetermined frame. This method is particularly suitable 
for studies of hitherto unexplored topics. This research places socio-
463 
 
economic resilience in the context of the approach set out in Chapter 
1 of this book, as contextually specific (Chapter 1, Roaming Africa: A 
Social Analysis of Migration and Resilience, by Mirjam Van Reisen, Mia 
Stokmans, Munyaradzi Mawere & Kinfe Abraha Gebre-Egziabher). 
The promotion of resilience should, therefore, be understood as 
consisting of actions to protect people’s livelihood assets and support 
their own priorities and strategies. Resilience is explicitly placed 
within locally-specific approaches that are relevant to the culture and 
values in the community. Resilience seen as part of people's dignity, 
as a basis for ensuring that people can cope and organise their own 
adequate living conditions. 
The Afar region 
The Afar Regional State is an arid lowland area found in the north of 
Ethiopia bordering Djibouti and Eritrea. It is predominantly 
comprised of pastoralists (90%) and agro-pastoralists (10%), with 
over 95% of the region’s 1.5 million population depending almost 
entirely on livestock production for their livelihood. Poverty in the 
area has differed in previous decades, with the drought of the 1970s 
being the worst in living memory. In 1973/1974 alone, it is estimated 
that the Afar people lost 25% of their livestock and over 30% of their 
human population (International Livestock Centre for Africa, 1981). 
Subsequent droughts from 1985 to 2017, exacerbated by the El Niño 
effect, again reduced herd sizes. Humanitarian assistance has been 
required to enable people to survive periods of drought so regularly 
that it has become institutionalised within government policy, with 
the assistance of external donor agencies.  
 
Estimates regarding the pastoralist community vary, as they are often 
an invisible demographic, in both national and international statistics; 
however, the World Bank (2017) estimates there to be at least 12 
million pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in Ethiopia. So far, there has 
been little opportunity for livelihood diversification and smallholder 
agriculture still accounts for up to 80% of the population's 
employment (Wondifraw, Wakaiga & Kibret, 2014).  
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Determinants of vulnerability and resilience  
The Afar region experiences a hot, dry climate. There is considerable 
topographical variation, with altitudes ranging from 1,500 m above to 
120 m below sea level; in turn, daily temperatures range from between 
20°C to nearly 50°C in the highest and lowest elevations. Much of the 
rainfall (between 150 and 500 mm per annum) occurs from mid-June 
to mid-September, with shorter showers from March to April (suggum) 
and October to November (dababa) (Eriksen & Marin, 2015). 
Consequently, the Afar pastoralists partake in seasonal migration 
patterns that are dictated by the availability of pasture (Chapter 5, 
Mobility as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of Afar 
Region, Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen). 
 
The Afar people are known for their strong social cohesion (Chapter 
5, Mobility as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of 
Afar Region, Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen). Each Afar 
locality is identified by a major clan and inhabited by a mixture of 
clans, which proves to be an effective support network in times of 
social, economic and political strain. (Chapter 5, Mobility as a Social 
Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of Afar Region, Abdelah 
Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen). They have their own traditional and 
informal methods for providing for members of the clan who are 
experiencing hardship. Predominantly Muslim, the Afar adhere to the 
duty of zakat, in which they provide resources to the mosque leader, 
who redistributes them to the poor. These resources can be used to 
provide daily sustenance and medication for the sick and disabled; 
cover funeral expenses; contribute livestock to settle debt in the case 
of a member of another clan being killed; rebuild assets for those 
families who have drought or migration-induced losses; and cover 
engagement and marriage expenses. The Afar maintain economic and 
cultural relationships with external communities, such as the 
Amharas, Tigrigna and Somalis, which enables alternative sources of 
income and employment during times of drought (Chapter 5, Mobility 
as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of Afar Region, 
Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen). However, during concurrent 
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Figure 17.1. Map of Afar Regional State showing research sites where the study has 
been carried out  
Source: Zubairul Islam, Adigrat University 
 
Pastoralists have long been sustainable custodians of the natural 
resources of the dry lowland region. But in recent times the droughts 
have become more severe. The Afar region has experienced 
increasing drought during the suggum period over the last two decades 
(Viste & Sorteberg, 2013). In turn, livestock holding sizes have been 
steadily declining. This is caused by both the change in climatic 
conditions, but also the management and distribution of available 
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resources. Seasonal mobility usually occurs between December and 
May, but in some cases, this has been abandoned because there is no 
reachable pastureland. As it is becoming harder for pastoralists to find 
both water and pasture for their livestock, food insecurity and asset 
and resource depletion have become more common. Instead, 
pastoralists are forced to buy animal feed, such as wheat bran (frusca). 
The only months they do not buy frusca are the two summer (rainy) 
months.  
 
The loss of grassland and forest cover has greatly impacted on the 
ability of the Afar to maintain livestock. Forest cover has been lost 
due to climate change (either through dry spells or flooding caused 
by heavy rains on the hard soil); overuse of the forest and overgrazing 
of the grasslands (for livestock fodder, charcoal, firewood for trade 
and construction); and drought. As the forest cover shrinks, so does 
the other vegetation that forms the grazing fields. Indigenous species 
have also been lost, with invasive species, such as the Prosopis Juliflora, 
which cannot be used for grazing, proliferating. Furthermore, the 
pastoralists have lost the fertile land surrounding the Awash River, 
which was vital for dry-season livestock migration, to irrigated 
agriculture. For example, between 1972 and 2007 alone, the grassland 
cover in northern Afar decreased by 88% as the land was cleared for 
cultivation purposes (Tsegaye, Moe, Vedeld & Aynekulu, 2010). 
 
Many pastoralists have found it necessary to diversify to agriculture 
or are now highly dependent on external support and aid. The 
deteriorating conditions of the Afar pastoralists’ environment has 
created the need to implement robust adaptation strategies that 
strengthen the local adaptive capacity and reduce the root causes of 
vulnerability (Eriksen & Marin, 2015). For the past 50 years the 
Ethiopian state has been converting communal grazing areas to 
irrigated agricultural land, particularly along the Awash River. Many 
Afar pastoralists are encouraged, both through lack of grazing 
pastures and government policy, to consider irrigated agriculture and 
sedentary living as an alternative livelihood to traditional pastoralism 
(Eriksen & Marin, 2015). Maintaining a sufficient and nomadic herd, 
considered true pastoralism, is no longer always achievable and so 
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some have adopted sedentary living. With climatic stresses, land 
management changes, resource depletion, as well as other economic 
and political factors, some Afar claim to have ‘given up’ pastoralism. 
However, livestock are both practically and culturally significant for 
the Afar, so the loss of livestock has both a practical and cultural 
impact. The reduction of livestock undermines social norms, such as 
slaughtering cattle in order to provide meat for visitors and cultural 
celebrations.  
 
As the clan's social cohesion and support networks have been 
undermined by drought and resource depletion, some elders consider 
the Afar identity to have been weakened. The younger population 
consider the pursuit of traditional pastoralism less important than 
their elders, and 58% of the population in the Afar region is under 
the age of 19 (Devereux, 2006). As the younger generation re-evaluate 
what it means to be 'Afar', it is possible that the economic and social 
fabric of the region could change considerably in the coming decades. 
For example, consider absuma marriages, cross-cousin marriages 
practised within Islam which strengthen clan relations. Ethiopian 
state law and Islamic law state that the marriage is only valid if the 
woman accepts, but to refuse such a marriage is both socially 
stigmatised and requires financial compensation. Refusal of these 
marriages has been increasing, which is largely attributed to the 
increasing visibility of women in both education and employment, 
allowing their individual choice to be valued alongside clan loyalties. 
 
Migration offers access to improved infrastructure, including better 
health and education, and the opportunity of an alternative, more 
resilient income that is not weather dependent. Furthermore, it could 
grant the opportunity for workers to send funds home to family and 
clan members. However, as well as socio-cultural and linguistic 
barriers, migrants are required to gain the permission of district 
officials before they can access state services. Youth unemployment 
remains high and so many young Afar chose to migrate to cities, or 
internationally (primarily to Djibouti, Saudi Arabia and Yemen), in 
search of better economic prospects. However, inequality is still 
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pronounced and pastoralists are often socially and economically 
marginalised. 
 
The Afar people usually maintain a good condition of health between 
December and April, but malaria, cholera and the common cold are 
prevalent in the rainy periods. One of the indirect impacts of climate 
change has been the decrease of available livestock by-products, 
which has negatively affected nutrition. Without sufficient butter, 
meat and milk there has been a deterioration in health, which has 
particular affected old people, women and children. Consequently, 
pregnancy and childbirth can prove to be particularly risky. 
Traditional midwives are still common in the Afar region. Due to 
multiple factors, including high infant mortality and the need for 
future assets, an Afar woman may be expected to produce 6 to 14 
children. Contraception is usually forbidden and birth spacing is not 
commonly practised if the woman is healthy. Diseases and ill health 
are not just a threat to the Afar people, but also to their livestock. 
Their animals are susceptible to sheep and goat plague, pasturellosis, 
shoat pox, ORF (contagious dermatitis), camel respiratory disease 
complex, as well as parasites and diarrhoea. Veterinary experts visit 
villages administering free vaccinations, which keep outbreaks under 
control, but cases increase during times of drought. 
 
Education is difficult among the Afar people, because of their mobile 
lifestyle. In addition, there is a negative attitude towards education in 
the region, which is partly due to previous development policies, 
which saw children forcibly removed from their communities to fulfil 
enrolment quotas, as seen all across the Sub-Saharan region in the last 
half century (Tsegay, 2017). However, the demand for education is 
increasing as attitudes change. But still, there are considerable barriers 
regarding the supply of standard education, particularly in the remote 
and arid parts of the Afar region. For example, the teachers provided 
are often short term, unpaid, under resourced and newly trained. 
Mobile schools have been difficult to maintain, as the pastoralists 
within Afar perform irregular migration patterns, meaning social 
groups disconnect and reform, so long-term contact with students is 
almost impossible. Barriers to the success rates of boarding schools 
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include the social stigma of pastoralist livelihoods, which prevents 
children integrating fully, linguistic barriers caused by differences in 
dialect, and the separation of the children from their own community 
and culture. Qur’anic schools have proved to be effective and trusted 
institutions in the community and could be adapted to include basic 
literacy and numeracy.  
 
Predominantly, the Afar rely on the following economic activities for 
sustenance: animal husbandry, trade (such as wood and charcoal), 
remittances, daily labour work, agriculture and the PSNP. Livestock 
and livestock products are traded at market, which usually take place 
once a week. Livestock are purchased in the summer season when 
animal fodder is available and sold in the winter when there are 
shortages of water and fodder. Moreover, for profit purposes, 
livestock are ideally bought when they are most affordable and are 
sold when their price increases. However, there is a general lack of 
transport and travel distances can be significant, meaning that 
products must be sold at market when there, whether or not the price 
offered is favourable. This is exacerbated in times of drought, when 
livestock must be sold to mitigate weather shocks and there are no 
livestock by-products to offer. 
 
Richer pastoralists a have greater ability to diversify income sources 
to increase returns and hedge against livestock risks. Off-farm 
activities are limited, but include selling firewood and charcoal, daily 
labour for construction and unloading grain sacks from the tracks (as 
part of the PSNP). When construction work is available, it is usually 
completed by highland workers who travel to the area, as they have a 
more established skill set. Furthermore, there is a general lack of 
micro-finance institutions and loaning money is often forbidden for 
religious reasons. Instead, people use an informal system of relatives 
and clan members to borrow funds. When borrowing is permitted, 
clan members will share the costs if an individual defaults on a loan. 
 
The Afar share information in a variety of ways, including through 
mobile phones, the village council or mosque, or an exchange system 
called dagu. Dagu is an informal communication network through 
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which news is shared between passing members of the ethnic group 
and in doing so, can travel great distances, including to clan members 
who have migrated. Dagu can pass between men or women (not 
youth), but only if the information does not have the potential to 
incite fighting. Clan leaders are responsible for the security of each 
clan member and must ensure good standards of behaviour. In times 
of conflict, which can occur in disputes over grazing land, peace 
committees are established to allow for discussion (Chapter 5, Mobility 
as a Social Process: Conflict Management in the Border Areas of Afar Region, 
by Abdelah Alifnur & Mirjam Van Reisen). Trade, conflict resolution, 
community management and social provisions are coordinated and 
managed by clan leaders wherever possible. 
Productive Safety Net Programme  
As climate change increases the frequency and severity of weather 
events, it has become a priority for the Ethiopian government to 
address the issue of food security. As agriculture is the cornerstone 
of its economy, the government has designed seasonal policies to 
mitigate hardship when harvests are poor. The Productive Safety Net 
Programme is an attempt by the Ethiopian government and the 
World Food Programme to advance the country's development 
process by supporting long-term resilience to food shortages. The 
PSNP arose because the government decided it was necessary to end 
the aid dependency of the population affected by poverty-related 
problems. 
 
The PSNP seeks to mitigate food insecurity by promoting livelihoods, 
preventing impoverishment and protecting against hunger. In doing 
so, it hopes to increase resilience to drought and, in turn, allow 
beneficiaries to escape cycles of poverty and humanitarian aid 
dependency. It does this by providing food and cash transfers for 
households that cannot feed themselves for at least three months per 
annum, to protect household assets (as beneficiaries do not have to 
sell their livestock, or their livestock by-products, or assume high 
interest loans in order to purchase food). These transfers are mostly 
given in exchange for labour, known as public works. Work-for-
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resources programmes have long been used by the Ethiopian 
government to mobilise its large supply of unskilled labour to fulfil 
infrastructure deficit (for example, the Employment Generation 
Scheme and Project 2488, supported by the World Bank). The labour 
provided under such programmes has supported the development of 
social infrastructure (such as education and health buildings), which 
are investments in future human capital. Those households without 
able-bodied members are not required to work, but instead receive 
direct support payments (Teka, Temesgen & Fre, 2018) 
 
It was believed that dependable cash transfers over an extended 
period would lead to better spending and saving, which in turn would 
stimulate growth: “Through the provision of cash transfers rather 
than food, the programme will enable smallholders to increase 
consumption and investment levels and stimulate the development of 
rural markets” (Devereux, Sabates-Wheeler, Tefera & Taye, 2006,  
p. 2). However, the purchasing power of cash transfers has decreased 
over time, which has resulted in many beneficiaries preferring food 
transfers. Typically, transfers are usually three kilograms of grain per 
day per person for up to five days a month. The PSNP transfer period 
runs primarily from January to June with able-bodied persons 
providing labour for approximately six hours (five hours for women) 
per day. During droughts, the programme has a contingency fund that 
allows for new beneficiaries to increase the length of time they receive 
benefits (from five to seven months). Since the beginning of the 
programme’s implementation, the government has established a 
network of staff who work at both the district and national level (Fre 
et al., 2017). 
 
So far, the PSNP is reported to have benefited nearly eight million 
Ethiopians. The multi-faceted impacts of the programme were 
demonstrated in a 2015 report by the European Commission, which 
found that the PSNP has enhanced the climate change resilience of 
vulnerable populations. The report also found that: soil erosion and 
sediment losses had decreased by 50%, the average household food 
gap had decreased from 3.6 months to 2.3 months, 40,000 kilometres 
of rural access roads (dry weather roads) had been constructed or 
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were being maintained, 600,000 km of soil and water structures had 
been rehabilitated, 200,000 ponds and 35,000 hand-dug wells for 
rainwater harvesting had been built, 2,800 kilometres of canals had 
been provided for small-scale irrigation, as well as access to water for 
households, and 4,000 classrooms and 600 new health posts had been 
built or were being rehabilitated (European Commission, 2017). 
 
The PSNP is now in its fourth phase, which will be implemented 
between 2015 and 2020. During 2015/2016, the country experienced 
the most severe drought in 50 years. The Ethiopian government 
managed a wide-scale response, providing 18.2 million people – 20% 
of the country’s total population – with food or the cash to buy it, in 
part through the PSNP. However, the government is still not 
adequately able to provide for the population's food needs. In 
response, the World Bank has since approved another USD 100 
million to the PSNP, on top of the extra USD 100 million it gave the 
programme last year. The next sections present the results of the 
research in answer to the two parts of the research question: Is the 
design of the PSNP relevant for the Afar in Ethiopia? And how has 
the programme improved the socio-economic resilience of this 
community?  
Relevance of design of the PSNP 
One of the problems with the design of the PSNP is that it is applied 
in the same way in each region. However, it cannot be assumed that 
what is applicable in the lowlands is also applicable in the highlands, 
when there are considerable geographical, socio-cultural, economic 
and environmental differences. For example, are the crops produced 
under the programme compatible with the regional diet? Does 
recruitment for public works projects conflict with the seasonal 
labour demands of local farms? The PSNP is not tailored to the 
production and livelihood system of the Afar people, as transfers and 
public works under the programme do not consider the 
environmental conditions of the villages. In addition, there are many 
contextual factors that are not included in the programme design. For 
instance, polygamous households in the Afar are not recognised and 
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receive only as much as one household. Likewise, one household is 
assumed to be comprised of a maximum of five persons, regardless 
of the total number of family members in the household. 
 
However, the PSNP does include clan leaders in the decision-making 
process, which does not occur in the highland regions. Clan leaders 
play a big role in screening residents, both within the appeal 
committee and regarding beneficiary selection. They work side-by-
side with the formal task force to smooth the PSNP transfers and 
public works activities. Targeting criteria is gender sensitive and 
considers those most vulnerable. While traditional leaders play a key 
role, they are not supposed to override formal protocol. While this 
process grants value to the clan structure, strengthens social ties 
(which have been consistently undermined by the drought), grants 
community autonomy in the development process and uses local 
knowledge in a large-scale development programme, it leaves the 
PSNP open to manipulation and social connections, authority, social 
ties, or influence can impact on the decision-making process.  
 
The PSNP does not specifically address gender inequalities, with are 
high in pastoral areas, particularly in terms of access to, and control 
over, resources. This contributes to impoverishment because it 
undermines women’s productive capacity. For example, apart from 
the lack of power of women in political, social and economic affairs, 
deep-rooted socio-cultural norms in pastoral areas further marginalise 
them in poverty reduction efforts. The transfer arrangements in the 
PSNP do not acknowledging these gender disparities or the diverse 
cultural contexts.  
Impact of PSNP on socio-economic resilience 
Although there are many practical (logistical and resource based) 
barriers that effect the implementation of the PSNP across Ethiopia, 
including lack of funds, staff turnover, transportation difficulties and 
transfer delays, the PSNP has had a significant impact across 
Ethiopia. It has been praised for providing a productive approach to 
addressing the food gap, in which households are more able to 
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maintain their assets. Where drought has undermined the ability of 
communities to provide for each other, people have been brought 
together to develop their communal resources through public works 
projects. A 2006 review of the first phase of the PSNP found that 
three-quarters of PSNP households reported consuming more food, 
or better-quality food (Devereux, 2006, p. 46). While many PSNP 
households still resorted to selling their assets to sustain themselves, 
62% of PSNP households reported that their assets were effectively 
protected against 'distress sale', while nearly a quarter (23%) increased 
their assets throughout the year. 
 
But has the PSNP enhanced the resilience of the Afar people? The 
programme considers multiple factors, including assets, climate 
change and food security, affecting the resilience of beneficiaries to 
poverty. Even so, reports on the programme grant more value to the 
economic processes of development, as is common in global 
development, but do little to acknowledge socio-cultural data 
collection or reflection. There is no attention paid to how the 
programme should be adapted to regional differences. As before, the 
programme is economically-focused and so omits the need to address 
social and cultural barriers to implementation. In doing so, the 
programme frames development as an economic issue, with little 
attention given to the welfare or satisfaction of beneficiaries. 
 
While the PSNP is being implemented in many areas of Ethiopia, 
both the Afar and Somali lowland regions are experiencing similar 
barriers to implementation and success. For this reason, some of the 
programme reporting refers to these regions together. According to 
the observations of researchers in the region, the food gap has 
generally decreased across both the Afar and Somali regions. 
Furthermore, there has been a general increase in trade, with public 
works contributing to considerable crop cultivation development and 
improving access to markets, water, and social and educational 
services. However, progress has been uneven and some areas have 
experienced an increase in food insecurity. Consequently, there is no 
clear evidence that the PSNP can be said to have directly improved 
food security. Asset protection has not been successful, with the 
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livestock holdings of the Afar declining; at the same time wealth 
disparity is pronounced. From our observations we conclude that 
targeting has been poor in the region, with some well-off households 
receiving resources and some poor households not being sufficiently 
supported. Transfers of cash have been inconsistent, both in terms of 
amount and timing. While the majority of highland and Somali 
households have a transfer point less than three hours from their 
home, this does not apply to nearly 40% of the Afar people.  
 
Although the PSNP has been successful as a multi-faceted approach 
to addressing food insecurity, in the Afar region, one of the most 
globally vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change, we need 
to consider whether the programme is addressing long-term 
adaptation. As it stands, the programme has insufficient resources to 
provide for all the food insecure households in the country, which is 
partly being dealt with by an increase of funds from the World Bank. 
As well as sustaining the survival of the Afar, the programme needs 
to be evaluated in terms of its capacity to produce graduate 
beneficiaries that are resilient to poverty in the future. This is 
somewhat undermined by the sharing that occurs between PSNP and 
non-PSNP beneficiaries, as members of the community attempt to 
support their peers. This is further exacerbated by graduation targets 
in which regional stakeholders may graduate beneficiaries before they 
are appropriately resilient. As it stands, there is no proof that the 
assets retained by PSNP beneficiaries are sustainable or evidence of 
how vulnerable these are to depletion following graduation, as is 
highlighted by the proportion of the community who report 
worsened food security after leaving the programme (Fre et al., 2017). 
 
In relation to general programme coordination in the Afar, the 
drought has severely impacted on the effective implementation of the 
PSNP. There has been insufficient targeting and there have been 
delays in addressing this when trying to support the population most 
in need. Technical software is not yet fully functional in most of the 
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kebeles73 where the PSNP is being implemented, delays in receiving 
transfers have been experienced and there is a low quality of 
reporting. The procurement plan of the PSNP is regarded as poor, 
both at the woreda74 and regional levels. There have been severe delays 
in food transfers, largely accredited to the lack of available transport. 
Consequently, many of the beneficiaries have had to sell some 
household assets to survive, further depleting community resilience 
to future drought.  
 
So far, the food and cash transfer element of the PSNP has received 
the most attention, but the public works element has also gone some 
way to mitigating the resource deficit. For instance, a school was 
constructed in Da’ar, of which four of the eight classrooms were built 
using PSNP labour. Similarly, houses have been provided for teachers 
in Eruhna, Adegahnu and Da'ar. Furthermore, in Urkudi, PSNP 
coordinators have been playing a significant role in introducing and 
expanding latrines. As many still rely on open defecation, the PSNP 
coordinators have been trying to create awareness of the benefits of 
improved sanitation. Public works projects have also created 
temporary employment for youth, which helps them to continue their 
studies and provide for their food needs. 
 
However, many of the communal public works assets created have 
been reported to be below technical standards, such as feeder roads, 
water harvesting structures, diversion and irrigation canals, and 
conservation structures. Public works planning and reporting is also 
generally inadequate. Public works reports were found to be almost 
non-existent in the Afar region (only 4 of the 32 woredas submitted 
one of the three required quarterly reports). The public works 
programmes that have been implemented are based on nearby 
highland models (with a focus on terracing and soil and water 
conservation), which may not be appropriate for conditions in the 
arid lowlands.  
 
 
73 A kebele is the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia, equivalent to a village or 
ward. 
74 A woreda is equivalent to a district. 
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More needs to be done to map these resources and who is benefiting 
from them, how they will be maintained in the future, and whether 
this would be better managed if it occurred as a programme in its own 
entity. The way in which this labour is sourced and managed also 
needs to be considered. It is not that the Afar region experiences a 
labour deficit, but many households are labour constrained, in that 
they have limited access to the resources to do so and a 
disproportionate resource return for this labour. Public works plans 
have primarily been tailored to the needs of the highlanders, so work 
needs to be tailored to pastoralist needs. In addition, public work 
projects are not fully utilised to develop long-term infrastructure to 
mitigate against climate change. 
 
Furthermore, there has been no progress on the livelihood’s 
component of the PSNP. Livelihood opportunities in the region have 
not yet been properly assessed, mapped and developed. One idea was 
to re-route funds to deal specifically with drought activities. However, 
this has been hindered by changes in the approved budget and a 
revised budget needs to be submitted and discussed at the federal 
level before this can be done. In addition, the programme is not 
linked to credit or related asset building interventions. There is a need 
for income diversification opportunities, like off-pastoral income 
generation and asset building activities (e.g., through cooperatives). 
Unlike other in regions, the Household Asset Building Programme 
has yet to be implemented in the Afar region. This is due to the 
religiously inclined tendency of the Afar people to avoid borrowing. 
 
More broadly, there is debate about whether development 
programmes in high risk areas like the Afar should be conservative in 
their approach, to minimise possible losses with smaller returns on 
poverty reduction or take a more aggressive approach to growth. The 
PSNP coordinator for the Somali region explained that there is very 
little to distinguish between beneficiaries of the PSNP and those of 
food aid programmes, other than the technical terms adopted 
(Ahmednur Daud, personal communication with Fre, November 
2016). While rises in food prices assist net producers, those who 
struggle to meet their subsistence needs (who must resort to 
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purchasing food on top of their own agricultural products) are made 
more vulnerable by such cost increases. So rising food prices are 
generally good for agriculture, but bad for food security; so, 
paradoxically, improve economic growth, but increase reliance on 
social safety nets such as the PSNP. 
 
Little to no action is being taken to instigate tangible improvement in 
the Afar region. On a nationwide scale, policies still actively 
discriminate against, or discount the importance of, pastoralist 
communities and their way of life. Hence, at the regional level, 
vulnerable groups must be better targeted to ensure development 
occurs evenly and for those who need it the most. Furthermore, the 
next generation of Afar – the youth – need to be targeted for tailored 
interventions to support them in their future ambitions, whether this 
is pastoral living, a sedentary lifestyle or migrating to urban centres. 
Conclusion  
This study considered the Productive Safety Net Programme in 
Ethiopia and its implementation in the Afar region among the mobile 
pastoralists who roam across the region. In particular, it looked at 
whether or not the design of the PSNP is relevant for the Afar people 
and if the programme improved the socio-economic resilience of this 
community. The research aimed to understand whether the PSNP 
can be positively linked to the socio-economic resilience of the Afar 
people to cope with hardship and emergencies, which is defined as 
local and context-specific. The research was based on a desk study of 
locally-collected documents regarding the programme design and 
implementation of the PSNP, as well as assessments of its impact. 
Furthermore, observations in the region and contact with officials 
and members of the Afar communities informed the research. 
 
In relation to the design of the programme and its suitability to the 
Afar region, there seems to be a lack of understanding of the local 
culture and reality on the ground. The result is a disconnect with what 
is provided by the programme on paper and its implementation in the 
region, resulting in the programme not reaching the intended 
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beneficiaries resulting in reduced impact. The PSNP has been 
designed by policymakers and planners who have sedentary or urban 
backgrounds and who may not appreciate the particular nomadic 
culture of the Afar and tailor the programme accordingly.  
 
The second part of the research question was on the impact of the 
PSNP on increasing the socio-economic resilience of the Afar people. 
The conclusion is that the PSNP does not sufficiently consider the 
specific conditions of the Afar people, including their traditional 
coping mechanisms, to be able to enhance resilience. There is a need 
to recognise the relevance of traditional resource-sharing 
mechanisms, as a form of community support for those affected by 
hardship, which the PSNP should aim to supplement and support, 
not replace. The PSNP should promote livelihoods, with 
understanding of pastoral livelihood production systems, to support 
households to maintain food security, even in times of crisis. 
Migratory patterns are an essential part of pastoral livelihoods; the 
PSNP can help only by explicitly recognising migration as key to the 
resilience of the Afar people. 
 
Based on the findings of this study, it is concluded that PSNP has the 
potential to yield better results, provided that the following 
recommendations are taken into account: 
 
• Allow for seasonal adjustments to be made to the transfer 
period, public works schedule and other activities, as well as 
the payment of transfers, to make them better suited to the 
needs of pastoral communities 
• Focus on alternative income generation approaches to 
addresses decreases in pastoral livelihoods due to climate 
change, youth outmigration, insecurity and other factors 
• Consider the allocation of resources in polygamous 
households in the targeting of beneficiaries  
• Establish links to financial and credit institutions to enable 




In conclusion, the socio-political context of the ethnically-
marginalised Afar communities need to be better appreciated and 
reflected in programme design in order to enhance the impact of the 
PSNP on the socio-economic resilience of the Afar people. With 
better contextualisation, social protection programmes can support 
the nomadic Afar community. 
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Where is your Brother? Religious Leaders in Eritrea 





On 12 October 2019, the 
Nobel Prize Committee 
awarded the Prize for that 
year to the Prime Minister of 
Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed Ali. 
This focused the spotlight on 
the peace process between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, which 
started in June 2018. 
However,  what has 
transpired as a consequence 
of the internationally 
proclaimed step by Prime 
Minister Abiy to open a 
process seeking peace with 
Eritrea? In October 2018, 
the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights in Eritrea 
congratulated Eritrea and 
Ethiopia on the Peace 
Process, but also affirmed 
that, irrespective of the peace 
process, the human rights situation in Eritrea remains grim and 
crimes against humanity continue to be perpetuated. The Rapporteur 
concluded that while: “The achievement of peace between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia must be duly celebrated. However, Eritrean authorities 
must urgently embrace and implement bold measures to strengthen 
Referred to as an ‘open-air prison’ and 
the ‘North Korea of Africa’, Eritrea is 
ruled by an iron fist. The regime has 
taken full control of the civil and political 
space, including that of religious 
communities. In this extreme situation, 
the religious leaders in Eritrea have risen 
up to pose a different narrative to the one 
of totalitarian rule. By asking ‘where is 
your brother?’ they have shown that there 
is a space that the government can’t own 
and thoughts that they cannot control. By 
reminding people that we are human 
beings with a responsibility to care for 
each other they are calling the government 
to account for the atrocities it has 
committed and standing up for people’s 
right to family, to pursue a living and to 
live in dignity. 
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the protection of and respect for human rights, justice and 
accountability” (OHCHR, 2018). 
 
The unexpected Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
concluded in July 2018 immediately raised expectations of a reduction 
in the number of refugees from Eritrea. Unfortunately, this has not 
materialised (UNHCR, 2017; 2018a; 2018b). Since 2018, Eritrea has 
increased in ranking from seventh to ninth largest refugee sending 
country in the world (UNHCR, 2018c). The overall population of the 
country is unknown, but estimated to be anywhere between 3.5 
million (World Population Review, 2019) and 6 million (Plechner, 
2019). Eritrea also has the highest number of refugees per capita who 
have fled the country (Connell, 2018). According to UNHCR (2018c), 
officially registered refugees from Eritrea stood at 507,300 at the end 
of 2018, an increase from the end of 2017 when this population stood 
at 486,200.75 These figures do not take into account the unregistered 
(forced) migrants in Ethiopia.  
 
This chapter examines the reasons for the exodus of Eritrean youth 
and other refugees and the attempts by religious leaders to preserve 
spaces that are not controlled by the government. It sets the exodus 
in the context of the developments in the country during the first two 
decades since its liberation from Ethiopia in 1991. It sheds light on 
the social and political structure that the People’s Front for 
Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) has established and its consequences 
for the people, particularly the youth. This chapter investigates the 
control Eritrea’s highest authorities have over Kingdon’s three policy 
streams – political, problem and policy – and, thereby, agenda setting 
in the country. However, in every environment, there are policy 
entrepreneurs who, sometimes at great personal risk, interact with the 
policy agenda and attempt to take advantage of any policy window 
 
75 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 
“Most Eritrean refugees (57%) were hosted by Ethiopia (174,000) and Sudan 
(114,500), but many also found protection farther away, such as in Germany 
(55,300), Switzerland (34,100), Sweden (27,700), Norway (15,200), the Netherlands 
(14,900), Israel (14,500) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and northern 
Ireland (United Kingdom) (13,000)” (UNHCR, 2018c, p. 17).  
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opening to influence the formulation of policies. This chapter asks: 
What is the role of religious leaders as policy entrepreneurs in Eritrea and how do 
they engage with the policy agenda to put human rights and the wellbeing of the 
Eritrean people on the policy agenda? 
 
The next section gives a quick overview of the situation in Eritrea, 
including the ruling regime and the political narrative. The chapter 
then introduces the theoretical concepts used – Kingdon’s policy 
streams and the idea of a political myth – which are used as lenses 
through which to understand agenda setting in Eritrea and the role of 
religious leaders. The methodology of the research is then presented. 
The section that follows examines the historical context of 
governance and the legitimisation of power in Eritrea through the 
ideological narratives that framed its independence. The current 
political narrative is then explored to explain the relationship between 
those in power and the subjects of this power. Having examined the 
key elements through which power is defined, the investigation then 
focuses on the central policy of the government, namely, National 
Service, which is integrated with the national development policy and 
education. We then look at the restrictions imposed by the 
government on the movement of people and the resistance to this, 
including fleeing the country. In the next section, the religious leaders 
in Eritrea are studied as policy entrepreneurs in the context of their 
contribution to an alternative narrative and their role in agenda 
setting. Finally, some brief conclusions are drawn.  
Background 
The PFDJ is the only political party in Eritrea and it has near total 
control of the country. Its nation-building project is geared towards 
neutralising any opposition and attaining total control over its 
citizens, as it was during the liberation struggle (Mengisteab & 
Yohannes, 2005). To achieve this, the PFDJ has established a new 
social order based on the political myth of struggle against all odds 




This political narrative has raised the status of former liberation 
fighters (tegadelay) to ‘citizens’ and established the leadership of the 
PFDJ as political elites. The PFDJ has centralised all government 
administration within the office of the president, which is run by a 
small group of political elites trusted by him. In this new social order, 
not all Eritreans are citizens. Only members of the PFDJ and armed 
forces, are considered ‘true citizens’, while the rest are considered 
masses to be moulded into ‘true citizens’ (Woldemikael, 2013). 
 
By redefining citizenship based on struggle and sacrifice, elites within 
the PFDJ have gained complete control over the policy agenda. 
Eritrea is a one-man, one-party state without an active constitution, 
where civil liberties, such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, 
and space for civil society are severely restricted and controlled. To 
consolidate its position of total control, based on the narrative of 
‘self-sacrifice’, the government (i.e., the PFDJ) has implemented 
integrated policies for National Service, national development (the 
Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme), and education 
(Dorman, 2003b; Van Reisen & Gerrima, 2016). The integration of 
National Service with development and education has officially 
extended National Service from the statutory 18 months to 
indefinitely, meaning that young people in Eritrea face a lifetime of 
compulsory and continuous service to their country. As a result of 
such policies, since 2002, young Eritreans have been leaving the 
country in vast numbers. In 2001/2002, there was a reported increase 
in the number of people leaving (UNHCR, 2006). Combined with 
Eritrea’s restrictions on the movement of people abroad, these 
policies have pushed more youth into the arms of traffickers and 
smugglers (Amnesty International, 2015). 
Theoretical framework: Agenda setting and political myths 
This chapter analyses the political environment in Eritrea through the 
lens of Kingdon’s (2014) multiple streams framework of policy 




Kingdon’s proposes three streams to describe and understand the 
process of public policy agenda setting:  
 
• Problem stream: This stream is made up of public problems 
requiring government action to resolve. Usually such 
problems reach policymakers because of specific events or 
crises. 
• Political stream: In this stream it is expected to see factors 
that influence the body of politics, such as change in 
government. 
• Policy stream: In this stream it is expected to see the 
participation of the public and civil society, as well as experts 
who are analysing the situation and proposing solutions. 
Each of the streams flow independently until a ‘policy window’ 
opens, after which three streams come together to resolve an issue. 
According to Kingdon, the opening of policy windows may be 
triggered by: “apparently unrelated external factors focusing events, 
such as crises, accidents, or the presence or absence of Policy 
Entrepreneurs both within and outside the government” (Kingdon, 
2014). So called ‘policy entrepreneurs’ engage by: “coupling policy 
problems and policy solutions together with political opportunities” 
(Béland & Howlett, 2016, p. 223). 
 
The policies of the Government of Eritrea are linked to the 
experience of the liberation struggle and the associated political myth 
of struggle, martyrdom and self-sacrifice for the nation. In this 
chapter, the term ‘political myth’ is understood in the terms proposed 
by Chiara Bottici, who describes it as: “work on a common narrative 
by members of a social group (or society), to make significance of 
their experience and deeds” (Bottici, 2007, p. 133). This chapter 
proposes that the liberation struggle generated a powerful and 
dramatic narrative of struggle against all odds and self-sacrifice of the 
individual for the nation, which links the liberation experience to the 
present and projects it into the future as the struggle to build a nation. 
According to Bottici (2007), a political myth must have ‘purpose’; 
therefore, the common narrative of a political myth is not just any 
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narrative, it is a dramatic narrative that is shared and connects past, 
present and future events. It must have a prophetic sense to it and, 
specifically, it has to have significance for a group of people. It is a 
political story that talks about power, resources, and things that 
fundamentally matter.  
 
Using the lenses of the multiple stream framework and the political 
myth, it is proposed that the PFDJ is using the ‘liberation struggle’ 
experience and narrative of ‘self-sacrifice’ to maintain control of the 
country. The narrative used during the liberation struggle has become 
the foundation of the nation-building project. It is used by the 
government to justify the high level of centralisation of power and 
control over all aspects of Eritrean life.  
Methodology  
The study combines a historical and ethnographic research design. 
The study is based on analysis of a collection of secondary data, 
included desk reviews of documents. An extensive library of policy 
documents is available to the author and was analysed for the desk 
review. In addition, qualitative research was conducted, consisting of 
the collection of both primary and secondary data. This included 
immersion in Eritrea, where the author worked. Key primary data was 
collected over a period of 8 weeks in 2016. To collect primary data, 
the snowball technique was used to obtain referrals of participants for 
the interviews and discussions. Conversations were held with various 
people in Eritrea of various ages and genders, and from different 
backgrounds. In addition, seven Skype interviews (with six men and 
one woman) were conducted with Eritreans in different locations (i.e., 
Ethiopia, Sweden, Norway). The individuals who participated, 
represent a cross-section of Eritreans, including some who chose to 
leave the country from 2001 to 2018, when the last interview was 
held. For reasons of security this chapter has been written under a 
pseudonym. The real identity of the author is known to the editors. 
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Liberation and the creation of a political myth 
The Eritrean Government’s revolutionary model of social 
transformation is influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology on the 
reorganisation of society and control of the means of production by 
the state. The purported aim of the ‘elite’ inner circle is the liberation 
and advancement of the masses, which is achieved by total control. 
According to Kebede in this undertaking, the elites are not taking on 
a representative role of particular interests or constituencies, they are 
creating: 
 
…. [a] tutorial power: in the name of a class or large sections of the people, conceived 
unfit to conquer political hegemony, an enlightened group aspires to or seizes power. 
It claims to have the mandate for tutorship until the class or the people become mature 
enough to assume the task of self-government. (Kebede, 2003, p. 9) 
 
African revolutionary leaders have historically used socialist theories 
not only in the organisation of their respective revolutionary 
movements, but also in an attempt to modernise Africa (Nkrumah, 
1975, cited in Serequeberhan, 1989, p. 8). In 1983, in a New York 
Times article, Colwell described the situation in the following terms: 
 
Socialism of one kind or another took root in Africa in tandem with 
decolonisation, a reaction to what was perceived as the oppression of 
foreign capitalists who ruled and exploited them from distant cities. 
It was a reflex that seemed to fit Marx’s division of the world into 
oppressors and the oppressed. An African Brand of socialism. 
(Colwell, 1983)  
 
The Black radical freedom and independence movements of the late 
1950s and 1960s, analysed the colonial experience in terms of the 
Western appropriation of Africa’s means of production (Robinson, 
1983, p. 72). For the students who established the Eritrean Peoples’ 
Liberation Front (EPLF), the predecessor to the PFDJ, the adoption 
of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary approach was based on 
frustration, not only at the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia, but also 
at the ineffectiveness of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). This led 
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them to conclude that the only way Eritrea could be liberated, and its 
perceived ‘backwardness’ reversed, was through a socialist revolution 
led by them (Kebede, 2003). This approach legitimised the political 
ambitions and aspirations of the student leaders and provided a 
strong backing for the elitism that has developed since (Kebede, 
2003). 
 
To achieve their purpose, in 1970, the founders of the EPLF 
established the Eritrean People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), a 
communist party. The objective of EPRP (which in 1986 became the 
Eritrean People’s Socialist Party) was to ensure that the liberation 
struggle would have the appropriate coordination, organisation and 
political orientation. According to Serequeberhan: 
 
The EPLF was established as the embodiment of nationalist efforts to overcome the 
obstacles created by the historically incompetent ELF leadership. In establishing itself 
the EPLF did so by undertaking a radical critique of the history of the struggle up 
to that point… (Serequeberhan, 1989, pp. 28–29) 
 
The EPRP became a tool for the centralisation of power by a 
secretive, elite, collective leadership that managed to unify the 
dissident factions in the ELF and guide the EPLF’s liberation efforts 
(Connell, 2005).  
 
The EPLF considered the liberation of Eritrea as a revolution to free 
the masses and redesign society (Weldehaimanot & Taylor, 2011). 
From its inception, the EPLF (now the PFDJ) thought to achieve its 
goal of liberation of the masses through the total control of all aspects 
of the economic, social and political life of the people to be liberate. 
The intention of the PFDJ is to exercise such power until the masses 
become mature enough to assume the task of self-government 
(Serequeberhan, 1989).  
 
In 1971, the EPLF leadership produced a document called NHnan 
Elaman (Our Struggle and its Aims) (Weldehaimanot & Taylor, 2011). 
This document is also known as the ‘Eritrean Manifesto’. The 
Manifesto lays the foundation for the political narrative of a ‘struggle 
491 
 
against all odds’, of Eritrea surrounded by enemies, and of self-
sacrifice of the individual for the nation. According to the Manifesto: 
 
[….] Our present struggle against Ethiopian oppressors is nothing more than an 
extension of our militant Eritrean struggle against foreign oppressors. We are 
sacrificing our lives to free our people from the shackles of Haile Selassie [Emperor 
of Ethiopia] and his master [US imperialism] to attain independence for our country 
and to realise the self-reliant progress, of the Eritrean people […] a society where no 
economic exploitation or political oppression of man by man exists… [A prosperous] 
nation with educational, agricultural and industrial development based on a 
‘National United Front’ ... (Weldehaimanot & Taylor, 2011, pp. 569, 570, 
582) 
 
From the beginning, the EPLF strategy for achieving national unity 
and liberation and addressing the perceived social and economic 
backwardness of the country, caused by the colonial experience, was 
for the EPLF to dominate all social, political and economic spaces 
and all aspects of policy formulation and implementation. 
 
The EPLF implemented a highly-centralised and opaque 
administration that continues to operate today (Buysse, Van Reisen 
& Van Soomeren, 2017). It works on a two-track system: an unseen, 
powerful, inner circle of elites and public structures projecting the 
image of egalitarian self-sufficiency. This approach is in line with 
Lenin’s ideology, as described in his work What is to be done? (Lenin, 
1987). For the EPLF, as with Lenin, it was not enough to achieve 
independence of a society that was considered backwards and holding 
on to “traditional, religious and social values”. The revolution had to 
redesign society and create a new “progressive social order” 
(Mengisteab & Yohannes, 2005, p. 35). This process required not only 
the indoctrination of members of the armed forces, but also the 
mobilisation of the civilian population.  
 
Prior to 1991, the EPLF was focused on liberation. After 1991, its 
focus shifted to nation building. The nation-building project 
borrowed concepts from the liberation struggle, such as ‘struggle 
against all odds’, ‘martyrdom’ and ‘self-sacrifice’ for the nation, 
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absorbing individuals within the political narrative of an Eritrea beset 
by multiple enemies and struggling against all odds (Dorman, 2003a; 
2003b). The resumption of hostilities with Ethiopia, and the ‘no war, 
no peace’ status that followed, reinforced the narrative and the 
associated political myth of struggle against all odds (Bundegaard, 
2004). 
 
Post liberation, to correct what the EPLF perceived to be the social 
and economic ‘backwardness’ of the people, it continued to 
administer the state in a highly-centralised manner. It banned all 
opposition parties and treated all non-mass movement organisations 
(i.e., independent civil society) with suspicion and as usurpers of the 
people’s sovereignty. It reacted to any challenge to its authority with 
force. In addition, without any consultation, it nationalised land (State 
of Eritrea, 1994), established a unitary form of government, and 
changed the administrative boundaries within Eritrea to establish 
Zobas (State of Eritrea, 1996). This approach deliberately ignored the 
fact that, despite colonisation, Eritrea has a history of self-
administration (Tronvoll, 1998). 
Political narrative: Martyrdom and self-sacrifice 
The culture of martyrdom and sacrifice established in the post-
independence period, transformed the concept of citizenship and the 
social contract between citizens and the Eritrean state. It is no longer 
a contract based on the protection of the rights of citizens (such as 
the protection of life and property), it is an expression of the 
willingness of Eritreans to sacrifice themselves in service of the nation 
(Bernal, 2017). This culture is based on the narrative of Eritrea as 
beset by multiple enemies opposed to its independence (Dorman, 
2003a). However, through discipline and sacrifice the Eritrean people 
were able to defeat, without outside help, Ethiopia, a numerically 
superior enemy supported by a superpower, the Soviet Union 
(Kaplan, 2003, cited in Bundegaard, 2004, p. 36).  
 
In the aftermath of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war (1998–2000), the 
PFDJ narrative of struggle and sacrifice for the nation focused on the 
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threat of Ethiopia. Seizing the opportunity presented by the 
continuation of hostility between the two countries, and building the 
narrative of multiple existential threats, the PFDJ indefinitely 
postponed the implementation of the 1997 Constitution, 
development of a multiparty system, and the national elections (Al 
Jazeera, 2008; Chapter 19, Peace, but no Progress: Eritrea, an 
Unconstitutional State, by Bereket Selassie & Mirjam Van Reisen). 
Instead, it centralised all political and economic power (Human 
Rights Concern Eritrea , 2018; Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2002), and 
proceeded with the implementation of a series of policies to ensure 
the deployment of the country’s youth for nation building, thus 
retaining a high level of militarisation (an estimated 300,000 to 
350,000 personnel) (AECID, 2007). In this way, the Government of 
Eritrea replicated the liberation experience of struggle, sacrifice and 
martyrdom: “In Eritrea, the expectation that the youth will defend 
the nation, and also serve the nation in peace time has been much 
more widespread” (Dorman, 2003a, p. 13). 
 
Those who fail to participate in the government’s nation-building 
activities are denied the rights and benefits of citizenship:  
 
Groups which refused to participate in these programmes (i.e. Service Programmes) 
are denied the right to citizenship. The first group to resist national service was the 
small community of Jehovah’s Witnesses. This led the government to claim that they 
had ‘relinquished’ their rights to citizenship by categorically and repeatedly refusing 
to recognise the state of Eritrea and its laws. (Dorman, 2003a, p. 10) 
 
The term citizen is used to refer to those who fought and sacrificed 
themselves for liberation: members of the PFDJ, armed service 
personnel and former liberation fighters (i.e., tegadelay). The masses 
(i.e., the hafash, and taxpayers or gabar) are citizens in the making. They 
constitute the majority, are considered to be backward and have not 
yet struggled and sacrificed for the nation. This group includes 
members of the National Service and the diaspora. Non-citizens are 
people who refuse to participate in the nation-building project (i.e., 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, youth escaping National Service, and members 




The experience of exclusion from citizenship is supported by the 
distinction between different classes of people in which only those 
loyal to the PFDJ can be qualified as citizens, who are protected by 
the regime and can participate in the political and economic life of 
the country and benefit from it. Those who are excluded from this 
status, are either forced to prove their allegiance through near-total 
obedience (the masses) or are denied Eritrean identity and 
recognition of citizenship and are totally excluded from any form of 
protection. 
Nation-building: The integration of National Service, 
development and education  
In 2001, following the arrest of 15 members of the government 
(known as the G15) who promoted a democratisation process, there 
was a crackdown followed by the incarceration of students from 
Asmara University. At the time 5,000 university students were 
arrested and taken to Wi’a and Gelaalo, two notorious military 
prisons, and accused of siding with the G15 (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 
2017). 
 
Subsequent to the 2001 arrests, National Service, which had started 
in 1994, was integrated with the education system. In Eritrea, 
National Service is a combination of military training and civil service, 
working for little pay in non-military activities, such as agriculture, the 
construction of roads, houses, buildings, and mining. From 2002, 
National Service was linked to the Warsay Yikaalo National 
Development Programme. The objective of this programme is to 
secure the country’s post-war economic rehabilitation and bring 
about radical change in all development sectors. The programme 
relies on the deployment of National Service (Warsay) defence force 
personnel (Yikaalo) as labour. All Warsay Yikaalo activities are carried 
out under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defence. Therefore, 
conscripts work for an indefinite period of time on development 
projects and the administration of ministries and local authorities, in 
many cases also working for government or PFDJ-owned businesses. 
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Such work is carried out in conditions that are considered to be forced 
labour (UN Human Rights Council, 2015). 
 
In September 2003, the Ministry of Education announced the 
comprehensive reform of the national education system. The view of 
the government was that the existing education system was too 
academic and did not serve the country’s development objectives 
(Ministry of Education, 2003, Article 31). Under this reform, Asmara 
University was closed, an additional year of high school was 
introduced (to be completed at the Sawa Warsay Yikaalo Military 
School), and higher education decentralised by establishing a network 
of regional colleges. Since the 2001 Asmara University student 
protest,76 the view of the government is that the higher education 
offered by Asmara University is a troublesome and bourgeois and has 
nothing to contribute to the revolution. Hence, the University of 
Asmara was closed in 2003 and the building has since fallen into decay 
(Asmarino, 2017b).  
 
Under this system students who have not completed their final year 
of school at Sawa and have not sat for the National School Certificate, 
cannot access a college education. The regional colleges subsequently 
developed are administered jointly by an academic director and a 
military director: 
 
The Eritrean Institute of Technology at Mai Nefhi is located only a few kilometres 
South of Asmara. Built on an open field site, it feels isolated and remote. Run jointly 
by an academic vice director and an army colonel, Nefhi resembles a military camp 
more than a place of higher learning. Students, at least in theory need permission to 
leave campus, and in private conversation it’s often referred to as the ‘camp’. (Müller, 
2008, p. 122) 
 
Through the integration of these policies, the government is 
recreating the liberation experience of fighters working for the nation. 
The effect of these policies is to move students into National Service 
 
76 This protest was over students being required to conduct research in the field 
without sufficient allowance for accommodation and food (Van Reisen & 
Estefanos, 2017; Dorman, 2003b). 
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and the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme earlier 
and indefinitely extend the period of service, taking full control over 
the working population.  
 
At the same time as taking control over the working population, 
Eritrea has also taken control of economic sectors, including finance, 
imports and exports, transport, and construction. This was done 
through a process of unfair competition with private businesses, 
facilitated by the fact that the government does not pay taxes and 
does not comply with labour, environmental, and other regulatory 
requirements. Also, because of the control by the regime over its 
working population, the authorities have unlimited access to a large 
pool of free labour, effecting a transfer of labour away from the 
private sector and keeping it fully government controlled. This policy 
of moving labour away to labour sites identified and controlled by the 
government, has crippled the agricultural sector, which still relies to a 
large extent on subsistence farming (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). 
Kibreab, referring to the construction sector, summarises the 
situation as follows: “Since April 2006 only PFDJ firms are allowed 
to engage in construction activities, after private firms and individual 
entrepreneurs were banned from the construction industry as part of 
the government’s crackdown on the private sector” (Kibreab, 2014, 
pp. 62–63). 
 
The government’s control and domination of the economy has not 
increased economic activity or productivity. In fact, the economy is 
stagnating, further weakening the private sector and restricting 
economic opportunities for Eritreans. According to the World Bank’s 
economic review:  
 
[Despite] recent growth, Eritrea remains one of the least developed countries in the 
world. Anecdotal evidence indicates that poverty is still widespread in the country, 
where 65% of the population lives in rural areas and 80% depend on subsistence 
agriculture for their livelihood, negatively impacting human development statistics. In 
2012, Eritrea’s Human Development Index at 0.351, was below the average of 
0.446 for countries in the Low Human Development group and below the 0.475 
average for countries in the Sub Saharan Africa region. (World Bank, 2018) 
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Since 2002, there have also been aggressive round-ups of youth for 
National Service, expanded by the Warsay Yikaalo National 
Development Programme and the 2003 education reform. 
Consequently, the number of Eritrean youths fleeing the country has 
increased. According to UNHCR, the first significant, post-liberation 
movement of Eritrean youth started in 2002, coinciding with the 
introduction of the Warsay Yikaalo National Development 
Programme. By 2010, National Service and the Warsay Yikaalo 
Development Programme were augmented by the Hizbawi Serawit 
(People’s Army), as an additional service requirement for people aged 
between 50 and 80 years (Amnesty International, 2015; 
Globalsecurity.org, n.d.). Members of the Hizbawi Serawit are 
required to carry out compulsory duties such as guarding public 
spaces and government property and patrols, as well as working on 
national development projects. These compulsory duties have in 
some cases resulted in people having to discontinue their paid 
employment (Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018), thus, 
contributing to the process of deliberate impoverishment of Eritreans 
(Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017). The situation is eloquently described 
by Kibreab: 
 
Present day Eritrea is among the most militarised countries in the world. 
Even the education system is militarised. After ENS [Eritrean National 
Service] became open ended and consequently militarisation affected all aspects 
of life in the country, the unpopularity of the ENS among citizens within 
and/or approaching the age of conscription increased dramatically. This was 
reflected on the one hand, in the large number of people fleeing the country, 
and on the other, hiding within the country to avoid conscription. (Kibreab, 
2014, p. 9) 
 
The youth experience the state as an albatross around their necks. 
They understand the state in terms of spy networks (Bozzini, 2011), 
as a human rights violator curtailing civil, political and economic 
rights, and the source of torture and desperation. They see it as the 




The state has maintained a narrative of threat and struggle for the 
survival of Eritrea and has proceeded to exercise centralised control, 
restricting the space for citizen participation in decision making and 
suffocating any nascent indigenous civil society that could challenge 
its power (Hepner, 2008, p. 478). In 2014, members of the People’s 
Army refused to report for training during harvest time (Awate, 
2014a). At the time, during an interview with Eri TV, the President 
stated: “Since training is a priority, harvesting can wait, we can afford 
weeks or months to do that… And one has to make decisions… We 
made a trade-off” (Awate, 2014a).  
 
The control over people is linked to a systematic process of political, 
social, and economic deprivation, and human rights violations – 
violations that the government refuses to take any responsibility for 
and, reverting to its ‘threat’ stance, has labelled ‘lies’ and ‘ploys’ of its 
enemies to undermine the state. A position confirmed by Yemane 
Gebreab (Head of Political Affairs, PFDJ) who dismissed the finding 
of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea that 
Eritrea may have committed crimes against humanity (UN Human 
Rights Council, 2015): “…[it is] really laughable ... There is no basis 
to the claims of the Commission of Inquiry …” (Harper, 2016a; 
2016b). 
 
Through the integration of National Service, the Warsay Yikaalo 
National Development Programme, and education, the government 
has limited the citizenship rights of conscripts who, while in service, 
cannot: legally obtain a mobile phone or sim card; legally obtain or 
renew a business licence; access land; or access travel documents and 
exit visas (Bozzini, 2011). Deserters or objectors are denied any rights 
and cannot access state services. Thus, the Eritrean official concept 
of citizenship is intrinsically linked to enlistment and the fulfilment of 






Eritrean youth describe their situation as slavery: 
 
[The] situation in Eritrea and long time ago with slaves is the same. We build the 
houses of the elites without money. We work on farms of government officials for no 
money. If you are educated, they deploy you anywhere…. for a short time, you can 
tolerate it… but this is for life. Freedom is to do your duty and ask for your rights. 
If you are doing your duty, but do not get rights – then you can complain that you 
do not have rights… In Eritrea even if you do your duty, you cannot move freely 
within the country; cannot open own business for yourself. If you cannot do what you 
want (legally) etc., you can’t say ‘I am free’. (NTN, interview with MS, face-
to-face, 2018) 
 
A law graduate from the former Asmara University (KN, interview 
with MS, Skype, 2016) explained that there are people in Eritrea who 
have been in the military for 20–30 years. After military training, he 
served 8 years in the National Service, as a legal advisor at the Ministry 
of Justice, for 500 Eritrean nakfa (USD 10) a month. Despite the 
many opportunities for training at the Ministry of Justice, National 
Service conscripts cannot participate. KN felt that the situation 
destroyed any hope he had of progressing in life: “They [the 
Government] took my age and my opportunities” (KN, interview 
with MS, Skype, 2016). 
 
A young veteran of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war explained that after the 
year 2000, he continued with National Service as a legal advisor for 
the government. During this time, he was repeatedly arrested at the 
whim of his commanding officer. On one occasion he was 
incarcerated in a container. For this veteran: “Staying at home [in 
Eritrea] is almost valueless as people cannot improve their economic 
status, people do not own themselves – so people are moving away 
for the sake of freedom” (HA, interview with MS, Skype, 2016). 
 
A National Service conscript who had been assigned to work for the 
Ministry of Information in Asmara, explained that even though he 
had an interesting job and was close to his family, he decided to leave 
because his monthly salary of 145 Eritrean nakfa did not meet his 
basic needs (T, interview with MS, Skype, 2016). He could not achieve 
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the status of an ‘independent adult’. Also, as a graduate of the Italian 
School in Asmara, he could not sit for the National School Certificate 
and as a result had no access to tertiary education.  
 
A former Italian School student who was excused from National 
Service because of a family situation, explained that this was not the 
same as clearance or a demobilisation (MA, interview with MS, Skype, 
2016). She was still subjected to economic and mobility constraints 
imposed on National Service conscripts. As a former student of the 
Italian School, now excused from National Service, she could not 
pursue higher education at any of the colleges in Eritrea and, as a 
result, had no opportunity to improve her family’s economic 
situation.  
 
A priest who had been excused from National Service was 
subsequently required to report for duty due to a change in policy in 
2008 that required all members of a religious order to report for 
National Service (Y, interview with MS, Skype, 2016). He had a long 
history of family members who sacrificed their lives for the nation. 
Some died during the liberation struggle, while others were still 
serving. However, this did not make a difference to his obligation to 
serve. 
 
A former military doctor explained that after independence, and 
especially after the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war, Eritreans were 
leaving the country because of the political breakdown and 
suppression of civil space (KB, interview with MS, Skype, 2016). 
According to him, the phenomenon of Eritreans leaving is linked to 
extreme impoverishment and a lack of freedom, associated with 
indefinite National Service – a situation made worse by the 
government’s decision to close all private health clinics since 2011. 
As a result of this policy, medical professionals are now leaving the 
country, further weakening an already fragile health system.  
 
The Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process has not changed the situation 
within Eritrea and, unfortunately, at the time of writing, there is no 
indication of any policy change. In an interview with Nizar Manek, 
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Madame Luul Gebreab, Minister of Labour and Human Welfare 
(former Director of the National Union of Eritrean Women) 
explained that: “Definitively a small army will remain, and the others 
will concentrate on the development work as planned” (Manek, 
2018). The ‘development work’ referred to is the Warsay Yikaalo 
National Development Programme. This means that the government 
is not planning to overhaul the system through which it can exercise 
direct control over labour in the country. Nor has the practice of 
arresting and disappearing of dissenters changed, as they try to open 
up a discussion on the dire situation in the country. This is evidenced 
by the arrest of the former Minister of Finance, Berhane Abrehe, who 
sought to open up debate on need for reform of the current situation 
in Eritrea, following the peace agreement (Daily Reporter, 2018).  
Restriction of movement 
The sense of ownership by the authorities over its people is 
complemented by the restriction of movement forced upon the 
population. This applies to both internal and external movement. In 
order to leave the country, all Eritreans aged five and over must 
obtain an exit visa. The government will not issue an exit visa to any 
children above the age of five, irrespective of their situation (i.e., 
health, family reunification, etc.) (Amnesty International, 2017; 
Freedom House, 2018; Home Office, 2015, p. 12). 
 
The restriction of movement of children above five years old, 
particularly affects families seeking to reunite in a foreign country. In 
the case of one family, the parents migrated from Eritrea legally and 
obtained the relevant migration documents for their seven children 
from the host country. However, the Eritrean government issued an 
exit visa only for the child below age five. As a result, the remaining 
children, aged 8 to 17, were not able to migrate safely with their 
parents. The family resorted to smuggling the children to Sudan 
through Karora (the north east border between Eritrea and Sudan). 
The first attempt failed and resulted in the arrest of all the children, 
who were released after the payment of a fine. However, the second 
attempt succeeded (Family A, interview with MS, face-to-face, 2016).  
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The restriction on external movement forces families to seek the 
services of smugglers. As a result, human smuggling has become a 
lucrative activity and many Eritreans are taking up the work (KB, 
interview with MS, Skype, 2016): “Due to the illegal nature of travel 
and migration, leaving the country involves illegal payments and illicit 
money transfers” (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017, p. 98). 
 
Despite PFDJ rhetoric to the contrary, because of policies that the 
PFDJ is implementing, a wide rift has developed between the 
government and the Eritrean people. The government has 
systematically impoverished the population, leaving the youth to 
choose between a life of slave labour or exile: “Everything on the 
ground that happened and was done was not only pushing, but 
forcing people to leave” (Van Reisen & Estefanos, 2017, p. 108).  
 
Eritrea remains food insecure and it is one of the poorest countries in 
the world, ranked 176 out of 180 countries in the World Economic 
Freedom Index (Miller, Kim & Roberts, 2018). According to the 
Global Hunger Index 2017, Eritrea has a child stunting rate of 53% 
and a child wasting rate of 14.7 % (Von Grebmer, Bernstein, Brown, 
Prasai & Yohannes, 2017). The Mo Ibrahim Index 2018 of African 
Governance ranks Eritrea last (54th place) in the category 
‘participation and human rights’ (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2018). 
This category measures civil and political rights, citizen participation 
in political and electoral processes and respect for basic rights. Such 
a low ranking is a reflection of the fact that Eritrea is a one-man, one-
party state that lacks a constitution; there is no freedom of speech or 
assembly; and rule of law is lacking (Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 
2018).  
 
Even though it is not possible for Eritreans to organise themselves 
politically and to openly express dissent in the country, they do 
express defiance and resistance by: refusing to report for National 
Service (Globalsecurity.org, n.d.); refusing to hand over community 
schools to the government (ERi-TV 2, 2015); and leaving the country. 
The religious leaders in Eritrea have supported the people in this 
resistance by providing an alternative narrative and acting as policy 
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entrepreneurs in the limited space they are allowed. The next section 
examines this narrative and investigates their role. 
An alternative narrative: The pastoral letters of the Bishops of 
Eritrea  
The PFDJ has established a policy environment in Eritrea that is very 
difficult to engage with or challenge. In relation to religious leaders, 
Proclamation No.73 of 1995 requires religious groups to register with 
the government and limits their activities to pastoral work (Human 
Rights Concern Eritrea, 2018, paragraphs 144–159). Despite the very 
restricted space and the limitations imposed on faith-based 
organisations, religious leaders in Eritrea have sought to continue 
their tradition of interceding on behalf of Eritreans and championing 
their wellbeing (Negash & Weldemichael, 2018).  
 
Since independence, despite the restrictions imposed by 
Proclamation No.73 of 1995 and the harassment, arrests and 
disappearance of religious leaders, faith-based organisations have 
continued to present alternative voices. Muslim clerics have 
repeatedly challenged policy on matters such as education and 
National Service for women, with many of them being arrested and 
disappearing (Christian Solidarity Worldwide & Human Rights 
Concern Eritrea, 2009). In response, the Eritrean government has 
sought to silence them: 
 
…[the] Commission finds that former freedom fighters belonging to the ELF, 
Muslim scholars and businessmen, members of the Afar ethnic group, alleged 
participants of the Forto incident in January 2013, were particularly targeted by the 
Eritrean Government, who organized their arrests in the streets, mosques and 
workplaces by masked Eritrean security agents either in uniform or in civilian 
clothes. (UN Human Rights Council, 2015, paragraph 44)  
 
In 2004, Patriarch Antonius spoke out against the arrest of three 
Sunday school instructors and refused to comply with the 
Government’s request to excommunicate more than 3,000 members 
of the Church associated with the Medhanie Alem movement. The 
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government reacted by placing him under house arrest and replacing 
him with its own nominee, Yoftahe Dimetros (Hepner, 2014). The 
Eritrean Government’s intimidation and harassment tactics have not 
worked on many Orthodox clergy, who like so many Eritreans, have 
sought refuge in the diaspora, particularly Ethiopia. These clergymen 
have reported the destruction of monasteries, arrest of fellow 
clergymen for demanding the release of Patriarch Antonious, and the 
closure of the school at the Enda Marriam Cathedral (Christian 
Solidarity Worldwide, 2018). 
 
In October 2017, the government demanded the surrender of both 
Al Diia Muslim School as well as the closure of the Catholic Medhanie 
Alem Secondary School of Asmara (Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 
2018). Both communities refused to comply. The government 
responded by arresting the dissenters.  
 
…the government imprisoned the sister working at the pastoral office in Asmara, a 
Combonian, Sr. Tinsae and the administrator of the school, Abba Haile Paulos, a 
diocesan priest (he volunteered to be imprisoned in replacement of Sr. Tsigewoini, the 
director of the school). (Asmarino, 2017a)  
 
Prior to his arrest, the leader of the board of the school, Haj Musa 
Mohamed Nur addressed a meeting of parents and teachers of Al Diia 
Muslim School. At that meeting Haj Musa resolutely refused to 
comply with the government’s directive to hand over the school (ERi-
TV 2, 2015). He argued: 
 
… [because] this school is ours, even now, whatever its shortcomings, [your] 
suggestions that are not compatible with our views will not have acceptance. And 
because we have full rights there is nothing that should frighten us or scare us. 
(Awate, 2017a) 
The arrest of Haj Musa and members of the Al Diia school board as 
well as of the Catholic clergy sparked a demonstration in Asmara that 
was dispersed using force and live fire by the military (Christian 
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Solidarity Worldwide, 2018).77 The government attempted to justify 
its drastic reaction by describing the protest as sectarian:  
…. [the unruly] group, who were chanting sectarian and inflammatory slogans all 
the way, proceeded to Liberation Avenue and the Ministry of Education. At this 
stage, they began to throw stones and to attack the Police. (Letter from the 
Government of Eritrea to the UN, quoted in Shaban, 2018) 
 
Haji Musa continued his defiance when he refused to be released 
from prison without his companions (Awate, 2017b). He died in 
March 2018. According to the Christian Solidarity Worldwide, the Al 
Diia Muslim School has been reopened and some of the school 
community members have been released. However, Haji Ibrahim 
Yonus, a member of the Al Diia School Executive Committee also 
died in prison in January 2019 (Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 2018; 
2019). 
 
The pastoral letters of the Catholic Bishops of Eritrea are part of an 
ongoing tradition of providing alternative voices. Since liberation, the 
Catholic Bishops have written a series of letters marking the key 
transitions of Eritrea. In 1991, they thanked God for liberation and 
the end of the long liberation struggle (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 
1991, cited in Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2002 p. 7). In 2001, they 
lamented the destruction caused by the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war; 
the top-down approach taken by the government, as well as the harsh 
repression of dissent (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2002). The 
Government’s response to this mild rebuke was to close the Catholic 
press and demand that clerics report for National Service – a request 
that was declined on the basis that the “bearing of arms was ‘not in 
accordance’ with the role of clergy” (Christian Solidarity Worldwide 
& Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2009). In retaliation the 
government closed Catholic schools and clinics, expelled clergy and 
other personnel, and denied exit visas for national clergy (Christian 
Solidarity Worldwide & Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 2009). 
 





Irrespective of this, the Catholic Bishops have continued to issue 
pastoral letters. In 2004, they acknowledged the growing diaspora and 
praised them for their efforts to support family and friends in Eritrea 
and urged them to Be Steadfast in Hope (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 
2004). In 2014, following the tragic drowning of more than 300 
Eritreans off the coast of Lampedusa, Italy, the Catholic Bishops of 
Eritrea wrote a letter asking, Where is Your Brother?. By quoting Genesis 
4:9, the Bishops reminded the people of Eritrea and the regime that 
we ‘are our brother’s keepers’ (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2014). It 
was a strong rebuke of the government for its lack of care for 
Eritreans leaving the country. The action of the Bishops was 
supported by Abuna Menkerius, the Arch Diocese of North America, 
Eritrean Orthodox Church (Awate, 2014b; Arch Diocese of North 
America, 2014; Tewahado Eritrea, 2013).  
 
With Where is Your Brother?, the Bishops have set a precedent. They 
have reached out and touched the youth deeply. This letter has 
reached Eritrean youth at home, in refugee camps, on migration 
routes and in destination countries. In this letter, the Bishops, in 
keeping with tradition of Catholic social teaching and liberation 
theology, firmly place themselves on the side of the: “disenfranchised 
citizens of the country (the poor, the exiled, the victims of accidents 
at sea and the desert, and the imprisoned)” (Negash & Weldemichael, 
2018). The 2014 pastoral letter speaks directly to the heart of the 
Eritrean people and addresses the deep betrayal that is felt due to the 
conduct of the PFDJ. In the letter, the Bishops clearly identify the 
indefinite and poorly-paid National Service and the imprisonment of 
many young people in detention centres or punishment camps as the 
direct cause of their misery. They point out that: 
 
[…] There is no point in just asking: ‘Why are the youth choosing to go abroad? 
For no-one leaves a country of milk and honey to seek another country offering the 
same opportunities. If one’s homeland is a place of peace, jobs and freedom of 
expression there is no reason to leave it to suffer hardship, loneliness and exile to 





On 12 October 2018, during mass, Catholic Priest Aba 
Teklemmichael pointing to the recent reforms in Ethiopia. He urged 
the Eritrean government to also make the necessary reforms in 
Eritrea, and to democratise the government to enable Eritreans to 
influence the formulation of policies and participate in their own 
governance (Solomon, 2018).  
 
On Easter Friday 2019, the Catholic Bishops, issued a new Pastoral 
Letter entitled: Peace to You Who Were Far Off, and Those Who are Near, 
Call for National Reconciliation (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2019a). In 
the letter, once again, the Bishops, recognised the sacrifice and 
suffering of the youth, pointing out that the regime has failed them 
and that this failure is responsible for their flight from the country. 
While, the Bishops welcomed the peace process with Ethiopia, they 
pointed out that much work must be done internally to achieve peace 
and reconciliation among Eritreans. They called for: a constitutional 
government and the rule of law. And, referring to the many Eritreans 
imprisoned without due process, the Bishops called for justice, 
pointing out that there can be no peace without justice (Catholic 
Bishop of Eritrea, 2019b).  
 
On 12 June 2019, two months since the publication of: Peace to You 
Who Were Far off, and Those Who are Near, the Eritrean Government, in 
what is believed to be an act of retaliation, closed 22 Catholic health 
centres. The Bishops vigorously protested the action, writing to the 
government (Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2019b) expressing their 
concern and dismay at the action. At the same time, they called for 
17 days of prayer and fasting until 12 July 2019 (Unah, 2019). They 
have also recently issued a Further Clarification on the Recent Take-over and 
Closure by the PFDJ of the Catholic Clinics in Eritrea (Catholic Bishops of 
Eritrea, 2019c)  
 
Through the pastoral letters, the Bishops are engaging in policy 
dialogue. They review the context, identify issues, and suggest policy 
options and a holistic approach to development to fulfil all aspects of 
human life, bringing to life Catholic social teachings and echoing 
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Amartya Sen’s concept of development as freedom (Sen, 1999; 
Catholic Bishops of Eritrea, 2002). 
 
The actions of religious leaders are significant because they have deep 
historical roots within communities and can speak from experience 
and a higher moral ground. They can connect the diaspora to 
communities in Eritrea and, therefore, exercise an incremental 
influence, preparing the ground for the development of a policy 
window for future action. These leaders are recalling the primary duty 
of the authorities to serve the people, respect their dignity, and 
recognise them as citizens. Although their expressions are non-
confrontational, there is no doubt that this narrative is a challenge to 
the almost total control exercised by the PFDJ. In the current 
atmosphere in Eritrea, it is community leaders (many of whom are 
also religious leaders) who are steering initiatives for people-to-people 
reconciliation and normalisation along the Eritrea-Ethiopia border. 
Conclusion 
Using Kingdon’s multiple stream framework (political, problem and 
policy streams), this chapter argues that the regime in Eritrea is 
exercising control over all aspects of the policy stream in the country. 
The top-down centralised form of government and the targeting of 
youth is designed to dispel any potential opposition to the ruling party 
the PFDJ and President Isaias Afwerki. The regime does not allow 
any space for policy entrepreneurs, outside those in power. 
 
This chapter identifies various policy mechanisms developed by the 
government to exercise near-total control over Eritrean society 
especially the youth, namely, the integration of National Service with 
the Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme and the 
education system. This integrated mechanism traps youth in a system 
of indefinite forced labour, in which their right to a family and to 
work to support themselves is violated. Eritrean youth, experience 
this as state ownership of their lives – the total control over its people, 
is tantamount to modern-day slavery. In their experience, the state 
controls their public and private lives. This repression has contributed 
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to a rapid increase in the exodus from Eritrea and human trafficking 
of Eritrean youth.  
 
The PFDJ’s Marxist-Leninist approach supports the achievement of 
almost total control of all political narratives and policy development, 
resulting in repression of the people. This includes the direct targeting 
of people who are active members of religious organisations and who 
express themselves religiously, especially among the smaller, minority, 
faith-based organisations. The PFDJ has supported a political myth 
that the nation-building project is one of sacrifice, in which the 
Eritrean people live for the good of the nation. Except for those in 
the inner circle of the regime, all others are excluded from this status 
and need to continuously prove their allegiance – those who defy the 
narrative of power are completely excluded. 
 
Despite the almost total control maintained by the government, the 
youth and others have shown various covert ways to express their 
resistance. They do so by refusing to report for National Service, the 
Warsay Yikaalo National Development Programme and Hizbawi 
Serawit (the people’s army). The youth are also showing their 
resistance by leaving the country.  
 
Religious leaders have emerged to challenge the status quo by 
elevating Eritreans first and foremost as human beings of faith and 
with a responsibility for the wellbeing of their fellow community 
members. They have spoken out, expressing their sadness over the 
loss of life of refugees fleeing from the country. They can be seen as 
social entrepreneurs in that they propose a narrative based on the 
freedom of a spiritual belonging as a strong alternative to the 
dominant ideology of exercising control over people’s lives. 
Emphasising the importance to care for fellow Eritreans respecting 
their dignity, these messages challenge the narrative of the PFDJ that 
the only goal of Eritreans is to serve the PFDJ and sacrifice 
themselves for the nation.  
 
Risking their life and freedom, elders such as Abuna Philipos and 
Abuna Antonious (Eritrean Orthodox Church), Haj Musa (who died 
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in prison after his arrest), the board members of the Al Diia Muslim 
School, and the Catholic Bishops of Eritrea have been speaking out. 
Deriving strength from their historical roots in communities and 
ability to spiritually connect with young Eritreans in the diaspora, they 
have been able to speak the truth from a higher moral ground and 
offer human dignity as an alternative to the total civil control 
exercised by the government.  
 
Asking the rhetorical question ‘Where is your brother?’, the Catholic 
Bishops of Eritrea have shown that not every space can be controlled 
by the Government. By posing this question, the religious leaders 
have called the Eritrean Government to account. The efforts of the 
religious leaders may be the strongest yet in Eritrea, showing that new 
ideas may emerge for the policy agenda in the country, namely, that a 
government may care about its people; that the people of Eritrea may 
express their thoughts; and that the Eritrean people are human 
beings, born as spiritually endowed members of the universe, and 
they deserve to live in dignity. 
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Introduction 
In 2019, the Nobel Peace 
Prize was awarded to Prime 
Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali of 
Ethiopia following the 
signing of the Eritrea and 
Ethiopia Peace agreement in 
September 2018. When Abiy 
accepted the post of Prime 
Minister in April 2018, he 
immediately announced that 
Ethiopia would accept the 
conclusions of the Boundary 
Commission in relation to 
the territorial conflict, which 
both countries must 
implement. A series of high-
level appointments of the 
State of Eritrea in 
international organisations 
followed. One month after 
the signing of the agreement, 
Eritrea was elected to the General Assembly of the United Nations 
Human Rights Council (UNHRC), a body promoting and protecting 
human rights. More recently, Eritrea has taken over the chair of the 
European-led Khartoum Process, which aims to stop human 
 
78 Lucie Delecolle and Marco Paron Trivellato provided valuable research support 
for this chapter. 
Although the signing of the peace 
agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
in 2018 was heralded as a new 
beginning, the Eritrean people have not 
been able to reap the dividends of peace, 
as they are still living in a totalitarian 
dictatorship. This chapter investigates the 
relationship between peace, progress, and 
the Constitution of Eritrea, which has 
never been implemented. Although much 
awaited, the peace process must be 
accompanied by implementation of the 
Constitution, the rule of law, and 
mechanisms for the protection of human 
rights, so that the Eritrean people can 
benefit from peace, move towards 




trafficking (Plaut, 2019). All of these developments have created an 
expectation that the peace process may lead to an easing of the 
situation in Eritrea for the Eritrean people. The Peace Agreement has 
formed the basis for a policy of normalisation of relations with 
Eritrea, at least for the time being, in the hope that the dividends of 
peace will materialise by the way of an improvement in the internal 
situation in Eritrea as well as the regional situation with its 
neighbours. But meanwhile serious doubts have arisen as to whether 
Eritrea is able to live up to these expectations, and the absence of 
progress must explain why President Isaias was not recognized by the 
Nobel Prize Committee. 
 
The decision by the Nobel Prize Committee to award the Peace Prize 
to Prime Minister Abiy alone, speaks to the concern that hope of 
improvements in Eritrea is, as yet, unfounded. This chapter considers 
the apprehension over the lack of tangible improvements in Eritrea 
from the perspective of the lack of constitutionality and the absence 
of any signs that it may return to a constitutional state governed by 
the rule of law. Plaut calls Eritrea a ‘Mafia State’ (2017), Tronvoll and 
Mekonnen (2014) refer to it as the ‘Garrison State’ and Riggan (2016) 
calls it the ‘Struggling State’. The debate on whether or not Eritrea is 
in fact a constitutional state matters, because if Eritrea is not a 
constitutional state, then this entirely changes expectations about the 
dividends that peace may bring. 
  
The existence of a constitutional state is regarded as a sensitive 
question in Africa, not in the least because the modern African state 
overlays a rich, functional and meaningful set of governance 
structures that were overruled and ignored by European colonial 
rulers and other invaders. The scramble for Africa in Berlin in 1884 
redrew the map of Africa without any regard for African realities (Van 
Reisen, Mawere, Stokmans, Nakazibwe, Van Stam & Ong’ayo, 2019). 
As a result, it is sometimes suggested that there is tension between 
constitutionality and African leadership.  
 
Hence, this chapter investigates constitution making in Africa, within 
the context of peace and stability, taking into account historical and 
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contextual realities. It discusses certain constitutional principles that 
are included in most constitutions. It then considers some core issues, 
relevant to constitutionality in Eritrea, in the context of the peace-
making process with its neighbour Ethiopia, before drawing some 
conclusions. The main research question is: How does the lack of an 
operable constitution in Eritrea affect the dividends reaped by the people of Eritrea 
from the 2018 peace agreement between Eritrea with Ethiopia? 
The constitution and the rule of law 
To understand the fundamental linkages between the rule of law, 
respect for human rights, and an effective and functioning 
constitutional system, it is necessary to consider the evolution and 
definition of the term ‘constitution’. Generally, a constitution is 
considered to be a set of legal texts defining the role of the various 
state institutions; it organises their relations, in other words, it defines 
the powers, rights and duties of bodies in the country. According to 
Henkin (1994), the constitution of a state specifies the sources of 
sovereignty, checks and balances, division of power between 
institutions, judicial control and, above all, individual rights and 
freedoms. Constitutions also usually include a charter of fundamental 
rights, as is the case in France,79 or these may be contained in a single 
text in the form of core democratic values (Civitas, 1991), like in the 
American Constitution. The constitution is considered to be the 
highest law in each country (Kelsen & Wilson, 1934); hence, its rights 
and freedoms are guaranteed and have specific judicial protection 
(Denoix de Saint Marc, 2009). 
  
Consider South Africa’s constitution: at the end of apartheid, respect 
for human rights, dignity, freedom and equality were considered 
essential. Thus, the country’s supreme legal document, which was 
enacted in 1996, provided legal protection for citizen’s rights and the 
possibility to hold politicians accountable. It outlined democratic 
values and principles. The state, thus, became a constitutional 
democracy (Civic Academy, n.d.). 
 




Every constitution in the modern era must contain some core values 
in order to be considered worthy of the name constitution 
(McWhinney, 1981). And if we accept the words of a South African 
scholar that the constitution is the soul of a nation, any constitution 
without such core values may be likened to a body without a soul 
(McWhinney, 1981). In our view, a more accurate statement would 
be: a constitution is a vital requirement of a nation, and 
constitutionalism is the soul of a constitution, for there have been 
constitutions without constitutionalism (Elshtain, 1996). The concept 
of constitutionalism is based on the: “perception of constitution as 
specific guarantees and on the idea that the political order is subject 
to a stable and independent of various (first of all political) changes 
‘higher law’” (Bieliauskaitė, Šlapkauskas, Vainiutė & Beinoravičius, 
2016, p. 378). 
 
It is worth pointing out the connection between constitutional 
engineering and statecraft. In recent years, state actors, supported by 
scholars and practitioners, have been increasingly relying on 
constitutional engineering to create bridges of understanding among 
different segments in divided societies. In nation building and state 
construction, particularly in post-colonial African states, defined by 
colonially-imposed artificial borders, it is better to build bridges than 
walls, especially in nations divided along ethnic, racial or class lines 
(Hamilton, Jay & Madison, 1818). 
 
The constitutionality – and, hence, legitimacy – of a state authority 
can be determined by a set of criteria, which also make common 
sense, and which ensure that the powers of the authority are used 
within the boundaries set to protect the citizens. The checklist for the 
rule of law (or Rechtsstaat) can be identified using the following broad 
criteria (Venice Mission of the Council of Europe, n.d.):  
 
• The principle of legality  
• Legal certainty 
• Prohibition on arbitrariness  
• Access to an independent and impartial judge 
• Non-discrimination and equality of the law 
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• Separation of powers and checks and balances 
• Respect for human rights in a broad sense 
 
The constitutional foundation of a state aims to provide the basic 
mechanisms for the rule of law to function, within broad respect for 
human rights. 
Models of constitution making 
Historically, we can discern three main methods of constitution 
making. The first is the classical method, the Philadelphia model 
(Selassie, 2003). The American constitutional convention held in 
Philadelphia in 1787 comprised representatives of the then 13 states 
and combined the function of a drafting commission and constituent 
assembly. The constituent character of the Convention was partial, in 
that the draft coming out of the Philadelphia Convention had to be 
ratified by the legislature of each of the 13 states. 
 
The second example, which may be called the Westminster model 
(Harding, 2004), is the one followed by countries with established 
democratic systems. Under this model the drafting is left to the 
parliament, or a committee of the parliament, and the ratification 
done by a large majority (e.g., two-thirds) of the next parliament or 
by popular referendum. The assumption is that the parliament 
represents all the constituent members of the political community in 
the country concerned, which may not be necessarily the case. In fact, 
there may be instances in which the parliament is simply what James 
Tully calls “an imperial center” (Selassie, 2010). A recent example of 
this is the attempt by the Scottish nationalists to obtain sovereignty 
for Scotland through the Scottish Parliament, which was defeated by 
the Parliament in Westminster (the imperial parliament), a defeat 
which the Scottish nationalists still hope to reverse (Spiers, 2015). 
  
The third example is the use of a constitutional commission (Ghai, 
2016), which has gained ground in recent years. In this model a 
specially mandated drafting commission submits a draft constitution 
to an elected constituent assembly to ratify it. Many African countries 
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have adopted this model, including Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa 
and Uganda. In Namibia, the elected parliament turned itself into a 
constituent assembly. The common feature of this new type of 
constitution making in Africa is that it marks a break with the past, 
when constitutions used to be drafted by experts in the capitals of the 
metropolis (London, Paris or Brussels), where the debate was limited 
to among the ruling elite. This is what I (first author) have called in 
some of my writings the Lancaster House model (Selassie, 2003). 
The case of Eritrea 
The significance of the constitutional commission model, exemplified 
by the Eritrean case, is the participation of the public in making the 
constitution. The law establishing the Constitutional Commission of 
Eritrea charged the Commission with organising and managing “a 
wide-ranging and all-embracing national debate and education 
through public seminars and lecture series on constitutional 
principles and practices” (Proclamation No. 55/1994 establishing the 
Constitutional Commission in Eritrea, 1994, Article 4[4]; see State of 
Eritrea, 1994). The law also provided that, following the public debate 
on a constitutional draft, the Commission must submit the draft to 
the National Assembly, having taken the views of the public into 
account, and that the approved draft must then be submitted to a 
Constituent Assembly for ratification (State of Eritrea, 1994). 
 
The establishment of the Commission was envisaged in the law that 
reorganised the Government of Eritrea in the post-referendum 
period of 1993. That law charged the government, inter alia, with 
“…preparing the ground and laying the foundation for a democratic 
system of government” (State of Eritrea, 1994). The National 
Assembly established the Constitutional Commission in fulfilment of 
that goal. The Commission, which was accountable to the National 
Assembly, was composed of a Council of 50 members and an 
Executive Committee of 10 members drawn from the Council. The 
Chairman of the Commission presided over both the Council and the 
Executive Committee. In Eritrea, there was general agreement among 
the members of the Commission that the process of making the 
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constitution, including the drafting, is as important as the product of 
the process, namely, the final text of the constitution (Selassie, 2010). 
Relevant questions 
Constitution makers start by asking two related questions: First, what 
should be included in the constitution and, second, how long should 
the constitution be? These questions logically raise a third question 
one: How does one determine what should or should not be included 
in the constitution? In other words, is there a set of universally 
applicable principles, or is each country’s choice determined by it 
specific (historical) conditions? In answer to the last question, both 
are true (Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute, n.d.). From the 
writing of the American Constitution onward, modern constitutions 
have been based on preceding models or experience, modified to suit 
the conditions of the particular country. How much such 
modification affects the universal principles differs from case to case. 
Nonetheless, the point of departure must be the historical, socio-
political situation in the country concerned. Let us note that not 
everything in the American Constitution was a novel invention, owing 
nothing to other ideas and experiences. In crafting what later became 
a model, the American Constitution makers borrowed ideas like 
separation of powers from the French Enlightenment (Potofsky, 
2002) and the federal system of government from the confederacy of 
the Iroquois nation (Feathers & Feathers, 2007). 
 
As to the length of the constitution, some scholars have attempted to 
provide general rules for good constitution writing. For example, 
British scholar and statesman, Lord Bryce, affirms the rule of brevity 
in writing a constitution, adding simplicity of language and precision 
as essential requirements. In this respect, he ranks the American 
Constitution above all other written constitutions: 
 
... for the intrinsic excellence of its scheme, its adaptation to the circumstances of the 
people, the simplicity, brevity, and precision of its language, its judicious mixture of 




The last phrase is worth emphasising: a judicious mixture of 
definiteness in principle with elasticity in detail. This pithy statement 
suggests that drafting a constitution can be likened to both a work of 
art and an engineering project. As such, it can test the writing skills of 
the best draftsman in terms of choice of language, precision and 
clarity, while at the same time requiring craftsmanship to build the 
edifice of state institutions. An edifice should be built to last and, in 
the case of a constitutional edifice, it has to be built to weather the 
storms brought about by changing political fortunes. 
 
Another counsel of the wise comes from Abbé Sieyes, who insists 
that a constitution must be neutral. Sieyes, who influenced the 
constitution making in post-revolutionary France, counselled that the 
constitution must be kept neutral or at least open-ended in political 
and ideological terms, particularly in relation to the bill of rights, 
otherwise they might be too closely identified with the “transient 
fortunes of a particular party or pressure group, and rise and fall with 
them” (Selassie, 2010). Neutrality is arguably a pivotal concept in this 
respect; even a partisan of a ruling group can see the rationale behind 
Sieyes’ counsel, assuming that such partisan is clearheaded and can 
see the perils of being wrapped only in the present or in parochial 
concerns. 
 
The foregoing introductory remarks will hopefully prepare the 
ground for our discussion on the challenges of constitution making 
in Africa, focused on one particular country, Eritrea. We will also 
make reference to other African countries as need be. Let us start 
with a discussion of some constitutional principles. 
Constitutional principles 
Rule of law 
The rule of law is a mechanism, practice, or norm that maintains the 
equality of all citizens before the law (Choi, n.d.) – meaning that the 
law is superior to any political power and all persons are subject to 
the law. In accordance with this definition, the power – or 
government – should favour principles of law and condemn any 
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attempt by judicial or other authorities to subvert the law. This system 
became popularised towards the end of the 19th Century in Great 
Britain and Germany, as ‘Rechtsstaat’ (Advisory Council on 
International Affairs, 2017a; 2017b), to counter the power of the 
absolute monarchy (Jean, 2018). According to the German theory, 
Rechtsstaat guarantees the state and citizens’ freedoms: the sovereign 
is limited by the principle of legality, which places the law above 
public authorities. The concept of ‘Rechtsstaat’ or ‘rule of law’ was 
imported into France by Léon Duguit in 1907 under the name ‘Etat 
de droit’.  
 
This concept has transcended time and borders: the rule of law is the 
cornerstone of the European Union (EU), embodying one of the 
EU's fundamental values (European Union, 2008, Article 2). Indeed, 
the EU is filled with the spirit of the rule of law, as reflected in the 
rule of law checklist of the Venice Commission, also known as the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law, which was 
adopted on 12 March 2016 (Council of Europe, 2016). In addition, 
the EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, 
Vĕra Jourová, in a Press Conference on 28 May 2018 for the 2018 
EU Justice Scoreboard, stated that “Democracy, civic rights and due 
management of EU funds are under threat without the rule of law” 
(European Commission, 2018; see also Brzozowski, 2018). However, 
the implementation of the rule of law by the EU has been called into 
question recently, as illustrated by the case of the Foundation of 
Human Rights for Eritreans, which summoned the European 
Commission alleging that it was violating EU law by funding projects 
in Eritrea, thereby contributing to the implementation of 
programmes executed with forced labour (The Guardian, 2019). 
 
An important question is to consider whether or not, and, if so, how, 




African continent? Writing for the International Journal on Human  
Rights, Makau Mutua said that the rule of law is often seen as a:  
 
…panacea for ensuring a successful, fair and modern democracy which enables 
sustainable development. [But no] African country has [ever] truly thrown off the 
shackles of colonial rule and emerged as a truly just nation state – even though many 
have the rule of law at the heart of their constitutions [...] the concept must be adapted 
accordingly to take into account the cultural, geographic and economic peculiarities of 
each state. (Mutua, 2016) 
 
So, what should an African adaptation of the rule of law be based on? 
Mawere (2009) proposes an African conception. Writing on the 
specifically thorny issue of euthanasia and the right to choose death, 
as analysed in Shona culture in Zimbabwe, Mawere notes: 
 
The Shona people have a tradition rich with knowledge, culture and wisdom that 
enriched and inspired our ancestors. Tsumo (proverbs), madimikira (idioms), ngano 
(folklore) and popular sayings are traditionally used to inculcate traditional values, 
customary laws and the general rules of conduct in Shona society, hence it is in these 
sociological models that the position (against euthanasia) by the Shona people on 
euthanasia is drawn. (Mawere, 2009) 
 
Drawing on both African and European notions of the basis of the 
law in a society as a moral community, Mawere concludes that the 
aim is to protect the wholeness of society: 
 
In the Western tradition, there are also some scholars who like the Shonas argue 
that euthanasia is morally wrong for the simple reason that everything naturally loves 
itself. Besides, every part belongs to the whole and so death injures the whole society. 
Thomas Aquinas for example, argues that “everything naturally loves itself and, 
every part as such belongs to the whole. Every man is part of the community. As 
such man belongs to the community. By having his life terminated, he injures himself 





According to Mawere, the sanctity of life is central to the protection 
of the community as one: 
 
Thus, the Shonas hold the same view, as this is captured in the idiom, Kufa izuva 
rimwe, kuora igore (Death is one day, corruption is a year). This idiom warns people 
to beware of what may harm a person and have long-lasting consequences to oneself 
and society [...]. Thus, in Shona society choosing death in whatever circumstances is 
considered harmful, destructive and a loss not only to the bearer of life but to family, 
friends and the community to which the one whose life is terminated is a member. 
(Mawere, 2009, p. 105) 
 
The rule of law and its constitutional framework can also be looked 
at using Mawere’s analysis, based on deep foundational ethical norms 
and beliefs, which may change over time, but are also are rooted in a 
deeply religiously embedded understanding of the dignity of life:  
 
It seems clear that though this view is contentious, it has gained wide acceptance and 
veneration through the ages, especially in the African cultures because of a respect for 
the sanctity of life and conformity to the biblical ethics of “Do not kill” (Deuteronomy 
20) which is commonly taken as the foundation for ethical concern by the Shona 
culture and African cultures in general. (Mawere, 2009, p. 105) 
 
In this sense, the rule of law, or Rechtsstaat, is not a relative idea at the 
disposition of rulers, but ultimately belongs to the community. The 
task of the constitution is to protect this process. 
 
This idea – which is more than 2,000 years old – lived through 
antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Enlightenment and the modern era. 
The rule of law appeared in Christian, Jewish and Muslim texts, 
Classical Greek philosophical essays, and political and legal trials. 
More recently this notion has been upheld in international and 
European treaties and national constitutions. The theory that political 
power cannot be the supreme power was actually present in the Bible: 
according to Hebrew kings in the Old Testament, God's law – 
equivalent to justice – was the supreme norm and humans were not 
532 
 
allowed to betray it (Bible Gateway, n.d.-a).80 This is reiterated in the 
New Testament, when Peter and the Apostles, who were brought to 
the high priest because they were standing in the temple courts, 
answered: “We must obey God rather than human authority” (Bible 
Gateway, n.d.-b). 
 
The superiority of the law over civil and political power is also 
developed by several Classical Greek authors. Plato, in his book 
Statesman (Berges, 2010) and Aristotle in Politics (Cleary & Gurtler, 
2000), argued that it is more appropriate for the law to govern, than 
any citizen. Cicero stated in his book The Republic and the Law that:  
 
The law can’t be countermanded, nor can it be in any way amended, nor can it be 
totally rescinded. [...] There won’t be one such law in Rome and another in Athens, 
one now and another in the future, but all people at all times will be embraced by a 
single and eternal and unchangeable law; and there will be, as it were, one lord and 
master of us all [...]. (Cicero, Rudd & Powell, 1998, p. 83). 
 
Titus Livius added a nuance to Cicero’s definition: “Imperia legum 
potentiora quam hominum” (Nemo, 2018), which Algernon Sidney 
and James Harrington translated as “the government of laws not of 
men” (Houston, 1991).  
Democracy 
The first author teaches comparative constitutional law in the United 
States and has been involved in drafting constitutions, including the 
Constitution of Eritrea, as well as comparative studies of 
constitutions and constitution making. In this duty, the first author 
has noticed that comparative constitution making has become a 
popular subject among scholars, policymakers and practitioners. This 
development can be traced back to the experience of Eastern Europe 
in the post-Soviet era, which essentially involved a democratic 
transition from autocracy. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 
 
80 “And you, Ezra, in accordance with the wisdom of your God, which you possess, 
appoint magistrates and judges to administer justice to all the people of Trans-
Euphrates – all who know the laws of your God. And you are to teach any who do 
not know them” (Bible Gateway, n.d.-a). 
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coincided with popular movements demanding democratic transition 
in much of Africa, and constitution making became the principal 
method of achieving democracy, with constitutionalism as a prime 
element of that objective. Constitution making and constitutionalism, 
which had been consigned by reductionist ideology to a mere 
superstructure, have attained a higher status in the current discourse. 
There has been a paradigm shift. 
 
In constitution making in this modern era, more emphasis is given to 
process than in earlier times. This emphasis is related to the 
democratic imperative as the governing principle. For example, in a 
long-running comparative constitutional study in which I (first 
author) was involved, cosponsored by the US Institute of Peace and 
the United Nations Development Programme, the study focused on 
the process of constitution making more than the content of the 
constitution (Hart, 2003). The rationale behind this focus is the 
conviction that process-driven constitution making is better than 
previous approaches, which depended on the decisions of a select 
group of people, be they distinguished statesmen, as were the framers 
of the American Constitution, or a select committee of the 
government of the day and its expert legal draftsmen, as was the case 
with the independence constitutions of many African countries. 
  
The process involved in drafting the constitutions of African 
countries on the eve of their independence excluded African 
populations from participating in the making of the basic law by 
which they were to be governed (Selassie, 2010). Indeed, preventing 
people from being properly involved in the making of their 
constitution sharpens the risk they will not support the constitution, 
which can lead to instability, or even revolution, especially in 
countries undergoing a post-conflict transition. However, no analysis 
devoted to process can avoid reference to substance. Process and 
product are dialectically linked: the end prescribes the means and the 
means impinges on the end. To put it differently, the democratic 
imperative demands the involvement of the public – the process 
empowers the public, giving its members a sense of ownership of the 
constitution and allowing them to air their views on a range of critical 
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issues that affect their lives. And, public participation in the making 
of a constitution necessarily raises questions of substance. 
 
Let us probe a little further; so what is democracy? An important part 
of the contemporary debate on the meaning of democracy concerns 
the criteria applied to evaluate progress in a democratic transition. A 
proper debate on the meaning of democracy must first of all focus on 
its substantive aspects – that is, its source and purpose. Then it can 
focus on procedure. The classical approach defines democracy in 
terms of its source and purpose, with the will of the people its source 
and the common good its purpose. However, in recent times, 
emphasis has shifted to the procedural aspect as the central feature of 
democracy, namely, the selection of leaders through competitive 
elections by the people. Implicit in this concept of electoral 
democracy is the conviction that popular participation and 
competition are crucial components of a democratic government. 
 
But the question remains: do elections equal democracy? Certainly, 
elections are a critical part of it, to the extent that elected bodies, as 
representative institutions, are the primary national institutions 
accountable to the citizens of a country. But once the representatives 
are elected, their responsibilities do not end when the election is over. 
In other words, an election is a means to an end – the end being the 
proper functioning of representative institutions, which constitute the 
substantive aspect of democracy. The procedural imperative, 
although essential, must be analysed in relation to the role of 
representative institutions in the totality of the constitutional order. 
Commenting on the undue emphasis placed on process, Jean Bethke 
Elshtain of Chicago University wrote:  
 
Democracy is not and has never been primarily a means whereby popular will is 
tabulated and carried out but, rather, a political world within which citizens 
negotiate, compromise, engage and hold themselves and those they choose to represent 
them accountable for action taken. Have we lost this deliberative dimension of 
democracy? Democracy’s enduring promise is that citizens can come to know a good 




It is hard to disagree with this statement. Indeed, the other core 
objectives that we will consider later are shaped, or at least influenced, 
by the process in which “citizens negotiate, compromise and engage” 
(Soyinka et al., 2015) in the daily business of the government and in 
social interactions. To sum up, democracy is the keystone of the 
entire edifice of the political system of countries in the modern era. 
Stability 
In the life of a nation, stability, as a core value, often goes together 
with national unity – and the two are essential conditions for social 
and economic progress. Indeed, the continued existence of the nation 
depends on them, and the other core values – democracy, sustainable 
development, social justice and stability – are dependent on them. 
Only people who have not experienced the dislocating effects of 
turbulence caused by lack of stability and unity, or who have a dim 
memory of such effects, can ever question this simple fact. 
  
But what are the conditions that sustain stability? Well, first of all, 
stability is not simply the absence of conflict, just as peace is not 
simply the absence of war. True stability cannot be imposed by force. 
Rather, for stability, citizens must be secure under the rule of law, as 
opposed to arbitrary personal rule; the government must be subject 
to the law, just as individual citizens are; no one can be above the law; 
and everyone must be equal under the law. In a democratic society, 
citizens know this to be a fundamental constitutional principle.  
 
One of the favourite American founding fathers, Benjamin Franklin, 
who was a member of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia 
in 1787, was asked by a citizen as he came out of the final meeting of 
the convention what the convention had done. His quick response 
was:  
 
“We have given you a republic, if you can keep it” 81 (Farrand, 1911). Franklin 
died the following year aged 84, but the constitution has survived for over 200 years. 
It has helped the republic to become the wonder that we know today, even with the 
 
81 Quote attributed to Benjamin Franklin in the words of James McHenry. 
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state of virtual dysfunction that assails it from time to time due to polarized politics. 
Another gem among Ben Franklin’s sayings is one that is the basis of stability and 
that should be posted on every citizen’s door: “The price of liberty is eternal vigilance”. 
(Burger, 1991) 
 
Whenever the rule of law is violated for any reason, even for reasons 
of state security, a clash of values occurs, which can lead to serious 
conflict. In such a situation, a well-informed citizen who knows 
his/her rights, would invoke another equally basic value, i.e., human 
rights. 
Human rights 
We will begin the discussion of human rights with a quote from 
Alexander Hamilton, one of America’s founding fathers. It is 
remarkable, not least because it comes from a man who was better 
known for being the father of the American banking system: 
 
The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rampaged for among old parchments, or 
musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam in the whole value of human 
nature, by the hand of divinity itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal 
power. (Hamilton et al., 1818) 
 
It is hard to believe that a banker penned these words. Such eloquent, 
poetic expression of human rights reflects the spirit of the ‘Age of 
Reason’, couched in the language of natural law philosophy. Written 
in 1775, Hamilton’s statement presaged that most eloquent of historic 
documents, the American Declaration of Independence (Selassie, 
2003), which came one year later. Hamilton’s language reflects the 
mood of the Enlightenment, linking reason with God. The attribution 
of the writing of the “sacred rights of mankind” suggests a reference 
to the Ten Commandments, in the authorship of which Moses was 
(to believers) merely an agent, a divinely chosen medium (as 
Mohammed was of the Holy Qur’an). That the Ten Commandments 
impose more duties than they confer rights does not diminish their 




Concerning the source of human rights, there has been an ongoing 
debate between the proponents of natural law and those of the Realist 
school. In its contemporary phase, the debate boils down to whether 
human rights are absolute or relative values. On first reading, 
Jefferson and the framers of the American Constitution seem to 
subscribe to the view that human rights are absolute values. But 
Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence and the American 
Constitution proclaim that all men are created equal as a ‘self-evident’ 
truth at a time when slavery was an accepted institution, and Jefferson 
himself a slave owner and known to dally with pretty black girls 
(Greene Bowmand, 2016). We should also remember that women 
had no right to vote until a century and a half later.  
 
The conclusion is that absolute may be relative in response to the 
complexities of the world. Hannah Ahrendt solved this problem by 
identifying human rights at the core as the right to have rights, the 
right to have a place in the world. These rights are undeniable, even 
in the absence of a state or if a state does not award any rights. 
Ahrendt strongly argues that those who are stateless and cannot 
access rights through the system of states still have rights and that this 
is an absolute. What is relative is that the implementation of human 
rights depends on the human rights culture (Rorty, 1993). This 
recognition of the location of human rights within the living culture 
was discussed by the founders of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948), the basis of the human 
rights system (Borgman, Plessius & Van Reisen, 2012), and one of the 
achievements of post-World War II period. Since then, human rights 
have seen incremental growth and universal acceptance in all their 
varied forms. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided 
the basic framework for the development of human rights and 
influenced the writing of national constitutions in this respect. 
Human rights and democracy, as the paramount political values of 
our epoch, reinforce each other. A climax in the evolution of human 
rights was reached in 1966 with the adoption by the United Nations 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN 
General Assembly, 1966a), the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly, 1966b) and the 
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declaration of their interdependence in 1993 (UN General Assembly, 
1993) for the full realisation of human rights. But the struggle 
continues in terms of their application, all the time and in all places – 
in some places more than others (Makei, 2012). 
 
Today, even dictatorial regimes pay lip service to human rights as 
enshrined in these international legal instruments. And the majority 
of governments have ratified them and included their essential 
elements in their national constitutions (Elkins, Ginsburg & 
Simmons, 2013). Some of these rights have such a high level of 
acceptance that they are not under dispute – whether or not the 
government has ratified the relevant treaties or made reference to 
them in their constitution or national legislation. Among these is the 
right to be free from torture and enslavement.  
Sustainable development 
Sustainable development is defined in the Brundtland Report as 
development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs (Brundtland & World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987). This definition reconciles two seemingly 
contradictory goals – environmental conservation and economic 
growth. And it offers a solution to today’s global crisis: the crisis of 
mass poverty and the excessive consumption by the minority. In 
terms of the global political economy, the two issues of excessive 
consumption by the minority and mass poverty have been the driving 
forces behind environmental degradation. This is why the 
environmental movement is perhaps humanity’s most important 
movement in the contemporary world. It is also the reason why 
sustainable development, properly understood and applied, is one of 
the core values that must be considered in the constitution making of 
a country. 
 
As indicated above, a distinction can be drawn between economic 
growth and sustainable development. Economic growth is measured 
in terms of the quantity of goods and services provided over a given 
time frame, usually a year (tonnes of steel, bushels of wheat, bales of 
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cotton or coffee, kilowatts of electricity, etc.). Thus, the gross national 
product of a country is the amount of goods and services produced 
in a year. On the other hand, the definition of sustainable 
development includes something qualitative in addition to growth, 
including due care taken in the protection and preservation of the 
environment and the ecosystem, such that economic growth does not 
adversely affect the interests of future generations, and does not 
involve hazards to the health and wellbeing of present generations. Is 
it any wonder that it is considered a core value and essential subject 
to be included in a constitutional provision?  
 
This idea of sustainable development must be read together with what 
has been called the new generation of human rights: the right to clean 
air, clean water, food and employment (Ruppel, n.d.). As already 
noted, these core values are interconnected and interdependent, but 
their pursuit can also lead to clashes between or among them, as 
conflicting demands are made by different segments of society. A 
growth-oriented state and allied business interests may demand 
economic growth that does not take into account the environmental 
damage involved in such growth. In terms of economic growth, there 
is the advantage of adding more acreage to agricultural development, 
with the related increase in goods, services and employment. The best 
example of this is development in the Amazon region of South 
America, in which agribusiness companies aim to undertake the 
wholesale destruction of forest areas, clearing the forest for 
agriculture and timber. Opposed to such schemes are environmental 
groups and their allies in the government (Gonzales, 2019). This 
represents a clash of values, with the government and its business 
associates claiming that such economic growth would generate 
revenue and jobs for the poor, and environmental groups and their 
allies claiming that the destruction of the forest will cause permanent 
damage to the ecosystem and give rise to climate change and related 
hazards. That this is an unresolved issue is borne out by the failure of 
the international conference on climate change in Copenhagen (BBC, 
2009). Important work is now being carried out to reconcile the 
Sustainable Development Goals and the existing human rights 
framework, so that the framework is conducive to sustainability and 
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to ensure that the goals are strengthened by the human rights 
framework, which has been built by the international community 
since 1948 (Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2019). 
Social justice 
Often confused with socialism, the concept of social justice is of 
recent origin in terms of its inclusion as a constitutional principle. Its 
application dovetails with human rights principles; indeed, scholars 
of human rights include aspects of social justice in what they call 
second generation human rights (Mubangizi, 2004). The success of 
the application of the other values discussed in the preceding section 
can also depend on whether or not, and to what extent, they 
contribute to the attainment of social justice. Human rights may be 
partly judged by the achievement of human security, measured in 
terms of the provision, or lack of provision, of some services to 
citizens. 
 
To this end, the United Nations has created a system of measurement 
called the Human Development Index (HDI). This is a useful 
measure of human wellbeing that goes beyond gross domestic 
product (GDP), and beyond the production of goods and the 
building of roads and bridges and other infrastructure, important as 
these are. Poor people throughout the world do not have the ability 
to attain wellbeing, or even to “picture what wellbeing means”, as one 
poor Indonesian woman said to some Oxford University researchers 
(Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, n.d.). The HDI 
embraces different dimensions of human development, including the 
availability of affordable and adequate nutrition, affordable education, 
access to good health services, and affordable housing in safe 
neighbourhoods (Krieger, 2001). 
 
A memorable statement written in an Alabama jail by the late Martin 
Luther King Jr speaks to this: “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice 
everywhere” (King, 1963). It is an incisive statement articulating in 
simple language the idea of social justice. It was written in an attempt 
to persuade America of the injustice of racial discrimination. The 
statement postulates that justice, like peace, is indivisible. Why? 
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Because the breakout of conflict in one area will impact on 
neighbouring areas. Peace is indivisible. By the same token, a 
wounded segment of society, wounded by benign neglect like the 
inner city of a prosperous town, or by the malignant hostility of an 
errant leader of a country, will affect the rest. Justice is indivisible; the 
denial of justice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. It took a 
prophetic voice and long struggle to cause America to address the 
wounds of its history. 
 
How do you constitutionalise social justice? With all due humility, as 
an example, we cite a provision concerning social justice from a 
constitution, the first author had a hand in drafting. The aim is to 
make concrete in constitutional terms an abstract idea like social 
justice. Under the heading ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Right and 
Responsibilities’, Article 21 of the Constitution of Eritrea in 1997 
provides as follows (State of Eritrea, 1997): 
 
1. Every citizen has the right of equal access to publicly funded social 
services. The state shall endeavor, within the limits of its resources, to 
make available to all citizens, health, education, cultural and other social 
services. 
2. The state shall secure, within available means, the social welfare of all 
citizens and particularly those disadvantaged. 
3. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in any economic 
activity and to engage in any lawful business. 
 
Furthermore, the last clause of Article 21 (sub-article 5) enjoins the 
National Assembly to enact laws guaranteeing and securing the social 
welfare of citizens, including the rights and conditions of labour and 
other rights and responsibilities listed in Article 21.  
 
So, what has social justice to do with constitution making? We trust 
that the foregoing discussion has explained how social justice as a 
core value or objective has everything to do with the constitution. 
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The constitutionality of the State of Eritrea  
Constitution of Eritrea 
After independence from Ethiopia in 1991, Eritrea formed a 
Constitutional Commission to draft a constitution for the new state 
(State of Eritrea, 1994). In due course, this constitution was written 
and promulgated (State of Eritrea, 1997). In September 1997, 
President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea delivered an address at a 
conference in West Sussex, England on the constitutional process of 
Eritrea. He keenly set out that the building of a society should expand 
to include the traditional and historically evolved principles relevant 
to an African context in a modern society. He listed six fundamental 
principles (Afwerki, 1998):  
 
• the right to a fair share of national resources 
• equal opportunity 
• the right to full respect and protection of one’s dignity 
• the right to unhindered movement and freedom of expression  
• institutional guarantees (a constitution and a judiciary) 
• and responsible, transparent and non-corrupt government  
 
Afwerki also listed the causes of the problems with the 
democratisation process in post-colonial Africa. Unfortunately, as 
history will tell, he backed away from the idea of democracy. Hence, 
the Constitution of Eritrea has never been implemented (Zere, 2018), 
and none of the six points listed by Afwerki have been realised for 
the majority of Eritrean people. 
Rule of law in Eritrea 
The British Parliament, by implementing the rule of law in the 17th 
and 18th centuries (under the Bill of Rights in 1689 and later the Acts 
of Settlement in 1701 and 1703) – to balance the royal power – 
developed three constitutive aspects related to the rule of law. First, 
the equality of all before the law; second, the subjection of political 
power (including the monarchy) to the laws of the country; and, 
finally, the idea that even a government democratically elected cannot 
act in a discretionary manner (Dicey, 1885). Since the Parliament 
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represents the legislative power, i.e., the source of the law, this 
institution is, therefore, the supreme one.  
 
While the Eritrean state institutions are built on a similar logic, the 
rule of law is absent in Eritrea. As power is concentrated in the 
President and his advisors, they have full control over the government 
and the judiciary without any checks and balances. The Parliament 
has not met in 20 years and holds no power independent from the 
President’s office. The execution of policy and the implementation of 
the law is arbitrary and dependent on favour, lacking equality before 
the law. The President exercises a firm control over the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches, breaching the division of power, a 
fundamental principle of the rule of law.  
 
In Eritrea, divergence of opinion is not tolerated. According to a 
report by the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, “the 
rule of law affirms that the people have a right to know what their 
government does and how the arms and institutions of state relate 
with each other. In this way, the people can exercise their duty to elect 
governments” (Centre for Human Rights, 2015, p. 6). In Eritrea, no 
elections have ever taken place and freedom of opinion and of speech 
is severely lacking. Since the 2001 ‘crackdown’82 (Plaut, 2017), 
information and freedoms have been censored. Since then, the 
situation has worsened: media outlets have been shut down, private 
press outlawed, journalists detained, and some religions banned. In 
2018, Freedom House scored Eritrea as ‘Not Free’ (Freedom House, 
2018). 
 
While the Eritrean people have traditionally placed trust in the 
government of President Afwerki – and have been expected to 
perform their duties and obey the law – those in power have broken 
this trust by ignoring the most basic principles of the rule of law  
  
 
82 In September 2001, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki banned independent 
newspapers, arrested and imprisoned senior government officials, leading to 
insecurity and arbitrary arrests. 
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within the country and outside its borders. Plaut refers to Eritrea as a 
mafia state:  
 
Eritrea is no ordinary state; rather it resembles a criminal organisation designed to 
keep its citizens in perpetual servitude. It is behaves like a mafia organisation: with 
covert finances but without a constitution, legislature or elections, run by the country’s 
president and his closest associates. (Plaut, 2017) 
 
The last two decades have brought Eritrea closer to the law of the 
jungle, which according to Rudyard Kipling in his work Jungle Book is 
a “place devoid of ethics where brutality and self-interest reign” 
(1894), meaning that people do whatever is necessary to survive or 
succeed (Ammer, 2003) and live a life in fear (UN Human Rights 
Commission, 2015, 2016). 
 
In any democratic system, people place trust in their government, 
expecting it to perform duties according to the promises it made and 
by virtue of the law. In actual fact, promises and laws are frequently 
broken, which raises the issue of responsibility. This is exactly why 
accountability and transparency need to be legally and constitutionally 
required (Selassie, 2011). 
The Eritrean 2% diaspora tax 
The result of the lack of constitutionality in Eritrea is well illustrated 
by the 2% diaspora tax levied by the Eritrean regime on members of 
the diaspora. According to a report by DSP-Groep & Tilburg School 
of Humanities (Buysse, Van Reisen & Van Soomeren, 2017) 
presented to the Dutch Parliament, The 2% Tax for Eritreans in the 
Diaspora, the 2% tax is an income tax based on two Eritrean 
proclamations: Proclamation to Provide for the Collection of 
Rehabilitation Tax (State of Eritrea, 1991) and Proclamation to 
Provide for the Collection of Tax from Eritreans who Earn Income 
while Living Abroad (State of Eritrea, 1995) – although neither law 
clearly applies in this situation. In addition, under the 1997 
Constitution, which was ratified, but never implemented, the 
National Assembly is the only competent institution entitled to levy 
taxes, but the National Assembly has not met since 2002, and the tax 
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is currently collected by embassies and ‘representatives’ of the 
government, without any (paper) trail or financial accountability 
mechanisms. Hence, the 2% diaspora tax has an uncertain legal basis 
(Buysse et al., 2017). 
 
The 2% tax is a perfect illustration of what Laub (2016) calls the ‘rule 
of fear’ and has been described by the UN Commission of Inquiry on 
Human Rights in Eritrea as a: “pervasive control system [that] is used 
in absolute arbitrariness to keep the population in a state of 
permanent anxiety. It is not law that rules Eritreans – but fear” (UN 
Human Rights Council, 2015). The report by Buysse et al. (2017) 
describes the 2% tax as ‘protection money’, which is levied through 
intimidation, extortion, coercion and social pressure over its citizens, 
extending the control of the government to diaspora communities 
outside the country, including children of Eritrean citizens who were 
born abroad and hold foreign citizenship. Although many officials of 
the Eritrea government describe the tax as voluntary, “the 2% Tax is 
perceived as mandatory by Eritreans in the diaspora and […] non-
compliance may result in a range of consequences”, such as refusal of 
consular services to members of the diaspora and threats to relatives 
in Eritrea, to name a few (Buysse et al., 2017, p. 10). As well as a 
mechanism to control the diaspora, the tax has been recognised “as a 
form of intelligence gathering” (Buysse et al., 2017, p. 14) and a way 
of proving allegiance to the government.  
 
The research also found that “the tax is potentially illegal in its 
application in practice, and concluded, inter alia, that it is collected 
using coercion and intimidation” (Buysse et al., 2017, p. 10). Reacting 
to the research results, the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation (IBFD), an organisation expert on international 
taxation, concluded the following: 
 
There are significant problems if, in the absence of international agreements of mutual 
assistance in the collection of taxes, people formally or informally representing the 
interest of Eritrea undertake actions on the territory of another State to force people 
to pay an Eritrean tax. We consider this as unprecedented in international tax law 
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and as a violation of the sovereignty of the Netherlands [or another European 
country] from a public international law perspective. (Buysse et al., 2017) 
 
In an opinion on the legality of the tax raised by the Eritrean 
authorities on its diaspora, Nollkaemper stated: 
 
International law draws boundaries regarding the way the levy and particularly the 
collection of a diaspora tax can take place. […] The answer as to whether or not 
the Netherlands can prohibit the levying and/or collection of the 2% tax depends to 
a large extent on how this levying and collection takes place. (Buysse et al., 2017, 
p. 9)  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the lack of rule of law not only 
extends to citizens within the country, but also to those in the 
diaspora. This causes undue strain in the country itself, as well as 
abroad, while also undermining the rule of law in foreign countries 
through interference over their citizens (of Eritrean descent) through 
control exercised by the ‘long arm’ of the Eritrean government.  
The rise of totalitarianism  
The lack of implementation of the Eritrean constitution has 
contributed to the lack of checks and balances, which has enabled 
Eritrea’s authoritarian regime, which has been accused of ongoing 
crimes against humanity by the United Nations Commission of 
Inquiry on Eritrea (UN Human Rights Council, 2016). This 
constitutional vacuum enabled the delay and eventual abandonment 
of (presidential) elections, allowing President Afwerki's 
totalitarianism to emerge, as well as grave and systematic human 
rights violations, resulting in the mass exodus of Eritreans. This and 
other measures have created what the UN Commission of Inquiry 
into Human Rights in Eritrea refers to as a ‘culture of fear’ and Laub 
(2016) refers to as the ‘rule of fear’. 
 
According to Jennifer Riggan (2012), many Eritreans see their country 
as a prison. Indeed, those who have been able to flee the country, 
describe the terrible conditions in National Service and the inhumane 
treatment inflicted on those serving, referring to Eritrea an open-air 
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prison (Riggan, 2012; see also Mary, 2013 and Teckle, 2018). Van 
Reisen and Mawere (2017) describe the state of ‘deliberate poverty’ in 
the country as a mechanism used to encourage young people to flee 
the country, putting them in a desperate situation, from which those 
in power in Eritrea benefit in multiple ways (Van Reisen & Mawere, 
2017). 
 
In various ways, the quality of rule of law within a constitutional 
framework is also relevant for the legitimacy and constitutionality of 
the policies of the regime. In that respect, a constitution (written or 
unwritten) represents a democratic prerogative with core values and 
a guarantee of citizen rights. However, this privilege is not always 
granted. A country without a constitution cannot codify the rule of 
law and, therefore, does not have any legal or efficient way to limit 
the state or government’s power and, thus, cannot ensure legal 
protection for its citizens.  
Peace, but no progress  
Notwithstanding the reconciliation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 
and the high expectations of Eritreans and the international 
community, nothing has changed to allow the Eritrean people to 
access their rights or implement the Constitution. This is reflected in 
the continuation of indefinite National Service, despite the signing of 
the peace agreement with Ethiopia in 2018, causing the UN Deputy 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kate Gilmore, to state: 
“Conscripts continue to confront open-ended duration of service, far 
beyond the 18 months stipulated in law and often under abusive 
conditions, which may include the use of torture, sexual violence and 
forced labour” (UN Human Rights Council, 2019). Similar calls have 
been made by the UN Human Rights Committee, which has 
recommended that Eritrea end its National Service and expressed 
concern about its continued use under severely exploitative 
circumstances. Lopatka (1980) states that we cannot completely 
consider a peace process in a society in which human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are violated on mass. Moreover, the peace 
process has not included the Eritrean people or its National 
Assembly. In addition to a lack of participation by the Eritrean people 
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in the peace process, there is little evidence of an improvement in any 
real sense for the people in Eritrea. Hence, despite the hope that 
peace always gives, at the moment of writing, every day hundreds of 
Eritreans are leaving the country due to these conditions, often lured 
into the arms of human smugglers and traffickers, facing an uncertain 
and dangerous future (Van Reisen & Mawere, 2017).  
Conclusion 
Peace is a vital element in building a society in which people can live 
in dignity. Peace means accepting the unity of the world at large, 
recognising neighbours and valuing those who are part of our 
community. Peace has to be built within the moral framework given 
to us by our forefathers and leaders. African tradition and philosophy 
is clear and unequivocal in recognising the communal imperative of 
peace. 
 
The link between a peace process and the rule of law, legal and judicial 
system, and democratic system of a country has been supported by 
several scholars (e.g., Tronvoll & Mekonnen, 2017). The Eritrean 
peace process cannot be considered complete if it is not accompanied 
by the implementation of the Constitution and the rule of law, as well 
as mechanisms for the protection of human rights. The Eritrean 
Constitution is an inclusive framework that offers the mechanisms to 
advance the wellbeing of society, while upholding the rule of law, 
respect for human rights, and the need to advance social justice and 
sustainable development. But, unfortunately, it has never been 
implemented, arguably because of the war between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the political 
opportunism of the Afwerki regime, which used this conflict as an 
excuse not to implement the constitution, shattered the democratic 
promise of Eritrea (Patterson, n.d.), heightening its isolation and 
allowed a dictatorship to emerge. 
 
Prima facie, the peace agreement appears to be the long-awaited 
remedy, ending the 50-year conflict and providing an opportunity to 
redesign Afwerki's rule. At least this should be the starting point of 
549 
 
any effort towards rebuilding peace. Indeed, the peace process marks 
a diplomatic, military and democratic shift, reinforced by Eritrea's 
appointment as Chair of the Khartoum Process in 2019 and member 
of the General Assembly of the Human Rights Council in late 2018.  
 
However, stability is conditional upon the existence of the other core 
values or fundamental principles underpinning a democratic and 
human-centred order (such as rule of law and human rights), which 
are non-existent in Eritrea. Although the peace agreement is a step 
forward, it has not involved the participation of the people, or 
included steps towards the implementation of basic conditions for 
constitutionality, such as the rule of law, democracy, stability, human 
rights, sustainable development and social justice. While people have 
welcomed the peace agreement, they are yearning for a country in 
which they can live with a little dignity.  
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Moving Through the Policy Window: Women in 





The importance of constitutional reform to women’s rights and 
gender equality cannot be 
understated. This is 
especially so in Kenya with 
its fragile post-colonial 
political order. Unfortunately 
until the constitution was 
passed in 2010, the Kenyan 
government had largely 
failed to assure women of 
their rights and retained 
many laws that legitimised 
the subordination of women, 
Moreover, the structures and 
administration that support 
these laws and the socio-
economic realities in Kenya 
are stacked against women 
(Kameri-Mbote, 2003; 
Domingo, McCullough, 
Simbiri & Wanjala, 2016). The 2010 Constitution of Kenya was a 
product of years of social pressure as a result of democratisation and 
by political movements keen to address the failings of the prevailing 
political order. Until that time, gender injustices and women’s 
empowerment had not emerged strongly as social justice issues in the 
mainstream in Kenya, but during the constitutional review process 
these issues garnered national attention and the women’s movement 
The rule of law is critical to ensure 
inclusive societies and political 
participation. This chapter investigates 
how political participation was increased 
as part of Kenya’s constitutional review 
process in 2010, opening a policy window 
for women’s rights and gender equality to 
be placed firmly on the decision-making 
agenda. The women’s movement in 
Kenya united to move swiftly through this 
policy window, in what has been hailed 
as one of the most successful feminist 
engagements of our time, resulting in the 
inclusion of what some consider to be 
radical gender equality provisions in the 
Constitution of Kenya.  
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emerged as one of the most effective mobilisers for constitutional 
reform. 
 
This chapter examines the role that the women’s movement and 
feminist thinkers played in the constitutional review process during 
the passing of the Constitution of Kenya in 2010. In the years since 
then there have been a number of articles and books written to 
document the role of women in the constitutional review process. 
Notably, in the book Time for Harvest, Wanjiru Kabira (2012) narrates 
her first-hand experience with women’s engagement in the review 
process. A paper published by the Overseas Development Institute 
(Domingo et al., 2016) also analyses the role women in Kenya played 
in influencing both the gender equality provisions and social norms 
and how they participated in the constitution-making process. The 
point of departure of this chapter is that it examines how women used 
the policy window opened by the constitutional reform process to 
bring about what has been hailed as one of the most successful 
feminist engagements of our time, resulting in the inclusion of what 
are considered by some as radical gender equality provisions (Tripp, 
Lott & Khabure, 2014; Domingo et al., 2016). The chapter asks three 
key questions: How was the gender question articulated as an agenda in the 
constitution review process? How did the women’s movement organise itself to form 
a negotiating block? And, finally, what strategies were used to ensure women’s 
presence at the table at all times?  
 
The chapter reflects on the achievements, but also identifies some of 
the gaps, in Kenya’s constitution-making process, both in terms of 
who was at the table and what issues made it onto the agenda. 
Kingdon’s multiple streams approach and the concept of a policy 
window are used to guide the analysis (Kingdon, 2006). The chapter 
is based on a secondary literature review of publications and reports 
prepared before, during and after the Constitution of Kenya was 
passed in 2010. The chapter relies primarily on the articles that were 
presented at a gender conference organised as part of the preparations 
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for the review process83 and on literature developed after the passing 
of the constitution. 
Opening a policy window 
The multiple streams approach (Kingdon, 2006) provides a theory of 
how new ideas enter the policy agenda. Drawing inspiration from 
organisational development theory, the framework looks at the 
dynamics of the entire policy process from agenda setting to decision 
making and implementation and identifies three streams that flow 
through the policy system: the problem stream, policy stream and 
political stream. Each is conceptualised as separate from the others, 
with its own dynamic and rules. At critical moments ‘policy windows 
open’ and the streams are coupled, dramatically increasing the 
chances that policymakers will adopt a specific agenda. 
 
The multiple streams approach is part of complexity theory and 
acknowledges the ambiguity around policy processes (Zahariadis, 
2007). It is based on the premise that governments are complex units 
and not all actors understand the policy process; members know their 
roles, but are unclear how their job fits with the whole. Participants 
drift in and out and turnover is high, legislators come and go, and 
non-government actors exercise significant influence over decisions. 
People often do not know what they want, forcing politicians to make 
decisions without having formulated precise preferences (Kingdon, 
2006; Zahariadis, 2007). A central premise of the approach is that 
there is no rational explanation for why some problems are on the 
agenda (list of subjects that those in government are paying serious 
attention to) and others are not. The central idea of a policy window 
is that policy making may not be as straightforward as we assume.  
 
The argument that policymaking is not always a linear process has 
also been discussed by others. In her analysis of European Union 
development cooperation after the end of the cold war, Van Reisen 
observed that change is often assumed to a linear process, whereas, 
in reality, significant changes are not always the direct product of 
 
83 The National Women’s Convention was held in Kenya in 1992. 
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policy setting or decision making (Van Reisen, 2009). Van Reisen 
further observes that major changes can happen without a plan or 
strategy and without policymakers necessarily anticipating the change. 
She also points out that one event can trigger a series of changes and 
raise a series of questions. As part of their work towards changing the 
policy agenda, Fourie, Perche and Schoeman (2010) conducted an 
ethnographic study of donor assistance for AIDS in South Africa to 
determine respondents’ views regarding their role in the AIDS policy 
process. This study is of particular interest as it looks at a policy 
process in which prevailing values and attitudes were an impediment 
to policy change. This is comparable to the issues of gender and 
affirmative action during a constitution-making process, where the 
emergence of a policy window can provide an opportunity to pass 
policies that might otherwise face resistance. 
Benefiting from a national mood 
One of the most remarkable phenomena around the time of the 
constitutional review process in Kenya was public perception of 
gender inequality and affirmative action. Prevailing social attitudes 
towards these issues were negative, or were assumed to be negative. 
Indeed, parliamentary debates on gender equality and affirmative 
action were always defeated based on the argument that these were 
elite issues and not priorities for grassroots women (Kabira, 2012). 
Moreover, gender issues were considered contentious enough to have 
contributed to the failure of earlier constitutional review attempts. 
Theories of heuristic biases (Kahneman, 2011) purport that human 
beings are not always capable of perceiving everything in their 
environment, so attention is drawn to the most prominent 
information available. Kahneman states that people tend to make 
mental short cuts and judgements based on hasty conclusions, or on 
the information available to them at the time of making these 
decisions. People’s emotional evaluation of outcomes also plays a 
central role in guiding decision making. 
 
In Kenya, the gender equality and affirmative action proposals were 
presented to the public as part of a much-anticipated package of 
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institutional and policy reforms that Kenyans were extremely excited 
and motivated about. Two aspects were especially pivotal in engaging 
the public mood: the potential for a reduction in presidential powers 
and the devolution of power to the regions. Devolution was especially 
emotionally charged, as most Kenyans considered it a solution to 
economic and social inequality and an opportunity for the 
redistribution of economic benefits. A hypothesis for the very 
positive perception of the gender equality provisions and affirmative 
action is that they were perceived by the public to be desirable 
outcomes for most Kenyans. Later actions would demonstrate that 
this view changed once the public and policymakers looked at the 
provisions through another lens.  
The constitutional review process84 
Until 1992, Kenya was a one-party state, formalised by constitutional 
amendment in 1982. Political power was vested in the executive 
branch and many state organs were weakened by consecutive 
authoritarian regimes. Political inequalities had contributed to 
growing unrest and social protest, opening the way for a push for 
constitutional reforms. In 1992, the section in the constitution that 
established Kenya as a one-party state was formally repealed. In 1997, 
the Constitution of Kenya Review Act was enacted, opening the way 
for a people-driven constitution-making process. This was followed 
closely by the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission in 2001 
(Fitzgerald, 2010). At least four constitutional drafts were produced. 
The first was the ‘Bomas draft’, which was presented at the national 
conference in 2004. This was followed by the modified ‘Wako draft’, 
which was put to a national referendum and defeated in 2005. 
Following a contentious election and post-election violence in 2007, 
the constitutional reform process was reinitiated and formalised 
through the Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 2008, which 
established four organs: the Commission of Experts (the main 
technical drafting body made up of nine experts), the Parliamentary 
 
84 It is not the aim of this chapter to discuss in-depth the process of the 




Select Committee, the national assembly and the referendum body 
(the Kenyan people). This process produced the third version of the 
constitution, the ‘harmonised draft’, which was presented to the 
Parliamentary Select Committee. The Parliamentary Select 
Committee was tasked with discussing and resolving the contentious 
issues before producing a revised draft, which was returned to the 
Committee of Experts, which produced a final version that was put 
to a referendum and approved by a 68% margin. 
Gender equality and affirmative action 
Broadly speaking there were two gender questions that received 
attention leading up to the constitutional review. The first was ‘gender 
equality’ and what that meant for women’s rights in the constitution 
and the second was ‘affirmative action’. Despite the fact that they are 
related, they were tackled quite differently by gender activists. 
Affirmative action received more publicity and engagement, 
sometimes overshadowing other gender questions. In terms of who 
engaged, the gender question was articulated primarily by feminist 
thinkers and interest groups, whereas affirmative action seemed to 
galvanise the women’s movement more broadly. 
 
In articulating gender equality, the first challenge dealt with by gender 
experts and feminist thinkers was what gender equality meant. The 
discourse seemed aimed at bringing constitution experts, and 
specifically the constitution writing team, up to date on the current 
global gender equality debate and the gaps in Kenyan law in relation 
to women’s rights. In reading the papers presented at the various 
preparatory conferences, one comes away with the feeling that the 
public and policymakers understanding of gender was very limited. 
Each of the papers started off by providing a very basic definition of 
gender and gender equality; followed by an argument for why gender 
equality was not a foreign or Western concept, but one embedded in 
African culture and values, and religious principles. The papers then 
all proceeded to demonstrate the impact that gender inequality had 




Translating gender equality into actionable points for the constitution 
was not always easy; while some questions were quite straightforward, 
some were a little more complex. For example, no one seemed to 
argue that gender equality meant granting women equal citizenship 
status to men, whereas the situation was less clear when it came to 
issues like inheritance. It is debatable whether a clear definition of 
gender equality was needed for the process to move forward, but this 
was not achieved. 
 
The overarching paper that seems to have guided how gender was 
handled in the constitutional review process seems to have been the 
one written by Patricia Kameri-Mbote. In her paper, she provides a 
broad definition of gender, feminism and women’s rights. She 
highlights what provisions had been included in constitutions in other 
countries and what gaps were present in Kenyan law as it stood at the 
time. In making her case for women she made the following 
observation: “The danger here is that we may ignore the fact that 
women suffer double jeopardy as social beings in terms of both class 
and sex” (Kameri-Mbote, 2003, p. 156). In making the case for 
affirmative action, she argued for the differential treatment of 
women, defined as “one of the ways in which the principles of 
distributive justice can be implemented to foster the realization of 
substantive equality between men and women” (Kameri-Mbote, 
2003, p. 145). 
 
Other writers have expanded the discussion on gender and women’s 
rights and how these issues should be handled in the constitutional 
review process. Christian feminists engaged in the process to argue 
that gender equality was part of the religious doctrine or to raise their 
objection to some of the more radical feminist positions. The 
majority of the writers of the papers for the conference seemed to 
argue that there was an African interpretation of feminism that was 
more acceptable to the mainstream Kenyan population than the 
positions taken by women activists. However, it is significant to note 
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that they all resorted to an almost identical definition of gender 
equality.85 
 
Social and cultural anthropologists have argued for a more contextual 
interpretation of gender within the Kenyan context. Monica Mweseli 
(2003), for example, argued that feminism has strengths and 
weaknesses and promoted ‘African Womanism’ as a more acceptable 
approach to analysing gender in the constitution. African Womanism, 
she argued, is less individualistic and takes on board the intersections 
and unique circumstances of African woman, instead of adopting the 
more Western-influenced concept of feminism. She identified 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) rights and the 
rights of commercial sex workers as some of the ideas that African 
Womanism rejected. She emphasised that African women’s rights 
must be seen within women’s role as mother and nurturer and 
identified the focus on divorce as a potentially divisive issue. Pala 
Achola (2003) made similar arguments about the issue of gender 
within African culture. 
Violence against women 
Even at this early stage of the gender equality conversation, there 
were certain discourses that were absent. In her initial paper, Kameri-
Mbote (2003) highlighted violence against women as one of the key 
issues that the constitution needed to address. In her definition of 
violence, Mbote included issues that were quite radical and varied, like 
marital rape, sexual harassment, and female genital mutilation, as 
issues that the law needed to address. She emphasised the need to 
address negative cultural practices that perpetuate violence against 
women. However, the conversation does not seem to have been 
picked up by the mainstream and all the current provisions on 
violence against women in Kenya are gender neutral and do not 
identify violence against women as a specific issue of concern.86 
 
85 This is surmised from analysis of the papers presented at the Constitutional 
Review (Gender) Conference in Bomas, 2003. The papers presented at this 
conference are quoted extensively in this chapter (see Kibiti, 2003; Mweseli, 2003; 
Namyalo, 2003; Nasimiyu, 2003; Nzomo, 2003). 
86 Articles 25 and 29 prohibit violence against persons and Article 53 prohibits 




The careful wording of certain issues that were of concern to women 
was a common feature of the constitution negotiation process in 
Kenya. In some cases, such as in relation to violence against women, 
women downplayed their concerns. By presenting violence as gender 
neutral, a number of the nuances that had been articulated by Kameri-
Mbote and others at the beginning of the discourse were missed 
(Kameri-Mbote, 2003). In the case of polygamy, the language in the 
constitution was so careful that a law has since been passed that 
allows men to marry many wives if the first wife allows it.87 
 
In summary, despite the fact that there was almost unanimous 
agreement that gender equality was the desired goal for women in the 
Kenyan Constitution, there was less clarity on what exactly that meant 
and whether it was equally applicable to all women. Contentious 
issues were either ignored or downplayed; the question of inheritance, 
for example, was downplayed, because certain religious groups were 
against an explicit clause providing for women’s inheritance. Minority 
issues, such as LGBTQ issues, were completely ignored, as was the 
issue of freedom of choice in relation to reproductive rights. 
Presenting domestic violence as a gender-neutral issue may have 
made it acceptable to the general population, but it did not reflect the 
reality on the ground, where women are disproportionately affected 
by domestic violence. 
The emergence of affirmative action 
The issue of affirmative action did not emerge for the first time during 
the constitutional review process; rather, it had been debated in 
Kenya since the early 1990s. To understand the modern-day struggle 
for women’s participation in the constitution we look to the National 
Women’s Convention in 1992 (Kabira, 2012; Nzomo 1993, 1997). 
The keynote presentation at the convention was made by Maria 
Nzomo (1993). In her paper, Nzomo argued that women in Kenya 
face a number of barriers to equally participating politically, 
economically and socially, and that they could not hope to compete 
 
87 In 2014, the Kenyan Parliament passed a law that allowed polygamy in some 
cases, with the consent of the first wife. 
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equally or effectively unless measures were taken to ensure their 
participation. The paper and conference were set against the 
backdrop of the United Nations Women’s Conference, which took 
place in Kenya in 1985 and in which commitments had been made to 
promote gender equality and women’s participation in politics and 
decision making. This conference seems to have mobilised women 
nationally and was successful in articulating why affirmative action 
was needed in Kenya. The challenge remained making it a reality. 
 
In 1997, affirmative action became part of the agenda in mainstream 
Kenyan politics when then member of parliament, Honourable 
Pheobe Asiyo, tabled a motion in parliament for affirmative action to 
be entrenched in the Kenyan Parliament. The proposal was modest 
and well thought out and had the support of all women, and some 
men, in the parliament – but when it came to a vote, it was defeated. 
Despite its defeat, the motion by Asiyo seems to have brought 
affirmative action to the forefront in Kenya in ways that had not been 
considered before. The motion also coincided with growing efforts 
for a more inclusive governance structure and more diversity in 
representation. 
Affirmative action in the 2010 Constitution  
The affirmative action provision articulated by Honourable Member 
of Parliament Pheobe Asiyo in 1997 formed the basis of what was to 
be the policy position of Kenyan women over the next 20 years or so 
in the struggle to pass it into law. The provision has three key 
elements: 
 
• It requires all registered political parties to nominate at least 
one-third women candidates to participate in national and 
local elections 
• It introduces a constitution provision to create two 
parliamentary constituencies in each province exclusively for 
women candidates 
• It links political party funding to the number of women 




The affirmative action bill tabled in 2000 added to the petition by 
asking each district to nominate a woman representative to 
parliament, based on lessons from other countries in the region. The 
petition also added an element of political savviness to the process by 
incorporating other minorities to gain broader support when the vote 
came up in parliament. The bill was not debated in parliament, but 
rather referred to the constitutional review process. 
 
In 2006, when the constitutional review process appeared stalled, 
there was another attempt to introduce minimum reforms by revising 
constitutional boundaries; once again women attempted to get 
affirmative action into these reforms. The Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs introduced a bill in 2007 to increase the 
number of constituencies as a minimum reform prior to the 
constitutional review process. The affirmative action clause requested 
that 50 seats be reserved for women. This process was also defeated 
in parliament. 
 
Affirmative action and the gender quota in the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution  
The Constitution of 2010 contained the following provisions on 
affirmative action:  
 
Section 81 (b): Not more than two-thirds of the members of elective 
public bodies shall be of the same gender. 
 
Section 90 (b): Except in the case of the seats provided for under Article 
98(1)(b), each party list comprises the appropriate number of qualified 
candidates and alternates between male and female candidates in the 
priority in which they are listed. 
 
Section 97: In relation to members of parliament, there shall be: 
(b) Forty-seven women, each elected by the registered voters of the 
counties, each county constituting a single member constituency 
(c) Twelve members nominated by parliamentary political parties 
according to their proportion of members in the National Assembly, 
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in accordance with Article 90, to represent special interests including 
youth, persons with disabilities and workers  
 
Section 98: In relation to members of the senate, there shall be: 
(b) Sixteen women members who shall be nominated by political 
parties according to their proportion of members in the Senate 
elected under clause (a) in accordance with Article 90 
(c) Two members, being one man and one woman, representing the 
youth 
(d) Two members, being one man and one woman, representing 
persons with disabilities  
 
Section 100. Parliament shall enact legislation to promote the 
representation in Parliament of: 
(a) women 
(b) persons with disabilities 
(c) youth 
(d) ethnic and other minorities 
(e) marginalised communities 
 
Further affirmative action provisions are also contained in Article 27 of 
the constitution 
 
Article 27(6): The State shall take legislative and other measures, 
including, but not limited to, affirmative action programmes and policies 
designed to redress any disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups as 
a result of past discrimination.  
In addition to the measures contemplated in Article 27(6), the State shall 
take legislative and other measures to implement the principle that not 
more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies 
shall be of the same gender. 
Kenyan women’s movement 
The modern women’s movement in Kenya has its roots in the 
precolonial period, when women organised largely around improving 
the material conditions of women. At that time, the women’s 
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movement was based primarily on self-help groups. These were 
primarily focused on building women’s skills within their traditional 
roles as wives and mothers and for economic development. Since 
independence, these groups have grown into strong organisations 
with their own established structures and values (Kabira, 2012).  
 
After the 1985 United Nations Women’s Conference in Nairobi, the 
women’s movement started to gain momentum and became more 
political in advocating for women’s rights, especially their right to 
participate in politics. Women started to broaden the remit of the 
precolonial women’s groups, with a much more explicit feminist and 
gender equality agenda. Another pivotal moment in the movement 
was the National Women’s Convention that took place in 1992, 
which was organised by the National Council of Women of Kenya. 
The conference brought together over 2,000 women and had a very 
clear political agenda. This conference addressed issues on women’s 
participation in politics and, more importantly, raised concerns about 
the barriers to women’s participation in politics. The keynote 
presentation at the conference by Maria Nzomo on women’s 
economic, social and political participation in Kenya is still seen as 
pivotal in inspiring political activism (Nzomo, 1993). It was at this 
conference that women acknowledged that without affirmative action 
there was no possibility of participating equally in politics (Kabira 
2012, p. 19). On the vision or aspirations of Kenyan women, Kabira 
had this to say: “Nothing, however, has taken so much energy from 
women than the efforts towards increasing women’s representations 
in political bodies” (Kabira, 2012, p. 19). 
 
The shift that happened in 1992 was not just in relation to agenda 
setting, there also seemed to have been a shift in the way that women 
organised and mobilised. Several special interest or issue groups 
emerged and new coalitions started forming. Although this chapter 
does not look at the women’s groups in Kenya in-depth, but as the 
organising was a critical part of the strategies, this section looks briefly 
at the three key categories of women’s organisations that were pivotal 
in campaigning for affirmative action in the constitution. 
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Political groups/coalitions and alliances 
Political groups have always been at the forefront of advocacy work 
in the women’s movement in Kenya. They have articulated women’s 
issues to the mainstream, given women access to the political decision 
makers, and helped women from the newer groups and grassroots 
women to understand how the mainstream worked. Although these 
political groups relied on feminist thinkers to articulate and 
conceptualise the issues, it is important to note that the feminist 
thinkers were also members of these groups. Some of the groups that 
stood out in this period are: the Kenya Women’s Political Caucus, 
which later split to form the Women’s Political Alliance, League of 
Kenya Women Voters, and Kenya Women Parliamentarians 
Association. The Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation also needs 
to be mentioned here as a national women’s organisation. This 
organisation became politicised by default, after being co-opted into 
a political party when Kenya was a one-party state. 
Special interest and issue groups 
Special interest and issue groups have existed in various forms in 
Kenya since 1992. Although they came into the constitution-making 
process to promote their special interests and the provisions they 
wanted included in the constitution, almost all of them supported the 
affirmative action agenda. Affirmative action was seen as an issue for 
all women. The special interest groups contributed to the process by 
mobilising and organising their interest groups, as well as developing 
thinking on the issues. Some of the key groups here include the 
Federation of Women Lawyers, Coalition on Violence Against 
Women, African Women’s Development and Communication 
Network, Association of African Women in Research and 
Development, Federation of African Women Educationalists, 
Education Centre for Women in Democracy, and Collaborative 
Centre for Gender and Development. 
National machineries and national women’s organisations 
National machineries and national women’s organisations were 
pivotal in reaching grassroots women and organising women. 
Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation, for example, has members in 
each district in Kenya, and it was impossible to reach women at the 
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district levels without working through such groups. Another 
organisation that was pivotal in organising the National Women’s 
Convention in 1992 is the National Council of Women of Kenya. 
These national machineries become a force for women’s 
empowerment in Kenya after the 1985 and 1995 United Nations 
women’s conferences in Nairobi and Beijing, respectively. These 
national machineries were housed within the Department of Social 
Services, where most women’s self-help groups were housed. These 
groups worked together to register women and get them to attend 
national events. 
Strategies and counter-strategies to put affirmative action on 
the agenda 
The realisation that women were never going to be able to compete 
fairly in Kenyan politics was clearly expressed during the National 
Women’s Conference in 1992. Women realised that the only way to 
get into the political scene was by getting a special provision passed 
that would bring affirmative action into law. Many strategies were 
used towards this. Perhaps the simplest and first strategy for women 
was to articulate what they wanted in terms of policy options. Once 
the policy options for affirmative action had been articulated, they did 
not change much – a few requests were modified or adapted 
depending on the response in parliament, but the basic demands were 
consistent.  
Women working together  
When the first affirmative action motion was defeated in 1997, 
women quickly realised that they had a serious battle on their hands 
and that they would not succeed without standing together. So 
perhaps the strongest strategy that women adopted was to work 
together. To this end, women adopted both formal and informal ways 
of organising and forming coalitions and groups, learnt to speak and 
communicate with one voice, and learnt to accommodate differences. 
Uniting women meant transcending political, tribal and class barriers 
and establishing networks and linkages between the national, district 
and constituency levels. From 1998, when the constitutional review 
process started in earnest, until the passing of the Constitution in 
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2010, all national meetings included a quota for women, as well as 
representatives from the constituency to the national levels. Another 
level of organising was the formation of steering groups (the 
Affirmative Action Steering Committee was one such group), and 
determining where each of the women’s groups’ strengths lay (for 
example, there were technical working groups and lobby groups).  
Women negotiating: Gaining a seat at the table  
Having a united front was a key step for women in the negotiation 
process – the next step was to gain a seat at the table. Between 1998 
and 2010 there were several processes related to the constitutional 
review process. In order to ensure that both their participation and 
their agenda were part of the dialogue, Kenyan women: 
 
• ensured the inclusion of women in the constitution drafting 
team (five out of twelve member drafting team were women) 
• negotiated for a participatory and inclusive process, meaning 
that any draft would be subjected to grassroots consultations, 
which would include women 
• ensured that women’s organisations would be recognised as 
nominating bodies 
• ensured that 30% of representatives from civil society, 
commissioners and district representatives would be women 
 
On how the women performed once they were at the negotiating 
table, a number of writers have highlighted the engagement of women 
not just in gender and affirmative action issues, but in mediating 
between the parties when the processes stalled. Kabira had this to say: 
“They coordinated themselves on a daily basis, prepared their 
positions, met before the meeting to agree on positions they would 
take, and agreed on who should lobby who” (Kabira, 2012, p. 36). 
This proved very effective. 
Building alliances and overcoming obstacles 
The very first obstacle that women faced when the issue of 
affirmative action came before a parliamentary debate was whether 
women were capable of being leaders and whether affirmative action 
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was necessary. When the issue came up for debate in 1997, three 
arguments were presented to oppose the motion. The first was that 
women were not by nature or nurture meant for parliament. The 
second was that affirmative action was going against the principle of 
universal suffrage (one man, one vote) and, finally, that elected men 
in parliament were already adequately representing their constituents, 
including women.  
 
As already mentioned, the 1997 motion was defeated, so the 
arguments above had enough male sympathisers to defeat the motion. 
However, there was also a large percentage of men who supported 
the motion, and made very eloquent arguments for why affirmative 
action was needed. Women, on their part, started to understand that 
the notion of women speaking for themselves was new to some of 
the elected members of parliament and that they would need to tackle 
the issues delicately, but firmly. 
 
I want to respond to that by saying that by nature a woman is capable of taking 
dual or multiple responsibilities quite effective. We should therefore, not be told about 
our maternal duties when we ask to participate in leadership. (Karua, M., quoted 
in Kabira, 2012 p. 24) 
 
Another criticism levied against affirmative action was that it was an 
elitist feminist agenda that lacked the support of grassroots women 
(Kabira, 2012). This was actually two related accusations: the first was 
that the agenda itself did not reflect the issues or needs of women at 
the grassroots, the second was that the negotiations were being 
undertaken by an unrepresentative sample of women. In other words, 
women from certain communities and from the grassroots were not 
at the negotiating table. The irony that the first accusation was levied 
by men who had spoken for women almost their entire lives was not 
lost on the women and gender activists, as evidenced by this 
observation by Kabira: “Public knowledge of women has always been 
articulated by men. Men claim knowledge about and on women 
without any regard to what the same women think or feel” (Kabira, 




The second accusation took on quite serious proportions, as it 
threatened to break the strong alliance that women had formed. A 
section of the women’s movement filed a court case to demand that 
the selection of commissioners for the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission be revisited. The conclusion by the women at the 
forefront was that this was an attempt by the opponents to 
affirmative action to put in women who were more malleable.  
Conclusion 
Perhaps the strongest message sent by women in the process of 
Kenya’s constitutional review was that when they presented a united 
front, women were capable of achieving anything. Their engagement 
with the constitutional review process made it possible to include all 
the gender provisions and gains in the constitution. It also enabled 
the entire process to move forward when political shenanigans 
threatened to stall it.  
 
One of the loudest criticisms of the advocacy around affirmative 
action was that it was an elitist movement driven by urban well-
educated women. While this was considered a tactic by men to derail 
the petition, at the same time it was a genuine criticism of the 
women’s movement in Kenya. Despite the fact that all the processes 
leading up to the constitutional review process involved grassroots 
women, it is not clear what their input was in the process. Most of 
the documentation shows the women being given information or 
engaging in sensitisation programmes on the constitution, however, 
there is little evidence of them being substantively engaged or of a 
genuine attempt by the leaders of the movement to seek their views, 
especially on affirmative action clauses.  
 
Gender issues were among the most contentious issues in the 
constitution. While women presented a fairly harmonised front on all 
gender and affirmative action issues, it is interesting to look at the 
issues that were ignored or not entirely embraced by the women’s 
movement. Issues of inheritance where practices differed between 
religions and cultures, for example, were downplayed for the sake of 
575 
 
presenting a harmonised front. Issues of LGBTQ rights were raised 
early on, but were panned by broader civil society and the women’s 
movement. On the question of reproductive rights, a woman’s right 
to choose (abortion) was dropped as it was considered to be too 
radical for the largely Christian population in Kenya. Finally, on the 
question of polygamy, the constitution left a loophole that allowed 
parliament to pass a law that allowed polygamy in certain cases.  
 
One of the key arguments of the multiple streams approach is that, 
because of the complexity of decision making and ambiguity 
surrounding policy processes, there is no rational reason why certain 
policy positions are more acceptable than others. This seems to be 
the case for affirmative action in the Kenyan Constitution. There is 
no evidence that the policy positions resisting affirmative action had 
shifted in favour of women participating in politics; instead, women 
seemed to have been very effective in making use of the window of 
opportunity presented by the constitution review process. In an 
Overseas Development Institute report on how women shaped the 
constitutional review process in Kenya, the authors remarked that: 
“No single strategy explains the gains the women achieved through 
the constitutional reform process. Institutional change is an uneven 
process” (Domingo et al., 2016, p. 9). 
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A constitution enjoys a special place in the life of any nation. It is the 
supreme law upon which all 
other laws are based. It sets 
out the state’s basic structure, 
including the exercise of 
political power and the 
relationship between political 
entities, and between the 
state and the people. It has 
been referred to as a ‘social 
contract’ between the rulers 
and the ruled (Lermack, 
2007). It is also a consensus 
among the people 
themselves. A constitution is, 
therefore, more than just a 
document: it embodies the 
wishes and aspirations of a 
country.  
 
As the former Chief Justice of South Africa, Justice Ismail Mohamed, 
observed:  
 
…a constitution is not simply a statute which mechanically defines the structures of 
the government and the relations between the government and the governed, but it is 
a mirror that reflects the national soul, the identification of the ideals and aspiration 
A constitution embodies the wishes and 
aspirations of a country. But where are 
Somalia’s youth in its constitution-
making process? And what are their 
wishes and aspirations? This chapter 
investigates the youth agenda in 
Somalia’s constitution-making process 
and finds that it is glaringly lacking. 
With 67% of youth unemployed, their 
exclusion from economic and political 
participation could cause many to find 
alternatives elsewhere. If the voices of 
youth are excluded from the constitution 
it will not only impact on the legitimacy 
of this most important statute, it could 
also affect the future stability of Somalia. 
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of a nation; the articulation of the values binding its people and disciplining its 
government. (Hatchard, Ndulo & Slinn, 2004, p. 12) 
 
Okoth-Ogendo (1991) argues that a constitution is a power map upon 
which the framers may delineate a whole set of concerns, ranging 
from application of the Hobbesian concept of ‘a covenant’, to an 
authoritative affirmation on the basis of social, moral, political or 
cultural ideals, including the ideals towards which the constitution 
strives. This implies that constitution making is a process that 
involves making choices regarding which concerns should appear on 
the ‘map’. How these choices are made can affect some positively and 
others negatively, depending on how they are involved in making the 
choices. Hart (2003) asserts that, unlike traditional constitution 
making, which considers the constitution as an act of ‘completion’, 
modern constitution making focuses on a participatory process and 
conversational ‘new constitutionalism’. Today, there is a broad 
consensus that a constitution should be made democratically and that 
a constitution-making process is only democratic if it is participatory 
and all-inclusive at all stages leading up to the final document.  
 
The United States Institute of Peace asserts that constitution making, 
if properly organised and given adequate attention and resources, can 
transform a society from worse to better or, if it fails to do this, can 
result in continued unrest (Kaariye, 2017; Chapter 9, Countering 
Radicalisation in Communities: The Case of Pumwani, Nairobi, by Reginald 
Nalugala). Somalia, having lacked an effective national government 
since 1991 (when the government collapsed following the ousting of 
President Mohamed Siyad Barre), requires a national framework to 
ensure lasting peace (Nur, 2011). The road to lasting peace in Somalia 
requires the re-establishment of the rule of law through an effective 
government (Kaariye, 2017).  
 
The adoption of the Provisional Constitution by the National 
Constitution Assembly on 1 August 2012 is a milestone. The 
Provisional Constitution is a progressive document based on Islamic 
principles; it contains key elements of the rule of law and lays out a 
vision of democratic governance. It also establishes federalism with a 
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parliamentary system of government. The constitution attempts to 
respond to historic injustices and appreciates that where security and 
justice are not available to all equally, grievances may develop that can 
cause or aggravate conflict. However, missing from the constitution 
of Somalia are the voices of youth, who have been absent from the 
whole constitution-making process. 
Objectives  
This research was undertaken to ask questions about the role of youth 
in the constitution-making process towards ensuring that a section of 
society is not left behind in the development of the country.  
 
This study has the following specific objectives: 
 
• To determine the role of youth in the constitution-making 
process in Somalia 
• To determine the importance of addressing youth issues 
through an article in the constitution  
• To recommend strategies to draw attention to the role of 
youth in the constitution-making process and to address 
constitutional gaps 
Research methodology 
In order to meet these objectives, the study conducted both 
theoretical and practical analyses. For the theoretical analysis, a 
literature review (of books, journals and articles) was conducted 
focusing on the legitimacy of a constitution-making process and how 
the Somali constitution was formed. This literature review focused on 
youth in Somalia and interventions for their inclusion in decision 
making and policymaking. For the review, data was collected from 
government publications, technical documents, and annual reports 
on the youth upsurge in Somalia. Valuable insights were also gained 
from research conducted by various United Nations bodies driving 
development and humanitarian projects and interventions in Somalia, 
including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and United Nations 
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Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Analysis was carried out by 
grouping the research literature into themes in line with the objectives 
of the study.  
 
Primary data were also gathered over a period of six months in face-
to-face interviews with federal and regional governments, in 
particular, the Federal Minister of Constitutional Affairs, international 
development partners, university students, youth-led organisations, 
civil society and national youth networks across all regions in Somalia. 
The key informants who participated in this study were selected 
through non-probability purposive sampling processes, including a 
combination of expert and snowball sampling methods. The 
qualitative data from the interviews were coded thematically and then 
analysed statistically. The data was analysed using conceptual content 
analysis, which is the best method of analysis for this type of study 
(Mugenda & Mugenda, 2013). 
Democracy and a constitution  
Saunders (2010) contends that democracy, as a form of majoritarian 
rule, can led to tyranny of the majority over the minority; however, if 
we seek a more stable and all-inclusive polity, democracy should be 
more than simply majoritarian rule. In this sense, scholars have often 
pointed to the limitations of a simple interpretation of democracy. 
Peczenik (2002), argues for a broader definition of democracy: 
political representation of the interests of citizens, majority rule, the 
participation of citizens in politics, freedom of opinion, the 
protection of human and political rights, legal certainty, and the 
division of power and responsibility among those in power. Saunders 
(2010) points to certain criteria – voting equality at a decisive stage, 
effective participation, enlightened understanding, final control of the 
agenda, and inclusiveness – as essential for a democracy not to end 
up a majority tyranny. Despite the differences in the criteria presented 
by different scholars, there is a common understanding that for rights 
to be protected in a democracy the majority should act only within 
prescribed rules, there should be legal certainty and there should be 
an all-inclusive political environment (Saunders, 2010). A constitution 
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can prescribe such rules and provide such legal certainty, which is why 
a constitution and democracy are often considered inseparable.  
A legitimate constitution 
According to Bannon (2010), constitutional legitimacy depends on 
the legal, moral and social tolerability of the document by all who are 
ruled by it. A constitution enjoys legitimacy when the public regards 
it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving support for reasons 
beyond fear of sanctions or hope of personal rewards (Bannon, 2010). 
Bilkin (2004) adds that the legitimacy of a constitution requires 
genuine social acceptance, whereby the public reveres and honours 
both the political intention, expression behind the constitution, and 
legal forms and foundational institutions established by the 
constitution. It is that which, Bilkin argues, creates a sense of 
ownership or a feeling in the people that the document should be 
obeyed or is ‘respect-worthy’.  
 
Legitimacy, in general, requires the acceptability of the process-
content analysis (Bilkin, 2004). Not only does the process need to be 
participatory, but the values, principles, rules and institutions adopted 
must command the respect and loyalty of the public. Yet, it is also 
valid to argue that the acceptability of the process should be capable 
of justifying the substance (Bilkin, 2004). Because, if the text is the 
product of the genuine deliberation by all groups, there should not be 
any legitimate reason to question the validity of the content.  
Public participation  
Constitution making is not like the formulation of a league or a treaty, 
which only involves the legislature. Constitution making is founded 
on the people; one of the main differences between the law and the 
constitution is that in a constitution there is peoples’ involvement. 
While a treaty lacks direct people’s involvement, constitution making 
depends on public involvement (Bannon, 2010).  
 
Neil (1996) notes that different rationales have been used for public 
involvement in constitution making. Popular sovereignty is the 
notion behind many nations’ struggle for democracy. In fact, it is the 
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most common ideal underpinning constitutions and, therefore, has 
been construed as a universal value of constitutions and modern 
democracy (Neil, 1996). Most constitutions also declare the primacy 
of popular sovereignty and that ultimate power resides with ‘the 
people’. More importantly, modern constitutions usually regard the 
people not only as the place sovereignty resides, but also as the source 
of the constitution itself. Hence, if sovereignty is vested in, and flows 
from, the people, they should also be able to determine how it is 
delegated and exercised.  
 
Until people are given the power to choose the government and the 
society that they prefer to live in, it is meaningless to talk about the 
sovereignty of people. The concept of sovereignty and participatory 
democracy are, therefore, interlinked with one another. In fact, 
participatory democracy has now been accepted as a condition for 
genuine democracy (Pateman, 1970).  
 
Therefore, public participation in modern constitution making is 
important, because it enhances the legitimacy of the constitution 
(Pateman, 1970). The question of legitimacy is concerned with how 
to make a constitution that commands the loyalty and confidence of 
the people. In order for this, a constitution should be generally 
understood by the people and acceptable to them (Cohen, 2003). To 
achieve public engagement in constitution making, certain 
requirements have to be satisfied. In countries where democracy is a 
novel concept, educating the populace must precede other tasks 
(Christiano, 2003). This usually involves two elements: First, the 
population must be educated about the role that they will play in 
creating the new constitution. Then, they must be informed about 
how democracy and constitutional supremacy works and, more 
specifically, about the possible considerations they need to take into 
account in forming the constitution (Christiano, 2003). 
 
In addition, public consultation as part of the constitution-making 
process must be all-inclusive and extensive to overcome the power 
gap. Consultation must not be limited to the elite or main power 
holders; all classes of society must be afforded the opportunity to 
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participate. Ordinary people must be empowered to make effective 
contributions to the debate and they must be provided with the 
necessary channels through which to participate (Samuel, 2006).  
 
So the legitimacy of the constitution-making process is affected by 
the ability to overcome the information and power gap between the 
common people and the ruling elite. At the political level this means 
that common people should have access to knowledge about 
democracy as well as facilities to participate in (public) debate as part 
of the constitution-making process. However, knowledge and 
facilities are only prerequisites so that people can take part in the 
public debate, the ruling elite must also respect their voices.  
Theoretical framework 
In this section, the social process to overcome the information and 
power gap is framed within Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams 
framework. This framework is applied in the context of the 
developing democracy of Somalia, and used as a tool for analysing 
public policy making at the agenda setting stage. Kingdon’s multiple 
streams framework argues that policy decisions flow from the 
coupling of problems, policies, and politics. In the Somalia 
constitution-making process, the problem stream is the power and 
knowledge gap between the ruling elite and the common people, 
which hinders the common people from participating in the 
constitution-making process. The policy stream encompasses the 
provisional constitution as well as current and new policies to 
facilitate the participation of common people in the constitution-
making process, and regards the social and decision-making processes 
of the ruling elite in the constitution-making process.  
 
Kingdon’s (1995) discussion of the three streams has significance for 
identifying problems arising from the youth bulge in Somalia, 
highlighting the importance of having youth policies in order to 
include youth and of attracting political goodwill to include youth 
issues in the constitution. The three streams are driven by different 
forces and are independent of each other, so none can single-
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handedly decide the overall outcome of the policy-making process. 
At some critical points, policy entrepreneurs are able to bring the 
streams together in what Kingdon calls ‘coupling’, which leads to the 
opening of a policy window, which creates opportunities for policy 
proposals and the alternatives to be specified. Kingdon contends that 
the coupling of the streams is sustainable only when an issue is linked 
to all three streams: an identified problem is matched with a possible 
solution in a politically favourable environment. The distinction 
between the streams is noteworthy because it offers an understanding 
of how the dynamic characteristics of each stream contribute to the 
agenda-setting process (Kingdon, 1995).  
 
It is important to note that, in Somalia, there is currently a situation 
in which a policy window may open due to the promulgation of the 
Provisional Constitution in 2019. The Provisional Constitution, in 
Article 3 (4), guarantees, among other things, human rights, rule of 
law, justice, participatory, consultative and inclusive government, and 
efficiency and responsiveness to the interests of the people. These 
(policy) provisions provide avenues for the inclusion of youth in the 
new constitution, which is currently being drafted. These provisions 
also allow policymakers to address concerns about the lack of 
involvement of youth in the constitution-making process and the lack 
of an article that specifically addresses youth issues (by redefining the 
problem in accordance with the policy stream). The aim is to 
accomplish partial coupling between the problem and policy stream, 
so a policy window opens to generate the necessary official attention 
and action.  
 
Kingdon (1995) highlights the role of policy entrepreneurs in the 
partial coupling of the problem and policy stream. He describes policy 
entrepreneurs as individuals who invest their time, energy and 
resources to ensure that an idea or proposal (an alternative solution 
to a problem at hand) becomes part of the agenda that will receive 
attention and political support from the governing elite. So, policy 
entrepreneurs are able to couple a particular problem with plausible 
solutions, while working to focus the attention of political actors on 
certain issues. The qualities described by Kingdon include: expertise 
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or authority that serve as a source of influence and the ability to speak 
for others; political connections or negotiating skills; and persistence. 
Having worked as a National Youth Policy Advisor appointed by the 
Federal Government of Somalia between 2014 and 2015, the author 
of this paper fits Kingdon’s description of a policy entrepreneur.  
The plight of youth in Somalia  
Somalia has been in the throes of an affliction, which predominantly 
affects young Somalis. Simply stated, this can be summed up as a 
powerful, almost uncontrollable urge to emigrate in search of better 
opportunities. The Somalis have dubbed it ‘dhoof’, which roughly 
translates as ‘migration syndrome’. Another term often used is ‘buufis’, 
which means ‘delusional obsession’. Of course, this is not specific 
only to Somalia and Somali youth. Recent events in the Middle East 
and across Europe have proven the global nature of this crisis in the 
most graphic way.  
 
However, the situation has older and deeper roots in Somalia, initially 
starting in the 1970s. In those days, the Arabian Peninsula, especially 
the oil rich Gulf countries, were the preferred destination. The Gulf 
was geographically close, safe and easy to travel to. Opportunities for 
work were bountiful, and the pay was good. Somali youth and men 
went to these countries in droves, and often came back with 
considerable wealth. In the 1980s a significant number of Somalis, 
including families and children, began going to Europe and beyond 
as migrants and refugees. The civil war that broke out during that time 
accelerated migration and by the 1990s, one of the consequences of 
the Somali civil war was the unprecedented large-scale displacement 
of Somalis across the world, making Somalia a household name 
worldwide as a nation of refugees and migrants.  
 
In more recent times, Somali youth have looked to Europe, seeking 





end up victims of smugglers and traffickers, who extort their families 
for ransom. One of the participants in this study shared the following: 
 
The main driver of illegal migration from Somali is the lack of employment 
opportunities for the youth. My daughter was 18 years of age; she went via Yemen 
with her friends who had siblings who migrated to Italy safely. The smugglers 
promised safe and false hope to my daughter. I paid the USD 5,000, thinking that 
she could lead a better future elsewhere and support her siblings in the future… After 
four weeks, my daughter called at 4 am in the morning crying with a weak voice: “I 
am in need of USD 7,000; they won’t take me to the promised destination unless I 
pay this within two day. Next morning, my daughter called me from unknown 
number again, this time a man with a scary voice said: “She will die if you don’t 
send the money by tomorrow”, and disconnected the phone call. I sold my house for 
USD 15,000 and sent USD 7,000 to save my daughter. Within two days of the 
smugglers receiving the money, I was told my daughter had died from sexual abuse 
and a broken back. (A., interview, Mogadishu, September 2018)  
 
Another respondent, Amina, explained how she was now living in an 
internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Puntland after having lost 
everything to smugglers (Amina, interview, face-to-face, Garoe, 
Puntland, 15 April 2018).  
 
Somali youth migrants face enormous risks and challenges during the 
migration process including, detention, torture, sexual abuse and even 
death, at the hands of smugglers and traffickers. Moreover, youth 
migrants do not usually attain the high expectations they had had 
before they migrated and many face a difficult life in their destination 
country. Families have to choose between two difficult situations: to 
protect their sons/daughters from the recruiters of violent, extremist 
groups (such as Al-Shabaab), or support them to take a risky journey 
in search of a better future and employment opportunities to support 
their families. A 21-year-old respondent shared this: 
 
We are against two dangerous factors here in Somalia and we have a tough choice to 
make. In my case, I am the first-born of six children. I have three younger brothers 
and two sisters. I have finished university, yet cannot secure employment and support 
my mother or help raise my siblings. We are running away from unemployment, 
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forced recruitment, radicalisation and daily attacks by Al-Shabaab. (Mohamed, 
interview, face-to-face, Mogadishu, 2017) 
 
Somalia is a youthful nation. According to the UNFPA, 81.5% of the 
population are below the age of 30, of which 67% are unemployed. 
In addition, those between the age of 14 and 29 constitute 42% of the 
population, making it one of the youngest nations in the world with 
one of the highest unemployment rates (UNFPA, 2014). These young 
people grew up during the conflict, which spanned two and half 
decades, from 1991 to 2019 (Federal Government of Somalia, 2018). 
This means that many did not have the opportunity to access public 
services such as education. According to civil society activist Abdi, 
youth, particularly female youth, are marginalised in social aspects, 
education and wellbeing, which contributes to the knowledge and 
power gap described earlier. He argues that: 
 
The prolonged strife in Somalia has meant that youth, and especially female 
youth, have limited access to the care and comfort of their parents and 
immediate families, communal peace and societal cohesion, their basic human 
rights and dignity, legal protection and basic social services provided by the 
state. (Abdi, interview, face-to-face in Mogadishu, 15 July 
2018) 
 
The youth upsurge in Somalia presents both challenges and 
opportunities. According to the Jubbaland Regional Minister for 
Youth, Honourable Osman Hagi: 
 
Challenges come from the failure of educational institutions and unemployment, 
resulting in social exclusion and economic marginalisation. Dealing with such a 
large section of society means a large portion of national resources should focus on 
frameworks and avenues for the development of youth, something that is hard to 
come by. However, it presents an opportunity for us as the government to make 
efforts towards ensuring that youth issues are addressed to strike a balance. 
(Minister for Youth, Osman Hagi, interview, face-to-face, Nairobi, 




The conflict in Somalia has generated extreme poverty, vulnerability 
and a complex set of political and social grievances, which remain a 
threat to the country’s stability. The conflict has been largely 
attributed to the youth bulge. Al-Shabaab, an Islamist insurgent group 
that is posing a major security problem in the country, has its roots in 
youth dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in Somalia. In 
this sense, Somali youth are trapped in a seemingly endless cycle of 
violence, both as participants and victims. Despite the fact that the 
conflict has ended, avenues for youth to obtain an education and gain 
full employment are still limited, and opportunities to engage 
politically, economically or socially remain weak or non-existent. 
Opportunities are even further limited for girls and young women. 
These information and power gaps will hinder the inclusion of youth 
in the constitution-making process, as it will be a hard task to 
overcome both gaps due to education poverty.  
 
Somalia’s youth 
• Youth in Somalia face extreme education poverty: 61% of those aged 
17–22 and 67% of the 23–27 age group have less than two years of 
schooling. In addition, 90% of the 7–16 year olds have never been 
to school. 
• The literacy rate in Somalia is about 48% in the age group 14 to 29. 
• Youth unemployment in Somalia is at 67%, one of the highest rates 
worldwide, and for young women this figure rises to 74%. 
Source: UNDP, 2012  
 
The conflict and the continued poverty and lack of opportunities in 
Somalia have driven large numbers of youth to flee the country. It is 
estimated that there are 1.02 million Somali refugees in neighbouring 
countries such as Kenya, of which children and youth constitute a 
considerable proportion (MoHD&PS, 2013). Their return, 
voluntarily or through mandatory repatriation, seems increasingly 
likely, following the recent decision by the Government of Kenya to 
repatriate Somali refugees. In fact, many have already left Kenya and 
returned to Somalia. How their educational and other needs will be 
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addressed in Somalia is not entirely clear. The Regional Minister for 
Youth explained: 
 
Our current headache is now exacerbated by the fact that more Somali refugees are 
being repatriated from Kenya. A large proportion of these refugees are youth and 
children. While at the refugee camps, these youth were getting access to quality 
education. While Somalia also has education frameworks they can fit into, problems 
arise as to how to immediately assimilate this large group into the education system 
at once. Any failure to provide appropriate opportunities for this large segment of the 
population could have enormous economic, political, cultural, and social consequences. 
Engaging the youth population fully is, therefore, no longer a choice, but an imperative 
in the development process that is also recognised by the government of Somalia. 
(Minister for Youth, Osman Hagi, interview, face-to-face, Kismayo, 
Jubbaland, March 2018)  
 
As Minister Hagi warns, failure to provide opportunities for youth 
could have serious consequences, also in the context of the 
constitution-making process. Although there is no doubt that the 
Government of Somalia and its international development partners 
are attempting to address youth challenges, Somali youth are still a 
missing agenda in the constitution. The draft bill of rights on youth, 
as a stand-alone article, has been ignored, despite the country’s youth 
upsurge being one of the largest in the world (UNDP, 2012). So the 
problem of the information gap, which can only be overcome by 
education (policy), is recognised, but the information gap is not 
framed as a problem to be addressed in the provisional constitution 
(policy). According to Kingdon’s multiple stream models, a policy 
entrepreneur is needed to make this happen.  
The role of youth in the constitution-making 
In 2012, Somalia endorsed a provisional constitution that set in place 
a national and central legal framework to guide the country towards 
the process of rebuilding itself according to the rule of law and 
separation of powers (UNDP, 2012). This constitution-making 
process has the potential to empower youth and strengthen their role 
in state and peace building. However, it requires promoting the 
inclusion of the country’s youth, both male and female (Samuels, 
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2010). With such a large youth population, empowerment is critical, 
as youth exclusion, grievances, and perceptions of inequity have 
resulted in youth making up the majority of militias like Al-Shabaab 
(Kaariye, 2017). Hammond (2013) found that the omission of the 
youth agenda from constitution making in Somalia has frustrated and 
demoralised youth, leading many to join terrorist groups or emigrate. 
Some try risky border crossings in search of better lives. The young 
people who stay behind are vulnerable to crime, drugs, radicalism and 
piracy, and there are no policies in place to help overcome these issues 
(Hammond, 2013). In a recent study by UNDP, over 60% of the 
youth in Somalia expressed interest in leaving the country in search 
of better livelihood opportunities. However, if provided with the 
tools to thrive and succeed, Somalia’s youth population could be its 
greatest asset (UNDP, 2016).  
 
Societies emerging from conflict face the difficulty of channelling 
future political contestation through institutional pathways. 
Rebuilding often takes place in the context of collapsed state 
institutions, weak political will for reconciliation, and distrust. An 
unprecedented constitution building boom followed the end of the 
Cold War in 1989. During this boom seven countries in South 
America started constitution-building processes: Brazil, Columbia, 
Argentina, Peru, Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia. In Africa, 23 out of 52 
states had experienced internal conflict by 1994. In all of these 
countries, constitution building followed peace building. Somalia can 
be considered part of this boom.  
 
The African Union, declared 2009–2018 as the African Youth 
Decade. As in many war-torn countries, youth in Somalia have 
suffered through a societal breakdown that has left them feeling 
victimised. At the same time, they are a source of conflict, which 
affects society at large. These two dimensions have combined to 
create a ‘youth crisis’, which has become a fundamental barrier to 
breaking the cycle of intergenerational poverty and conflict, and 




However, there are also opportunities; with the vast youth population 
in Somalia who have lived, studied and worked in developed 
countries slowly coming back, a good portion of them may be suitable 
to become policy entrepreneurs. While there have been minimal 
efforts to leverage it, the government of Somalia is looking to making 
use of youth who have had an opportunity to get an education from 
developed nations. In an interview with the author, the Federal 
Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Honourable Abdirahman Abdi 
Hoosh, pointed out the following: 
 
With the vast population of youth who have lived, studied and worked in 
developed countries slowly coming back to the state, it is apparent that a good 
portion of them might be trained in leadership concepts. Such individuals 
should be at the forefront of campaigning and taking up political and social 
leadership positions. Once they have acquired these positions, they can use the 
opportunity to disperse their knowledge and opinions on how the constitution 
should appear or amendments that must be fulfilled. Moreover, the leaders can 
take up the chance to bring the respective communities together and possibly 
consider ending the conflict, which has raged through the country for several 
decades. (Federal Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Abdirahman 
Abdi Hoosh, interview, face-to-face, Mogadishu, 3 November 
2018)  
 
In this quote the Federal Minister acknowledges the role of highly 
educated returning youth as policy entrepreneurs to overcome the 
information and power gap. In addition to this, civil society activist 
Abdi pointed out that: 
 
Civic education is one of the activities conducted to ensure that the public 
understands and appreciates the various sections of the legal document. 
However, with Somalia’s youthful population, this can prove to be difficult. 
Young people can take up the mantle and actively become part of the solution 
by sacrificing their time and effort to educate others. It will be a form of 
empowerment that vindicates their contribution towards creating a self-sufficient 
and reliant Somalia. (Abdi, interview, face-to-face, Kismayu, 




The United Nations recognises youth as partners for peace and 
development, and promotes youth inclusion in political participation 
and decision making. Somali youth can play a critical role in decision 
making and constitution making. Psychologically, the active 
participation and involvement of young people in the constitution-
making process enhances national pride and the development spirit, 
thus promoting social inclusion. In recent times, there has been an 
increased level of recognition of the need for participation as a tool 
to stabilise the post-conflict situation in Somalia. The engagement of 
youth in the constitution-making process and other political 
processes has been proposed as an effective approach to enhance 
peace building and economic development (International Crisis 
Group, 2003). Honourable Abdi Hoosh, the Federal Minister of 
Constitutional Affairs argues that: 
 
An important element in empowering the youth in Somalia is to guarantee the 
inclusion of their rights and interests in their country’s constitution as a legal 
document. This will enable the country to achieve lasting peace as the youth 
will feel represented politically, socially and economically in the affairs of the 
state. It is essential that youth perspectives be included in the constitution and 
decision-making in order to advance their socio-economic rights. (Abdi 
Hoosh, interview, face-to-face, Mogadishu, 26 July 2018) 
 
The lack of youth involvement in the constitution-making process 
creates youth exclusion, particularly in relation to female youth 
(Feldman, 2011). When young people contribute to the constitutional 
review process, it provides them with a sense of ownership, as well as 
bringing about a paradigmatic shift in the concept of youth to 
transform them from being victims or agents of violence to being 
active agents of peace-building, democracy, socio-economic 
development and positive social change (Elazar, 1985). 
 
Feldman (2011) notes that empowerment is deemed to be the 
provision of power to citizens to perform civic duties and, 
consequently, create change. Youth should always be empowered 
with a positive mindset by teaching them about their potential and 
capacity, both in their lives and as members of society (UNDP, 2016). 
593 
 
The empowerment of youth can occur in several ways during 
constitution making, including when promoting the constitution-
making process. Young people can be influenced by values that 
support consistent behaviour and attitudes towards constitution 
making, and youth who have embraced these values can empower 
other youth to possess the same mentality. 
The importance of a youth article in the constitution 
It is of great importance for Somalia to consider a youth bill of rights 
as a stand-alone article in the Somalia constitution. This is because 
youth have the ability to raise genuine concerns about issues affecting 
society and offer workable options and solutions to existing 
challenges. The process of adding youth rights to the constitution as 
a stand-alone article should go beyond giving views in formal 
consultations and dialogues that can guide decisions and genuinely 
represent a body of opinion. The inclusion of an article must form 
part of an engagement process whereby youth are actively involved 
in the planning, review and implementation of the constitution to 
include their rights (Al-Ali, 2011). Such engagement is likely to lead 
to a greater connection between the government and youth. 
 
Youth in Somalia have remained at the periphery of the country’s 
affairs for decades and their needs and aspirations have not been 
accorded due recognition. Youth have not been participating in 
developing the policies that affect them, and, as a result, their 
knowledge, skills and energy have been underutilised. While 
governments around the world are increasingly supporting youth 
empowerment, youth policies and youth programmes, there seems to 
be a lack of appreciation that young people are the future of Somalia’s 
development. As Samuels (2010) notes, Somalia, like many other war-
torn countries, still has a long way to go in realising the potential of 
its youth. Youth in Somalia are a major asset for socio-economic 
development and political prosperity. They can contribute immensely 
to good governance at both local and national levels. However, the 
challenge is for the authorities, international organisations and other 




Setting the youth agenda in the constitution will drive the 
attention of the general public to the role of youth in the 
development process and in building a cohesive and peaceful 
community in Somalia. On this, the Federal Minister of 
Constitutional Affairs, Honourable Abdi Hoosh, stated that: 
 
As professionals and individuals charged with the responsibility of guiding the 
country in the right direction, we are all aware of the role youth play in our 
society. But that is just at the level of a few elites in society. How about the 
whole country! Do our institutions recognise the role youth play in society? If 
you go to the lowest level of administration, or the lowest unit in our society – 
our families, do they appreciate the role of youth? This is why we are of the 
opinion that including this as part of the constitution will go a long way in 
instilling a culture that supports youth issues and agendas. (Abdi Hoosh, 
interview, face-to-face, Nairobi, 26 July 2018) 
 
This quote illustrates that the information gap in the constitution-
making process is recognised. However, the acceptance of the 
inclusion of (highly educated) youth as policy entrepreneurs in the 
constitution-making process (as an alternative solution) is not 
recognised. One could also say that the ruling elite should set a good 
example for lower governments and the general public by actively 
engaging with highly educated youth as policy entrepreneurs in the 
constitution-making process. As proposed by Kingdon (1995), setting 
the agenda for nationwide policies on the plight of youth in Somalia 
will need policy entrepreneurs that push forward an article in the 
constitution addressing the plight of youth. A constitution sets the 
values that guide society. If youth issues are addressed in the 
constitution, leaders at both local and national levels can ensure 
young people’s inclusion in development and decision making. 
Inclusion of a comprehensive article that addresses youth rights in the 
constitution can enhance positive development initiatives by youth, 
who are significant agents in community and national development 
(Chesterman, 2011). As a result, youth will be increasingly engaged in 
development initiatives that can re-shape political processes in 
Somalia, mainly through youth organisations. This can also lead to 
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the emergence of an aggressive youth discourse as a result of 
addressing the issues affecting youth in the constitution.  
Conclusion 
This chapter examines the critical role of youth in Somalia’s 
provisional constitution-making and review process. It points out the 
missing agenda in Somalia’s Constitution: a youth bill of rights as a 
stand-alone article. The process of creating a formal constitution is 
daunting, as it requires the government and several stakeholders to be 
involved, as well as an active youth population. Although youth make 
up the majority Somalia’s population, they are excluded from political 
decision making, even though these very decisions determine their 
future.  
 
Youth in Somalia are confronted with multiple challenges, with 
violent extremism and unemployment featuring prominently. 
Unemployment among youth in Somalia is unacceptably high, at 67% 
overall and rising to 74% for young women (Federal Government of 
Somalia, 2018). With some of the worst indicators in the world, the 
health of young people in Somalia is also in a critical state (Federal 
Government of Somalia, 2018). 
 
Youth participation in reconstructing Somalia, particularly their 
inclusive participation in constitution making, is crucial to the 
implementation of policies that can advance the socio-economic 
empowerment of youth, as well as the general economic development 
of the country. The lack of mechanisms for youth and youth-led 
organisations to engage with stakeholders excludes them from 
participation. Immediate steps must, therefore, be taken to create 
opportunities for the participation of youth in decision-making 
processes, both at local and national levels. The need to prepare 
young people to become responsible adults and to harness their 





The Government of Somalia and other stakeholders must, therefore, 
work together to effectively support young people and implement 
holistic policies that mainstream youth into the overall peace and 
state-building processes of the country (Peczenik, 2002). It is crucial 
that the new constitution includes issues that affect youth and ensures 
that youth are fully engaged in making development decisions, as this 
will ensure that the policies formulated and services provided respond 
to their needs. According to the analyses provided in this paper an 
alternative solution is to overcome the information and power gap by 
giving highly educated Somali youth the opportunity to engage in the 
constitution making and review process as policy entrepreneurs. The 
failure to give a voice to this large segment of the population could 
have enormous economic, political, cultural, and social consequences. 
Engaging youth in decision and constitution making is, therefore, no 
longer a choice, but an imperative in the development process, which 
is also recognised by the government. There is no doubt that the 
Government of Somalia and its international development partners 
have made a number of efforts to address youth challenges. However, 
Somali youth are still the missing agenda in the constitution. A bill of 
rights on youth as a stand-alone article has been ignored, despite the 
fact that Somalia has one of the largest youth demographics in the 
world (Federal Government of Somalia, 2018). Such a bill could 
signal that youth are important social partners, that the problems they 
are facing are on the political agenda and that youth are invited to take 
part in the policy-making process.  
Recommendations  
While the efforts currently underway to bring Somalia back to its feet 
through constitutional review are commendable, it is the belief of the 
author that more can be done to realise this dream. The following 
recommendations are made: 
 
• Introduce a bill of rights: First and foremost, a bill of rights 
on youth should be introduced in the constitution. This 
should be a stand-alone article that: 
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- Provides for the recognition, protection and 
enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of both young men and women in Somalia 
- Ensures that youth have access to relevant education, 
training and employment 
- Provides opportunities for youth to be represented 
and participate in political, social and economic 
spheres of life 
- Provides protection from harmful cultural practices, 
such as female genital mutilation 
- Provides protection for girls and women against 
gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and 
abuse 
- Takes into account the contribution of youth in 
designing, implementing and evaluating national 
policies and plans affecting their concerns 
 
• Make policy proposals to open a policy window: The 
prolonged youth crisis in Somalia has the potential to turn 
into a bigger calamity with far-reaching consequences for 
Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and the world at large. This calls 
for urgent and decisive action. The Federal Republic of 
Somalia, the United Nations and Somalia’s development 
partners are urged to pay more attention to the rights of youth 
in the constitution and their participation in the constitution-
making process. Whilst youth participation is already a 
problem in the constitution-making process, it will only reach 
the policy-making agenda if it is combined with political will 
and policy proposals (solutions) from all the relevant 
stakeholders, to allow for the opening of a policy window. 
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